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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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Reflections on the Quarter

Nonproliferation and the Future of NATO

THE United States, on August 17, submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference a Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which have not yet acquired atomic capabilities. During the past year U.S. policymakers have attached increasing importance to achieving agreement with the Soviets on an anti-proliferation treaty. The Soviet Union, it is suggested, may be desirous of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as are the United States and Britain, and a common fear of a future nuclear war, triggered by a smaller power, may now transcend all divisive issues.

The gains and losses of a nonproliferation agreement must be carefully weighed. The effectiveness of an uninspected pledge in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons technology is a highly debatable matter. A treaty to restrain the Soviet Union from giving nuclear information or weapons to other nations seems unnecessary, for Moscow has indicated little desire to take such action. Furthermore, the effort to negotiate such a treaty and thus to assign the highest policy priority to nonproliferation has given rise to serious political problems within the Atlantic Alliance.

The British government appears to attach more importance to a nonproliferation treaty with the Soviet Union than to restoring the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance by the creation of the Atlantic nuclear force or the multilateral force (ANF and MLF). By its advocacy of the MLF the United States sought to give our European allies a greater measure of control over NATO nuclear strategy. For several years, the Administration has attempted to convince the Soviet Union that the proposed multilateral force not only is compatible with an anti-proliferation treaty, but also offers promise of preventing the German Federal Republic from acquiring a national nuclear force. Were the Administration now to abandon the MLF project in order to obtain a nuclear *détente* with the Soviet Union, disintegrative tendencies within NATO would almost certainly increase.

An anti-proliferation treaty may present the Soviet Union with a diplomatic victory. For fifteen years the primary goal of Soviet foreign policy has been the destruction of NATO. The separation of the Federal Republic from NATO has been viewed by Soviet diplomatic planners as the most appropriate method of weakening the Atlantic Alliance. Soviet efforts, during Khrushchev's rule, were directed toward this long-range ob-

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jective. It has now become fashionable in the West to suggest that the Soviet Union no longer poses an active military threat to the Atlantic Alliance. Yet Soviet military capabilities vis-à-vis Western Europe in 1965 are greater than they have ever been. If the treaty is signed, the Soviet Union will have strongly influenced Western defense policies by reducing the options available to the West in the reshaping of NATO.

Since 1961 U.S. strategy has attempted to de-emphasize the nuclear defense of Western Europe, while seeking instead to increase the conventional capabilities of the Alliance and to obtain a nuclear *détente* with the Soviet Union. While these policies may not have spurred President de Gaulle's efforts to build an independent French nuclear force and to detach France from its commitments to NATO, certainly they have provided a convincing rationale for Gaullist opposition to American concepts of global strategy and Europe's place in it.

Neither the French nor the German government has responded enthusiastically to the U.S. effort to emphasize conventional rather than nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. The Germans have sought to adapt their policy to the changing strategic doctrines held by the United States. Not so, the French. President de Gaulle has even suggested that France might not continue to provide facilities and logistical support for U.S. forces in Western Europe. Thus, the United States might be compelled to abandon its conventional strategy if an attack from the East could not be checked solely by conventional forces and it could not gain the "pause" needed for a deliberate, selective and controlled response to a communist incursion. The removal of NATO bases from France would make the U.S. maintenance of a conventional defense in Western Europe difficult, if not impossible. An antiproliferation treaty might reduce the opportunities for developing a nuclear strategy acceptable to all members of the Atlantic Alliance.

During the 1950's, the Western allies became convinced that German rearmament was essential to the future security of Europe. The Federal Republic was admitted to the Atlantic Alliance, pledging itself not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and now makes the second largest military contribution to NATO. A generation after the end of World War II some Germans believe that the discriminatory provisions imposed upon them by their allies should be lifted. Yet the Federal Republic does not seek—and has not sought—a nuclear force. Even though Germany is the only nation which, by international agreement, has agreed not to produce nuclear weapons, Soviet propaganda, pacing the discussions of a nonproliferation treaty at Geneva, has sought to convince the world that Bonn desires to acquire national control over nuclear weapons by participating in a multilateral force. The United States, if it should now abandon the MLF concept, would

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have conceded implicitly the validity of Soviet propaganda charges. The MLF could serve as a vehicle which, over a period of time, might permit the consolidation of existing European national forces within NATO, reduce the membership of the nuclear club, and thus reverse the trend toward proliferation.

The Federal Republic entered NATO under the leadership of Chancellor Adenauer, who believed that the identification of Germany with the West provided the most appropriate means of assuring German security and obtaining eventual reunification. The prospects for continued close German cooperation with the West, however, may diminish if the Germans believe that the United States is seeking closer collaboration with the Soviet Union at the expense of Germany's interests. Bonn may conclude that in the future its interests might be better protected through collaboration with the Soviets.

Twice thus far in the twentieth century the Germans have made far-reaching agreements with the Soviet Union. The Rapallo Pact of 1922 helped to consolidate communist power inside the Soviet Union, and enabled the Germans to circumvent provisions contained in the Versailles Treaty. The other agreement was the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939, just a few days before the outbreak of the Second World War. If the Western powers prove unable to pursue policies which will encourage German integration with the West, then Germany may explore once again the possibilities for forging new links with its neighbors to the East. A new German-Soviet entente will render insignificant French-British and U.S. efforts at "bridge-building" in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union holds the prize which many Germans covet: reunification. One day, Moscow might be prepared to reach a political settlement with a reunified Germany—in return for reorientation of German policy.

It is doubtful that the United States can lessen the desire of other powers to obtain nuclear weapons unless it is prepared to give a firm guarantee to defend them against nuclear attack. In signing an anti-proliferation treaty, the United States might be forced to extend its commitments to countries on the periphery of the communist world. At the same time, the United States appears to favor the creation of nuclear-free zones in some parts of the world. A policy of extending U.S. security commitments, while encouraging the creation of nuclear-free zones, might seem to make the densely populated United States the only important target for communist nuclear attack in the event of a major conflict.

The avowed purpose of the non-proliferation treaty is to prevent an increase in the number of nations armed with nuclear weapons. It is doubtful whether the pursuit of this goal requires a treaty. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has shown an inclination to distribute nuclear capabilities to its

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allies. The Soviets are not likely to allow nuclear weapons to fall under the control of other communist states. By signing a nonproliferation treaty, the United States would restrict its own freedom of action in resolving problems of NATO's strategy. Why should the United States sign a treaty that may be unnecessary, that will increase rather than decrease worldwide security obligations, and that might weaken NATO?

Post-Election Trends in West Germany

IN the German general election held on September 19, Chancellor Erhard and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) received a mandate to govern the Federal Republic for another four years. It is appropriate to ask what the election victory of the CDU portends for German politics and foreign policy.

The immediate problem confronting Chancellor Erhard after the election was the formation of a cabinet. While the CDU and its affiliate, the Christian Socialist Union of Bavaria (CSU), won 49.5 per cent of the total vote and 247 seats, this total still falls short of an absolute majority in the Bundestag. Thus the Free Democratic Party (FDP), while winning only 49 seats and 9.5 per cent of the electoral vote, a loss from its 1961 position when it won 67 seats and 12.8 per cent of the total vote, remains in a position to influence both the shape of the new cabinet and its policies. While the FDP will endeavor to maintain a strong position within the government, the CSU, under the leadership of former Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, may obtain a more attentive hearing for its members in the deliberations of the cabinet.

To a considerable degree, the difficulty which Chancellor Erhard experienced in achieving agreement upon a cabinet reflected a more fundamental problem: should the Federal Republic give first priority to its relations with France or to those with the United States? Evidently, Herr Strauss and the CSU would prefer that the Bonn government strengthen its links with France. The Free Democrats, however, do not find fault with the efforts of the CDU to maintain close ties between the Federal Republic and the United States.

The election results have given rise to speculation concerning the political future of Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, Chancellor Erhard's principal opponent in the election, and the future course of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Despite the efforts of SPD members to dissociate themselves from doctrinaire socialist programs and their expressions of support for Chancellor Erhard's economic plans for Germany, the electorate chose to entrust to the CDU the task of preserving the country's remarkable prosperity and stability. Indeed, an examination of the views expressed by the SPD and the CDU candidates during the campaign on the major foreign policy as well as domestic issues

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illustrates the basic similarity between the policy proposals of both parties. This may account for the poor showing of the SPD in the election. Now, the SPD will have to decide whether to continue to adhere to objectives set forth in the Godesberg Program and approved by the Party Congress in Karlsruhe, or to accede to the wishes of some of the younger members of the party who advocated that greater emphasis be placed upon socialist tenets. Such a step, however, may raise doubts in the German voter's mind as to whether the SPD is a "national" party or a "class" party, and thus jeopardize the gains the party has made in recent elections.

The result of the election placed in doubt the position of Willy Brandt as the principal spokesman of the SPD. Brandt has announced that he will not again be a candidate for the chancellorship. Thus a struggle is likely to develop among contenders to lead the party at the next election. In particular, two men have been prominently mentioned as possibilities: Helmut Schmidt of Hamburg and Karl Schiller of West Berlin. Their prospects will depend, to a considerable extent, upon the ability of the party to convince the electorate that the SPD provides a program substantially different from, and preferable to, that of the CDU, or that the SPD can administer more effectively the policies which the CDU has developed for the Federal Republic.

The CDU itself faces internal problems. During the election campaign, CDU campaigners expressed some divergent views. Public expressions of differing opinions eased the task of the opposition parties, whose spokesmen called the Christian Democrats a divided party without a leader. Now that Erhard has become chancellor in his own right, he may emerge from the shadow of former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Of primary concern to the Federal Republic is the problem of German reunification and the control of nuclear weapons within the North Atlantic Alliance. No German political leader can afford to neglect for long the issue of the reunification of Germany. Restiveness concerning the country's international status may result in renewed efforts by the German leaders to seek, in the aftermath of the election, new methods to bridge the gap separating them from East Germany. German sentiment for reunification may be strengthened by U.S. efforts to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union on nuclear nonproliferation. The Bonn government has expressed fears not only that a nondissemination treaty would affect adversely its objectives for reunification but that it would also reduce the prospects for a greater German voice in nuclear strategy for the defense of the West. Erhard had advised the United States that his government could not sign a nondissemination treaty unless Bonn had been guaranteed a greater role than the Germans now enjoy in NATO nuclear affairs.

During the election campaign,

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Willy Brandt raised yet another issue which has disturbed some Germans, namely, West Germany's need to obtain greater knowledge of nuclear technology as a stimulant to Bonn's atoms-for-peace program. Otherwise, Brandt suggested, Germany might be relegated, by 1975, to the status of a "less developed" nation in comparison with the most advanced industrial powers. Future U.S.-German relations will thus reflect, to a considerable extent, the relative importance which the United States attaches to NATO, in contrast to Washington's apparent desire to conclude an anti-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union. Should the principle of NATO nuclear sharing be subordinated to the principle of nonproliferation, it is likely that German dissatisfaction with NATO will rise, and that the alliance will be subjected to new disintegrative tendencies. The Soviet leaders have insisted that the prospects for an anti-proliferation treaty will remain dim until the United States formally renounces its intention of allowing the "militarists and revanchists" of the Federal Republic to obtain access to nuclear weapons.

The Federal Republic faces difficult problems in its relations with other European countries. Chancellor Erhard is disturbed by French policies toward the Common Market as well as President de Gaulle's call for a "European" settlement to the German problem. Moreover, French policy toward Germany appears to have as its objective the deterioration of Bonn's relationship with Washington by forcing the former to choose between a "little" Europe organized according to De Gaulle's conception and an Atlantic Community.

Recent trends in British politics do not augur well for the future of British-German relations. In recent months British leaders have conceded that their primary interest lies in obtaining a nonproliferation agreement with the Soviet Union, rather than reaching agreement for the control of NATO strategy. Both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart have suggested that the West should seek first to find common ground with the Soviet Union on the question of a nonproliferation treaty before undertaking any new organizational initiative such as the MLF or ANF.

While advocating the improvement of East-West relations, the British government has indicated that Britain's commitment of military forces to the defense of NATO may be scaled down. Because of her balance-of-payments problems, Britain has sought to obtain assurances from the Bonn government that the latter will pay a greater proportion of the cost of maintaining British forces in the Federal Republic. The Germans, on the other hand, view the dispute over support costs as evidence of the clash between the rival pull upon Labour of Europe and the Commonwealth. Thus, if Europe represented Britain's first priority in foreign policy, the British balance of payments problem would not

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bear first on the Rhine Army. Britain points to the apparent willingness of the Federal Republic to place defense orders in the United States and France in order to offset the dollar and franc expenditures in the Federal Republic while London has been unable, in the past, to obtain from such orders more than 30 per cent of British costs in Germany. This problem illustrates the need for the United States and its European allies to make more equitable arrangements for the sharing of the costs of NATO defense.

A new direction in German policy may become evident in the months ahead. Efforts may be made to revise the Hallstein Doctrine concerning the nonrecognition of East European states which maintain diplomatic relations with East Germany. Serious discussion developed in Germany on this issue during the crisis over the decision by the Bonn government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. German businessmen, in particular, have become critical of the restrictions which the doctrine has imposed upon their efforts to increase trade with East European countries. While the Federal government has not gone so far as Britain and France in granting credits to promote trade with East European countries, a considerable number of businessmen as well as some influential politicians view the broadening of economic ties with Eastern Europe as one means by which the prospects for German unification might be enhanced. The famous coal-steel firm of Krupp has agreed to help Poland build a $10 million factory near Warsaw to produce machines and machine tools. This agreement may provide a pattern for future collaboration between private enterprise in Western Europe and state-controlled economies in Eastern Europe. In addition, negotiations have been initiated between the Soviet Union and a consortium of West German firms to build a petrochemical complex on the Volga River. The firms are authorized to offer credits up to eight years on the $450 million enterprise.

Chancellor Erhard has expressed his fear that the inability of the West to develop a common policy toward Eastern Europe may result in the granting of concessions to the communist world without the West having gained any of its objectives regarding the German question. Understandably, Bonn has always sought a commitment to German reunification from the Soviet Union as part of any major concessions to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Germans themselves have begun to seek not only greater trade but increased cultural and social contacts with the communist regimes of Eastern Europe in an effort to open new avenues toward a political settlement. Such a policy finds support among members of the SPD and the CDU. Indeed, the major parties are likely to disagree only about the extent to which Bonn should take initiatives to improve relations with Eastern Europe. The FDP and the SPD might be more venturesome than

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the Erhard government on such issues as transit between East and West Germany and the release of political prisoners in East Germany. However, neither party is willing for the moment to go so far as to agree to the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent eastern frontier of a reunified Germany.

In sum, the prospects for the continuation of a West German foreign policy closely aligned to the Atlantic Alliance depend to a considerable extent upon the ability of Bonn's Western allies to reconcile German aspirations with broader Western interests and to decide upon the proper priority of policy objectives to be pursued within NATO and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

De Gaulle's Twelfth Press Conference

ON September 9 President de Gaulle held his twelfth press conference since returning to power in 1958. On this occasion the French President chose to address himself to several major questions: France's relations with the European Communities and NATO, the French economy, the United Nations, and the political institutions of the Fifth Republic. The press conference provided an opportunity for him to express his dissatisfaction with the present role accorded France in the movement toward European integration and NATO, as well as France's place in world politics. His most recent pronouncement contains not only a reiteration of previous positions on major issues, but also hints at the possible future orientation of French policy.

France, according to President de Gaulle, is bound by "unequal" treaties in Europe and NATO which were negotiated at a time when French power and influence were less than they are today. He called attention, in particular, to the Rome Treaties which were concluded, he maintained, "before France's recovery in 1958." The Treaty for the creation of Euratom, he suggested, took less account of French interests than of those of the other signatories, for only France possessed a nuclear technology and weapons capability. France was asked to share her nuclear technology with nations which had nothing to give in return. Finally, the Treaty of Rome establishing the Common Market is now considered unfair to France in that "it fully governed the conditions for the industrial community that was the prime concern of our neighbors, but in no way governed those for the agricultural common market, in which we were most interested." President de Gaulle claimed that the difficulty France has encountered in persuading other EEC members to agree to the freeing of trade in agriculture "has brought to light . . . the persistent reservations of most of our partners toward the inclusion of agriculture in the Common Market."

De Gaulle criticized the Rome Treaties as being administered by a "technocracy" and as "destined to infringe upon France's democ-

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racy in settling problems that dictate the very existence of our country. . . ." His implication is that the treaties, because of their unequal and supranational nature, are no longer acceptable to France unless they take account of French interests. However, the French President indicated his willingness to accept an economic community that is "fair and reasonable." A "fair" community would provide for the inclusion of agricultural products in the Common Market on an equitable basis; a "reasonable" community would permit all important procedural and substantive decisions to be taken by national governments. An organization possessing such features, he claimed, "would make the future entente of all of Europe conceivable."

Whatever his criticisms of the Rome Treaties, President de Gaulle still does not appear to have abandoned hope that France will reconcile major differences with her partners in the Common Market. France "envisages resuming the Brussels negotiations, once the inclusion of agriculture into the Common Market is truly adopted and there is a desire to put an end to the claims that abusive and fanciful myths are setting against common sense and reality." When assured that French agriculture will have satisfactory markets in the Six and that economic integration will go no further, France will collaborate fully in the Community.

If French views are not accommodated, De Gaulle threatened to raise the question of revising the Rome Treaties. In a purposely vague passage, he stated that now France has "more clearly measured the situation in which [she] would risk finding herself if one provision or another initially provided for by the Rome Treaty was actually applied." Referring to the provision whereby after January 1, 1966, decisions of the Council of Ministers would be taken by majority voting procedures, he noted, almost cryptically, that "we see where we could be led by such a disposal of ourselves." Thus France may be expected to pose obstacles to the efforts of her EEC partners to grant more authority to the Council of Ministers.

De Gaulle then turned his attention to the French economy to reject the bearish comments that had appeared in some newspapers in France during the summer. He asserted that "the necessary is now being done and will continue to be done so that henceforth these poisoned springs [easy money, high prices] will run dry." In brief, the French government continues to strive to combat inflation.

In his remarks about the economy, President de Gaulle claimed that there has been "decisive progress in planning." The present job of the Fifth Plan is to direct state investment to infrastructure needs even at the expense of reducing "what it [the state] devotes to operating the government and public services." Other branches of development must take into account "what must first be done for infrastructure and the human and material equipment of national

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production, upon which, in the long run, everything depends." He declared that "it will naturally be . . . one of the State's vital tasks to encourage the growth of savings rather than that of consumption." France, in her economic planning, will continue to expand her basic facilities for production, and will give emphasis to the education and training of her population in the professions and skills essential to this development.

According to De Gaulle, France's political position depends upon her economic expansion. He maintains that science, technology and industry will open new opportunities to advanced countries: "The speed of communications and the multiplicity of contacts among peoples will create in all a growing desire to deal with one another. Thus competition will more and more be the springboard of a legitimate ambition. That is why France wants to have the means for this."

In his discussion of the configuration of world politics, President de Gaulle cited in particular the rise of new nations and the awakening of China. The General claimed that the French are a people rising as a result of gains in population, production, trade, monetary reserves and standard of living. He lauded the spread of the French language and culture, and the growth of France's military power. France, he declared, must have an independent foreign policy. "The independence thus regained is enabling France to become, despite the ideologies and hegemonies of the colossi, for all the racial passions and prejudices, above and beyond the rivalries and ambitions of nations, a champion of cooperation, failing which the troubles, the interventions, the conflicts that lead to world war would go on spreading."

During the press conference De Gaulle offered his most definitive statement on the Atlantic Alliance. He declared that "upon the expiration of the [NATO] commitments formerly taken—that is, in 1969 by the latest—the subordination known as 'integration' . . . shall cease, as far as we are concerned." Thus the French government, it appears, is determined to dismantle the integrated command structure which makes NATO unique among alliance systems. President de Gaulle suggested that the Atlantic Alliance, in his estimation, was a temporary necessity, to which France would adhere so long as "the solidarity of the Western peoples appears to us necessary for the eventual defense of Europe." Thus he served notice that, so far as France is concerned, the Atlantic Alliance must be restructured by 1969 at the latest to take account of French interests.

Commenting on the political structure of the Fifth Republic, he praised the French Constitution as making the people "the direct source of the power of the Chief of State and, if need be, his direct recourse," and as enabling the latter, "who is alone the representative . . . of the nation as a whole" to "trace out the nation's conduct." Moreover, President de Gaulle

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sought to refute those of his critics who have accused him of "personalism." He declared his belief that the chief risk to France "lies much less in edicts launched from ivory towers than in endless examination from which no decision emerges."

De Gaulle defended the record of his administration by declaring that "in relation to what existed yesterday, the French State appears at present to be entirely transformed in terms of solidarity and capacity." In his September press conference, he provided an indication of the next steps envisaged in order to increase the prestige and influence of France in Europe and in world politics. It remains for France's allies in the West, and the United States in particular, to offer proposals which take greater account of French interests, while strengthening the security of the North Atlantic area.

China's Revolutionary Strategy and Vietnam

IN an article published on September 3 in all major Chinese communist newspapers, Marshal Lin Piao, Peking's Minister of Defense, set forth his government's latest conception of revolutionary strategy. Chinese global strategy, according to Lin Piao, aims at the encirclement of the West and, in particular, the United States, by fomenting and supporting a series of "people's wars" in the underdeveloped areas. Chinese communist strategists have long stressed the importance of conflict waged by insurgency forces in rural areas against an enemy who controls the major centers of population. The Chinese communists waged such a war against their Nationalist opponents in their long struggle from the remote reaches of Yenan to the densely populated centers of China. According to Marshal Lin Piao, "the countryside alone can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory."

This latest pronouncement adds yet another dimension to the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary warfare. It is suggested that the Chinese "theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention" among the peoples of the less developed areas. In other less developed countries, "the basic political and economic conditions have many similarities to those that prevailed in old China." In this pronouncement, the Chinese communists extend their conception of the rural base for revolution from a strictly national to a global context. "Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world.' " According to Lin Piao, "the contemporary world revolution presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas." Although the "proletarian movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries," the

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prospects for communism are said to have become favorable in Asia, Africa and Latin America. By progressively extending their power in the less developed areas, communist regimes inspired by the Chinese example can destroy the "colossus of U.S. imperialism." It is for this reason, according to Lin Piao, that the United States "regards people's wars as a mortal danger" and undertakes military action in Vietnam.

The Chinese claim to have discovered a strategy for defeating the industrialized West without primary reliance upon nuclear weapons. "However highly developed modern weapons and technical equipment may be and however complicated the methods of modern warfare," the Marshal suggests, "in the final analysis the outcome of a war will be decided by the sustained fighting of the ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefields, by the political consciousness of the men, by their courage and spirit of sacrifice." Thus the United States, whatever the technical sophistication of its weaponry, cannot match the "courage and the spirit of sacrifice possessed by the revolutionary people," for the "spiritual atom bomb that the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb."

In his statement Lin Piao cites the Vietnam conflict as "the most convincing example of a victim of aggression defeating U.S. imperialism by a people's war." The Chinese claim that the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam will provide both a test and a vindication of Peking's strategy of revolutionary warfare. "U.S. imperialism, like a mad bull dashing from place to place, will finally be burned to ashes in the blazing fire of the people's wars it has provoked by its own actions." Thus the Chinese communists, unlike many opponents of U.S. action in Vietnam, view that conflict in its relationship to broader, global strategy. Lin Piao asserts that Vietnam is the present focal point of a world revolutionary struggle which Communist China will support with all the means at its disposal. If the Chinese communists avoid a direct confrontation with the United States over the Vietnam question, they do so because the strategy of revolutionary warfare to which they profess adherence enjoins a less powerful power to avoid a decisive encounter with a superior adversary.

Thus the task of the United States is to demonstrate in Vietnam its ability to face down the challenge posed by communist revolutionary warfare. The Administration, by its deployment of military power, has provided evidence of the U.S. ability to thwart communist objectives in Vietnam. The Viet Cong not only failed to win a decisive victory over the Saigon government during the summer monsoon season, but suffered heavy casualties at the hands of defending forces bolstered by the continuing U.S. troop buildup in South Vietnam. Contrary to Chinese assertions about the "courage and

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spirit of sacrifice" which supposedly characterize "people's armies" fighting liberation wars against the West, the Viet Cong forces appear increasingly to face problems of flagging zeal and dissatisfaction.

The question of the appropriate strategy for achieving a victory over Viet Cong forces now assumes a place of urgent priority. There are two alternatives: the seizure of a series of coastal enclaves, affording secure bases, lines of communication, and logistical supply from which ever-widening areas could be freed from communist control; and the interdiction of the Viet Cong supply lines from bases in the western and northern reaches of South Vietnam and then undertaking military action to search out the insurgents in the countryside. For the success of either strategy the use of air power to destroy Viet Cong concentrations in South Vietnam and to attack military targets in North Vietnam is essential. Moreover, it may become necessary to take action against port facilities, such as those at Haiphong, which receive shipments of war matériel from the Soviet Union and some East European countries.

The most effective strategy for the United States is probably to be found in a combination of these two strategic approaches. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would advance from secure coastal enclaves. At the same time, efforts would be made to secure the borders of South Vietnam by creating a strip of "no man's land"—a cordon sanitaire—to block Viet Cong infiltration, while U.S. air power crippled Viet Cong capabilities.

Whatever the importance of military action in thwarting communist ambitions, the Johnson Administration must also address itself to the complex political problems confronting South Vietnam. The internal ferment, particularly among Buddhists and intellectuals, appears to reflect an effort by the dissidents to gain a greater voice in the Saigon government. The future stability of South Vietnam depends upon the reconciliation of the contending forces and the creation of a broadly based government. Moreover, greater efforts must be made to assure the loyalty of the rural population to the central government. A new program of land reform has been initiated. The Saigon government has declared a moratorium on the payment of back taxes in order to relieve the burden upon farmers who find themselves in government-controlled territory after long Viet Cong domination.

Both the Chinese communists and the Soviet Union have given considerable military assistance to the Viet Cong. Yet Peking, in Marshal Lin Piao's statement, has criticized Moscow for its alleged unwillingness to give greater support to "people's wars," including the conflict in Vietnam. According to him, "the Khrushchev revisionists" are unwilling to commit the resources necessary to assure a Viet Cong victory because the Soviets are "afraid of U.S. imperialism, of war, and of revolution." Only Communist China, according

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to Lin Piao, has found a strategy appropriate to the nuclear age. Yet on October 5, Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Moscow Presidium and a leading communist theoretician, called upon Peking to take "concrete" actions in collaboration with Moscow against the United States in Vietnam. The display of U.S. military superiority in Vietnam is likely to heighten the difficulties which confront Peking and Moscow in their efforts to achieve an accord on the Vietnam conflict. A victory for South Vietnam and the United States would provide evidence that neither Peking nor Moscow has developed a strategy which will assure a worldwide victory for the "revolutionary forces" of communism.

International Monetary Reform

BOLSTERED by a marked improvement in the U.S. balance of payments in the second quarter of 1965, the Administration initiated a policy designed to build support for international monetary reform. Since the Second World War, the gold exchange system, with the pound sterling and dollar as major reserve currencies, has provided sufficient liquidity to enable the Free World to achieve an unparalleled expansion in world trade and international capital movement. Because of Britain's chronic economic problems, however, many countries outside the sterling area have become reluctant to hold the pound sterling as a reserve currency. Therefore, the U.S. dollar has assumed a role of growing importance in international trade. U.S. dollars have been made available to many countries through a variety of means, including military and economic aid.

The United States, because of its heavy burden as leader of the Free World, together with the importance of the dollar as a reserve currency, has incurred a deficit in its balance of payments for many years. This deficit, in turn, has diminished confidence in Western Europe and elsewhere in the dollar. During the first six months of 1965, France purchased $630 million in gold; Italy, $80 million; Belgium, $22.1 million; and Switzerland, $12.5 million. Fear that other countries might seek to exchange their dollars for gold led the Administration to begin a program of "voluntary restraint" on U.S. purchases and investment abroad in order to reduce the deficit. The nations of the Free World face the problem of assuring sufficient liquidity for the conduct of world trade, which is expected to expand rapidly during the next decade. The adequacy of liquidity is dependent in large part upon the supply of gold and reserve currencies, such as the dollar and pound sterling. Unless the U.S. and British currencies enjoy the confidence of other trading nations, their value as reserve currencies is diminished. Hence the strengthening of the dollar and pound sterling bears an important relationship to assuring a level of

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liquidity adequate for the conduct of world trade.

But there is growing sentiment among Free World nations that measures beyond the bolstering of existing reserve currencies must be taken in order to provide greater international liquidity. Therefore, the Administration sent Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler on a mission designed to obtain the views of the West European governments on monetary reform. Between August 29 and September 10 Mr. Fowler visited Paris, Rome, Bonn, Frankfurt, Stockholm, Brussels, Amsterdam, the Hague and London.

The opinions Secretary Fowler obtained from European authorities on the problems of monetary reform were not uniform. There was, however, general agreement that, during the International Monetary Fund Conference in Washington in the last week of September, the Group of Ten should confer on the problem of international reform. The Group of Ten includes the world's major industrial and trading nations—Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, with Switzerland as an observer. In 1961 the Group negotiated with the IMF a so-called General Arrangements Agreement whereby the ten nations agreed to lend the IMF $6 billion, if necessary, in order "to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international monetary system." In December 1964 and May 1965 Britain received aid for the pound sterling in part through this arrangement.

From the meetings between Secretary Fowler and European officials came a multilateral agreement to extend credits to Britain to bolster the pound sterling. France, however, was not a party to this accord. The agreement provided a demonstration of the willingness of the Continental Europeans (with the exception of France) to give assistance to the existing monetary system—at least until reforms can be worked out. Moreover, it reduced the likelihood of any run on sterling, which would place an even greater burden upon the dollar and increase the demand for gold.

The United States and other members of the Group of Ten face difficult problems as they strive to achieve needed changes in the international monetary mechanism. Despite the fact that they all agree that ways must be found to ensure adequate liquidity for expanding trade, there are fundamental differences of opinion about the appropriate solutions. For example, the United States seeks to increase the availability of reserve currencies by introducing a reserve unit supplementing the existing reserve. Such a proposal, it is suggested, would bolster both the dollar and the pound sterling by reducing the likelihood of balance of payments deficits due to capital exports for the financing of international trade.

The French government appears to favor a proposal to replace the existing system of reserve currencies with one more closely tied to

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gold. Other European countries, including Germany and Italy, see no necessity for haste in effecting reform. The Italian government, because of its own successful experience, considers the present system to be adequate. The Group of Ten, however, are not agreed on which other nations should participate in future negotiations. European members of the Group have held that those nations which do the largest amount of international business should have basic responsibility for reforming the international monetary system. The United States, fearful of charges of "rich man's club" being ascribed to such a group by the developing nations, has favored a larger group of negotiators.

The importance of the Group of Ten's contribution to future monetary reform cannot be underestimated. Its very composition inevitably gives the Group an important voice in international economic affairs. At the International Monetary Fund Conference held in Washington from September 27 to October 1, the Ten reached agreement about the question of participation in future discussions about international monetary reform. Preliminary talks are to be held among Deputy Finance Ministers of the Group by the end of next year to determine the major issues upon which agreement exists. These participants are to be joined by representatives of the IMF, OECD, Bank for International Settlements, and the Swiss National Bank. If these deliberations produce a measure of agreement, there will then be, according to the Group communiqué, "a broader consideration of the questions that affect the world economy as a whole." Next, representatives of the Group would work with the Executive Board of the IMF, thereby assuring representation of the interests of the less developed countries in the talks. Moreover, the Group agreed to extend internal borrowing arrangements for another four years by adopting a French-sponsored amendment providing for the right to review national commitments after a two-year period.

Thus far, however, only procedural problems have been resolved. The more difficult substantive questions of monetary reform still remain to be answered by the United States and other Free World nations who hold the largest share of international trade.

The Greek Constitutional Crisis

ALTHOUGH Greece has been a monarchy for more than a century, Greek acceptance of this form of government has not been unanimous. The first Greek king, Otho, was expelled. George I, founder of the present dynasty, was assassinated by a Bulgarian in 1913. His son Constantine I came to the throne, but was forced to abdicate four years later in favor of his second son, Alexander, because of his opposition to intervention on the Allied side in World War I. When King Alexander died in 1920, a plebiscite recalled Constantine, who

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again was forced to abdicate after two years, this time in favor of his oldest son, George II. King George reigned for two years before another plebiscite, in 1924, abolished the monarchy in favor of a republic. George returned in 1935 when a third plebiscite restored the monarchy and supported the coup d'état by which Joannes Metaxas came to power, establishing a dictatorship in 1936. In 1941, George II was expelled by Hitler's invading armies. He returned for the third time in 1946, when a fourth plebiscite restored the monarchy. Upon his death in 1947, the third son of Constantine I, Paul, took the throne. On Paul's death in 1964, his son Constantine II was proclaimed king.

Of the six previous kings, therefore, one was expelled, one was assassinated, one was twice forced to abdicate, and one lost his throne when the monarchy was abolished. This history of the throne's instability has returned to haunt Constantine II. The constitutional crisis which began in July has threatened not only the continued existence of the monarchy, but has cast doubt on the existing Greek political system.

The November 1963 election which brought George Papandreou to power was the first victory for a center party in Greek politics since 1952. It was a tenuous victory, however, for no party obtained a clear majority. Papandreou resigned two months later, refusing to rely on the support of the pro-communist deputies in order to remain in office. At the same time the rightist leader, Constantin Karamanlis, withdrew from active politics. In the election of February 1964, Papandreou won a landslide victory.

During his one-and-a-half-year tenure as premier, Papandreou adopted policies which enhanced his popular support in Greece. Lavish price supports were extended to all crops. Numerous pay increases were granted to industrial workers, and coverage under social security laws was increased and extended to include agricultural workers. Rising governmental expenditures led to fears for the stability of the Greek economy, and many of Papandreou's parliamentary collaborators became uneasy. The trade deficit rose rapidly. In 1964 alone, this deficit had increased by over 25 per cent to $573 million. In April 1965 the President of the Greek Bank, Xenophon Zolotas, recommended a more stringent policy in order to halt a further worsening of the trade balance and to check inflation. Economic growth which had increased at an average annual rate of 10 per cent during the years of rule by conservatives, had declined to 5 per cent in 1964.

Dissatisfaction among the more conservative members of Papandreou's own Center Union Party was increased by a cabinet reshuffle in January 1965 which led to a strengthening of left-wing influence. Papandreou's endorsement the following month of a communist-backed plan to investigate the Public Power Corporation of the previous regime, a ploy de-

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signed to discredit ex-Premier Karamanlis, reinforced their doubts.

At the same time, Papandreou was waging a quiet war against right-wing elements in the Greek army. As a consequence of the 1946-49 civil war, the Greek army consisted largely of right-wing elements. To some extent, Papandreou feared direct intervention by the army in his government. In January 1965 he published the "Pericles Plan" drawn up by the army General Staff prior to the 1961 elections. Although the army maintained that this was no more than a plan to combat possible civil insurrection arising out of the elections, it was widely believed to be a plot to secure the election of Premier Karamanlis. In any event, the plan was not put into operation because the 1961 elections were not marked by civil insurrection and resulted in a sweeping victory for Karamanlis. However, there is no doubt that his knowledge of the plan reinforced Papandreou's desire to assure his own security and motivated him to move against the army's right-wing elements. He attempted to restrict the influence of right-wing officers by transferring over 2,000 of them—some to posts far from Athens. Some were assigned to a Cyprus contingent to the satisfaction of General George Grivas, who has attempted to reduce leftist influence in Cyprus.

There were disturbing signs, however, that the moves against the army typified a growing dependence of Papandreou upon his son Andreas, whom it was felt he was grooming as his successor. Andreas had returned to Greece in 1963 after a successful academic career in the United States which included the chairmanship of the Department of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. Under his father's tutelage, he gravitated to politics. He responded to the charge that he favored the United States by becoming vehemently anti-American. This naturally attracted the extreme left, and a basis for cooperation may have been established. At any rate, the forces of the left soon began publicly to support him, and his own policies quickly reinforced his father's drift to the left. It was he who persuaded his father to reject the "Acheson plan" for a solution to the Cyprus crisis in September 1964. He was instrumental in urging his father to endorse the communist plan to investigate Karamanlis' Public Power Corporation. Finally, following complaints by Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, he convinced his father to send left-wing army officers to Cyprus to balance the right-wing officers already there. Some of these officers were members of Aspida, a secret leftist organization committed to Greek withdrawal from NATO.

General George Grivas exposed the existence of Aspida in a report to King Constantine in early May. Thirty officers were implicated, including the Deputy Chief of Greek Army Intelligence and the Chief of Intelligence for the Cyprus contingent. Even more damaging was the implication by right-wing papers that Andreas

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Papandreou had supported the conspiracy.

The publication of rumors concerning the existence of Aspida put Papandreou in a difficult position. Were his son to be officially implicated, it would almost certainly end his own political career. Thus, when King Constantine requested a judicial inquiry into the affair, Papandreou refused to initiate such an investigation. Defense Minister Petros Garafoulias, a political moderate, undertook an inquiry into Aspida on his own initiative, which resulted in the resignation of General Agaros, Director of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency, and the removal of his deputy and the Chief of Intelligence of the Greek army staff. Papandreou reacted by expelling Garafoulias from the Center Union Party and requested his resignation. Garafoulias refused to resign without the king's assent. When Papandreou sent a draft decree requesting Constantine's assent to Garafoulias' ouster, the king asked him to name a replacement. Papandreou named himself. The king refused his support, alleging that it was improper for Papandreou to preside over an investigation implicating his own son. However, he was prepared to sign a decree for the removal of Garafoulias from the Defense Ministry provided that Papandreou entrusted the ministry to another member of his party rather than assuming the position himself.

The inquiry appears to have been prompted by a desire to embarrass the Papandreou government and Papandreou in particular. Thus, in the premier's mind the issue was less one of who was to preside over the inquiry than whether or not such an inquiry should be held at all. Under the existing circumstances, it seemed unlikely that even Parliament would have consented to calling off the investigation. Faced with this impasse, Papandreou announced after a meeting with the king on July 15 that he would resign the following day. It may have been Papandreou's intention to call for elections to ask the Greek people whether they wanted their king to assume an active role in Greek politics, while placing upon the king the onus for refusing to hold elections.

It is questionable whether Papandreou's tactics would have succeeded. Most members of Parliament did not want an election at that time. Although Papandreou had managed to maintain party unity in a vote of confidence in late June by agreeing to call off the investigation of Karamanlis' Public Power Corporation, members of Parliament were less disposed to condone his son's participation in Aspida. Had the moderates in the Center Union Party been able to form an acceptable government themselves, or in conjunction with the right-wing National Radical Union, a constitutional crisis would not have arisen. Thus, Constantine's best expedient might have been to await developments, hoping that the moderate forces would win out.

But the king accepted Papan-

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dreou's resignation as final, and dismissed both the premier and Garafoulias. Without waiting for Papandreou's official resignation, he designated the President of Parliament, George Athanassiades-Novas, as the new premier. Stavros Costopoulos, another Center Union Party defector who had previously been Foreign Minister, was also sworn in as Defense Minister. The following day the new government took office; all of its fifteen ministers were defectors from Papandreou's Center Union Party.

Papandreou wasted no time in making an issue of the monarchy itself. He embarked upon a speaking tour in which he denounced the new "puppet" government of "traitors." The Communist Party, which had been agitating in favor of Papandreou's removal prior to the crisis, now lined up behind him. Demonstrations against the new government were held throughout the country, and a general strike was proclaimed. When Papandreou indirectly threatened the formation of a Popular Front with the communists, Greek parliamentarians were faced with a difficult choice. Whereas the king's action had unnecessarily raised the question of constitutionalism and thus made Papandreou a martyr symbolizing democracy, Papandreou's response had unnecessarily complicated the issue by introducing the specter of communism.

Throughout the summer Papandreou continued to call for immediate elections while the king tried, with the help of his parliamentary advisers, to form a workable government. The deadlock appeared to be permanent. Only the king had the power to call new elections. Initially, only Papandreou had the votes necessary to form a new government. As a result, the king's first three attempts at a solution were failures. Athanassiades-Novas resigned on August 5 after Parliament expressed its lack of confidence in his government by a vote of 167 to 131. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, the former Deputy Premier, was then asked to form a government, but refused the king's appointment after inquiries revealed that he would be no more likely than Novas to obtain a majority. Then, in an open bid for support of the left, the king asked Papandreou's Interior Minister Elias Tsirimokos, a former Marxist who had once been expelled from Papandreou's Center Union Party for his militancy, to form a new government. This attempt, which hurt the king's image more than any other event of the crisis, failed when the right-wing Progressive Party refused to endorse Tsirimokos.

The king's position had been weakened considerably. He had been defeated three consecutive times by Papandreou and the communists. However, at the same time defections from Papandreou's Center Union Party were increasing. Immediately prior to Papandreou's resignation, eight Center Union deputies had refused to endorse him. This number rose to twenty-six during the voting for Novas. By the time Tsirimokos was denied confidence, eleven more

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deputies had broken away from the Center Union Party. Thus, when Stephanopoulos was again asked by the king, in early September, to head a new government, only seven more votes were needed for a majority. By a judicious distribution of cabinet posts Stephanopoulos obtained eight, and on September 24 a vote of confidence was granted by 152 delegates out of 300.

Thus, complete defeat for King Constantine and the monarchists has been averted. Yet their victory has at best been partial. The Stephanopoulos government is far from stable. For its majority of two votes, the government depends upon an alliance between the right-wing National Radical Union, those moderates who defected from Papandreou's Center Union Party in early summer, and the left-wing deputies who have joined the new government because of the participation of Tsirimokos. Such a coalition cannot be expected to survive for long the vicissitudes of Greek politics. The election following the present government's fall could assume the character of a plebiscite about the future of the monarchy.

It is the communists who stand to gain the most from such an election. For the first time in recent years they have an issue, the king versus the people, which can command nationwide attention. They have placed themselves in the vanguard of popular demonstrations against the monarchy and for Papandreou. During the crisis, they held the balance of parliamentary power between Papandreou's depleted Center Union Party and the right-wing forces backing the king. Their policy of Greek withdrawal from NATO received the implied backing of at least one member of Papandreou's old cabinet. At the same time, the crisis has weakened the moderate parties.

The communists could gain strength from another source. Under the old system of weighted proportional voting, the Communist Party was underrepresented in the Greek Parliament. Thus, with 12 per cent of the votes in the 1964 elections, they obtained less than 8 per cent of the seats in Parliament. The next election will be held, according to Stephanopoulos, under a straight proportional scheme. Under these circumstances, the communists could gain as many as fourteen new seats even if they did not increase their proportion of the total vote. Since they are very likely to increase their total vote as well, they could end up with more than one-sixth of the votes in the Greek Parliament.

In such a situation, it is hardly likely that either of the two other parties could obtain a majority. A noncommunist coalition, after the bitter fighting of the summer, would be out of the question. Thus Papandreou, who will again occupy a pivotal position, will be forced to choose between taking the communists into the government or accepting the deadlock and calling for new elections. In 1963, he chose the second option. However, in 1963 he had every expectation of a victory in the new elections,

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and had not just emerged from a close-working collaboration with the communists. Today the situation is different.

The most ominous result of the constitutional crisis has been the widening of the gaps among all factions in the Greek political system. The problem of achieving compromise has always been formidable in Greek political life; it has become even more difficult as a result of events of the summer of 1965. The army has emerged from the crisis with a renewed and reinforced conviction that it must depend upon the continued existence of the monarchy for its very survival. Many supporters of Papandreou now believe that only the abolition of the monarchy can guarantee the continued existence of Greek democracy. Since both sides view the issue as one of survival, they may be prepared to resort to violence. In such circumstances the almost unbridgeable gap between the two major noncommunist political parties could precipitate a deadlock which might threaten Greek political institutions and alter Greece's position in the Atlantic Alliance.

Conflict in Kashmir

SINCE 1947 the status of Kashmir has been a perennial bone of contention between the governments of India and Pakistan. The Kashmir question has set the two largest noncommunist nations in Asia at loggerheads and imperiled the stability and security of the Indian subcontinent. Although minor violations of the 1948 ceasefire have occurred during the past seventeen years, both nations managed, until August 1965, to refrain from taking direct military action.

The crisis which produced open conflict between India and Pakistan grew out of a diplomatic misunderstanding between the two countries in the autumn of 1964. Shortly after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1964, a series of meetings was held between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. In order to allow Shastri sufficient time to settle into office, it was agreed that both sides would do nothing to exacerbate tensions on the Kashmir problem.

This accord appears to have held a different meaning for each side. India did not interpret the accord to mean that she should slacken her efforts to integrate the Indian-held portion of Kashmir into the Indian state. A series of actions to achieve this objective was undertaken in the winter and spring of 1965. Indian politicians vied with each other in proclaiming Kashmir an integral part of India, and repeatedly declared the issue permanently settled in India's favor. In May 1965 the Sheikh Abdullah, a long-time advocate of an independent Kashmir, was arrested by Indian authorities for the third time. The Indian government combated the ensuing civil disobedience campaign by the suppression of newspapers and the harassment of political workers, and announced at the same time

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a "liberalizing" policy. In July, apparently in response to India's policy, Pakistan began to infiltrate terrorists into Kashmir in the hope of forcing India to a showdown on the issue.

By the beginning of August, the Pakistani infiltrators had succeeded in transforming a delicate problem into a civil insurrection and thus a major provocation to India. According to India, Pakistan, by attacking the Rann of Kutch in the spring of 1965, had violated the spirit of conciliation which supposedly had emerged from the meetings between President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri. Moreover, criticism of the Shastri government's policy of hesitation on a series of issues, but especially on Kashmir, was rising in India. Conceivably, the Shastri government could not have survived in the face of domestic opposition had it chosen to adopt a moderate approach to the Kashmir issue. Thus, India resorted to military force in Kashmir.

Militarily, the two nations appear to have been evenly matched, despite the quantitative advantage in men and matériel enjoyed by India. Several factors combined to reduce the significance of India's superiority of 825,000 troops to Pakistan's 250,000. The professional army of pre-partition India was strongly Moslem. Since most Moslems opted for Pakistan after independence, that state inherited a core of well-trained officers and troops which was proportionately much greater than that which passed under the control of India. That portion of the officer corps which remained in India was subjected to strong political harassment, particularly during Khrishna Menon's tenure as Defense Minister. Many officers who had served in the Indian army before independence were prematurely retired, and preferential treatment was given to officers not on the basis of their military skills, but because they were not "tainted" with the stigma of colonial service. Moreover, the quality of Pakistani weapons is generally considered higher than those of India. For example, half of the Indian armored force is still composed of World War II Stuart and Sherman tanks, while the army of Pakistan is equipped with more advanced M-47 Patton tanks. A large part of the Indian army must be held in reserve to cope with the potential threat of at least sixteen Chinese divisions poised near the Himalayan border.

In other respects, however, India possessed a military edge over Pakistan. Her navy, which includes an aircraft carrier and two cruisers, outclassed that of Pakistan, whose largest vessel is a single cruiser being used as a training ship. Her air force, which included about 500 combat aircraft at the beginning of the hostilities, outnumbers Pakistan's slightly more modern force of 160.

India eventually gained the advantage in the fighting which erupted over the Kashmir dispute. After the initial Indian decision to take military action each side enjoyed temporary periods of advan-

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tage. The Indians first contested the Pakistani infiltration of Kashmir by mounting a limited attack against the strategic Haji Pir Pass through which the infiltrators and regular Pakistani units were obtaining a major part of their support. The pass and the entire 250-square-mile "Uri-Punch bulge" area surrounding it fell to Indian forces by September 1. Pakistan responded by threatening the Indian line of supply. The attack by Pakistani armored units began on September 1 near the Indian town of Chambb. By September 5 Pakistani forces were less than three miles from the town of Akhnur on the road supporting the Indian attack.

Both armies had thus crossed the cease-fire line, but hostilities had not yet extended beyond Kashmir. However, the Pakistani attack on Akhnur, if successful, would have imperiled India's position not only in the Uri-Punch bulge, but along the entire cease-fire line. Therefore, India, in order to relieve pressure on her Kashmir units, extended the conflict to the India-Pakistan border, initiating on September 6 a three-pronged drive on Lahore. Full-scale military action between the two states was underway.

The Indian drive on Lahore halted the Pakistani attack in the north. However, after two days the thrust against Lahore was halted. By September 10 Pakistani counterattacks had forced the Indians to withdraw some miles behind their own frontier. At this point India launched a second attack for which she appears to have committed reserves, thus weakening the forces available to halt a potential Chinese offensive. Indian military units pressed toward the Pakistani town of Sialkot, 50 miles north of Lahore. This attack, which menaced the supply line to Pakistani troops north of Chambb, was climaxed by a three-day tank battle between September 13 and 15. By September 16, India had advanced to within less than five miles of Sialkot, and her forces were again so close to Lahore that the United States was forced to begin evacuation of its dependents from that city. At this point, Peking issued an ultimatum demanding the removal of Indian border fortifications.

The initial Chinese reaction to the India-Pakistan conflict appears to have been one of noncommitment. Only when Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Pakistan on September 4 did Peking issue its first statement, accusing India of "armed aggression" and supporting Pakistan's military action. This was followed by an increasingly vehement barrage of accusations against India. On September 8, China demanded for the first time that the fortifications in Sikkim be dismantled. When this demand was answered on September 12 by an Indian note stating that intervention would only impede a peaceful solution, China countered with an ultimatum on September 16.

It is doubtful that China intended to launch a direct attack against India, for she would have

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risked direct intervention by the West. It is also doubtful that Pakistan would have welcomed a Chinese attack against India. Pakistan might have benefited from a temporary improvement in her military situation as a result of Chinese intervention. However, India might have been strengthened in the long run, if a Chinese attack had led the West to embark on a massive program of military aid to India—a program in which Pakistan could not have been expected to share.

Probably, the Chinese reasoned that they had little to lose by issuing an ultimatum to India. If the ultimatum led to a cease-fire, Peking might receive the credit for ending the hostilities. If it did not, the move would still aid Pakistan for as long as the ultimatum could reasonably be extended. China could then claim that the terms had been met, withdraw the ultimatum, and watch India and Pakistan continue to weaken each other. In any event, the ultimatum appears to have been a factor contributing to the cease-fire.

A permanent settlement of the Kashmir issue is unlikely to emerge from the events of the late summer of 1965. Both nations have committed themselves to the objective of gaining control of Kashmir. New Delhi, struggling to impose an all-Indian national identity upon her conflicting ethnic groups and religions, fears to recognize the right of one religious group to secede, for such an event could give rise to similar demands by other Indian minority groups. Pakistan, a state with a common religion, appears unwilling to deny the Kashmiri the right to assert their national identity based upon their faith, Islam. Kashmir, moreover, is a strategically important territory: each government seems convinced that compromise on this issue is impossible if it hopes to remain in power.

The cease-fire has not led to a cessation of guerrilla activity in Kashmir. The Voice of Kashmir radio has appealed for a continuation of the fighting. India has charged that Pakistan continues to infiltrate guerrilla fighters into Kashmir. Thus, Karachi and New Delhi may sooner or later resume the conflict. Moreover, should India refuse to evacuate the Uri-Punch bulge until the insurrection in Kashmir has been suppressed, Pakistan might feel the necessity again to resort openly to arms.

Pakistan has emerged from the conflict in an even less favorable position than India. Her forces, if not defeated, were repulsed by India. President Ayub Khan's appeal to the United States for mediation was initially rejected. He was forced to back down on his demands that any cease-fire should lead to a permanent settlement. As a result, Pakistan, though accepting the UN cease-fire, threatened to withdraw from the international organization if a permanent settlement is not negotiated.

For the Soviet Union the conflict—which might have posed a difficult choice had China attacked India—has provided a remarkable opportunity. During the hostilities

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between India and Pakistan the Soviets sought to place themselves in the role of peacemakers in the Indian subcontinent. At the time of the confrontation between India and China in the autumn of 1962 the Soviets had striven to avoid a close identification with Peking's aggressive policy. In the summer of 1965, the Soviets saw opportunities for extending their own influence in India at a time when the prestige of the United States appeared to be waning. By working at the United Nations to obtain the cessation of hostilities and by offering to mediate the dispute, the Soviets adopted a policy which was designed to enhance their increasingly cordial relations with India. Soviet policy vis-à-vis the India-Pakistan conflict has also enabled Moscow to appear in the guise of a great power having a common interest with the United States in the restoration of peace over the Kashmir issue.

The tragic events of the recent past forebode future troubles. Neither government appears to have altered its policy on Kashmir. Thus the possibility of renewed violence cannot be discounted. The United States and its allies face the formidable problem of assisting India and Pakistan to avoid the outbreak of renewed hostilities, and to reach a settlement of this persistent dispute, so that these two countries can get on with the tasks of economic development and security against their communist neighbors.

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THE PROSPECTS FOR WESTERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

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TECHNOLOGY is transforming relations among nations. The changes induced by the technological revolution affect not only the economic well-being of peoples everywhere but drastically transform strategic relationships in the international system. However, not all nations have benefited equally from the forward thrust of technology during the last generation, nor have they reaped, in equal measure, the fruits of technological advance.

Since the end of the Second World War, the most important technological advances have been scored either by the United States or the Soviet Union. The nations of Western Europe, which prior to the war led in both scientific inquiry and advanced military technology, have not participated fully in the technological revolution of the past twenty years. The relative decline of European technology lies at the root of much of the strategic controversy which cleaves the Atlantic Alliance. Since Western Europe has been unable through its own technological efforts to provide for its defense, the United States has assumed this task.

There is a complex relationship between science and technology, on the one hand, and defense and economic change on the other. U.S. technological developments in atomic engineering, electronics and space are pushing American industry ahead so rapidly that Europe faces the risk of falling even farther behind the United States in certain key sectors of advanced technology. Yet the major advances in U.S. technology over the last decade have resulted, to a considerable extent, from the energetic application on a very large scale of basic scientific ideas first developed in Europe. Basic science in the United States—the source of future technologies—is by no means so advanced or so clearly superior as U.S. engineering and industrial techniques. Many of the technologies in which the United States leads the world—nucleonics, electronics and space—rest upon European scientific achievements.

The quality of U.S. technology may depend in the future, as it has in the past, upon our ability to draw upon scientific advances elsewhere. The history of knowledge, as well as the strength of

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basic science which European universities and research institutes have displayed, attest to the potential contribution of other countries to technological innovation. By assuring the best possible qualitative standards in science through collaboration at the international level, the United States could assure the Free World a technological lead for the indefinite future.

The necessity for such a definition of the national interest is underlined by a consideration of scientific and technological advances in the Soviet Union. The improvements which the Soviet Union has registered in scientific training in recent years can be expected to reveal themselves in technological advances over the next generation, as the graduates of Soviet technical schools during the last decade reach their most productive years. While qualitative differences may exist between certain categories of Soviet and Western scientists and engineers, it appears that only when the educational efforts of the United States and Western Europe in the physical sciences are more closely combined will the potential advantage of the Soviets in this sector diminish. Greater Western collaboration may become essential if the peoples of the North Atlantic area are to remain in the forefront of the scientific and technological revolution of our age.

The United States thus faces the problem of assuring a scientific base which, at the very least, will permit this country to maintain its existing position in technology. Western Europe, if it does not achieve a higher level of technological proficiency, will be unable over the next decade to assume a greater part of the burden of its own defense than it presently bears. In part, the United States might assist Western Europe to acquire or develop much of the advanced technology necessary for its defense as well as for its industrial future. In return, the United States might take steps to assure that advances in European science would become immediately available to U. S. technology. Clearly there exists, by virtue of expertise to be found on both sides of the Atlantic, a community of interest in science and technology.

The problem of technological collaboration has yet another dimension. Some Europeans, in recent years, have become concerned with what they perceive to be the U.S. technological-industrial domination of the Atlantic Alliance. Europeans have become resentful of what sometimes appears to be the overzealous efforts of U.S. firms to press NATO allies to purchase U.S. weapons systems, even when European firms may have developed

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what they believe is a superior product.[1] Therefore, the problem of technological collaboration is related, in part, to the development of policies in NATO which will enable European member countries to secure what they consider to be a more equitable share of defense contracts.

Europe and the Technological Revolution

Many of the great technological advances of the United States over the last thirty years are the product of European basic research transplanted to this country. European scientists played a decisive part in the harnessing of nuclear energy and in the development of capabilities for space exploration. In fact, the United States has been traditionally to a great extent the consumer rather than the producer of the insights provided by pure scientific research.

Yet it appears that Western Europe is deficient, in comparison with the United States and the Soviet Union, in the allocation of resources to technological research and development. The disparity between U.S. and European efforts in technology may account in part for the inability of Western Europe to rival the superpowers. A comparison between European and U.S. expenditures for scientific research (see Table I) illustrates the dispari-

Table I

EXPENDITURES ON INDUSTRIAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN MAJOR NORTH ATLANTIC COUNTRIES

	*Total Expenditure**		*Government Expenditure**	
	Millions of dollars	*Per cent of national income*	*Millions of dollars*	*Per cent of budget*
United States	14,039	3.3	9,218	11.3
United Kingdom	1,775	2.8	1,078	6.2
West Germany	966	1.6	529	4.7
France	700	1.5	546	3.6

*The figures are from 1961, the latest year for which comparable figures are available.

Source: *EFTA Reporter,* April 5, 1965.

[1]See, for example, *The Observer,* July 18, 1965, p. 6.

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ties between the capability of European countries and the United States to engage in technological innovation.

No European country devotes to research and development (R&D) a percentage of national income comparable to that of the United States. The total expenditures of the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, taken together, fall far short of the U.S. figures. Even though costs in Western Europe may be lower, the total European effort for technological research and development is considerably less than that of the United States. Considered either singly or as part of the total West European expenditure for technology, European programs lag far behind those of their major ally. Moreover, Europe remains deficient in comparison with the United States in the granting of patents and licenses, one indication of technological innovation.

In sheer numbers, if not in quality, Europe remains behind the United States and the Soviet Union in school enrollment. In 1963, for example, the United States granted approximately 465,000 undergraduate degrees in the natural sciences and engineering. Universities in Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom together awarded an estimated 100,000 degrees in the same year.[2] Although European countries will probably have narrowed this gap by 1970, the number of persons enrolled in universities in Europe as candidates for degrees in science is likely to remain well below comparable enrollment in the United States.

Beyond the problem of producing trained personnel in sufficient numbers, some European countries have suffered an exodus of scientists and engineers attracted to the United States by higher salaries, superior laboratory facilities and greater opportunities for scientific achievement and personal advancement. The so-called brain drain has caused considerable concern especially in Britain, for Britain's economic future depends to a large extent upon its ability to utilize advanced technology to sustain competitive export industries.

Since 1947 U.S. government expenditures for R&D have risen from $0.7 billion to $14.7 billion in 1963. The government now accounts for two-thirds of the nation's total annual expenditure on scientific research.[3] U.S. defense expenditures in 1965 are

[2]Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Resources of Scientific and Technical Personnel in the OECD Area* (Paris: OECD, 1963), pp. 214-215.

[3]See Edward T. Chase, "Politics and Technology," *Yale Review,* March 1963, p. 333.

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expected to exceed $52 billion, and will represent about 8.2 per cent of this country's Gross National Product. Most West European countries devote a considerably lower percentage of their GNP to defense and to R&D for defense-related technology. If Western Europe, including the Six and Britain, were to raise its level of defense spending to 10 per cent of its total GNP of approximately $340 billion at 1964 rates, European expenditures for defense would begin to approach those of the United States and the Soviet Union.[4]

The French Defense Effort

An examination of European levels of expenditure illustrate the problems confronting individual European countries in their efforts to sustain programs of defense and of research and development more nearly comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain, for example, has encountered seemingly insurmountable difficulties in her efforts to sustain a modern aircraft industry and to develop delivery systems, such as the Blue Streak rocket, for her nuclear force.

France, on the other hand, has set for herself the ambitious goal of narrowing the gap which separates her militarily from the two superpowers. In the next five years France plans to spend on her defense establishment about 5 per cent of her GNP, which, according to projections, will be approximately $88 billion in 1965.[5] France is devoting resources to the building of telecommunications satellites in an apparent effort to avoid an excessive dependence upon the United States in this new field. The French space program includes the development of a rocket called the Diamant for the launching of telecommunications satellites. Beyond the desire to be economically independent of the United States, the French hope to derive technological advances from programs such as those necessary to place satellites into orbit and to build a nuclear capability. Although they remain dependent upon the United States for much of the advanced technology needed to complete their space and military programs, they have increased substantially the number of modern facilities for research and development. Governmental expenditures for tech-

[4]The Soviet Union, it is estimated, spends about 20 per cent of its annual GNP on defense or about $50 billion, i.e., roughly the same amount as the United States. See Timothy Sosnovy, "The Soviet Military Budget," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, pp. 487-494, for further information on Soviet defense spending.

[5]The comparable figure for the U.S. GNP in 1965 is $657 billion. The federal budget is $97.5 billion and the defense budget $52.2 billion.

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nology doubled in the period between 1959 and 1964, as France made her bid to become a nuclear power.[6]

As a result of such expenditures France is expected to have in 1970 a military establishment which includes 500 up-to-date aircraft, twenty-five land-based ballistic missiles, a small naval force with at least one nuclear submarine equipped with intermediate-range missiles, and two aircraft carriers.[7] The existence of such a French nuclear force might reduce the likelihood of a Soviet first strike. The Soviet Union, according to this line of reasoning, might be deterred from launching an attack against France unless the Soviets were willing to absorb whatever retaliatory strike France might inflict. Yet the prospects for the French developing a force which might seriously cripple the Soviet Union will become even more remote if the Soviets augment their air defense system with an anti-missile defense. Hence the existence of an independent French nuclear force by the end of this decade may have little effect upon the East-West strategic equation. France's nuclear capability will probably not be sufficiently large or effective, nor possess the requisite offensive-defensive balance, to provide in Western Europe a substitute for the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Without substantially higher expenditures France will be unable to develop advanced technologies comparable to those which the United States will have by the end of this decade. For example, the development of the supersonic Concorde air liner is expected to cost at least $2 billion. Because of the costs of developing such an aircraft, France and Britain have undertaken jointly to build the Concorde. Space technology has already cost the Soviet Union an estimated $20 billion and the United States $25.9 billion; of the latter figure only $7.1 billion was for specifically military applications. Because of the data generated by the pioneering nations, and because European R&D costs are undoubtedly lower than those prevailing in the United States, Western Europe undoubtedly could match many of the existing U.S. and Soviet achievements even with a lower level of expenditure. Initially, however, Western Europe might be compelled to make

[6]Roy Battersby, "French Eyes on the Future," *Listener*, July 1, 1965, pp. 5-7. Reprinted in *Survival*, September 1965, pp. 219-223. For an examination of the French scientific and technological program, see also *L'Industrie Aeronautique et Spatial Français* (Paris: Union Syndicale des Industries Aeronautiques et Spatiales, 1965).

[7]Pierre Messmer, "The French Military Establishment of Tomorrow," ORBIS, Summer 1962, pp. 205-216.

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a greater expenditure than either the United States or the Soviet Union currently makes in order to narrow appreciably the gap between European and U.S.-Soviet levels in space technology.

Government and Corporate Sponsorship of Technological Innovation

Thanks to the heavy government investment in research and development and the large markets for advanced products, the United States appears to enjoy an advantage in the exploitation of the potential inherent in modern science. Since government-sponsored research and the development of advanced technology are closely related industries in which major scientific breakthroughs are most prevalent, they will maintain a competitive advantage over their foreign counterparts less abundantly supplied with government funds. This problem, for example, confronts the electronics industries of several European countries. European firms have found it difficult to penetrate markets for computers even in their own countries. Although British scientists played a major part in the development of the computer, one U.S. firm, International Business Machines, supplies 80 per cent of the world market. The remainder is controlled largely by two other U.S. producers, Radio Corporation of America and General Electric. U.S. firms have even secured a large measure of control over those European companies which produce computers. Only one European computer manufacturer remains beyond U.S. control: International Computer and Tabulator (ICT) of Great Britain, which has received substantial support from the British government. Nevertheless, ICT supplies less than one-half of the British market, while IBM alone accounts for 40 per cent of the sales of computers in Britain. Other European computer manufacturers are now controlled totally or in part by U.S. corporations.[8] President de Gaulle is said to have agreed reluctantly to permit General Electric to acquire half ownership of Machines Bull in order to enable France to benefit from the infusion of U.S. computer technology. Such companies are in fact international in their personnel, programs of research and scope of operations, although their policies are influenced, if not controlled, by U.S. industry.

The technical lead attained by U.S. companies, which can rely upon a larger domestic market, poses serious problems for

[8]See *The Economist*, September 26, 1964, pp. 1251-1253.

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European producers of computers and other items derived from advanced technologies. Because of the necessity for large capital investment in R&D, together with constant modernization of production facilities, European firms with smaller markets than their U.S. counterparts find considerable difficulty in competing with them in many fields of advanced technology.

The ability to exploit existing scientific data, although not necessarily to produce new ideas or techniques, appears to lie with those countries able to support large corporate enterprises either through government subsidization or vast markets, or both. Standardization and concentration among firms, it appears, have been furthered in the United States more than in Europe. For example, in the field of avionics the United States has two firms which develop and build interceptor fire control radars; there are four such companies in Western Europe. Four U.S. firms build ground surveillance radar for air defense and traffic control; Western Europe has eight suppliers of this product.[9] Such a division of effort appears to reduce the opportunities for specialization in R&D and to limit the capabilities of European firms for large-scale production.

It is difficult to assess the relationship between the size of a firm and its ability to develop new technologies. Large firms appear to enjoy certain advantages in the application of science, including the funds necessary to employ scientific and technical personnel and to build well-equipped laboratories. Much of the R&D effort of corporate enterprise is undertaken by large firms: of all firms in the United States undertaking R&D, only 16 per cent of medium-sized firms (1,000-5,000 employees) conducted any basic research, while among firms employing more than 5,000 people the figure was 47 per cent.[10]

Whatever the limitations of smaller economic units, the United States does not lead other industrialized nations in every sector

[9]See Philip J. Klass, "European Defense Efforts Mold Future of Avionics," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* June 25, 1965, p. 109.

[10]OECD, *Ministers Talk Science* (Paris: 1965), p. 103. According to the General Manager, Defense Electronics Division, General Electric Company, one of the largest U.S. corporations: "For large companies like General Electric, a broad technological base is essential. Tomorrow's products and services will be coming from research carried out today, and any major industrial organization, to compete effectively, must be willing to devote a healthy effort to new technology and reasonable risk-taking. An example of this situation is the fact that half of General Electric's $5 billion worth of business today is estimated to come from new products introduced since World War II." Gerald A. Hoyt, "Industrial Strength and National Security: The Management of Change," *The General Electric Forum,* July-September 1965, p. 23.

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of technology. Perhaps because the United States has devoted a major portion of its efforts to the development of those technologies where the gap between U.S. and European achievements is most marked, in certain other fields it now lags behind its competitors in Western Europe and Japan. For example, the United States has not developed the new technologies for shipbuilding which enable other nations to compete successfully in world markets. The funds spent in the United States on research for naval design for cargo carriers and other kinds of merchant shipping are minute by comparison with the investment in R&D for air transportation and space exploration. In the building and operation of high-speed intra- and inter-urban transportation systems, the United States might benefit from techniques pioneered abroad.[11] Thus the U.S. economy might gain new technologies in a variety of important fields in a program of technological collaboration and perhaps specialization with other industrialized countries.

Education and Technology

The national educational system is vital to the efforts of any country to achieve major advances in science and technology. In educational institutions scientists and technicians are trained and basic research is conducted. It is perhaps impossible, regardless of expenditures for scientific education, to assure the emergence of talented persons such as those responsible for the major breakthroughs in nuclear energy, electronics and medicine. Nevertheless, the development of new technologies may be impossible without the training of large numbers of scientists, engineers, technicians and managers, as well as the investment of large sums of money—all of which have marked the technological efforts of the United States and, to an even greater extent over the last generation, of the Soviet Union. In the last two decades, the United States has impressively increased governmental funds available for university scientific research. Whereas in 1955 governmental grants to universities for R&D totaled $300 million, by 1963 such funds had risen to $1.2 billion. It is anticipated that by 1970 this figure will reach $2.5 billion.[12] Beyond their

[11]Seymour Melman, "Behind the Mask of Success," *Saturday Review*, July 31, 1965, pp. 9-10 ff. Melman contends that the United States, by concentrating its efforts on the development of military technologies, is allowing "entire industries" devoted to nondefense-oriented production "to fall into disrepair."

[12]"'Uncle Sam' Big Man on Campus," *Business Week*, November 2, 1963, p. 90.

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impact on technological innovation, such inflows of capital have served to increase considerably the number of students and faculty engaged in research in American universities.

Great disparities exist between U.S. and comparable European government programs to support scientific studies in universities. Nevertheless, European governments have made major efforts in recent years to remedy the serious deficiency of technical training in their educational systems. Since World War II, there has been a rising enrollment at all levels of education in Europe, especially in technical and professional programs. Technical studies now occupy a place of importance. In greater numbers than ever before, European students are being trained as engineers, draftsmen, scientists, technicians, and in the other skills essential in a modern industrialized society. European governments are making great efforts to adapt their educational systems to an age of science and technology. The Netherlands government, for example, is planning to create new technical universities; France has built fourteen more colleges of science; and the British government has given special emphasis to science in the new universities established in the United Kingdom since the Second World War, as well as in the older universities.

In certain European countries, notably Great Britain, occupations related to the applied sciences do not yet attract sufficient numbers of youths to fill the growing demand for engineers, technicians and managers. British education in the applied sciences and business administration still lags behind the needs of the 1960's. According to the Robbins Report, studies leading to careers in pure science not only attract greater numbers of students, but also persons of "better quality" than does technology. The Robbins Report recommended the creation of five special Institutions for Scientific and Technological Education and Research. In other colleges, it was recommended, "a new system for degrees should be established, covering business studies, languages and other subjects as well as science and technology."[13]

Integration of European Technological Efforts

Were Western Europe to aspire to a technological and military structure comparable to that of the United States and the Soviet Union it would be necessary to increase substantially the numbers

[13] *Higher Education.* Report of the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister under the chairmanship of Lord Robbins 1961-63. Cmnd. 2154 (London: HMSO, 1965), pp. 126-146.

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of persons trained in scientific and technological skills. Furthermore, it might be necessary to achieve a high level of political, military and economic integration in Western Europe. Only a central authority might be capable of allocating efficiently the massive expenditures necessary for research and the development and production of advanced weapons systems, as well as technologies with peacetime applications. In all likelihood, the organization directing a centralized effort for R&D would have to be endowed with the power of taxation. The substantial funds required would have to come, at least in part, from a source other than national parliaments, for such expenditures must be planned and sustained over a period of several years. Thus the creation of an integrated European defense effort might be dependent upon the building of integrated institutions possessing considerably greater supranational authority than is to be found in the existing European Communities.

European countries have already initiated efforts to achieve a measure of technological collaboration within Europe. Programs in space are illustrative of the new kinds of technological collaboration which have been developed in recent years. According to the Convention and Protocol of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), ten European countries have agreed "to establish European collaboration, exclusively for peaceful purposes, in the fields of space research."[14] Founded in 1962, ESRO will include centers for the design, development and construction of rocket nose cones, satellites and space probes; a space data center for the analysis of the problems of estimating and analyzing orbits; telemetry and telecommand stations, and launching sites. For the first three years of its existence, ESRO was granted a budget of $78 million. Expenditures for the second three-year period were expected to total $122 million. ESRO itself was not empowered by its members to undertake such projects as the placing of manned satellites into orbit. Instead it planned to launch sounding rockets, to place small satellites (about 100 kgs.) into orbit, and eventually to put into orbit around the earth an astronomical observatory, and around the moon a planetary observatory. ESRO was designed to enable national groups of scientists to collaborate in the preparation of rocket nose cones containing several different experiments, in the testing of rocket

[14]ESRO's members include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

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components and payloads, in experimenting with heavy satellites, and in the recording and analysis of data.

In 1962, the year of ESRO's formation, the European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) was established in London.[15] Its purpose, according to its Convention, was to enable its member governments to "cooperate in the development of space vehicle launchers and to study their scientific and commercial application." The negotiations for ELDO resulted from a British proposal, in the Council of Europe in September 1960, for European collaboration in the development of the Blue Streak rocket, originally designed as a British strategic missile, as the launching vehicle for a joint European satellite. Britain was to contribute the first stage of the rocket, France the second, and Germany the third. Italy was given the task of building the first series of experimental satellite test vehicles. Belgium was to provide down-range ground guidance stations. The Netherlands agreed to furnish long-range telemetry links, and Australia was to make available its Woomera launching site for firings. The first satellite is not scheduled to be launched until 1967.

Both ESRO and ELDO have experienced difficulties in achieving the necessary coordination of effort among participant nations, especially in meeting production deadlines. Moreover, the cost of launching a European satellite appears to be substantially in excess of original budget allocations. It is reported that the launching of ELDO's first rocket will require at least $100 million more than the original allocation of $200 million.[16] ELDO was given by its member governments a budget of $196 million for its initial five-year program. This multinational scientific project came up for critical review when its costs seemed likely to exceed original estimates, yet its expenditures are small in comparison with those of the United States.

The countries of Western Europe, with their comparatively meagre efforts, can hardly hope to narrow the gap which separates them from the United States in technology without a substantially greater investment than they have been willing to make thus far. The cost of research and development is growing. Consequently, there is an even greater likelihood in the future that smaller national political units will be excluded from participa-

[15]The members of ELDO include Australia, Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

[16]See *Christian Science Monitor,* June 1, 1965.

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tion in many advanced technological fields. The smallness of domestic markets raises the unit costs of production in military and industrial goods. Only a unified Europe, it appears, could afford the outlays of capital necessary to purchase U.S. technological skills and, subsequently, to engage in a European R&D effort designed to narrow appreciably the Atlantic technological gap.

Major Obstacles to Atlantic Technological Collaboration

Since the mid-1950's an increasing number of Europeans have sought to reduce their dependence upon the United States. It has been suggested that the sale of advanced technologies might eventually give Western Europe this greater measure of independence. Yet the transfer of technologies from the United States to Western Europe by the sale of data and processes, instead of their development in Europe, might only produce, at least in the short run, a greater dependence on U.S. technological data—unless Europeans themselves devoted greater expenditures to technical education and built more modern facilities for research.

In the absence of greater European R&D efforts, even the transfer of U.S. technology might not reduce substantially existing disparities, for the technological revolution is dynamic in nature. Technologies transferred today may become obsolescent after the passage of a few years. Thus the future position of Western Europe in many fields of advanced technology depends primarily upon the efforts of Europeans themselves.

To a considerable extent European success in achieving breakthroughs in advanced technology for both defense and nonmilitary applications will depend upon higher levels of collaborative effort *within* Western Europe. Yet the short-term prospects for European integration are not promising. For the most part, West European expenditures for national programs for research and development far exceed contributions to collaborative technological programs. France, for example, is said to spend twice as much on her national space program as on ELDO and ESRO together.[17] The revival of nationalism, together with continuing inability to agree upon the form which political integration should assume, poses obstacles to European collaborative programs in the development of advanced technologies. In the absence of progress toward an integrated Western Europe, the United States, it may

[17]Battersby, *op. cit.*

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be anticipated, will remain reluctant to provide large-scale technological assistance to national European governments.

Some of those Europeans who desire to reduce the U.S. presence in their countries might regard the sale of technology as a device whereby the United States could ensure that Europe, in fact, would remain dependent upon its leadership. President de Gaulle has maintained that France must "hold off American economic penetration" and remain "independent of the U.S. hegemony." The French President has called upon his countrymen to achieve "more and better production, savings and investment, scientific and technical research" in order to prevent France from sinking into "bitter mediocrity" and domination by "foreign participation, invention and capabilities.[18] In the same speech De Gaulle alluded to the tendency of French concerns to use U.S. patents instead of developing their own products through research and development. It is difficult to conceive of any scheme for the sale of U.S. technologies to West European countries in which Europe's use of U.S.-developed processes would decline rather than rise substantially, at least in the short run.

In a program of technological collaboration with Western Europe, the United States would face complex problems of patents, licensing, and differing styles of business behavior. Many advanced technologies are the product of collaboration between the U.S. government and private industry. Other technologies have been produced by the efforts of U.S. corporations without large-scale governmental assistance. The holders of patents, it may be anticipated, might not be willing, even in view of a very favorable consideration, to transfer advanced technology to European firms which, in turn, might become major competitors. The problems of transferring technical data between firms, even within the United States, are formidable. They are likely to be no less formidable in a scheme for the transfer of data from the United States to Western Europe.

Before embarking on a program for increased sharing of technological data with Western Europe, the United States should consider the implications for its domestic economy. The advantages in productivity and marketing enjoyed by U.S. firms have contributed to U.S. leadership in certain areas of advanced technology. Yet some industries in Western Europe have made remarkable gains in fields where the United States in the early

[18] *New York Times,* January 1, 1965.

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postwar period was without rival. To what extent would U.S. industry lose markets abroad, and perhaps even in this country, by making available to competitors in Western Europe certain of its advanced technologies? The United States should ponder carefully the advisability of selling devices and data which would enhance the competitive position of Western Europe vis-à-vis U.S. industry.

The sale of advanced technologies to Western Europe could serve to reduce, and perhaps even eliminate, the U.S. balance of payments deficit. Yet Europe itself might experience payments problems as a result of large-scale purchases of U.S. technological data. Moreover, the cost of acquiring advanced U.S. technologies might be prohibitive. Even as part of a unified Western Europe, Great Britain, with her own formidable economic and payments problems, might find it difficult, at least for a time, to contribute her share of the funds necessary to purchase advanced U.S. technologies.

The Security Problem

Under one form of technological collaboration or another, the United States could assist West European countries, either singly or together, in the development of advanced weapons systems. Before undertaking such a course of action, however, the United States would be compelled to alter its policy toward the dissemination and control of nuclear weapons.

U.S. technological collaboration in the field of nuclear energy is governed by the Atomic Energy (McMahon) Act of 1946. The principal objective of the McMahon Act was to preserve the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that they had been developed by an international effort which included a substantial European contribution. In order to assist the British nuclear effort, the United States amended the McMahon Act in 1951. After 1953, when the Soviet Union exploded its first hydrogen bomb, the Eisenhower Administration persuaded Congress to make further changes in the act. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitted the President to direct the Atomic Energy Commission to deliver atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as the President deemed to be in the national interest. However, nuclear warheads were to remain in the possession of U.S. nationals. The 1954 Act specified categories of information on the characteristics of nuclear warheads which

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could be transmitted to allies in order to enable them to receive training in the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

In 1958 new amendments to the Atomic Energy Act further reduced the obstacles to disclosing information on nuclear technology and extended the policy of preference for Britain. At this time the categories of information on nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials which the government was permitted to transfer to allies were broadened. The requirement that nuclear warheads remain in custody of U.S. nationals was retained. The amendments specified that technical information and materials for manufacturing nuclear weapons could be given only to a nation that had made "substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons." At that time only Great Britain, among the European NATO countries, qualified for such assistance. The United States continues to cite this provision as justification for providing information to Britain which it withholds from France, although France appears also to have made "substantial progress" in its nuclear program.

Whatever the official interpretation of the 1958 legislation with respect to France, the United States has given some assistance to the French nuclear effort. Under an agreement signed on July 27, 1961, the United States has provided France with information to enable French forces to receive training in the use of, and defense against, nuclear weapons. This agreement provides for the transfer of classified information, including "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data," necessary to the development of defense plans; training of personnel in the use of, and defense against, atomic warfare; and the development of delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The United States has further agreed to transfer nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems for the purpose of improving the state of training and operational readiness of French forces. Yet the agreement prohibits the transfer of information which would make a major contribution to the capabilities of a recipient nation for designing, developing or manufacturing nuclear weapons. Only exchanges of data which will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the defense and security of the United States are permitted. Under the terms of this qualification the United States determines the kinds of data and processes which can be made available. Thus European powers, aside from Britain, do not have access to the kinds of U.S. data which would enable them to become, separately or jointly, nuclear powers.

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Although the McMahon Act was designed to enable the United States to preserve a monopoly in nuclear weapons, by 1965 the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China had exploded nuclear devices. Within the next decade almost any partially industrialized nation will be able to build at least a crude nuclear capability at a relatively low cost, although the development of the most advanced technologies will remain the preserve of a few powers. Yet every nuclear advance outside the United States appears to undermine the rationale of the McMahon Act.

U.S. official attitudes toward atomic legislation, and technological collaboration in general, bear an important relationship to U.S. notions of prevailing trends in international politics. For example, a policy of collaboration in nuclear technology between the United States and its European allies must be weighed against U.S. efforts to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. A policy of nuclear collaboration would presuppose a greater degree of trust between the United States and its European allies than presently exists. Such a policy might issue also from a U.S. conviction that the Soviet Union was engaged in a scientific and technological effort to surpass the West. In point of fact, the U.S. government appears to accept the existence of neither of these conditions. Instead, the Soviet Union, it is hoped, would welcome a relaxation in international tensions, at least to the extent of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, and might be led increasingly to collaborate with the United States in the preservation of peace.

The question of nondissemination has occupied the minds of U.S. policymakers in recent months.[19] In the Draft Treaty on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the United States proposed to forbid by international agreement the transfer

[19]See, for example, William C. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1965, p. 596; and Report of Study on Problems of Nuclear Proliferation conducted by Presidential Panel headed by Roswell L. Gilpatric, *New York Times*, July 1, 1965, p. 1. On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference a Draft Treaty on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Member states would undertake, according to Article I, "not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear state, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of states and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons." Signatories who were not nuclear powers would agree, in Article II, "not to manufacture nuclear weapons" or to transfer "such weapons into [their] national control, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance." See *New York Times*, August 18, 1965, p. 2.

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of nuclear weapons to nations or organizations which presently do not possess them. The Draft Treaty, according to interpretations put forward by the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, does not necessarily preclude the building of the proposed multilateral force (MLF), since this proposal for nuclear sharing presumably would not permit a nonnuclear state to acquire "national control" over nuclear weapons and the United States would be expected to retain the power of veto over their use. The Draft Treaty, however, might make it impossible for the United States and its European allies to develop a system of weighted majority voting in an MLF unless Britain or France dismantled their national nuclear deterrents. Moreover, it is doubtful that a joint European deterrent could be created by signatories to the U.S. Draft Treaty unless Britain or France agreed to place its entire nuclear capability under all-European control, perhaps under an organization such as the Western European Union. Such action would be necessary, it appears, since signatories pledge themselves not to take any action "which would cause an increase in the total number of states and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons." Presumably, the "other organizations" to which the Draft Treaty makes reference include a European organization which might be created for the administration of a European deterrent. The United States, by adhering to its proposed Draft Treaty on nondissemination, would set strict limits to that kind of technological collaboration which might be undertaken with European allies. Thus the question of Atlantic technological collaboration is linked inextricably to other U.S. policies.

Avenues to Technological Collaboration

Advanced technologies developed in the United States can be made available to Western Europe in a variety of ways. The essential question is to what extent the United States should undertake to share its advanced technologies with NATO allies. In addition, the United States and the potential recipients of its technology must determine the absorptive capabilities of Western Europe, as well as the specific means by which U.S. technology should be transferred. The United States should regard its technological capabilities as a national asset acquired in large part through taxes levied upon the American people by the federal government, and through the investments which Americans have

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made in U.S. industry and education. Consequently, any proposal for sharing U.S. technology must be designed to advance U.S. and, more broadly, Western security and the general well-being of those nations and peoples who wish to associate themselves with us.

Several kinds of collaboration might be undertaken in order to enable the nations of the North Atlantic area to avoid costly duplication of technological efforts and to assure that Western science retains even its existing position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. First, North Atlantic nations, especially European powers, might increase their bilateral collaboration in the fashion of existing projects such as Concorde. Second, within Western Europe a multilateral collaborative effort might be organized. Third, the nations of the North Atlantic area might devise new mechanisms designed to assure a greater measure of technological collaboration at the Atlantic level. Finally, the United States might make available certain kinds of data to its European allies in a program of technological sharing.

Over the next decade, European countries must be prepared to undertake, at the very least, a growing number of bilateral technological efforts. No national economy in Western Europe, so it appears, can support the advanced R&D efforts necessary in such industries as aircraft and aerospace, nuclear power, electronics and telecommunications. Unless Europeans are content to watch the United States capture larger shares of the civilian and military market for the products of industries requiring large amounts of advanced technology, collaborative efforts must be expanded in Europe, at least on a bilateral basis.

Greater bilateral technological collaboration, however, may not prove sufficient to Europe's needs over the next decade. No two West European countries possess technological resources comparable to those of the United States. Only a multilateral European effort can enable Europe to narrow appreciably the technological gap between it and the United States.

Whatever the obstacles to transatlantic technological collaboration, a purely "European" solution will prove unsatisfactory to many European countries as well as the United States. So long as Western Europe remains linked to North America in a defense organization such as NATO, the need for transatlantic technological collaboration will remain urgent. Any scheme for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance should be designed so as to afford the West a greater measure of technological collaboration. In

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fact, proposals for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance which do not provide for a greater measure of technological collaboration are likely to prove inadequate to the needs of the alliance.

The question remains as to what might be done *now* to enhance the security of Europeans by making available advanced U.S. technology. For one thing, the United States might undertake to provide a greater measure of security from the threat posed by the many hundreds of Soviet intermediate-range missiles targeted against Western Europe. It is conceivable that the United States could furnish blueprints and designs for a land-based intermediate missile as part of a NATO nuclear force, which could be built in Western Europe on a consortium basis, i.e., one country would build the propellant, one the missile, and another the guidance systems, while the United States would provide the warheads. Such an arrangement appears to have inspired the founders of the so-called Hawk Consortium for the building of an anti-aircraft missile designed in the United States. The Hawk experience, it should be noted, provided the French with much of the data needed for their own efforts to develop missiles. A collaborative undertaking of this sort would enable several countries jointly to build intermediate-range missiles and would serve, at least in the short run, to reduce the nuclear imbalance in Europe while at the same time providing the Europeans with access to certain advanced technologies. As part of its conditions for assisting in the creation of such a force, the United States might propose arrangements for the command structure and political control within NATO. Subsequently, if both the United States and the Soviet Union acquire anti-missile defense systems, the United States might assist the Europeans in developing their own anti-missile defense system. A European missile defense system, like a European missile capability, may become feasible if the nations of Western Europe agree to accept a greater measure of integration than they have achieved thus far.

The United States might undertake to furnish Western Europe technical information designed to reduce the likelihood of war by accident or miscalculation. Efforts could be made to assure that Europeans had continuing access to U.S. technologies for the maintenance of centralized command and control of weapons systems. A program of technological collaboration might be conceived, in part, as a means whereby Western Europe could be granted technologies not merely for the production of advanced weapons systems but also for their control. Finally, European

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fears of U.S. technological preponderance in NATO could be assuaged in large measure by more equitable procurement policies within the Atlantic Alliance.

Joint planning for research and development in the North Atlantic area might be undertaken in a NATO agency, created specifically for this purpose. Such an agency might be charged with the task of advising the Secretary-General and the NATO Council on both the civilian and military aspects of North Atlantic research and development. In particular, a technological agency in NATO could provide a forum for the resolution of the formidable problems of allocating research, development and production among NATO members. European NATO members, depending upon the level of technological collaboration which they achieve among themselves, might be represented in an Atlantic technological agency either as national units or as delegates of a European technological community. From such collaborative efforts, both the United States and Western Europe might derive benefits enhancing the quality of Western science and technology.

The United States, for its part, might reduce European suspicions that it seeks to dominate the market for NATO arms by indicating its willingness to consider a greater degree of international specialization of effort. A European firm whose weapons system proved superior to that of its U.S. competitor might be assured a market within NATO for its product. Under such a scheme, more orders for tactical weapons systems would be given to European industry. For the production of tanks, antitank weapons, rifles, and certain kinds of advanced aircraft, European firms would probably receive an appreciably greater share of contracts than they have in recent years. European firms might provide much of the equipment for systems such as NADGE, a network of electronic aids in Europe for the guidance of advanced strike aircraft. Even if the United States were to concede such a place in weapons procurement to its European allies, it could be expected that U.S. industry would continue to supply a large part of the NATO arms market, especially in those phases of advanced research and development where scarcely any competition exists outside the Soviet Union. Thus, the United States would remain the major producer of weapons systems for strategic warfare, as well as many of the lesser systems, even though Europeans might gain a greater share of defense contracts in the alliance.

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Conclusions

Many of the strategic problems which confront NATO are the product of technological developments which, over the last generation, have complicated the task of defending Western Europe. Many of the problems which face West European countries stem from their inability to provide the vast amounts of capital investment, scientific manpower and markets necessary to remain in the forefront of technology. If the Atlantic Alliance is to remain the most important U.S. security arrangement, the United States and its NATO allies must seek solutions to the major technological problems confronting the West.

The Soviet Union has undertaken to develop the educational and scientific base necessary to assure Soviet technology the means to challenge U.S. supremacy over the next generation. Thus a greater unity of effort on the part of the West is essential for the future vitality of science and technology in Western Europe and the United States. The nations of Western Europe, either by their own efforts or with the aid of U.S. data and processes, may not be able to equal either the United States or the Soviet Union in many fields of advanced technology. But the contribution of European pure science may be as vital to the future of U.S. technology as were European scientific contributions to the unleashing of the atom, the building of spacecraft, and the major advances in electronics of the last generation. However formidable the obstacles to technological collaboration in the North Atlantic area, the task of surmounting them should become a priority item on the agenda of the Western nations.

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE AT THE CROSSROADS

by Stefan T. Possony

FORESIGHT is the prerequisite, perhaps even the essence, of effective government. But when did the government of the United States ever foresee a war and prepare in time for it? The record of U.S. foreign policy shows clearly that though this country may have mastered the arts of peace, it still is an apprentice in the arts of defense. In a democracy, men who are popular at the polls may turn out to be good leaders, but they are rarely strategists. All too often democratic leaders have reached and preserved their positions because they told the people what they wanted to hear and because, even during the coming of a storm, they denied threats and dangers.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, recognizing this weakness to be one of the major causes of the fragility of democracy, in 1937 deliberately violated the rules of demagoguery and warned the United States and Western Europe of the impending Nazi aggression—only to find himself a prophet reviled. It was Pearl Harbor that alerted us to the need for a realistic approach to national security. As a result, *after* World War II the U.S. government established a strong and permanent intelligence capability—in contrast to the post-World War I period when it was taken for granted that democracies do not indulge in activities such as intelligence, political warfare or propaganda.

While our fledgling intelligence services failed to prepare us for the attack in Korea, they amply paid for themselves by giving timely warning about Soviet acquisitions of nuclear weapons, aircraft and missiles. Then the advent of Castro, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis dealt U.S. intelligence—or some of its elements—a severe and not entirely undeserved blow.

The fortunes of U.S. intelligence declined also because it was interfering with politics-as-usual: objective reports of military developments in the Soviet Union and open and concealed communist aggressions tended to force military budgets upward, diverted funds and interests from domestic (and more popular) programs, and cast doubts on the *grande illusion* of disarmament. The "reporting" functions of intelligence naturally could not be curtailed, but the "estimating" function became ever more po-

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litically oriented. Intelligence evaluations of the Vietnamese conflict made public before 1965, including the estimate of early 1963 that the situation was approaching control and the unjustifiedly negative assessment of the Diem regime, exhibited clear signs of political domination.

Intelligence Estimates

What is an intelligence estimate? It is a judgment about the probability of future developments, which includes warnings about possible threats. The estimate is derived from the systematic study of currently observable trends and from the application of knowledge to determine, deductively as well as inductively, enemy intentions, plans and programs.

Estimating is not prophesying; its role is not that of Cassandra. It is, instead, the careful utilization of clearly thought out methodology for the purpose of arming a government with the foresight it needs to manage calamities and to prevent, or win, wars. Since estimating must be concerned with anticipating catastrophes, the pessimist is right more often than the optimist, especially in the twentieth century, the most bellicose of all historical epochs. The pessimist would be right at least in all cases when a valid warning went unheeded. In actuality, the pessimistic estimate seeks to convince the statesman that he should take preventive action so as to disprove the pessimist and confirm the optimist in his forecast that nothing serious will happen.[1]

In a well-run, survival-conscious government, intelligence is the core of foreign and defense policy. Since the estimating function is largely devoted to identifying the type, timing and probability of future threats, estimates should be the core of intelligence. Unfortunately, in the real political world, things work differently. Perhaps the "contradiction" between the sphere of intelligence and that of political decision-making is of an intrinsic nature. But there also is the difficulty that the reliability of estimates cannot always be proved persuasively.

The tradition, particularly among combat intelligence officers, has been to stick to "facts" and "current capabilities." But prac-

[1]Perhaps the estimator's function can best be compared to that of the stockbroker who, if he wants to keep his clients, never should commit himself dogmatically, let alone forever, either to a bullish or a bearish position. The stockbroker's job is to call the turns *in time;* this may require instantaneous changes in his "estimates" as to how a particular stock is going to perform within the next minutes, hours or days.

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tice has demonstrated that the mere listing of enemy capabilities does not satisfy command requirements. Hence there was developed the technique of "estimating"—or rather, identifying—the alternative courses of action open to the enemy. (Example: Of the enemy's 100 divisions, 60 are combat-ready. An offensive on the northern flank could be carried out with 40 divisions, while on the southern flank only 20 divisions can be accommodated. The enemy has been moving most of his best divisions to the north but 5 divisions which are deployed in the south could be used for a diversionary attack.)

This method of estimating alternative courses of action can be applied, with reasonable confidence, against opponents whose behavior pattern is known and fixed. Against imaginative strategic leadership it is less reliable: good generals usually are capable of figuring out the expectations of opponents and then surprising them through an entirely unanticipated series of moves. Some of history's most astounding victories were won because creative military leaders, like Charles XII, Frederick II, Napoleon, Moltke and even Hitler, did what they were allegedly unable to do. Just twenty-five years ago, France fell because French intelligence assumed that German tanks could not advance through the Ardennes.[2]

The larger an intelligence service is, the more bureaucratized it becomes. Bureaucratization requires—or implies—the dominance of stereotyped thinkers as well as political careerists who refuse to displease their superiors. It also requires the piling of echelons upon echelons and the establishment of elaborate "channels" and review procedures. The more frequently estimates are reviewed by "higher" and "highest" levels and the more frequently they emerge in the least controversial and the most bland language, the greater grows the danger that the estimates are no longer accurate and no longer capable of warding off surprise.

The greatest danger is that of self-fertilization. Suppose the working level experts, who deal only with the facts and who make reasonable inferences from these facts, arrive at an estimate with the content A; and suppose that this estimate, though entirely valid, is not popular. At the next level A may be changed into .75A and an additional, freely invented subestimate B may be added which stresses contradictory and more hopeful aspects. On

[2]Several years ago, the writer traveled through the Ardennes to test the validity of that estimate. It remains incomprehensible why experienced officers who knew the terrain should have taken it seriously.

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the highest intelligence level the estimate may be changed into .5A + 2B. The decision-makers may still find this estimate uncomfortable and request a recycling of the process. In the end, the "accepted estimate" may read: .05A + 3B. (Note that the B-values were not derived from intelligence "inputs" but emerged through self-fertilization.) Thereupon secondary processes may start through which all other estimates are harmonized with the "accepted estimate." In other words, assumptions are derived from assumptions, and hypotheses reinforce hypotheses. Occasionally the chain of self-fertilization breaks because of the intrusion of reality; but, unless this intrusion is of near-catastrophic proportions, the self-fertilization process starts up anew.

Despite these built-in hazards, some of which could be avoided, "estimating" is a necessary function of intelligence and government. This is increasingly true in a period of extremely swift and highly destructive weapons. Once a government realizes that self-deception is counterproductive for the country as well as for the ruling party, it can easily improve the system and create capabilities for effective estimating, thus reducing the areas of uncertainty. But even in this case, dangers remain so long as the government lacks sophisticated comprehension of intelligence methods, naively overrates the efficiency of its services and disregards the many uncertainties surrounding even the "best estimate," the one derived from "hard intelligence" about enemy intentions.

The best information contains elements of error and deception. Statisticians, as a matter of course, indicate "standard errors" and "levels of significance" (or certainty) in their work. Military intelligence estimates have remained aloof from statistical sophistication and instead rely on the simple scheme of higher and lower "possible" figures, e.g., of aircraft and missiles. Estimators, allergic to the error of over- or underestimating, often settle on a "most probable figure." However, political decision-makers usually prefer the low (less alarming) estimate and pretend that this estimate is "firm"; thus, there is no need to provide for margins of safety and no need whatever to increase the military budget. Realistic estimators respond to this fact of political life by inflating their estimates. In turn, decision-makers who know about this intelligence trick discount all estimates, low, medium and high, including even those which have been deliberately deflated to

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please. In this interplay, scientific methodology and objectivity are ground down as if between two millstones.

Estimating Soviet Intentions

The emergence of the United States as the leader of a worldwide coalition against communism has created an enormous intelligence requirement. Overshadowing the myriad questions intelligence must answer has been the great uncertainty about whether the Soviet Union, once it has acquired the requisite military capability, will or will not risk nuclear war. Are communist leaders intent on continuing the international revolution until they have achieved control over the globe; and, if they are, does this intent include recognition that in all likelihood the goal cannot be attained by means short of nuclear war?

The answers to these questions should have—and in part have—determined U.S. policies with respect to budgets, research and development, weapons procurement and force levels. They have also weighed heavily on U.S. relations with allied and neutral states. During the current period, when the Soviet Union is patently not yet "ready," these answers should have—and in part have—determined American attitudes toward the governments of the Soviet bloc. Should the United States have determined that the communists are irrevocably committed to our destruction, and that, lacking an opportunity for easy conquest, they may resort to nuclear war, Americans would be very foolish to facilitate communist purposes by allowing the Kremlin freedom of action and by propping up the Soviet regime so that in all leisure it could acquire the weapons needed to destroy us. By contrast, a more accommodating policy might be wiser if our estimate of Soviet intentions were less grim.

In formulating a policy deemed optimal in terms of a given estimate, we must guard against undesirable feedbacks. For example, a hardening of Soviet offensive intent may result either from a firm *or* a soft U.S. policy; and once such hardening occurs, a U.S. policy shift may be desirable. The stockbroker knows very well that other brokers share his evaluation of a given stock and that a sudden buying or selling wave may completely change the initial prospect; such an event obligates him to reverse his advice. Similarly, a good intelligence estimator is keenly aware that a perfectly correct estimate may be invalidated through its acceptance and the resultant action. The greatest hazard of "op-

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timism" is that an estimate, according to which major aggression will not happen, actually may encourage such aggression. In January 1939 British intelligence advised the Cabinet that no major war was to be anticipated for the next ten years.

U.S. estimators have never reached basic agreement as to whether the Soviets would pursue the international revolution to the point of risking nuclear conflict. Only a minority believes that the Soviets are contemplating war. The majority has adhered to the conviction that despite the magnitude of communist ambitions, nuclear war is an unacceptable means of implementing these intentions and hence would occur only accidentally—or if the United States were foolish enough to press the USSR against the wall. Though the communists conveniently reinterpreted their ideology to support this conviction in the West, such reasoning deals not so much with Soviet intentions per se as with the objective feasibility of nuclear war. It reflects many implicit and some explicit assumptions concerning technological trends and future military force relationships.

Those who take the announced intentions of the communists seriously and have high regard for their operational skills believe that under the appropriate circumstances the Soviets will not shrink from nuclear war. They derive this estimate from their assessment that nuclear war could be rendered feasible through proper technological strategy, and that under many circumstances nuclear aggression could be successful and militarily "profitable." They do not accept the notion that nuclear attack *ipso facto* is an act of suicide.

During the past seven or eight years, those who believe the Soviets have been quietly abandoning their ultimate objective and, in any event, have given up their once strong commitment to completing the world revolution by means of war, have been growing in numbers. Some of these optimistic estimators detect changes in communist ideology and doctrine. Others aver that even in comparatively favorable conditions, responsible and rational leadership would find nuclear war unacceptable—and they explicitly assume that Soviet leadership is rational and responsible. Quite a few have concluded that it may be feasible to "persuade" the Soviets to discontinue the "arms race."

The contradiction between these two views of Soviet intentions is totally irreconcilable. One or the other estimate must be

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wrong: either the Soviets will risk war, given a good opportunity, or they will not attack under any circumstances.

The estimate according to which the Soviet government, at some time in the future and under propitious circumstances, may resort to nuclear attack upon the United States has been filed away in favor of the "semi-realistic" estimate that, were the communists to risk military action at all, the effort would be restricted to guerrilla operations in the underdeveloped areas. It is also deemed most likely that for the foreseeable future the Soviets will prefer to entrust acts of aggression to proxies. Should the proxies take initiatives *against* the Kremlin's wish, Moscow, when confronted with U.S. firmness, can be induced to bring such undisciplined radicals to heel. After all, the Kremlin will not tolerate the torpedoing of its policy of coexistence by underlings. Except that the Chinese may not obey: at this point American intelligence, in its inability to decide whether the Sino-Soviet split promises peace or war, begins to resemble Buridan's Ass.

The Influence of American "Mensheviks"

The United States, throughout recent history, has had a deep-seated urge to regard its opponents optimistically (while at the same time displaying pessimism about friends and allies). This optimism derives from disbelief that a rational statesman, in the face of the self-evident fact that even a victorious war would be economically disastrous, could decide upon war deliberately. It is nourished by a national inability to understand the psychology of crude power and to take any but the American ideology seriously. Nor do we have enough introspection to comprehend our own psychology as the *beatus possidens:* why would anyone be so foolish as to disturb the best of all possible worlds?

This tendency toward euphoria is stimulated today by experts who are given to ambivalent estimations of communism, who are inclined to argue that the barbaric phase of communism ended after Stalin's death, and who are confident that henceforth the Soviet Union will be governed by moderate and progressive rulers. True, American experts on communism are divided into two schools, but the optimists have achieved predominant influence and now benefit from a strong bandwagon complex. As a result, they wield considerable political power.

Lest this label of "optimist" be misunderstood, I want to make it clear that, although a member of the minority group, I still

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count myself among the optimists in the sense that I believe war with the Soviet Union can be avoided, *provided* the United States adheres to an effective strategy. Unlike those of my colleagues in the majority, I believe the effectiveness of our strategy is above all, but not exclusively, a function of American *strategic* strength. In the present context, the term "optimist" is used to describe such majority positions as the belief that the Soviets have, more or less definitely, renounced the use of nuclear war; that therefore the United States should limit itself to a minimal defense establishment and to minimal deterrence; that it could take substantial risks in abandoning certain strategic weapons systems and weakening some of our NATO commitments; that the Soviets are honestly trying to establish some sort of accommodation with the United States; and that as the United States takes initiatives exhibiting its good faith and confidence in Soviet intentions, the USSR will be increasingly interested in achieving a sensible *modus vivendi*.

Before anyone accepts one estimate or the other, it would be advisable to establish the intellectual and emotional orientation —the prejudgment or the *parti pris*—of the two sets of estimators. Neo-Marxist scholars have rightly insisted on the need to determine the "location" of spokesmen in the socio-political discourse. They like to ferret out whether a particular person speaks for the capitalists or the proletariat, or is a "rootless intellectual." In a broader sense, the usefulness of identifying political and strategic advisers would appear to be self-evident.

It is my contention that the majority group of U.S. experts on communism is best described as "menshevik" in their intellectual make-up. Though some may appear to be close to the ideology of European socialism, they actually differ substantially from the realists within the foremost socialist parties (perhaps with the exception of the British Labour Party). The term "menshevik" is accurate in a literal sense. Some of the most influential advisers in Washington, even as late as a few years ago, were in effect Russian mensheviks who before 1917 had fought against the bolsheviks, had stayed in Soviet Russia until about 1920-1922, were permitted to emigrate, largely to Germany and France, and during World War II came to the United States. This older group has largely disappeared from the scene, but it has been succeeded by a younger generation whose background is similar.

Of the few American-born experts on communism, many also

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are of Russian-menshevik origin. "Old American" experts include those who were students of menshevik-oriented teachers and those who still are naive enough to take menshevik expertise for granted, usually under the mistaken impression that no bias is involved. Some American-born experts fell under the sway of socialist concepts without recognizing that these no longer are as "liberal" as they think they are. This process was facilitated by the necessity for *all* experts to overspecialize in one or the other aspect of communism, and simultaneously to gloss over or disregard those broad subjects that are not discussed in communist publications.

Since identification of possible bias is a primary rule of all analysis, and a fortiori of strategic estimating, the time has come to face this issue squarely. The implication is by no means that the "menshevik" experts on communism are incompetent or mischievous, that they are necessarily wrong, let alone wrong on all points, or that they aim to further the cause of socialism in the United States and in the rest of the world. On the contrary, most of these men have done their work capably and conscientiously, and mankind is indebted to them for their many accomplishments. During the last war, when American illusions about communism reached their peak, the mensheviks were practically the only group that raised warning voices—and it took courage to do so. In some ways the mensheviks, because they are fully aware of the tyrannical nature of communism, and have strenuously opposed dictatorship and inhumanity—to the point that they have suffered for their convictions—are more "democratic" than the rest of us. Gradually, their socialism has become perfunctory and ritualistic; certainly, their residual socialist ideals do not supersede their commitment to democracy.

But praise of the ethical, idealistic and democratic orientation of menshevism, addressed to the mensheviks as individuals, is not meant to extol menshevik understanding of communism. The truth is that the mensheviks have often been mistaken in evaluating communist strategy during the last fifty years; they have an almost unbroken record of misunderstanding communist operations. It is not widely recognized that these experts, for the most part, have remained under the sway of menshevik thought patterns. Their analyses have been accepted as objective and well-informed by American audiences and decision-makers. In particular, estimates on the crucial question of war or peace, as rou-

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tinely expounded in American journals, magazines, editorials and political speeches, have been permeated by menshevik preconceptions. The fact is that a great deal of cross-fertilization occurs between governmental and "private" estimating.

The mensheviks understand clearly the philosophical portions of the communist doctrine and remain alert to the Kremlin's ideological switches. But they fail to understand bolshevik power psychology and conflict management techniques. Their socialist idealism also makes it difficult for them to comprehend those types of "unethical" actions at which the bolsheviks excel. If they *had* understood those elements, the mensheviks and not the bolsheviks might rule Russia today.

Similarly, menshevik devotion to the ideal of peace precludes understanding of a mind that could coolly calculate the advantages or disadvantages of nuclear war. To these reformers-by-instinct the concept of a nuclear war which would be fought for the worldwide establishment of socialism is both an abomination and an incomprehensible paradox. Such incredulity concerning the reality of aggressiveness unites the ethical socialist with the pragmatically profit-oriented "capitalist."

As a part of their heritage, the mensheviks are given to inventing reform "schemes" whose adoption they recommend in lieu of strategies designed to neutralize power through power. To give a Labour Party example: During World War II, the late Harold Lasky suggested that in order to defeat the Nazis, Britain should reform its school system and free India. Regardless of the merit of such schemes in their own right, even the best school reform would not have defeated the Luftwaffe, nor could it have been carried out while Nazi planes were overhead. But many mensheviks—like many Americans—are suspicious of power and tend to believe that "social action" can be substituted for it.

Emotional attachment to the ideals of socialism has kept alive an attitude of hope that the prodigal son in the Kremlin ultimately will return to the father's mansion. Hence Soviet decisions and trends are recurrently viewed as irretrievable steps toward normalization, and reform schemes appear to be ever more attractive.

Finally, with the exception of a few Caucasians, the mensheviks, practically to a man, are ethnic Russians or "russified" Jews. Thus they are inclined to belittle the nationality problem within the Soviet Union and within the bloc, and sometimes they are not

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free from subconscious commitments to the cultural mission of the Great Russians and even to Russian nationalism. Fears about the fate of "Russia" and worry about reorganization of the Russian empire on the basis of the nationality principle and the principle of self-determination, have colored the judgment of many experts, sometimes avowedly so. It may or may not be a desirable objective to preserve "Russia" as a multinational empire; but American decision-makers must decide such problems in the light of American understanding of American interests. Biased or interested expertise surely is out of place, especially if dissenting judgments are effectively silenced. In any event, our difficulty in understanding the national tensions within the Soviet Union leads to overestimation of negotiation and patience as a means to diminish the conflict; and to underestimation of the depth and permanence of the war danger.

In brief, as long as menshevik-oriented experts stay within their spiritual tradition, they will remain unable to visualize the range of alternative Soviet courses of action and they cannot be expected to provide dependable guidance on Soviet strategy.

Thomas W. Wolfe on Soviet Strategy

The mensheviks have been "intellectual politicians." Most of them made their living in the liberal professions; only a few acquired some governmental and military experience. The younger generation includes persons who served as "consultants," but their background is predominantly academic. The irrelevance of their judgments on nuclear strategy therefore should be plain. Yet the power of the intellectual *ambiance* created by latter-day menshevism is surprisingly pervasive. This is amply demonstrated by a recent book written by an American-born expert who cannot in any way be described as a "menshevik" or a socialist, but who nevertheless, in his essential argument if not in his qualifying remarks, has succumbed to the attraction of menshevik optimism. The case is the more interesting because this author has all the necessary insights into communist operations and as a professional soldier is up-to-date on modern technology. He is Thomas W. Wolfe, and his highly successful book is entitled *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*.[3]

Thomas Wolfe is one of the best qualified Americans to write estimates on Soviet strategy. He served as an outstandingly suc-

[3]Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 342 pp. $5.95.

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cessful Air Attaché in Moscow and in varying capacities has studied Soviet affairs for more than twenty years. In addition to this vast practical experience, Wolfe possesses the customary academic union cards, degrees and titles. He is presently a senior staff member of the RAND Corporation, the nation's foremost breeding ground of experts, which over the years has made many and valuable contributions to governmental assessments of the Soviet threat.

Wolfe's book is important and instructive, and its argument is well-documented and persuasively presented. The author seems to be speaking for the majority of intelligence estimators and academic experts. Since his message is finding wide credence, and since it concerns the crux of national security, this is one of the most significant books of recent years.

Because the very merits of Wolfe's work may pose an added risk to the security of this country, I feel duty-bound to warn against some of his possible misinterpretations of Soviet strategy. I hasten to add that Thomas Wolfe is a personal friend of mine, in whose integrity I repose full confidence. *Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.* As for our differing estimates of Soviet strategy, I hope that Wolfe is right and Possony wrong.

Wolfe's primary thesis is that Soviet strategy has arrived at a crossroads where the Kremlin will be forced to make some basic and painful decisions. Those who have read my article, "The Challenge of Russian Totalitarianism,"[4] will know that I am in agreement with this thesis. I also agree that much of the Soviet quandary is caused by such troubles as scarcity of resources, the conflict with China, and uncertainties about optimal strategies, including doubts concerning the most advantageous structure of the Soviet armed forces and differences of opinion on weapons technology.

Wolfe presents documentary evidence that there are arguments among Soviet military leaders about the types of war that the Soviet Union should prepare for, and the types of war that should be avoided. The United States should not take those disputes too seriously. At all times and at all places, military traditionalists and progressivists have been arguing. In the Soviet Union, where few marshals ever fade away, where flag ranks are broken down into more levels than other types of ratings, and where the majority of the officers with great reputations began

[4]ORBIS, Winter 1965, pp. 761-789.

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their careers in the ground forces, traditionalism must be strong. In the absence of forceful censorship, this traditionalism is bound to be heard against the radicals who, inevitably, are inhibited because they necessarily argue on the basis of the new technology, that is, of facts that must remain classified. Moreover, the truly influential progressives are on active duty, while the traditionalist spokesmen are mostly retired.

Much of the debate we read about comes to our attention because Moscow has eased the rules of censorship, even with respect to political arguments. The traditionalist line emphasizing the need for large ground forces surely is acceptable because the army discharges major functions of internal and bloc security and also serves as an indispensable "transmission belt" for the dictatorship. Parts of the "strategic debate" assisted in the de-Stalinization process and other parts may be of assistance to the planners.

Were the United States located on the European or Asian continent, it would make a decisive difference whether Soviet preparations are in accord with military progressivism or traditionalism. But an attack against this country cannot be carried out by foot soldiers or tanks; it must be executed by strategic weapons systems. Hence the celebrated debate—even if it does have doctrinal relevance and assuming that the Soviet deception machinery did not fake part of it—deals with the entirely secondary question of how much ground force is necessary *in addition* to the strategic systems.

Of course, the size of the strategic forces, as well as of all other forces, is under debate, but to know this we merely need deductive reasoning. On the strength of mere deduction it is also reasonably safe to conclude that, whatever bearing the public military debate may have on the short run, in the long run the Soviets will not attack unless and until their strategic weapons systems are capable of defeating the United States. What did we learn that we did not know before?

Wolfe's allegation that the Soviets are particularly impressed by the destructiveness of nuclear war is essentially unsubstantiated. Any military planner knows that nuclear weapons may cause extensive destruction. But if he knows his métier, he also knows that under certain circumstances such weapons need not cause more destruction than the implements of past conflicts; and obviously, destructiveness depends on yield and target selection, to name just two of many variables. Circumstances can be visual-

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ized where nuclear weapons may allow the highest military efficiency and achieve the greatest results with the least destruction. Destructiveness is *not* a constant.

The task of a professional military planner is to see to it that war can be fought effectively; a planner who considers nuclear war infeasible is the wrong man for the job. In the Soviet Union, presumably, such a "planner" would be transferred, for example to command a warehouse. It is the task of Soviet planners to arrange things in such a way that should war be decided upon—and regardless of whether their assignment is to cause maximum destruction in the United States—there will be minimum destruction in the Soviet Union. It may not be feasible at a given time to fight an effective or "safe" nuclear war, but on the basis of what we know about communist operational doctrine and practice we must assume, first, that the main task of Soviet planners is to solve precisely this problem of feasibility, and, second, that Soviet strategists will not decide to launch a major attack before the problem is solved and before an exploitable opportunity presents itself. We may also be reasonably certain that Soviet planners, brought up in the intellectual tradition of Leninism, will not be concerned with destructiveness as an abstract problem. In their minds, this is an entirely concrete problem allowing specific and variable solutions. Meanwhile, the abstraction that nuclear war, *ipso facto,* must be the most destructive event in human history, is being turned to psychopolitical advantage. It is disturbing to see how the computer-minded, clever West trembles before abstractions suggested to us by our own fears.

The assessment of what constitutes "acceptable" loss in one's own country (and perhaps in the enemy state) differs with national tradition and type and strength of political motivation. Within the same country it may fluctuate from government to government. "Acceptability" is a variable which shows different values in Moscow and Washington. Even in Moscow this factor must necessarily vary between those who are strongly or weakly committed to the ultimate communist objective.

The point is fundamental because Western decision-makers uncritically assume that the alleged lethality of nuclear war, which *they* take for granted, is bound to paralyze the Kremlin and ultimately tame communist aggressiveness. As a typical line of reasoning goes, if the Soviets can be assured, for example through U.S. maintenance of a sizeable deterrent, that retaliation inevitably

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will cause "unacceptably" high losses, war will become "unthinkable." This is the modern version of Ivan Bloch's widely publicized hope of some seventy-five years ago that the machine gun had put an end to war; it is wrong for the same reasons that Bloch was proven wrong.

A hypothetical example will serve as an illustration. Assume that the U.S. strategic force consists of 1,000 Minutemen and 700 Polaris; each missile has a warhead of 1 megaton. Assume also that a Soviet first strike knocks out 900 Minutemen, that 235 Polaris are caught in port, and that two-thirds of the remaining Polaris and one-half of the remaining Minutemen are intercepted by Soviet ballistic missile defenses. Thus, some 200 missiles or 200 megatons would strike the Soviet Union. If these weapons were directed against urban areas exclusively, practically all the cities in the Soviet Union could be destroyed; but the Soviets would have been careful to evacuate most of the urban population beforehand. The 200 megatons would result in the destruction of industry and housing, but would not cause a very high number of casualties.

Such a prospect would hardly deter the Soviets, *provided* they were reasonably certain their first strike would effectively disarm the United States. If their attack destroyed U.S. power, the communists would have exchanged their dilapidated housing for world dominion—the industrial loss could be recouped in Europe.

Of course other "war-gaming" assumptions can be made. It can be just as easily "proved" that the Soviet Union would find the strategic exchange unacceptable. In the abstract it also can be demonstrated that the USSR—or the U.S.—would necessarily be defeated and destroyed. The point is that the feasibility or infeasibility of nuclear war is a function of the respective quantitative and qualitative capabilities, as well as of the will, of the belligerents. Estimates *in vacuo* are meaningless. To be valid, an estimate must be tied to concrete force and dynamic moral relationships. This is objectively true. It is also a central point in Soviet methodology. In Western doctrinal tradition, there surely has been a full realization of purpose, morale and will—but those factors do not seem to interest our current crop of experts, including Thomas Wolfe.

Wolfe asserts that uncertainty exists among Soviet military thinkers about "whether nuclear war can any longer be regarded as a rational instrument of policy." It is doubtful that he found

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this wording in any Soviet text. Again the argument revolves around an abstraction. He admits that "Soviet military theorists and ideologists continue publicly to spurn the concept 'no victor' in modern war," but asserts that "real doubt appears to be at work in the minds of many Soviet leaders whether in fact anything which could meaningfully be called victory could be salvaged after the damage the Soviet Union would suffer in a nuclear war." (pp. 9-10.) Wolfe reassures us that the dogma of inevitable communist victory has been eroding. "Increasing doubt as to its validity has evidently seeped into the consciousness of the top leadership and helped to alter their perspectives on fundamental problems of war and peace." (p. 71.) A similar estimate was made by the mensheviks on the eve of the October revolution. And no menshevik has yet understood Stalin's strategy through which he provoked World War II—in fact, the subject is taboo in the polite society of Soviet experts.

It should be stated clearly that Wolfe presents no evidence which would prove that the Soviet leaders are now beset by doubts about the feasibility of ultimate communist victory. This is entirely the author's interpretation. Would this abstraction apply to *all* concrete strategic situations? Hardly.

Whether Wolfe's interpretation is right or wrong, an estimator is entitled to go beyond the evidence. But if and when he switches to the making of deductive inferences, he must indicate that he is doing so. This is a methodological ground rule that Wolfe has failed to observe. It is particularly regrettable that he has done so in discussing the matter of confidence in victory which, inevitably, affects strategy in all of its aspects. If indeed the Soviets have lost confidence, then for all practical purposes the Cold War and the technological race are drawing to a close. But if Wolfe is wrong, then we are only passing through a lull and the conflict will be stepped up presently. The odds are that the more energetic and resourceful among the communist leaders have not yet given up their most ambitious goals.

The allegedly growing doubt in the ultimate triumph of communism is partly the cause and partly the effect of uncertainties about optimal strategy. But since conceptual difficulties exist together with material handicaps, Soviet freedom of action has become increasingly limited. Hence, Wolfe argues, the Soviets have been seeking a *détente* with the United States. In other words, the *détente* does not result from peacefulness, but is merely the good

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old *peredyshka* method of gaining time. Since a *détente* of sorts is in effect, however, Soviet leaders are deemed now to be beset by additional doubts about whether or not it might be useful to pursue the collaboration with the United States for its own sake. Wolfe implies that the fruits of Soviet-American collaboration taste so sweet that the Soviet leaders may decide to call off the communist revolution. Would this not lead to a further implication, namely, that although ideological appearances might continue to be observed, the communists *qua* communists might bow out of the political business voluntarily?

Wolfe probably would deny that such an anticipation is implied in his analysis. It might be useful, therefore, to present the estimate in his own words: "The chances are that neither party to the dispute [among Chinese and Russian communists] is any more eager than the other to invite a nuclear war, but . . . they differ in their estimates of how far it is safe to go in exerting pressure upon the West without serious risk of precipitating war." (p. 71.) This would be entirely acceptable as an assessment of the current situation in which the communists continue to remain weaker than the United States. But Wolfe ends the book with the expectation, unqualified and unlimited as to time, that though international crises "of a grave sort will arise from time to time," "if the experience of the nuclear age to date is a reliable guide, one might also expect such crises to stimulate further remedial efforts to improve cooperation and communication between the adversary parties, which may serve, hopefully, to keep the East-West conflict under control."

This happy-ending estimate means, *first,* the Cold War will continue in a fashion; *second,* there will be improved cooperation and communication; and *third,* the danger probably will lessen. In other words, the status quo is here to stay, only it will become increasingly better. There is one qualification: Wolfe assumes that there will be no sudden transformation in human affairs "by hitherto unknown political and social inventions." Amazingly, this caveat does not include the warning that an upset could also result from unforeseen technological changes.

This is "menshevism" at its purest. The estimate is invalidated by its own qualifications, however timidly those were presented. If one thing remains certain, it is that there *will* be "unknown" political, social and technological changes. Many of the events taking place today are still "unknown" to us and will become

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manifest only at a later time. Static reasoning cannot be applied to dynamic processes.

What is the evidence for all this cheerfulness? Pentagon and RAND censors and editors may have had an impact on Wolfe's text. For such interference, if it did occur, the author cannot be blamed, but it would be unusual if the censors, instead of simply cutting text, suggested wording and argument. Wolfe found his evidence in the published writings of Soviet military officers, and speeches by Khrushchev, Malinovsky and a few other party luminaries: the tedium of reading this material was rewarded by good news.

This is not meant to be facetious. Wolfe set himself the task of examining precisely those texts, and he has done so with skill. There is no question that such "communications" have a certain importance. The Soviets use speech-making and professional writing to communicate within the CPSU, the communist world movement, and the communist military establishments. Consequently, it is possible to draw certain conclusions from such materials, and careful analysis may provide insights for strategic estimates.

As already indicated, one can accept the inferences concerning the confusion of Soviet leaders with respect to a number of strategic questions. However, such inferences can be confirmed through independent, problem-oriented analysis of modern war and of the military tasks a would-be aggressor would have to solve before attacking the United States. Soviet statements which can be interpreted in terms of the real world may permit reasonably valid deductions regarding Kremlin intentions, but statements that are confirmed merely by other statements are at best markers or indicators; at worst they are deceptions. Wolfe ignores both the confirmation and the deception problem. Do any of the military writings on which Wolfe relies contain deceptive elements? Are speeches by Khrushchev and Malinovsky nondeceptive in all their relevant passages? The reader is entitled to know.

Moreover, how tenable is Wolfe's interpretation of the texts? Wolfe asserts that there was a "revision" in 1956 by Khrushchev "of the long-held communist dogma on the inevitability of an eventual war to the death between the capitalist and communist systems." This incorrect rendering *both* of the alleged dogma and of its alleged revision by Khrushchev does not reflect *Soviet* deception; it is in the nature of *self-deception* or simply careless

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exegesis. With respect to such crucial points as the communist doctrine on war the utmost accuracy and the greatest caution would appear to be mandatory.

Another example: Wolfe writes that "the development of a coherent doctrine of space warfare seems to have been inhibited by the necessity to preserve a propaganda image of the Soviet Union." (p. 205.) If instead of "development" Wolfe had written "publication" or "disclosure," he would have been on sounder ground. As it is, he not only goes far beyond the evidence, but he distorts the communist *modus operandi*. For that matter, in no effectively run government would the need for a propaganda image inhibit the formulation of an operationally needed doctrine.

Also, since Wolfe does not disclose how much of the published literature he used, there is no certainty that his sample is representative. Some gaps are apparent. For example, the reissuance of the works by Marshal Tukhachevsky and the rehabilitation of this Soviet marshal are not mentioned. Yet, in view of the content of Tukhachevsky's writings, this revalidation was more than just an exercise in historical justice. A two-volume *History of Military Art,* edited by Marshal Rotmistrov, one of the most intelligent Soviet strategists, is mentioned only in a discussion of a review. A passage is quoted from the preface and a number of Rotmistrov's articles are cited, but the basic text apparently was not used. Marshal Yeremenko's books as well as a work by Marshal Rokossovsky, chief inspector of the Soviet armed forces, are ignored. Perhaps those texts are too historical and therefore appear irrelevant. But it would seem to be a dubious method to rely mostly on articles and to ignore basic histories and treatises, including those older texts which would have provided much-needed historical depth. Such an oversight is particularly serious in this analysis, because Soviet military theoreticians are strongly history-oriented.

The sharp criticism to which Marshal Sokolovsky's tome was subjected by Chinese and North Vietnamese strategic writers was considered unworthy of comment. Yet the intracommunist argument is now featured prominently in the literature of the Progressive Labor Party right here in the United States. Communist literature spread all over the world leaves no doubt that orthodox Leninists reject—and must reject—the very texts to which Wolfe ascribes so much significance.

Incidentally, the military journals and magazines from which

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Wolfe quotes so copiously contain reams of aggressive and offensive anti-American propaganda. This output serves just as much to indoctrinate Soviet military leadership as the more staid doctrinal cerebrations. To understand the psychopolitical implications of the doctrinal argument, the correlated propaganda indoctrination, especially because it is directed against the United States, should have been mentioned.

One finding of Wolfe's analysis is that strategic difficulties, in addition to conditioning the Kremlin against war, will result in improved "cooperation." But this interpretation of semi-technical military texts is hardly in line with what Soviet military papers regularly say about the United States. If cooperation is in the offing, why is cooperation not being preached? Wolfe might retort that dialectics and deception provide the answer. Quite so, but if dialectics and deception are significant factors, they must also be considered in the analysis of the doctrinal texts.

A more important implication is that Leninism has died in the Soviet Union, and thus has become a sectarian underground movement within the Communist Party. Wolfe would surely agree that this is a far-fetched inference. But in this case, much of Wolfe's interpretation also becomes far-fetched. If Leninism is still alive, as a way of thinking, a mental conditioner, and a useful guide to action—Leninism *is* an operationally usable system—it is not permissible to ignore its continuing existence. It is not an acceptable methodology to base the interpretation of Soviet texts on American concepts, without cross-checking what other Marxists have to say on the subject. (Incidentally, with respect to Western sources, Wolfe adheres to the practice of "closed shop quotations," i.e., using quotations mostly from those writers with whom the author is organizationally linked.) Wolfe's version may even coincide with that of the Progressive Labor Party, and the Chinese and the North Vietnamese parties, for, in effect, they all claim that the CPSU has become "revisionist." But it is still mandatory to establish what Leninist thought on nuclear strategy might be and to test the hypothesis of "revisionism." It is more than doubtful that the CPSU has in fact slipped from the Leninist fold, and still more doubtful that even if the "revisionists" have taken over, the Leninists will never return to power. If those are the kinds of assumptions from which Wolfe's findings are derived, they should be accepted, modified or rejected

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after explicit and systematic debate, not smuggled into the book without examination.

The trend in the menshevik interpretation of communist strategy has been to ignore Lenin and Leninism. The "memory-hole," of which our experts are fond, happens to be larger in Americans than in the communists. Our experts seem to believe that only recent statements count. Wolfe is far better than some of his colleagues who have managed to write books on Soviet strategy without showing the slightest awareness of Lenin's lasting contributions to the theory of estimating and the doctrine of war. Even Wolfe deals with Lenin most sparingly. He, moreover, ignores the entire body of strategic thought produced by the Communist Party—as distinct from individual communists.

The results of such an incredible omission are: *First,* the thought pattern of communism is missed and the reconstruction bears on unrelated details instead of a *Gestalt*—the forest is not seen for the trees. *Second,* some key conflict techniques, including those correlated with military strategy, such as penetration, espionage and provocative instigation of conflict, are simply "forgotten." *Third,* Wolfe talks about "Soviet strategy" without bothering to explain that Soviet strategy (i.e., the strategy of the USSR) and military strategy are merely parts of a superordinated communist strategy. This is so despite the fact that communist strategy, or most of it, is decided in, and controlled from, the Kremlin. More than a fine terminological distinction is involved: communist strategy is a far broader concept than Soviet strategy and it applies to additional dimensions of decision-making. The practical significance is that problems which may appear insoluble within the framework of Soviet strategy may be more easily solved within the capability-context of communist strategy.

It is inadmissible that crucial distinctions of this nature are ignored, to the point that the precise meaning of the book's title remains unexplained. The truth is, the book deals with only a *segment* of Soviet military strategy. To provide the United States with a proper estimate, the topic covered—nuclear strategy —needed a discussion within the framework of the military strategy of the USSR, the grand strategy of the USSR, and communist strategy.

But even within those narrow, self-imposed limitations, distortions occur. According to Wolfe, a Soviet political commentator "repudiated" Lenin's dictum "adapted from Clausewitz" that war

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is the continuation of politics by violent means. This surprising commentator "changed" Lenin's formula to read that "war can be a continuation only of folly." (p. 72.) No communist, even when he was writing during 1963 in Adzhubei's *Izvestiya,* ever "repudiated" Lenin. If such repudiation had taken place, it would have been a major event; even had there been a *sotto voce* or implied repudiation, the incident would have been tantamount to striking the devil from medieval theology. The particular statement was printed on September 24, 1963, during an especially acrimonious phase of the dispute with China, in the midst of the negotiations about the wheat deal with the United States and on the eve of the U.S. Senate's ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty. The odds are that it served a specific purpose at the time, or Wolfe quoted it out of context. If it amounted to repudiation, Wolfe would have to prove the point, not merely assert it.

For that matter, the Clausewitz-Lenin dictum is not doctrinal but is in the nature of a "protocol sentence" on war and its relation to politics. It happens to be an objectively correct statement which, just as the specific gravity of water is identical on both sides of the Iron Curtain, is as pertinent in the United States as in the Soviet Union.

In summary, Wolfe's methodology is deficient on the level of textual exegesis. He does not employ methods that would have allowed a dependable understanding of the meaning of the texts he analyzed. He failed to consider the sociological setting of "Soviet strategy," including the workings of dictatorship in general and of communist and Russian dictatorship in particular. Finally, he did not evaluate the role which the generals play within the communist state and conflict apparatus, and he leaves the erroneous impression that the military are the top strategists of communism.

Wolfe's mistakes place him within the mainstream of American Sovietology. I trust that this detailed critique of current analytical customs may result in reconsideration of the manner in which the American people are "estimating" the dangers against which they seek protection.

Conclusions

Communist leaders probably do find it difficult to formulate a prescription for victory, not because they are lacking suitable "concepts," but because they are experiencing troubles in acquiring the requisite capabilities. To achieve a war-winning posture,

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the doctrinally correct procedure is to reduce the requirement by preliminarily weakening the opponent through conflict techniques which lie outside the framework of strictly military strategy. This strategic task must be executed by "forces" other than those under the control of the marshals. Wolfe does not breathe a word about those elementary matters that were clarified by Stalin more than forty years ago and which remain as valid as the insights of Clausewitz, Napoleon, Mahan, Foch or Liddell Hart. Soviet strategists know these basic principles better than their U.S. counterparts know the latest baseball scores. The whole complex is taboo among American experts.

It also might be useful to remember the firmly held, and objectively correct, communist notion that the international revolution—an operation or process not deemed worthy of comment in Wolfe's book—passes through ebbs and tides. Currently, on the main intercontinental theater of conflict, the revolution is at ebb. Hence, even if there were no technological time lags and no need for further economic development in the USSR, it would only be reasonable for the Kremlin to program a *gradual* military buildup. To accelerate now would be foolish. But the fact remains that the arms the Soviets have been procuring step-by-step are precisely the ones that will be needed to defeat the United States—granted that greater quantities and better quality weapons will be indispensable. Therefore, a systematic buildup and steady weapons improvements at least cost, with a minimum of international commotion, characterize Soviet strategy in the present epoch.

The specific date when the Soviet Union might achieve a war-winning posture depends largely on technological developments and on U.S. as well as Soviet decisions. Such a posture may never be attained; but if the United States adheres indefinitely to its present theory that a technological "plateau" has been reached, this ominous date might be advanced.

Suppose the Soviets have attained a war-winning capacity. In such a contingency, I doubt that Thomas Wolfe would stand by the proposition that the Soviets will not exploit the opportunity. Actually, if they possess a substantial superiority, they would not need to use their firepower. The nuclear war could be waged psychologically and politically, and not a single Soviet soldier or civilian would be hurt.

The counter-argument is that U.S. policy never will be so

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imprudent as to provide the communists with such an opening. This is quite reasonable, and let us hope it is true. But prudence is not a matter of predestination. In terms of estimating, the problem is this: Suppose the Soviet Union did not exist and the United States, therefore, was free to reduce its military budget by 99 per cent. In this case we could estimate with full confidence that Canada, Britain and France would not attack the United States. In the equivalent example, could we have the same confident expectation with respect to Moscow? Surely Wolfe does not approach that degree of optimism. If this is true, his argument is lacking still another full dimension of analysis.

Will—years from now—communist leadership change its psychology fundamentally? To estimate the psychology of future communist leaders is impossible. We also are unable to predict reliably who at any given time will emerge victorious from the intraparty power struggle; nor can we forecast the motivational strength of communist leaders in the face of various future international developments. We cannot predetermine the military and political force relationships that will exist at future junctures. We cannot tell whether five, ten or twenty years from now there will, or will not, arise within the communist camp a strategist of Napoleon's or Stalin's stature, who not only will believe in victory, but who will figure out practical ways through which the United States could be defeated. Hence we have no choice but to "estimate" that war is *not* unthinkable or even "remote" but remains within the realm of possibility. More particularly, the permanent danger of war must remain the primary assumption underlying U.S. defense policy.

To recognize the everlasting danger of war, the government does not need an intelligence service supported by a legion of outside optimists. It needs only the common-sense insight that, irrespective of what communist writers say or fail to say, the precedent of known history cannot be disregarded. War can be prevented, *provided* we do not aggravate the problem by assuming a priori that no war danger exists. We must be realistic enough to remain stronger than the putative aggressor—and peaceful enough to turn a new leaf as soon as we have firm evidence that due to fundamental and permanent socio-political changes (not merely alterations of verbal patterns), the danger of war has passed. Until that day comes, the country must ensure that our estimates have a greater survival value than siren songs.

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Comment by Thomas W. Wolfe

I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment briefly on the critical analysis of *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* which appears in the foregoing article by my long-time friend Dr. Stefan T. Possony, whose views on the subject of Soviet strategy are perhaps less distant from my own than his article might suggest. The main point on which we are in essential agreement is that the United States can best ensure its security and minimize the danger of war by being, as Possony puts it, "realistic enough to remain stronger than the putative aggressor—and peaceful enough to turn a new leaf as soon as we have firm evidence that due to fundamental and permanent socio-political changes (not merely alterations of verbal patterns), the danger of war has passed."

The differences between Possony and me seen to center chiefly on the question of change within the Soviet system. He believes, I gather, that the system and the men who run it have remained to date relatively immune to change. This position, it seems to me, hardly holds up in the face of the record—either on the level of Soviet verbal patterns or on that of Soviet behavior. At the same time, as I noted in the Introduction to my book, there is wide room for disparate views on the nature of change within Soviet society and the directions in which it may lead.

Dr. Possony's principal concern seems to be that recognition of the process of change at work within the Soviet system also implies a belief that change is necessarily in a benign direction. This may be true of some interpreters of the Soviet scene, but it is certainly not the message that my book was meant to convey. Quite the contrary.

Without rehearsing the arguments here, it was my contention that the Soviet leadership under Khrushchev found itself obliged to cope with numerous problems and changing conditions arising out of the new technological and political environment of the modern world. Whether the steps the Soviet leadership might take toward solution of its problems would lead to eventual mellowing of the Soviet system and a less dangerous world for the rest of us was left very much an open question. It was in this sense that the Soviet leadership was said to be at a crossroads, where its policy decisions would bear significantly upon the future

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character of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Khrushchev's successors seem likewise burdened by the same underlying choice which confronted him, namely, whether they are willing to assume a greater share of mutual responsibility for a stable world in the nuclear age at the sacrifice of potential opportunities for political advance.

The final returns on this question are not yet in, nor are they likely ever to become evident at one fell swoop. Short of some millennial solution, which I for one do not foresee, the problem of political competition between the rival systems will remain with us, along with the attendant risk of a devastating war which both sides have thus far found it in their interest to avoid. The proposition that U.S. policy should continue to make the prospect of nuclear war unattractive to the Soviet leadership is one with which I have no quarrel, nor does my book suggest otherwise. In the meantime, whatever its other shortcomings may be, I would find it difficult to agree with Possony that my effort to illuminate the issues of strategy and defense policy which stand before the Soviet leadership can properly be described as a surrender to the "attraction of menshevik optimism."

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THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: A FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY

by Frank N. Trager

THE shooting along the Indian-Pakistan border has ceased temporarily. Once again the United Nations, acting with unusual unanimity in the Security Council, has persuaded Pakistan and India to accept a cease-fire, "as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters." It has been trying without success since 1947 to promote such a settlement. Pakistan has frequently, but India has never, accepted the UN bases for a settlement of the Kashmir issue. During the latest crisis, Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire was dramatically coupled with a "last chance for the Security Council" announcement by Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto, who warned that "Pakistan will have to leave the UN" unless a solution is found.

Pakistan's most recent outburst over Kashmir has been directed largely against the United States for its failure to bring India to terms. Pakistani demonstrators burned the USIS library in Karachi and also demanded that their government withdraw from Western alliances, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), sponsored during the early 1950's by the United States. Why did Pakistan, after so many years as a staunch U.S. ally, begin to act in the manner of a neutral state? Did Pakistan's leaders have just cause for threatening to quit the UN and would they lead Pakistan out of the Free World alliance system? To what extent has the United States failed to discharge its responsibilities as an ally to Pakistan? And what can be done to rebuild the former close relationship between Pakistan and the United States? These are some of the questions to which we shall address ourselves here.

With sometimes brilliant diplomacy and always single-tracked purpose Pakistan, under every government since independence in 1947, balanced her original weakness, smaller size and other shortcomings against the larger, better-known, and more widely respected India. This much was achieved by a two-pronged diplomatic offensive.

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After partition and several years of hostile relations with India, Pakistan deliberately sought allies. In her view, as her ambassador to the United States said in 1960, it had been necessary to choose between "uncertain neutrality," a "shortsighted" policy, and a "firm alliance with the United States" and others. In this speech before the American Academy of Political Science, Ambassador Ahmed restated the case for an alliance system in Asia, emphasizing the threats to which the newly independent countries have been subjected. These alliances were essential, he continued, for "security, stability and development"; they were "instruments for deterring attacks"—from Moscow and Peking. On many occasions during the 1950's leading Pakistan spokesmen pointed out that by folly, miscalculation or design, or simply out of fear, neutralists ended up by adding their weight to that of the totalitarian bloc on critical issues in what President John F. Kennedy called the "global civil war."

Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO and to this day is the only Asian member of both of these pacts, one of which looks westward to a defense line extending to Iran and Turkey and the other eastward to Thailand and the Philippines. She also signed a bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States and a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation "designed further to reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO."[1] The military agreement has involved Pakistan as an airbase in such U.S. enterprises as the U-2 overflights. The Pakistani have not forgotten that Moscow threatened to obliterate Peshawar, which served as the takeoff base for the U-2 plane brought down at Sverdlovsk in 1960. Nor have they forgotten that, by and large since 1955, the USSR has treated India as a "progressive" client state, while considering Pakistan a "reactionary" one. Moscow has established relationships which accord with these Marxist terms. Pakistan came to regard itself as a firm ally of the West, tailored its policies accordingly, and stood ready to take the consequences of its alliance policy.

The second objective of Pakistan diplomacy was settlement of the Kashmir question and other issues resulting from partition. Pakistan's obsessive preoccupation with India and Kashmir has dominated her foreign policy and dictated many of her international actions, including, of course, her alliance policy. But

[1]Pakistan President Mohammed Ayub Khan wrote in the January 1964 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (p. 195) that Pakistan is "sometimes termed America's most allied ally in Asia."

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not without cause. "For so long as Indian and Pakistan troops continue to stand facing each other along the [17-year] cease-fire line in Kashmir and along the Indo-Pakistan border, instead of facing outward, so long would Indo-Pakistan tension remain and the two countries would not be able to cooperate in the vital field of defense, without which the security of the entire region would remain in jeopardy."[2] Pakistan has never tired of reminding the United States and her other Western allies that she expected their support in her conflict with India over Kashmir. Her patience wore thin after the United States and the United Kingdom aided India in the border fray with Communist China in 1962. Pakistan insisted that such aid to India, especially the major military components, and the military and other aid which India had been receiving from Moscow since 1955, would upset the delicate balance between the two countries. For this development she placed considerable blame on Washington. Faith in the United States as a loyal ally was severely undermined.

A Pakistani wit, writing in August 1963, said, "India is now a mistress of the West but claims chastity. Pakistan, the legally wedded wife, is now threatening divorce action citing India as a co-respondent." He was obviously summing up Pakistan's anguish over the U.S. role in aiding India in her 1962 border fight with Communist China while failing at the same time to extract from India any commitment to accept a compromise solution to the long-standing Indo-Pakistan conflict. For after the Sino-Indian shooting had stopped, the late Prime Minister Nehru flatly declared "India's case [against Pakistan] is watertight."[3] Since then other Indian statesmen have declared that India will maintain a position of "equal proximity" to Moscow and the West.

In September 1963 U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball was sent to Pakistan in an effort to reverse the deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the United States. He sought to reassure the Pakistani that their doubts and criticism regarding the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, expressed in the July 1963 National Assembly debates, were ill-founded. During that summer President Ayub Khan had removed S. K. Dehlavi, the then Foreign Secretary (Permanent Under Secretary) of Pakistan's External Affairs Ministry, and had replaced him with the former Ambassador to Washington, Aziz Ahmed. Dehlavi had been instrumental

[2]Aziz Ahmed, "Our Response to Changing Pressures in Asia." Address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, April 8, 1960.
[3]*New York Times,* April 17, 1963.

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in arranging the Pakistan-Communist China border settlement, while Ahmed had been a strong spokesman for U.S.-Pakistan friendship—on the basis of a tough line with India. Ball arrived in the temporary capital, Rawalpindi, shortly after the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) had suspended a $4.3 million loan for the improvement of the airport at Dacca in East Pakistan. This U.S. action was designed to show U.S. displeasure with Pakistan for having established air transport and landing rights between Karachi, Dacca and Communist China, and for signing a Commercial Treaty and Barter Agreement with Peking earlier in 1963. The State Department, seemingly ignoring the long-standing Karachi-Peking relationship—Pakistan was among the first to recognize Communist China in 1950 and exported jute and cotton to China from that date—termed the 1963 agreements between the Asian states "an unfortunate breach in free world solidarity." Secretary Ball left Pakistan without the publication even of a politely worded joint communiqué.

U.S.-Pakistan relations have continued to deteriorate since 1963. During the recent fighting between Pakistan and India, President Mohammed Ayub Khan asked Washington for direct diplomatic intervention. Washington, however, had already decided to place its hopes in the UN peace-making efforts. The USSR concurred in this approach, thereby making it feasible, but Moscow also invited President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to meet with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in Tashkent for a three-way "summit talk," and they accepted this offer.

This brief review shows how U.S.-Pakistan relations have waxed and waned ever since the Begum and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States at the personal invitation of President Truman in April 1950. In 1954 and subsequent years, Pakistan joined with the United States in a series of agreements, treaties and alliances for the defense of the Free World. She did this at a time when other newly independent countries, inspired or led in large part by India, adopted a neutral or nonaligned policy on the issues created by the Cold War initiated by Stalin and the USSR. When President Eisenhower, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy visited Pakistan in 1959, 1961 and 1962, respectively, they were greeted by enthusiastic crowds, seldom equaled in size anywhere, and given what observers agreed were genuine, affectionate receptions. In return,

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President Ayub Khan was given a warm welcome when he addressed the U.S. Congress in joint session in 1961 and visited other parts of the United States.

Americans should also remember that, however much the United States has been able to reconcile in the 1960's its policy and interests with some strains of Afro-Asian neutralism, India's neutralist policy operated against us during the difficult Cold War years of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies. Indian policy was inclined to favor Moscow at the expense of the West. Krishna Menon, for years a vicious opponent of U.S. policies in the UN and later as Defense Minister, was reluctantly dismissed by his ardent supporter, Prime Minister Nehru, in November 1962, because of his grave responsibility in the Indian defeat and humiliation by Peking. At the same time the Prime Minister, disappointed by Moscow's initial stand in favor of Communist China's territorial claims against India, turned to the West in a successful appeal for military and other aid. It took Moscow about two years to complete the sale of MIG planes and parts to India.[4]

Curiously, though Pakistan has been in alliance with the United States, it has never had in the United States the kind of fulsome press accorded to India. U.S. ambassadors to India—not to Pakistan—have frequently been eloquent national figures whose views on India have been given widespread coverage in the United States. Pakistan's ambassadors to the United States, outstandingly pro-Western, such as the late Mohammed Ali and Aziz Ahmed, have been able to reach only a small group of U.S. State and Defense Department officials and an even smaller group of "opinion molders."

Origins of the Kashmir Dispute

Unlike all other ex-colonial states in Asia which have achieved independence since the end of World War II, Pakistan had no prior history or existence as a state.[5] The approximately 110

[4] *Pravda*, October 25, 1962, as reported in the *New York Times* on November 5 by Seymour Topping. A. M. Rosenthal, writing in the *New York Times* of November 4, confirmed Topping's report by citing a letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister Nehru. Moscow subsequently shifted its policy and announced it would deliver twelve "sample" MIG's from a previously agreed sale of thirty-two MIG's. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1962.

[5] The name "Pakistan" was coined by a Cambridge University student, Rahmat Ali, in 1931. Pak, in Persian means pure; Stan means land. The letters of the name also stand for the major groups (excepting the Bengali in East Pakistan) in the country, viz. *P*unjabi, *A*fghan Pathans, *K*ashmiri, *S*indhi, and Baluchis*tan*i. Rahmat

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million people of Pakistan, separated into western and eastern "wings" by 1,200 miles of India, predominantly (almost 90 per cent) Muslim in religion and culture, occupied well-defined regions or provinces of the northwestern and eastern areas of the Indian subcontinent. These areas became Muslim in progressive waves of invasion and conversion beginning in the eighth century A.D. They were part of the Persian-Afghan-Turco conquest of India that ruled most of the subcontinent from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries.

The Muslim conquest gave way to the British conquest. In the twentieth century the Indian nationalist movement of Hindus and Muslims emerged to win independence *and* partition of the two cultures into secular India and Islamic Pakistan. At the risk of oversimplification, one may say that the creation of Pakistan as an independent state was to a large extent the result of the intense conflict in philosophical outlook and personality between two great leaders, each a British-trained barrister, each now regarded as the father of his country, Mohammed Ali Jinnah of Pakistan and Mohandas K. Gandhi of India. There were others before and after Jinnah and Gandhi, but if these two men and their followers could have resolved their differences by separate electorates and provincial autonomy or some other device, they could have employed their moral power to prevent partition.

Jawaharlal Nehru in his 1936 *Autobiography* had written that "this idea of a Muslim nation is the figment of a few imaginations only . . . and even if many people believed in it, it would still vanish at the touch of reality." Gandhi thought that, however "sincere" Jinnah may have been, he was "suffering from hallucination." Both were wrong. Pakistan did not disappear at the touch of reality; and Mohammed Ali Jinnah became its *Quaid-i-Azam,* Great Leader.

From the time of the British Declaration of June 3, 1947, which led to the independence and partition of the Indian subcontinent on August 15, the Pakistani had just seventy-two days to organize a government with a mere handful—about 100—of senior civil servants and to work out an equitable division of

Ali was a disciple of the poet of Muslim nationalism in India, Mohammed Iqbal. The latter had become president of the Muslim League in 1930 (founded in 1906). Iqbal, darling of the intellectuals of Aligarh University, had, perhaps for the first time, said at his presidential address: "I would like to see the Punjab, North-west Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state . . . within . . . or without the British Empire. . . . [Such a] Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of Muslims, at least of North West India."

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assets and debts left from the days of British India. At independence a state with all its enormous and complicated machinery had to be created out of an impoverished countryside, approximately 85 per cent rural, nearly the same percentage illiterate, with low levels of life expectancy and productivity, and a per capita income of less than fifty dollars per year. The territory of this state, approximately 365,000 square miles, was divided into two unequal parts: overcrowded, rice-eating, Bengali-speaking East Pakistan had more than half the total population but only 15 per cent of the total land area, while wheat-eating West Pakistan, seat of the capital[6] dominated the political life of the country—not without domestic friction. Urdu is the official language of West Pakistan, although it is frequently the second language for those who speak Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu and Baluchi. English is common to all educated Pakistani.

Pakistan had few industries, poor transportation, little electric power. Its economy depended upon four crops: cotton and wheat in the West and rice and jute in the East which, because of partition and conflict, could not be sold, as in the past, on the subcontinent's markets. Savage communal riots and bloodshed between Hindu and Muslim, attending the birth of the new countries, were an early cause of strained relations between Pakistan and India. The number of deaths is said to have exceeded 500,000. During the first five months of independence the new government had to make provision for an influx of some 4.6 million Muslim refugees—the total grew to 6 million later—from India. A similar number of Hindus fled to India. Truly, Pakistan was born in turbulence and in conflict with India.

All of this was prelude to Kashmir—technically the State of Jammu and Kashmir—whose 4.5 million population is at least 75 per cent Muslim. This state, widely acknowledged to have been misruled by the Hindu Maharajahs, consisted of the Kashmir Vale, Poonch, and the dependencies of Gilgit and Baltistan (mainly Muslim); Jammu (partly Hindu); and Ladakh (Buddhist). Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, then as now perhaps the most popular figure in the state, formed the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference in 1938 for the purpose of getting rid of the Hindu Maharajah. He associated this Conference with the Nehru-led Indian National Congress, for, like his friend Nehru,

[6]The capital has now been moved from Karachi to Rawalpindi while the official capital-to-be, Islamabad, is under construction.

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he opposed the "communal" solution of the Muslim League. Nehru supported Abdullah's "Quit Kashmir," anti-Maharajah campaign and was arrested in Kashmir in 1946 while engaged in this effort. At independence, the Maharajah signed a "stand-still agreement" with Pakistan in order to protect the traditional and only Kashmir trade routes which, after partition, ran through Pakistan territory. Accession to Pakistan was expected in accordance with the Independence Agreement on policy for contiguous states having a religious (Muslim) majority.

In the interim the Muslims of Poonch demonstrated against the Maharajah, and raised the banner of accession to Pakistan. They were fired upon, set up their own *Azad* or Free Kashmir government, and expelled the Maharajah's forces. The violence grew in intensity and spread on religious lines to Jammu where the Muslims engaged the Hindus and Sikhs in bloody fighting and rioting. In this fray, the Muslim Pathan tribesmen, normally accustomed to come down to the plains of the Punjab in the cold weather, joined forces against the Hindus of Jammu. The Maharajah freed Abdullah from prison, asked him to form a government, and on October 26, 1947 acceded to India and asked for military aid against the incursion of the tribesmen. The next day Lord Louis Mountbatten, Governor-General of India, accepted the accession on behalf of India pending "a reference to the people" (a plebiscite). Nehru agreed to accept these terms as soon as the "invaders" left Kashmir soil. Pakistan refused to recognize the legality of Kashmir's accession and between November 15 and 19 called for a cease-fire and a resolution of the conflict "before the bar of international opinion and the U.N." On the last day of the year India referred the dispute to the UN and Pakistan announced its assent to that action. The dispute has been there ever since and Kashmir has remained a divided state.

In a notable address before the Lok Sabba (House of the People) on March 29, 1956, Prime Minister Nehru, a Kashmiri Brahmin by ancestry, presented a lengthy review of India's foreign policy since 1947, one-third of which was devoted to an account and defense of India's Kashmir policy. He insisted that the events of late 1947 constituted "an invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State through Pakistan and by Pakistan." Hence, since "legally and constitutionally Kashmir acceded to India . . . it became the

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duty of the Indian Union to defend, to protect Kashmir from aggression and drive out the invaders."[7]

The UN Commission obtained a cease-fire in January 1949 based on a proposed withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan troops, the continuation of Sheikh Abdullah's government in those parts of Kashmir under Indian control, and a similar arrangement for the *Azad* Kashmir government, until a plebiscite could be held to determine the future of the land and its people. The UN Secretary-General appointed U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator. The Indians refused his services, as they refused for the most part the conciliation efforts of another American appointed by the UN, Dr. Frank Graham. The cease-fire line became a boundary line between Kashmir and *Azad* Kashmir, but the military forces of Pakistan, which were formally committed only in May 1948, continue to face the forces of India which had been sent to the Vale as far back as October 1947. The two have never agreed on the conduct of the plebiscite or any alternative, whether partition or independence for Kashmir, or any of the other proposed solutions. For more than a decade after 1953 Sheikh Abdullah spent most of his days in Indian jails or under protective custody because he dared to remind New Delhi that Kashmir's accession to India was only "provisional." He was released in April 1964 shortly before Nehru's death, but he was apprehended again in May 1965 on his return from a trip to the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.

Pakistan's Progress Toward Political and Economic Stability

In the meantime the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, member of the Commonwealth, has, with difficulty, sought constitutional and political stabilization. Jinnah, the Great Leader, who had given renewed life and purpose to the Muslim League—the dominant movement which brought Pakistan into being on its slogan of "faith, unity and discipline"—and who personified the new state to most if not all Pakistani, died in September 1948 at the age of 72. His chief lieutenant, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated by an Afghan in October 1951. From then on the changes of cabinets—five changes between 1953 and 1958—in part representing tension between East and West Pakistan, contributed to instability. Constitutional government was sus-

[7] "India's Foreign Policy." Distributed in the United States by the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations. 49 pp.

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pended and martial law was imposed in October 1958. Later that month Mohammed Ayub Khan assumed the presidency and leadership of the country.

One year later, the new President introduced a system of "democratic decentralization" and indirect political representation called "basic democracy," wherein 1,000 people form a "basic democracy" unit and those over 21 years of age elect one councilor or "basic democrat." These are organized into councils which include both elected and appointed councilors. In February 1960, some 83,000 basic democrats, forming an electoral college, chose Ayub Khan as President. They were given no other choice. In March 1962 he promulgated a new constitution, incorporating the same electoral system of basic democracies which in turn would select a president, a unicameral national assembly and two (East and West) provincial assemblies. In the January 1965 hotly contested national election, Ayub Khan won about 63 per cent of the vote in defeating Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the *Quaid-i-Azam*.[8]

In the midst of these domestic political problems, the Pakistani have turned to upgrading their primary product economy based largely on the agricultural production of jute—75 per cent of the world's supply comes from East Pakistan. To solve the recurring food shortage crisis, increase export earnings from agricultural products, develop an industrial base, and set its economic house in order, Pakistan has embarked upon a program of planned economic development. American private (chiefly the Ford Foundation and Harvard University) and public aid assisted Pakistan in preparing the first two Five-Year Plans, 1955-60 and 1960-65, and perhaps more importantly, in organizing a permanent professionally-staffed planning organization which was partially underwritten to 1965.

The first Five-Year Plan called for investments amounting to $2.7 billion, 70 per cent of which were to be government funds with the rest coming from the private sector. Gross national income was expected to rise during 1955-60 by 15 per cent and per capita income by 7 per cent. These goals were not achieved. However, the second plan, which was concluded in 1965 and had called for $4.8 billion in investments and a 24 per cent increase

[8]During the election campaign in the fall and winter of 1964, the Pakistan daily, *Dawn* (December 8, 30, 31, 1964), charged irresponsibly that American support was given to Miss Jinnah and Indian support to Ayub Khan's opposition in East Pakistan.

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in GNP, appears to have met most of its targets, and even surpassed some of them. Pakistan's growth rate has been about 5 per cent per year. Even a casual inspection of Pakistan in 1964-65, compared to the economic situation of a decade ago, reveals the major strides made by this developing country.[9]

U.S. assistance in grants, loans, Public Law 480 Food and Fiber for Peace, and participation in consortiums under the leadership of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has reached the $3 billion level. Military aid, a classified figure (but estimated at between $1.5 and $2.0 billion), is not included in this $3 billion. When the current conflict between India and Pakistan broke out, the U.S. government was preparing to participate in the projects of the Third Five-Year Plan, but Washington and the Consortium have temporarily suspended action on a new commitment to multinational aid projects.

By any account, U.S. aid to Pakistan has been substantial and Pakistan's progress has been encouraging. James H. Goss, Chief International Officer for General Electric Company, remarked in the spring of 1965: "Pakistan's relative progress toward stability and coherent economic policies is . . . an outstanding example of farsightedness and progressiveness. . . ."[10]

The Pakistan-India-China Triangle

Pakistan, like Iran, Thailand and the Philippines, has sought security through various collective defense arrangements. Her alliance policy did not preclude her participation as one of the sponsoring Colombo Powers which convened the April 1955 Bandung Conference. She also participates in various Commonwealth institutions, including the Colombo Plan. As one of the two largest Muslim nations, Pakistan has sought to play a major role in Islam, although it cannot be said that her ambitions in this direction have been realized. Indonesia, her competitor Muslim nation, requested that Pakistan troops under UN auspices be sent to West Irian during the transfer of sovereignty period. And Indonesia strongly supported Pakistan in the latter's confrontation with India in the summer of 1965. Pakistan's relations with Muslim Afghanistan were turbulent between 1955 and 1961. At

[9]The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development calls Pakistan's Third Five-Year Plan, starting July 1, 1965, "a satisfactory framework for future development." IBRD, Bank Press Release, No. 65/46, September 21, 1965.

[10]James H. Goss, "Helping to Close the Economic Gap," *The General Electric Forum,* April-June 1965, pp. 22-23.

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last in May 1963, through the good offices of the Shah of Iran, a settlement was reached with Kabul, apparently re-establishing peace along the 1,450-mile border.[11] In related fashion President Ayub Khan and General Ne Win of Burma achieved in 1964 a settlement of the East Pakistan-Burma border problem.

These diplomatic successes, desirable in themselves, formed an integral part of Pakistan's policy toward India. Under Ayub Khan, Pakistan set out to settle *all* its border problems including the one with India, as well as the one with Communist China.

The triangular problem, Pakistan-India-Communist China, is intricately bound up with U.S. policy in the immediate past and present. Its skeins are not easy to unravel, but unless we do so we shall continue to misread the developments of recent years. The ubiquitous Chinese issue caused Washington in 1962 to come to the aid of India on the Churchillian basis: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." It also led to U.S. disapproval of Pakistan's anti-Indian stance because Pakistan, in continuing its policy of securing border agreements, arrived at a settlement with China in March 1963 and thus appeared to be serving Communist China's interests against India. Although objectively there is an element of truth in this U.S. view, it is by no means the whole truth. It is necessary to recall the circumstances of the Pakistan-India-China triangle in order to render a sound judgment on both Pakistan and U.S. policy.

Pakistan recognized Red China in 1950 and urged her admission to the UN. However, from China's intervention in the Korean War until 1960, Pakistan supported the U.S. position on nonadmission. Since 1960, Pakistan has rejoined India and others in voting for China's entry. Throughout the 1950's Pakistan maintained a trading relationship with China. However, at no time did Pakistan indulge in the fantastic Indian posture of *Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers). The Indians learned otherwise but it took time and border conflicts.

Shortly after the October 1959 clash between the Indians and the Chinese, Ayub Khan offered to join Nehru in a defense agreement for the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.[12] Nehru rejected

[11]It is interesting to note that the Afghan dynasty and President Ayub Khan are Pathans.

[12]See *Hindu*, January 22, 1960, and *Dawn*, January 25, 1960. This point was also confirmed by Averell Harriman at the 1959 U.S. Senate Hearings on the Mutual Security Act. In a series of five articles on India and Pakistan, written for the North American Newspaper Alliance during February and March 1959, Harriman reported that President Ayub Khan was prepared to "reduce Pakistan military

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the offer and almost simultaneously issued a statement designed to throw doubt on the British-established border, the Durand Line, between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This move did not ultimately interfere with the May 1963 *détente* between the latter two countries, but Nehru's position was shortsighted even from the Indian point of view. For the British had established borders —the Durand Line in the northwest and the McMahon Line in the northeast of the subcontinent—which constitute strong international legal grounds for the Pakistan-Indian border with China and other neighbors. The only good that came out of the 1959-1960 effort of Pakistan to reach a *rapprochement* with India was the September 1960 settlement of the division of the Indus waters and tributary rivers. But this Boundary Waters Treaty was more the product of a concerted Western effort—particularly the UN, IBRD, United States and Great Britain—than of India's response to Pakistan's offer to negotiate.

In May 1961, after this rebuff, Ayub Khan began serious negotiations with Peking over the Pakistan-China border. Pakistan received what appears to be a favorable and firm settlement in the tri-state junction area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. Her rights to the grazing areas of the Hunzas—a people whose ruler once sought to make his land the forty-ninth state of the United States—were reaffirmed; in return for certain concessions in the Karakoram Ranges southeast of Gilgit at the north of Kashmir which afford the Chinese better access to Sinkiang and parts of Tibet, Pakistan gained recognition for the northern boundary of *Azad* Kashmir. These terms, provisionally agreed upon in May 1962, were signed in March 1963, shortly after the signing of a Pakistan-Chinese Commercial Treaty.[13]

These two agreements raised serious objections in Washington and London because by that time the Sino-Indian clash of late 1962 had fully developed and Washington and London had gone to India's aid. Pakistan insisted throughout this period, 1961-1963, that aid to India should not be of such a magnitude as to upset the balance between them, and more importantly, that the Kashmir dispute should be settled as the *quid pro quo* for shoring up the defense of India. London and Washington in fact persuaded

expenditures" and work with India "in terms of 'common defense'." These articles were published in the United States, Great Britain and India.

[13]Such concessions as Pakistan made appear to affect the Aksai Chin area in the Ladakh district of Kashmir. Pakistan claims to have gained 800 square miles in the division of the disputed 3400 square miles.

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India to take up the Kashmir problem once again with Pakistan; but when these talks ended in failure, Pakistan regarded the Western effort to pressure India as a mere sop to disguise a shift in the military alliance system of the subcontinent.

Since the spring of 1963, the downward plunge of U.S.-Pakistan relations has not been braked. Political forces within Pakistan—including perhaps Ayub Khan himself—have, especially since the death of Nehru in May 1964, been promoting the idea that their President is a "Muslim De Gaulle" and will treat Washington and London accordingly: that is, he will not formally break with his Western allies but he is determined to play an independent nationalist role for the greater glory of Pakistan even if this means closer ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

There is no doubt that the Pakistani found some satisfaction in India's humiliation by China. There is also no doubt that Pakistan's actions with respect to China have been partly dictated by long-standing considerations, deriving from Karachi's effort under Ayub Khan to settle all border questions, and the kind of faulty thinking in which the United States, too, has engaged, that is, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Pakistan's policy in recent years has been criticized as "walking down both sides of the street" and this may be correct. But Pakistan, however obsessed with Kashmir and India, has never tried to hide her obsession. The Pakistani argue, with considerable justification, that Pakistan's allies, to whom she has been loyal over many years, should have tried more vigorously to bring about a solution of the "root cause" of Indo-Pakistan tension—especially in 1962-1963 when they had considerable leverage.

Pakistan has never understood why the United States could not have extracted a price from India for the support given in 1962-1963. In her view, the Indian rejection of the Indo-Pakistan defense agreement and the failure of the Indo-Pakistan Kashmir discussions add up to Indian intransigence. At late as 1963 Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should be reincorporated into an Indian-dominated confederation;[14] he believed that the 1963 U.S.-British mediation effort—and the earlier one suggested in January 1962 by President Kennedy and employing the services of Eugene Black, then President of the IBRD—was unfriendly

[14]Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965, pp. 321-322. Harrison writes of a Kashmir settlement within "a larger Indo-Pakistan accommodation based on confederal relations between the two countries."

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and illogical, and betrayed a great deal of ignorance of the basic issues. Nehru is gone, but the Kashmir issue is still the stumbling block to a resolution of the conflict on the subcontinent.

United States Policy

U.S. policy at this critical junction in the affairs of the subcontinent has been in considerable part to "pass the buck" to the UN Security Council. This may enhance the prestige of the UN and it may eventually prove to be the best alternative for India and Pakistan. But it is not enough. Our alliance system and aid arrangements in Asia have been designed to provide security against the threat of aggressive communism. That objective is, if anything, more relevant today than it was when Dean Rusk, as Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, first adumbrated the Asian alliance system in 1951. Our primary task is to sit down with our present Asian allies and with others such as India, whose neutralist policies are in transition because of Communist China, to remold and rebuild the alliance system.

This recasting must be done in military terms and even more in political and economic terms. If President Johnson's imaginative $1 billion Mekong River Valley development proposal of April 1965 is valid for the forty million people of the riparian states of mainland Southeast Asia, how much more valid would such a program be to develop the lands for the almost 600 million of the subcontinent? Our interest in South Asia is in the progressive development of Pakistan and India—not one or the other as some would have it, but both. Our interest is in strong, viable states and healthy, literate peoples who inhabit that huge subcontinent extending deep into the strategically important Indian Ocean. The key to the defense and welfare of the subcontinent is a solution to the Kashmir issue. It is not enough for the United States to say that it has gone as far as it can go with Pakistan or with India and that they will have to resolve their remaining difficulties. They have been unable to resolve these differences, partly because each has had its partisans and each felt relatively secure in its respective policies.

The present drift of U.S. policy toward nearly equal treatment of India and Pakistan will destroy our position there. For it permits India to hold fast to her "Moscow line," thereby casting herself anew as presumed "broker" between the East (minus China) and the West. This in turn encourages a more trouble-

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some form of "'neutralism" or what has been called "bi-alignment." It allows India to recover, at almost no political cost, from its years of hawking *Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,* while continuing an unchanged relationship with Moscow. This in turn encourages an Indian commitment to the illusory view that Moscow is now a "peace-loving" nation. Bi-alignment serves India's self-interest and real need for foreign aid, but it does not serve the cause of Free World policy. India's interests could be served by means other than a pro-Moscow alignment. It may also encourage Ayub Khan to essay the role of De Gaulle in Asia with consequent disruptive effects on the alliance system similar to those now evident in Europe. It encourages the view that somehow we "must live with" such unsolvable problems as the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus issue or the Arab-Israeli one. On the contrary, problems created by humans are solvable in human terms if one works at them and has the capacity—power and will—to support the solution.

There is a grave danger that our "new" post-1962 friendship with India will cause Americans to forget the grave difficulties placed in our way by earlier Indian policies; and correlatively, that Pakistan's obsessive preoccupation with Kashmir will try our patience and cause us to forget Pakistan's loyalty of earlier years. The calculus of political interest is sometimes computed in a shortsighted way. *Realpolitik* ignores the non-immediate and the normative. But to this extent it also loses reality. For in any sound calculus of political interest it is essential to conserve the values of loyalty and friendship—and these we have had in sufficient measure from Pakistan.

The objectives of U.S. policy—e.g., to blunt the thrust of communist aggression and to build secure and stable societies among the newly independent states—are, to a considerable extent, congruent now with the general objectives of Pakistan and India. However, the two Asian countries interpret differently the thrust of communist aggression. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, is quoted as saying: ". . . given geography and the power realities of the nuclear age, the military threat to us, if there is one, would come more from the Soviet Union than from China." India's view is clearly the reverse. But Bhutto went on to say: "If there is to be joint defense [a proposal President Ayub Khan has made at least twice to India], let it be against any aggressor."[15]

[15] *Washington Post,* March 10, 1963.

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This position is entirely in harmony with U.S. alliance policy in NATO, CENTO, SEATO and all bilateral agreements. Pakistan continues to express its loyalty to these objectives which she accepted a decade or more ago.

Perhaps the United States will eventually persuade India and Pakistan to accept the view that neither Peking nor Moscow can be trusted; that though they may employ different methods, each represents dangers against which defense insurance is required. In any event, this is one of the two tasks facing President Johnson when he meets in the near future with President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri. The second task is to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In commenting on the October 20 announcement that President Johnson will receive the two Asian leaders "as soon as his health permits," Z. A. Bhutto said such discussions would provide an opportunity to find a solution to "one of the most important disputes facing the world."[16]

Proposed solutions for Kashmir abound. Kashmir might become an independent neutral state whose future would be guaranteed by both Pakistan and India and their allies; it might become a neutral zone in which Karachi and Delhi would enjoy condominium rights; it might be divided by communal plebiscites; it might be allowed to hold a supervised plebiscite with proportional electorates; it might be allowed to decide for itself what its 4.5 million inhabitants want.

These and other solutions are possible provided that Pakistan's obsession and India's intransigence over Kashmir—the "root cause of tension"—yield to the political realities of their common defense and to their common need for economic assistance to help them to build secure and stable societies. The forthcoming meetings between President Johnson and his "ally," President Ayub Khan, and his more recent "friend," Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, represent an opportunity for a constructive and imaginative use of U.S. diplomacy.

[16] *Ibid.*, October 22, 1965.

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THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD*

by David W. Tarr

THE permanent peacetime entanglement of the United States in world affairs is vividly manifested in the presence of American military power abroad. Close to half of the U.S. armed forces, indeed over half of America's actual combat strength, is deployed outside the continental United States. Most of this power is concentrated in Western Europe, the peripheral strongholds of East and Southeast Asia, and the seas that border the Eurasian perimeter.[1] The political and military conditions which gave rise to America's overseas commitments—the crudely aggressive policies of the Soviet Union, the political instability, economic weakness and military vulnerability of European and Asian nations, and the technological supremacy and strategic invulnerability of the United States—have in the intervening years been radically altered. Yet the disposition of U.S. forces overseas and the basic strategic assumption underlying their development have changed very little. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the basic functions[2] of U.S. armed forces abroad and, in the light of a substantially modified international environment, to evaluate their current disposition and effect.

American armed forces stationed in foreign countries are specialized instruments of national power supporting the general strategies of defense and deterrence. Their military missions *in the event of conflict* are related to the basic purposes of the entire military arsenal: to punish the enemy, to limit his capacity to damage the United States and its allies, and to deny him territorial gains.[3] Denial of territory is particularly pertinent to U.S.

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[1]Consideration of U.S. forces abroad is limited to the areas described, thus excluding, for most purposes, military personnel and installations located in the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

[2]"Function" as used here refers to a specific politico-military effect that is a consequence of stationing U.S. armed forces in overseas positions.

[3]Cf. Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Chapter 1.

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commitments abroad. But the American military presence is also significant in terms of its functions in the *absence* of open conflict. The primary purpose of America's armed forces is to *prevent* warfare from occurring. It is within this general context of the peacetime use of military power that U.S. armed forces abroad assume a special relevance for diplomacy. For the disposition and movement of military units and weapons convey implicit messages to foreign powers with respect to the intentions and interests of the United States. An American military presence measurably affects the attitudes and receptivity of other governments to the diplomacy of the United States. The manipulation of military power overseas thus should be viewed as a matter of the highest statecraft, a political instrument hardly separable from other aspects of diplomatic activity.

There are at least seven identifiable and obviously interrelated primary functions of U.S. armed forces abroad. Briefly, these are: (1) direct and explicit strategic nuclear deterrence; (2) indirect and implicit deterrence; (3) alliance cohesion; (4) local defense; (5) military display and demonstration; (6) intervention; and (7) control over the resources and dimensions of conflict.[4] None of these functions operates in isolation from the others, although for the sake of convenience they will be discussed separately. Each is evaluated in terms of its instrumental utility (that is, how aptly it facilitates the attainment of policy goals) and with special regard to the question of whether it is best performed by use of foreign- rather than domestic-based forces.

Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

The United States has sought to deter a wide range of overt aggressive action by explicitly threatening nuclear reprisal upon the military centers and populations of the communist bloc. This threat of strategic nuclear punishment, a basic ingredient of the policy of deterrence, depended during the early years of the Cold War upon U.S. access to overseas bases. The credibility of deterrence rested upon the evident capacity of the United States to deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the Soviet Union (and later Red China). Overseas air bases extended the American nuclear reach at a time when intercontinental means of delivery

[4]This analysis does not include certain secondary functions of overseas forces such as base expenditures as a form of foreign aid, or the "ambassadorial" function of person-to-person contacts between American servicemen and foreign nationals.

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were either unavailable or undependable. Eventually, of course, the effective radius of nuclear bombers was extended to intercontinental dimensions through the development of in-flight refueling techniques and longer-range aircraft, but overseas bases were still critically important for at least two reasons: they facilitated dispersal of the bomber force, thus reducing vulnerability to surprise attack; and they provided multiple axes for launching a nuclear strike, thereby complicating the Soviet air defense problem.[5] In short, in the early years of the Cold War the atomic monopoly was somewhat dependent for its utility as an effective deterrent upon a second monopoly—overseas air bases.

Although the availability of overseas bases for nuclear bombers constituted an early and significant strategic advantage for the United States, the rapid pace of military technology undermined the asset. Bases near the Soviet Union came into striking range of our adversary's nuclear bomber forces. Despite this growing Soviet nuclear counterthreat, U.S. strategic bomber bases abroad remained an important component of the Strategic Air Command so long as dispersal and warning times were sufficient to retain a credible strike-back capability. But the emergence of the long-range ballistic missile as the major weapon of strategic warfare set the value of the manned bomber and overseas bases into rapid decline. They were too vulnerable.

The United States has, of course, adjusted its strategic forces accordingly. The great air bases in Morocco, constructed on a "crash" basis in the early years of the 1950's, have been abandoned. The intermediate-range ballistic missiles emplaced in Great Britain, Italy and Turkey, in a similar stop-gap effort during the post-Sputnik missile crisis, were removed in 1963 because they were vulnerable and redundant. Moreover, the medium-range B-47 bomber, long the workhorse of the Strategic Air Command, is currently being phased out of the Air Force inventory. The United States is shifting its strategic nuclear mission from the bomber to the ballistic missile and from overseas bases to sites in the American interior and to submarines beneath the great oceans of the world.[6]

[5]The relationship of bomber radius to overseas bases is discussed briefly by Albert Wohlstetter in "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1959, pp. 223 ff.

[6]SAC bombers will remain in the nuclear picture, according to Pentagon forecasts, until the end of the present decade, and bases in Spain, Great Britain and Guam will be utilized during that period. But the shift is under way and undoubtedly irreversible.

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Strictly in terms of military technology, then, the need for foreign bases to enhance the credibility and efficacy of strategic nuclear deterrence is substantially diminished. Indeed, with the marginal exception of the Polaris system, which uses overseas bases for its submarine tenders but could be deployed directly from the United States, we might conclude that the requirement for overseas bases will soon be at an end.[7] Yet if we inquire further into the purposes and mechanics of strategic nuclear deterrence we see that such a conclusion must be carefully qualified.

The literature of deterrence informs us that the objectives of nuclear deterrence may be enhanced by having both "first-strike" and "second-strike" capabilities which may be utilized as threats to dissuade an adversary from undertaking hostile moves, primarily against the United States itself, and secondarily against our allies or in regions deemed vital to the security interests of the West. But the threat to *initiate* nuclear war has been rapidly losing credibility as the Western nations, in particular the United States—the primary custodian of the nuclear arsenal—become vulnerable to nuclear devastation. The removal of U.S. strategic weapons systems from overseas bases only further undermines the plausibility of the American threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to aggression abroad. Recognition of the potential hollowness of the U.S. deterrent in contingencies that would not otherwise immediately jeopardize the United States itself has produced an understandable inducement for some other nations to seek more dependable means of nuclear deterrence.

The multilateral force (MLF) and the French *force de frappe* represent the two poles of reaction to the declining value of the unilateral American deterrent. A discussion of the issues surrounding these two alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper. However, from the perspective of the present subject—that is, the American military presence abroad, of which strategic weapons now represent only a small part—one can see that those analyses of nuclear deterrence which conclude that the deterrent is no longer credible except in relation to a direct attack upon the United States ignore or depreciate the relevance U.S. military forces stationed abroad have to the overall strategy of deterrence. For an attack upon the armed forces of the United States

[7]One should hedge, however, against the possibility that some new technological development, an anti-missile system for example, might require forward base sites.

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is quite likely to be treated by the U.S. government as an attack upon the United States itself. Moreover, if U.S. strategic nuclear weapons abroad are attacked, the risk of provoking a high-level response is that much greater.

Overseas Forces as Implicit Deterrents

All of the basic values of the two major nuclear powers are threatened by the destructive potential of hydrogen warfare. Each side seeks to avoid open military confrontation out of fear that it may lose control of events and be cast into a nuclear holocaust. Obviously the calculus of deterrence is not confined to a simple weighing of relative strengths and weaknesses and potential gains and losses. It involves also a *fear* that war between the United States and the Soviet Union, even if in the initial stages the conflict is carefully bound by geographic and weapons limitations, may escalate or explode into an all-out, self-destructive, nuclear war. International politics is played out against this backdrop of nuclear hazard. Political crises raise the "sensed danger"[8] of major war under circumstances which inevitably involve factors beyond the control of the governments involved. Each side is therefore aware that "the triggering of general war can occur whether [they] intend it or not."[9]

Thus deterrence has a second important dimension. It is not only contingent upon an *explicit* threat, credibly made, to engage in a strategic nuclear attack through the commitment of weapons systems manifestly capable of imposing severe punishment upon the enemy. It is also enforced by the *implicit* threat of nuclear conflict which arises out of the danger of direct confrontation between the armed forces of the nuclear powers. The explicit threat to defend Berlin by nuclear reprisal may not be fully credible to the Soviet Union, but the implicit danger of a resort to nuclear weapons arising out of such a crisis has thus far been sufficient to dissuade the Soviets from rash action. Implicit deterrence is, in other words, the passive attribute of American forces deployed abroad. Those forces represent, symbolically, a commitment on the part of the United States which could, by inten-

[8]T. C. Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," *World Politics*, April 1962, pp. 431-432. The concept "sensed danger" is borrowed for use throughout this paper.

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 422.

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tion or accident, involve the whole panoply of American military power.[10]

The substantial U.S. military presence in Europe is in large measure a consequence of the requirement for an implicit or passive deterrent to aggression—that is, it guarantees that an attack by the Soviet Union would result in automatic American belligerency. Given the critical vulnerability of the United States to strategic missile attack, no American promise to respond on behalf of its allies would be credible without U.S. forces in Europe. They may or may not act as the trigger for strategic retaliation (this remains a complex controversy within NATO), for the American capacity to respond, in combination with that of its allies, is substantial enough to suggest a wide range of potential levels of response; but in the last analysis it is the presence of *American* military forces in Europe which so gravely heightens the prospect for nuclear war in the event of attack and thus provides the basic element for an effective, though passive, deterrent to open conflict.

How many soldiers constitute a credible and effective deterrent? Marshal Foch, in answer to a similar question about British troops before World War I, is said to have replied, "One single private soldier, and we would take care that he is killed."[11] The answer today is not quite so simple. In the first place, U.S. military forces in Europe serve important functions beyond deterrence, as we shall see. But even if the trigger function were the only useful purpose for an American presence in Europe (as some strategists have argued), one must take into account how much tolerance for accidental or malicious violence, breaches in international law and outrageous espionage has expanded since the advent of nuclear weapons. The death of a single American soldier is unlikely to provoke a U.S. nuclear response, strategic or tactical. It might precipitate a crisis in which the sensed danger of war is heightened, but not war itself. The United States has already experienced the loss of airmen in aircraft incidents and soldiers in "sub-limited" conflicts. We have become accustomed to the necessity of overlooking such events.

[10]It is a temptation to use the terms "active" and "passive" deterrence to distinguish between the explicit policy of nuclear deterrence and the implicit deterrent effect of maintaining a military presence in an area. But active and passive deterrence have been used in other literature in reference to quite different aspects of deterrence. Cf. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 126 ff; and Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 276 ff.

[11]Sir Charles Edward Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, His Life and Diaries* (London: Cassell and Company, 1927), I, 78-79.

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In terms of human beings, then, and quite apart from other considerations about the military missions of the forces involved, one must assume that the size of a hostage force whose loss would incite nuclear retaliation must be fairly large, probably at least the size of one U.S. Army division. But in terms of sophisticated political purposes, implicit deterrence suggests not simply a means of automatizing an American strategic nuclear response, but of having sufficient forces available to accomplish a sliding scale of responses, each of which raises further the danger of large-scale nuclear war. In other words, U.S. forces are committed to Europe to help deny, or at least make very costly, territorial conquest and (implicitly) to threaten several levels of punishment in the event of war.

These comments have been largely directed to U.S. armed forces in Europe. What of deterrence in non-European regions of the world? Military experience suggests, particularly in the Far East, that nuclear deterrence is clearly less applicable in contingencies not directly related to the primary interests of the United States and the principal members of NATO. Both the direct threat of strategic retaliation and the indirect threat of an escalatory war due to the proximity of American military forces are more credible in Europe; the United States obviously has more at stake there, has traditionally placed the defense of Europe on a higher priority than defense of Asia, and has physically committed itself in greater depth. By contrast, the American commitment to Asia is peripheral rather than continental and hesitant rather than firm.

The United States has, of course, applied its nuclear deterrent to situations that have arisen in the Middle and Far East, with mixed results. China, a new member of the nuclear club, has learned that military action involving American forces is not necessarily a trigger to nuclear attack. Indeed, the American military reputation in the Far East has been jeopardized by the persistent failure of the United States to translate its hostility to Chinese advances into successful frustrations of the political aims of the Chinese regime. The United States has succeeded in thwarting military adventures in the Formosa Straits. But the success of the communist revolution in China, the stalemate in Korea, and the deterioration of the noncommunist position in Southeast Asia indicate a political momentum which has exposed a basic weakness of the American strategy of deterrence: the

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tactics of subversion and internal, or guerrilla, warfare are too diffused to challenge U.S. power directly. In the long run marginal setbacks are eroding the American military reputation in the Far East. Nagging doubts with respect to the earnestness and depth of American defense commitments seriously undermine further efforts to deter provocations against allies.

A key factor in nuclear deterrence thus far may be the national identity of the forces in confrontation. In Europe the two nuclear giants face each other directly and the risk of destructive consequences is obvious and credible to all concerned. In Asia the United States is challenged in circumstances which have little relevance to nuclear weapons and by forces which choose, in most instances, to avoid a direct engagement. This does not mean that nuclear deterrence does not work in the Far East. On the contrary, it is evident that the Chinese and their client forces in Southeast Asia shun overt clashes with the United States out of a cautious respect for U.S. military power. But it is widely assumed that this military power is not applicable to the ambiguous disorders of the region and that, in any event, the United States is reluctant to become more deeply involved. In short, before the recent buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, there appeared to be a crisis in confidence with respect to the U.S. commitment—a crisis which led a former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to advocate that the United States establish a substantial military presence in Thailand as proof of our determination to halt communist advances in that area.[12] Clearly deterrence in Asia is as dependent upon the viability of the American presence there as is deterrence in Europe upon the continued deployment of U.S. military forces to NATO. For it is the proximity of American armed might that brings implicitly into account the panoply of power which backs it up.

Forces for Allied Cohesion

As we have observed, U.S. armed forces abroad perform a number of important functions beyond deterrence. One of the most significant is the cohesive effect of the American presence upon the NATO alliance. The cement of America's coalition diplomacy consists, in large measure, of U.S. armed forces stationed in allied countries as physical evidence of the irreversible

[12]Roger Hilsman, "Plea for 'Realism' in Southeast Asia," *New York Times Magazine,* August 23, 1964, pp. 26 ff.

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nature of the U.S. commitment. They serve not only to demonstrate to the enemy that an attack upon an ally will provoke an automatic American response, but also to give the allies objective assurance of the deep commitment of the United States on their behalf. Especially with respect to Europe, the American military guarantee has had to be *defense* rather than liberation. Such a gurantee cannot inspire confidence unless there is a specific and substantial contribution to that defense. The promise required strength in being and on location.

The American decision to send troops to Europe was part of a rearmament scheme that had as its objective, beyond the creation of a reasonably effective defensive force, an integrated military alliance in which the European partners would be, themselves, the major contributors. President Truman's announcement, made on September 9, 1950, spelled out the terms of the bargain:

> A basic element in the implementation of this decision is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard. Firm programs for the development of their forces will be expected to keep full step with the dispatch of additional United States forces to Europe. Our plans are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action on their part.[13]

In other words, the United States hoped to induce European troop commitments to NATO by setting an example as well as by providing a stop-gap force which would inspire confidence. But the U.S. government was not yet prepared to conclude that its own contribution of ground forces would be either large or permanent.[14] The failure of the Europeans to meet agreed-upon force goals left successive U.S. administrations impatient, but once the United States had committed its six divisions no opportunity could be found to reduce those forces without unduly alarming the allies.[15] The ties that bound the alliance depended on the inextricable, positive and deep physical involvement of American military power on the continent of Europe.

[13]The President's message is contained in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, *Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area,* 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, p. 83.

[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 49, 119, 140.

[15]Note former President Eisenhower's words: "Though for eight years in the White House I believed and announced to my associates that a reduction of American strength in Europe should be initiated as soon as European economies were restored, the matter was then considered too delicate a political question to raise." Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Let's Be Honest With Ourselves, II" *The Saturday Evening Post,* October 26, 1963, pp. 26-27.

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After the alarms produced by the Korean War had subsided and the death of Stalin set Soviet foreign policy on a different tack, the expectation of war in Europe noticeably declined. Moreover, the consequences of nuclear war became more widely apprehended and dreaded, so that while the expectation of war lessened its anticipated consequences heightened. The continental members of NATO wanted the military apparatus to be a shield, not to turn Europe into a battlefield. But their ambivalent expectations about a European war and its consequences neutralized efforts to promote larger conventional defense forces.

The failure of the European members of NATO to keep pace and faith with the American bargain did not lead to a reduction in U.S. forces. American armed forces held the delicate alliance together. Their removal would have torn it asunder. Thus the original stop-gap contribution became a quasi-permanent garrison and remains the military keystone of the NATO shield. Despite significant improvements in the defensive capabilities of the NATO armies, the alliance never went far beyond its original purpose, which was to bind the United States physically to the defense of Europe. American armed forces in Europe are a visible measure of that commitment.

In the meantime strategic nuclear attack has become largely irrational. An armed attack on Western Europe appears to be less probable today than it was during the early years of the Cold War. Yet there is contained in the precarious structure of the European political environment—symbolized by political divisions left in abeyance since 1945, in particular a divided Germany and an indefensible Berlin—those conditions which could lead to war by mistake or miscalculation.

The basic requisite for a successful Western military coalition has rested upon an insoluble dilemma: the defense of Europe by means that will not threaten its destruction. The United States has sought to overcome this dilemma by a renewed emphasis on conventional (i.e., nonnuclear) capabilities coupled with a refined application of nuclear deterrence—controlled counterforce nuclear retaliation. In other words, the United States has proposed to respond to limited military incursions with limited responses designed to disrupt the attack and to force a quick retreat and termination of hostilities. If this can be accomplished with nonnuclear forces so much the better, for such an accomplishment presumably minimizes the risk of escalation. But if the

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enemy initiates a major nuclear attack, the United States has proposed that NATO respond, as Secretary of Defense McNamara put it,

> in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his civilian population.[16]

The Secretary went on to say he was confident that NATO could defend itself against a nonnuclear attack by conventional means, and to this end the United States was making further improvements in conventional capabilities. The European members were urged to follow our example:

> With improvements in Alliance ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.[17]

But Europe did not follow McNamara's advice. The horns of the dilemma had been grasped but not surmounted. The American Defense Secretary had not convinced the West Europeans that a means of defense had been devised which would secure them against defeat or destruction.

The military fissures in the NATO structure could not and cannot be sealed by unilateral American policy. The erosion of European confidence in the United States lies in an awareness that the life and death decisions respecting war in Europe remain essentially in the hands of American and Soviet leaders. The U.S. military presence has become, therefore, an ambiguous symbol. It serves to strengthen the alliance insofar as it enforces deterrence, yet creates anxieties and misgivings to the extent that it engenders a fear of war and nuclear holocaust. Removal of U.S. forces would undoubtedly lead to NATO's dissolution and leave nuclear deterrence of war in Europe without much credence. In this fundamental sense American military power in Europe remains a vital cohesive factor, although not sufficient, in itself, to compensate for the continued failure of the alliance to reach basic agreements respecting NATO strategy and political integration.

[16]Robert S. McNamara, address at Commencement exercises, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, June 16, 1962.
[17]*Ibid.*

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The cohesive effect on the Atlantic Alliance of the U.S. military presence in Europe has not been reproduced in other areas of the globe. The string of alliances constructed largely through the initiative of the United States, "connecting" NATO with the Western aligned states along the Eurasian rim from Iran to Korea, gave the United States access to strategic positions but did not produce a cohesive and effective alliance system. In most of these countries the American presence is limited and sporadic (except for Korea, Japan, Okinawa and, after 1954, Vietnam). And while there has been no thought of establishing military forces on the relative scale undertaken in Europe, the global objective, namely, the containment of the communist bloc through the instrumentality of an encircling Western coalition, was basically military in conception and orientation.

The United States also sought to draw its principal allies, Great Britain and France, into a global military concert. But the grand alliance failed. The United States hoped, for example, to retain French and British power in Southeast Asia, but the French were humiliated in Indochina, and later, after suffering a similar setback in Algeria, withdrew their overseas forces to metropolitan France. Although the British have retained a semblance of military power across their fading lines of empire, much of the substance of British power is gone. The British military presence in the Middle East and Asia is important, yet its weakness, now highlighted by difficulties in Aden and Malaysia, is readily apparent.

Outside Europe, then, the American military presence, to the extent that it is felt, may serve useful purposes for the United States, but it is not likely to contribute significantly to the coherence of a global alliance which has failed to materialize; nor is it always likely to contribute to the greater cohesion of the NATO alliance since the political objectives of the essential partners of that alliance in Asia and Africa often are substantially different from those of the United States. On the other hand, America's bilateral defense arrangements are undoubtedly reinforced by the presence of U.S. armed might in Asia and the Middle East.

Local Defense

Beyond the psychological aspects of deploying forces abroad—that is, for deterrence of aggression and alliance cohesion—U.S. armed forces in Europe and Asia function as bona fide instru-

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ments of local defense. Both within and outside the context of alliance U.S. military forces are deployed *in loco* or *in transit* to counter local hostilities that threaten American security interests. A major purpose of U.S. forces abroad is to deny an adversary territorial conquest.

In order to accomplish a local counterforce mission overseas, the United States maintains an elaborate world-wide system of bases, installations and fleets, giving its forces not only access to territories most likely to be involved in hostilities which might concern the United States, but also the staging posts, pre-positioned equipment and supplies, communications facilities and logistics back-up that are so vital to effective military operations. This system has three major characteristics: (1) forward deployed ground, air and naval forces capable of sustained tactical operations; (2) strategically mobile reserve forces based in the United States; and (3) intermediate bases and installations serving to supply, reinforce or redeploy combat forces abroad.

This panoply of American military power, impressive as it is, cannot fight successfully under all conceivable military situations. But U.S. military forces do not exist in isolation. They are part of a global system, they are in many situations associated with reliable allies, and they operate within the framework of nuclear deterrence. Engaging American military forces in conflict risks drawing in more U.S. troops and weapons, bringing allied armed forces into play, and, most serious of all, inviting a nuclear response.

In short, the susceptibility of American military forces abroad to defeat locally proves neither that they should be withdrawn nor drastically reinforced. American military power is substantial enough in most locales to insure the degree of holding power necessary to blunt enemy attacks and force the attacker to raise the stakes if local victory is sought. But all local wars involving U.S. military forces operate within the framework of a graduated deterrent formula, so that the enemy presumably would take into account not only the forces encountered in the initial attack, but the responses that further conflict is likely to precipitate.

This symbolic value of the American military presence abroad explains why allied military units of comparable fighting quality cannot always be considered as symmetrical replacements for American units. The presence of U.S. power raises the potential attacker's risk of conventional and nuclear escalation on a scale

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far beyond the power of any other nation. The U.S. contribution to local defenses thus has the dual advantage of power in being plus impressive strategic back-up.

In order to employ an effective local defense mission in areas of potential conflict, the United States needs *access* to positions of strategic advantage. The alliance structure of the Western coalition, tying a great many countries with very diverse interests to the defense policies of the United States, is, in large measure, a method for assuring this access; it legitimizes the American presence (or sudden introduction of U.S. forces) and provides the necessary components, such as staging posts, supplies and communications, for maintaining and mobilizing overseas military contingents.

In sum, the function of local defense is served by an American military presence both in the sense of confronting an attacker with countervailing local military power and of heightening the risk of escalation that could result from launching an attack upon U.S. military forces. Presumably these factors help to deter small-scale warfare, but in the event conflict occurs, they may also deter an expansion of the war.

Military Demonstrations

Often military forces and weapons are conspicuously deployed, maneuvered or tested in order to realize a particular political effect. The symbolic value of such tests and demonstrations is not lost upon a world sensitized to the dangers of military involvement. Military units and weapons have been deployed to convey a warning, exhibit a capability, insist upon a right, test a government's intent, improve a bargaining position, impose a bluff—in short, to underscore the language and support the objectives of a nation's diplomacy by military means short of violence.

The United States, with its vast array of overseas forces and mobile equipment, is ideally suited to manipulate its military power for such purposes, yet there are inherent problems which restrain the impulse to exploit this capability. Military power, like sex, is something of a universal language and is just as susceptible to misinterpretation. Reactions to it run the gamut from puritanical shock to morbid fascination. The message conveyed is as dependent upon the attitude of the audience as on the disposition of the actor. And in a nuclear world the consequences of misunderstanding can be very grave.

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All this suggests that the manipulation of overseas forces for purposes of demonstrating power and intent is an important aspect of statecraft. In many instances the receptivity of governments to U.S. diplomatic objectives depends upon the skill with which military demonstrations are accomplished. Since these demonstrations must often be undertaken in the midst of crisis, it is critically important that the United States convey its intended meaning with a high degree of precision.[18]

In order to maintain an effective military presence abroad the United States is required to keep a large percentage of its forces in movement. Overseas deployments depend upon the strategically mobile characteristics of the support forces. Air and sealift machinery must be utilized both casually and in exercises of varying scale to keep the system in proper operational condition. Moreover, wherever combat units are stationed military exercises are necessary for training and readiness. Thus much of the movement within the overall system has little if any relevance to specific foreign policy issues.

There is an obvious advantage to maintaining a system of overseas deployments which exhibits a kind of homeostatic process of continual internal adjustment. Incessant internal movement and apparent external stability provide a flexible instrument of policy which can be adjusted slightly by casual increases in activity or shifts in deployment. Naval power is especially flexible in this regard and may often be used in precautionary roles, as the Sixth and Seventh Fleets are sometimes employed, without causing excessive international alarm, yet with the subtle suggestion of American presence and concern. Since sudden military moves are inherently provocative, a system manifesting a substantial degree of continuous movement offers a strategic and tactical subtlety that a static system cannot effect.

By the same token an overt move made for purposes other than routine internal adjustment must be accompanied by an explanatory text if a precise meaning is to be conveyed. The mere fact of an American presence has a broad-gauge political effect; this being so, unusual changes in the size, character or location of U.S. forces are sure to be detected quickly. Normally, demonstrative actions by U.S. armed forces accompany or follow policy

[18]Precision is not the equivalent of clarity of purpose. There are circumstances in which it may be in the best interest of the United States to suggest an ambiguity of purpose; by precision is meant the capacity to convey exactly what is meant to be conveyed.

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statements to underscore the meaning and emphasis of certain critical decisions. During the Berlin crisis of 1961, for example, the demonstrative character of U.S. reinforcements in Europe was well understood in foreign capitals despite the fact that the actual increases in tactical strength were marginal.[19]

There are many examples of demonstrative military acts by the United States involving armed forces overseas. With no guarantee of success in such techniques, there is always the inherent danger that those to whom the moves are addressed may assume the United States is bluffing or is not capable of achieving the objectives sought. In 1962, for example, the United States dispatched Marines to the Mekong River Valley in Thailand to provide visible evidence of American concern over events in Laos as well as to suggest possible intervention. While the situation was subsequently stabilized and the U.S. forces were withdrawn, by 1964 the situation in Laos and neighboring Vietnam had so deteriorated that a whole series of demonstrative acts by the United States appeared to have a successively lessening impact. The Seventh Fleet lurked off the coast, new shiploads of military equipment were sent to the Far East for pre-positioning, American jets were used for reconnaissance over Laos, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was appointed Ambassador to South Vietnam, and more U.S. advisers were sent to the embattled Vietnamese army. Yet one must conclude that these actions did not change the tide of events substantially. Until the U.S. intervention assumed major proportions in the summer of 1965, doubts existed both with respect to the capacity of the American forces to secure Vietnam from the insurgents and the will of the United States to commit itself deeply enough to prevent the region from falling under China's dominion. In short, military demonstrations may underscore statements of determination but they may also be read as evidence of desperation and the deterioration of position. There is no guarantee that show-the-flag dramatics will reap political gains.

Occasionally, in a military establishment as large and in a government as complex as that of the United States, military demonstrations are insufficiently coordinated with foreign policy. Some have been ill-timed, ill-conceived and badly man-

[19]The Berlin action was undertaken, of course, in the context of an acceleration of military preparations including the call-up of thousands of reservists.

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aged. A most dramatic case in point is "Operation Big-Lift." This highly publicized[20] airlift maneuver undertaken on October 22, 1963 transferred, in the span of sixty-three hours, 444.2 tons of equipment, 15,377 men of the Second Armored Division, and 387 support personnel of the Tactical Air Command from the United States to France and Germany.[21] In terms of the basic techniques of strategic mobility Operation Big-Lift was an enormous success. The United States demonstrated a capacity to conduct a division-size augmentation of forces in Europe in a matter of hours by using the Military Air Transport to carry the men, and by having pre-positioned equipment ready and on station in the region of redeployment. Yet the maneuver backfired politically. It alarmed the allies (especially West Germany), who feared that the exercise foreshadowed the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, instead of comforting them by proving how fast U.S. reinforcements can be dispatched to Europe.

Technical successes and political failures are not unusual in U.S. military operations. "Big-Lift" was directed by the Pentagon. The State Department, although ostensibly exercising political control, was sometimes overruled and always outmanned. News briefings and public statements from military sources were largely beyond State Department control. The political implications drawn from these statements concerned the briefing officers less than the technical aspects of the airlift itself. It was essentially a military show and the potential for political repercussion was not fully appreciated or at least did not directly concern those who ran it.[22]

Even if the political implications had been properly plotted and adequately explained, the incident, which has been aptly called the "fly-now-regret-it-later affair,"[23] would have been marred by the suspiciously timed remarks of the then Under-secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, who stated that U.S. military policy was entering a "new phase" in which reductions in overseas strength might be undertaken without impairing allied strength.[24]

[20]In addition to abundant press releases and news briefings on both sides of the Atlantic, each troop-carrying transport in the exercise carried two news correspondents along with its regular passengers. See Major General Glen R. Birchard, "Anatomy of an Airlift," *Air University Review*, May-June 1964, p. 24.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 18.

[22]These judgments are based upon interviews with State and Defense Department officials, conducted in March 1964.

[23]*The Economist*, November 9, 1963, p. 542.

[24]Address to the annual conference of United Press International editors, Chicago, October 19, 1963.

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This may, indeed, have been the message the Defense Department wanted to convey, although it was quickly and emphatically denied by the State Department. Gilpatric's remarks were underscored, moreover, by the fortuitously concurrent publication of an article by Dwight D. Eisenhower, in which he stated that "the time has come when we should start withdrawing some of those troops" from Europe.[25] No American official should have been surprised that European sensitivities were aroused by Operation Big-Lift and the statements accompanying it. Too much attention was paid to the technology of the exercise and too little to the political message it conveyed.

Military demonstrations, like other aspects of U.S. military power abroad, have an ambiguous effect that can never be entirely counteracted, even when there is basic agreement over political objectives (which was probably not the case with Operation Big-Lift). Any effort to flex the military muscle raises the specter of war. A measure designed to inspire confidence will also inspire fear. That is the paradox within which American military strategy must operate. Unfortunately the ambiguities of policy are sometimes compounded by the absence of political foresight. Despite these shortcomings, however, the capacity to demonstrate political intent with military forces is substantially enhanced by armed forces deployed abroad.

Intervention

One of the deep-rooted precepts of American politics is that the use of military force is justified only in response to aggression committed against the United States, its possessions, citizens or armed forces.[26] This doctrine of just war was extended after World War II to include treating an attack upon an ally as the equivalent of an attack upon the United States. In order to make this new commitment credible, to avoid the moral stigma of intervention, and to insure an effective defense effort in the event of attack, the United States stationed its armed forces in key strategic positions in Europe and Asia. Were it possible and militarily sound to make an American armed presence literally ubiquitous, any attack upon an ally would, *ipso facto,* constitute

[25]Eisenhower, *loc. cit.*

[26]Admittedly, the history of American wars does not entirely conform to that principle.

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aggression against the United States and the conditions that justified resort to force would be fulfilled.[27]

But limitations on American resources and the realities of world politics obviously vitiate such an approach. As a consequence the United States has deployed its forces in key areas—Western Europe, established strong points in the Far East, and the seas and oceans in between—where aggressors would encounter automatic American belligerency, but also, significantly, from which armed forces can be deployed for the purpose of intervening in conflicts not at the outset involving U.S. military units.

Despite the opprobrious connotation of the term "intervention," the United States pursues an interventionist strategy both to implement its basic policy of containment vis-à-vis the communist bloc and to impose, insofar as possible, a quarantine against communist influence upon the "emerging" nations of Africa and Asia. American experiences with interventions have been mixed —the Greek Civil War, the Korean War, the battles over Quemoy and Matsu, the landings in Lebanon, the dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic and the provision of large-scale aid to South Vietnam, to name some of the more conspicuous, all have been interventions of sorts. Recent experience in Southeast Asia, plus political turmoil in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, suggest that insurgencies and coups d'état are likely to plague American policymakers for some time to come. The United States will be tempted to intervene, either to prevent the seizure of power by communists or to seal out communist efforts to gain control over indigenous noncommunist revolutionaries. However, while the prospects for successful intervention do not appear to be high, nor the wisdom of such a strategy beyond reproach, the capacity to intervene remains an important aspect of the military posture of the United States.

The basic defense against insurgency is not military intervention. It resides in the effectiveness of local government, supported by loyal police forces, alert intelligence units, and a national military force which is capable of guarding the country's borders

[27]Note the wording of President Johnson's announcement of a reprisal raid upon North Vietnam in response to attacks upon U.S. destroyers August 2 and 4, 1964, which reads, in part, as follows: "Aggression by terror against the villages of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against *the United States of America.*" Text, *New York Times,* August 6, 1964, p. 7. (Emphasis added.)

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against large-scale infiltration.[28] The United States cannot create such well ordered political systems, although it can and does offer some aid. Once a government is beleaguered, U.S. intervention as a counterinsurgency operation may be too late to produce a dramatic reversal of the military fortunes of the local regime—or else, in order for it to be successful, it must be undertaken on a massive scale, as in South Vietnam today. Intervention is a better-late-than-never proposition at best.

While the primary antidote to coups d'état and insurgencies by political forces considered hostile to Western interests is the effectiveness of local government control, the best means for establishing and preserving control consists in strengthening the police forces and political organization of the threatened country. Herein lies a dilemma for a democracy: the course by which a country might best be preserved from communist control tends in the direction of the police state and totalitarian methods such as the communists themselves employ. Is the anti-communist objective of the United States sufficient to justify a resort to means which we find politically distasteful—the building and support of strong governments where democratic principles may be sacrificed in order to prevent the extension of communist power in the world?

The foreign policy of the United States is increasingly addressed to the problem of "nation building." Yet nation building is a complex process largely beyond the capacity of any other nation to accelerate. New nations are precarious political entities, much more susceptible to political mischief than to constructive aid. Moreover, most new nations, if they are to survive, are probably not ready for the delicate political system we call "democracy." No ordering of political power in society could be more precarious than democratic rule when the political customs and institutions of the country are unsettled, the economy is barely viable, and the level of literacy is very low. The greatest service the United States can perform for such emergent political entities is to isolate them from great power politics, to keep them out of the Cold War.

However, that is not a choice for the United States alone to make. Whatever the merits of intervention in specific cases, the *capacity* to intervene appears a necessary corollary to the policy

[28]Despite contrary popular belief, American military professionals are largely aware of the limitations of intervention and counterinsurgency wars. See, for example, Major Boyd T. Bayshore, "Organization for Frontless Wars," *Military Review,* May 1964, pp. 3-16.

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of containment. The United States must try to provide a countervailing force that will dissuade the communist bloc from becoming involved in costly enterprises—a procedure that is easier to prescribe than to accomplish. Such a countervailing force will be self-defeating if it involves the establishment of military bases within the areas to be neutralized from the Cold War. The only method which offers any hope of success lies in the threat of counterintervention, a threat which if credibly backed by the capacity to carry it out may deter communist intervention or at least keep communist aid below the threshold of overt military aid.

Current U.S. defense policy is aimed at a substantial increase in the forces and equipment that make intervention effective. Notable advances have already been made. Secretary of Defense McNamara stated in 1964 that there had been, since 1960, "a 45 per cent increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions; a one-third increase in the number of tactical fighter squadrons . . . a 75 percent increase in airlift capability [and] . . . a six-fold increase in counterinsurgency forces."[29] He went on to say that special attention is being given to advance deployment to trouble spots, readiness of the strategic reserve forces, adequate airlift and sealift capabilities, and pre-positioning abroad of equipment and supplies.[30] These measures anticipate situations in which the United States may find it necessary to intervene militarily. According to the Secretary of Defense, in many such situations the limiting factor will be "our ability to move forces promptly and to support them in combat . . . and not the number of divisions available."[31]

Obviously the U.S. government is placing great stress upon the capacity to intervene promptly and decisively. An interventionist posture presumably deters others from intervening, and seeks to react effectively before *faits accomplis* can be consummated. Overseas forces constitute the largest and most significant element in the interventionist design. However, current experience with an active interventionist operation, in South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, indicates the extreme difficulties which the United States is likely to encounter in its attempt to prevent political deterioration by military means.

[29]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 9637,* 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. 6899.

[30]*Ibid.,* p. 7024.

[31]*Ibid.*

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Controlling the Dimensions of Conflict[32]

A final significant effect of an American military presence on foreign soil is that it gives the United States a unique capacity for exercising control over the employment of military power. As the predominant nation in the Western coalition, the United States has undertaken the major responsibility for deterring attacks and unleashing active defensive measures in the event that deterrence fails. An objective implicit in the discussion of the other military functions of overseas deployments is the exercise of a high degree of control over the use of force in international politics. But this effort to control the use and magnitude of conflict is not limited solely to deterrence of potential adversaries. It applies also to the military activities of America's allies. Control through deterrence is self-evident, but control over allied actions requires elaboration.

In many circumstances the United States is in a position to determine, influence or delimit the resort to and use of arms by friendly governments. The United States dominates the Western alliance systems and maintains unilateral control over the nuclear arsenal which functions as a major deterrent on behalf of those alliances. American forces in West Germany, South Korea, the Formosa Straits and South Vietnam serve to defend against attack, but also implicitly to restrain or even prevent independent military action by the allies. Wherever conflict may occur on the long arc from Northern Europe to the Korean Peninsula, the proximity of U.S. armed forces makes it probable that the United States will be both involved and in control of Western response. The vital decisions respecting the level and timing of responses, weapons to be employed, targets chosen, and political objectives and conditions of settlement, while not matters of unilateral control, will probably be determined largely by the United States.

Only the United States, among the nations of the West, has the global responsibilities, strategically located forces and military resources that make central control and influence possible. America's domination is by dint of unique responsibilities and power rather than a result of unilateral dictate or conspiracy. This role has been thrust upon it by the exigencies of Cold War politics and military technology. Few nations allied with the West could

[32]The writer wishes to thank Seyom Brown of the RAND Corporation for calling attention to the importance of making this function an explicit part of this text.

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hope to undertake military operations of any substance without the United States' political support and military aid, especially if that conflict is related to the larger issues of the Cold War. It is this condition of relative dependence upon the United States that now plagues U.S. relations with Great Britain, France and Germany. The major allies are understandably restive under restraints governing their own destinies. But the resolution of this problem probably lies in special arrangements that could make their dependence more palatable rather than in overturning the alliance itself.

In short, while dependence on U.S. military power may offend national sensibilities, it does impose a degree of central control and political stability that appears necessary in the larger context of the East-West conflict. The rearmament of West Germany would be of little comfort to Europe without the substantial presence of American troops. So too would the array of South Korean military power along the 38th Parallel and the ever-present threat of the Nationalist forces on Formosa to return to mainland China be causes for anxiety.

In a world of nuclear hazard, where almost every armed conflict raises the risk of uncontrolled responses, the exercise of centralized authority and control undoubtedly enhances stable relations between East and West. That task has fallen to the United States, and the deployment of U.S. armed forces abroad enlarges its capacity for control.

The Question of Alternatives

The preceding analysis of the politico-military functions of American armed forces abroad suggests that, despite certain reservations, a military presence in Europe and Asia will remain an essential aspect of U.S. diplomacy so long as the strategy of containment retains political validity. The objective of containment is, of course, to prevent the expansion of the communist domain. The main purpose of U.S. military preparedness has been to deter the Soviet Union and China from extending their areas of control by forceful means, to defeat them locally if they or their clients attempt piecemeal aggression, to encourage allied cooperation in this effort, to maintain access to territories and seas from which battles might have to be fought, to demonstrate American determination and will in specific circumstances, to intervene in situations where Western interests are in severe jeopardy, and to

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exercise a degree of control over the sources and dimensions of conflict.

It may be objected that the Cold War is over, that the bipolar conditions out of which the American strategy of containment arose have disappeared, and that containment is therefore no longer a relevant consideration. There is no denying that the character of international politics has changed substantially since 1947, that polycentric tendencies operate in some respects within the communist and Western alliance systems, and that a third group of nations has emerged that is uncommitted to the two major power contestants. But it is premature to conclude that the Cold War is over. The power struggle, centered in the vastly diverging political objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union, has changed in character largely because of the more subtle tactics adopted by the Soviet leaders during the last decade. But the aims of the two sides remain incompatible and the contest is still partly determined by military considerations. The Soviet Union still seeks to undermine the strength of the West and to gain political ascendancy in the world. It would be extremely hazardous to assume that the Soviets will ignore their own military arsenal in the quest for power. The Cuban missile crisis remains instructive evidence of their continued willingness to resort to military instruments.[33] Moreover, the military basis of the Chinese power quest, always obvious, is further emphasized by the recent acquisition of nuclear status.

In short, the Cold War has changed but it has not ended. Neither side can afford to rely upon military power alone to maintain its interests, nor should the United States be guilty of an inflexible commitment to military measures when political and economic instruments might accomplish American objectives better and with lesser risks. But can it be argued that the functions of the American military presence abroad which have been outlined here are no longer necessary, or that they can be better performed by other means? Aside from the conclusion, already noted,

[33]A knowledgeable student of Soviet affairs recently wrote that "one must not forget that the Soviet regime has never ceased to advocate a world triumph of Communism which posits our subjugation. . . . This goal, however indefinitely scheduled, constitutes a large part of the regime's *raison d'être*. When it thinks it is reasonably safe to do so, as in the late summer of 1962 [sending missiles to Cuba], the Soviet regime will try to alter the world military environment to bring this goal a step closer. Insofar as the policy of 'containment' implied the maintenance of a military situation which precluded such Soviet effort, the policy is just as valid today as in 1947." John A. Armstrong, "The Soviet-American Confrontation: A New Stage?," *The Russian Review*, April 1964, p. 114.

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that strategic deterrence can now be accomplished without a network of elaborate overseas bases, the functions we have analyzed indicate that the military emphasis of U.S. diplomacy is largely necessary.

Any contemplated change in the American global force structure must be studied in terms of the functions those forces presently perform. Unilateral withdrawals, agreements to "disengage," the substitution of allied for American troops, and the interposition of United Nations forces for those of the United States—to mention the most obvious alternatives—each would radically disturb the stabilizing influence of the American military presence. The removal of U.S. military power could unhinge the alliance structure, jeopardize Western confidence in the United States, and remove the major deterrent to and defense against military adventurism. The nuclear stalemate that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union has not proscribed the use of force in international politics. Indeed, that stalemate has only lowered the level of permissible violence.

In summary, then, this analysis points to the positive conclusion that the American global system of deployed forces contributes to a stabilized military environment. The global responsibilities of the United States, legitimized by multiple alliances, have made it possible to establish a worldwide network of national power that includes access to territories, bases and waters all along the Eurasian periphery. The U.S. military presence retains significance precisely because of its *national* identity, as the symbol of deep American commitment. It is an ambiguous symbol because it seeks to reinforce the peace by military means. Yet in the absence of an international system in which disputes are decisively resolved by supranational means, there is no other effective stabilizing force.

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A EUROPEAN COORDINATED FORCE*

by David Robison

SINCE the late 1950's, a critical issue besetting the Atlantic Alliance has been the organization and control of strategic nuclear forces. Of the schemes put forward for either joint Atlantic or European nuclear forces, none has satisfied a sufficient number of the major powers concerned. This paper proposes a militarily effective, joint European nuclear force and examines its political feasibility in terms of the interests of the leading NATO powers.

In the following analysis, we will reach the basic conclusion that the political objectives of France, West Germany, Great Britain and the United States seem to dictate that, if a joint force is to be organized at all, it will be a European rather than an Atlantic force. Such a force could be organized around three basic principles: separate national forces in Europe will coexist together with the European force; there must be a right of instant withdrawal and later reinstatement without penalty for all members in order to solve the problem of the veto; and, consequently, a joint European deterrent will be a coordinated, not an integrated, force, at least during its early years and perhaps for a long time thereafter.

It would also be preferable, but not essential, that the voting formula for decisions regarding the *use* of the force be different from the formula for decisions which do not involve its use; that decisions about its use should not require the assent of all the major powers in Western Europe, but only a majority of them; and that if an active or withdrawn member is attacked with nuclear weapons and the European force is not activated, that member would have the right to employ the nuclear weapons systems belonging to the European force which have been entrusted to its military services.

Characteristics of a European Coordinated Force

The most reasonable proposal for the political control of a

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joint force was made by Klaus Knorr in February 1963.[1] He noted that a deterrent system in which each member kept a veto was hardly worth joining, since "it would have little military worth and low political feasibility . . . the unanimity principle might be workable in the very improbable event that the *entire* alliance was subjected to a *simultaneous* attack." But much more likely are limited conflicts that might spread or escalate, which involve "a *selective* use of nuclear threats and actions," and in which responsibility for the conflict may be ambiguous and recourse to the joint force may involve escalation by the West. "Some country or other, or perhaps several, is likely to veto employment of the collective force when only one ally faces an immediate threat." On the other hand, Knorr insists that "the stake of involvement in nuclear war is so high that no sovereign nation can be expected to renounce its veto." His solution was that any member could drop out of the force as soon as the decision-making stage was reached in a crisis, and could be instantly reinstated later. Membership of the force in a crisis might therefore drop as low as the minimum majority needed for affirmative vote. Withdrawing members would take out the joint force's nuclear weapons systems manned by their national services, which would be controlled by electronic locks against unauthorized use.

Using the Knorr proposal as a basis, we may proceed to examine some of the organizing principles for a workable European deterrent. First, and most important, if a joint European force is to be established and is to remain relevant to the political needs of the major West European powers, it cannot be an anti-proliferation device. Existing national forces will almost certainly be retained and expanded, although the European force could control by far the largest part of European nuclear weapons systems.

Second, the command structure of a European force will no doubt have to be based on the *coordination* of national military commands. *Integration* of the command structure is politically unacceptable to France at the present time—although it is worth remembering that General de Gaulle's rejection of an integrated multilateral force was made specifically in response to the multilateral formula drawn up at Nassau, in which the French force

[1]For the full proposal, see Knorr, *A NATO Nuclear Force: The Problem of Management*, Policy Memorandum No. 26, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, February 5, 1963.

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was to be turned over to NATO. If member-states are permitted to withdraw in a crisis and later return, an integrated military command structure must either be fully international (i.e., individual military officers from member-states would owe their allegiance to the European force—a most unlikely development) or else it would be depleted as members withdraw. A command structure should not be so constituted that it might suffer major disruptions in the midst of a crisis: on the other hand, the establishment of an international military staff would create an arbitrary distinction between national and international officers which would impede relations between the European force and national forces and lead to a serious problem of coordination, in peacetime and especially in a crisis. No country would want to split its senior military officers in this way. It would be better, in a crisis, if those members who disagreed on the strategy preferred by the majority could withdraw from the European force rather than deadlock the military decision-making process of an integrated military council. The *coordination* of national military commands appears to be the solution.[2]

Coordination in a European force would involve general strategic concepts, targeting for various kinds of conflict, designing of force requirements, and the production and deployment of the military systems appropriate to the strategy. The European force would in effect be commanded and controlled by as many headquarters as there were nations in the force, and European nuclear weapons systems would be assigned to the national military services. These European weapons and delivery systems

[2]Coordination of forces is thought by many Americans to be inadequate, and therefore dangerous. They say that unless friendly nuclear powers are linked by a grand political concept, their fear of being led into nuclear war against their will by the action of nuclear allies will eventually fracture the alliance. So far, this has not happened, and one wonders whether such an argument has not been tainted by the American desire to halt nuclear proliferation. Alliances express a core of common purpose or security interest; they do not specify that the allies will necessarily act together in any future crisis. In reporting on the NATO Treaty in 1949, for example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called "particular attention to the phrase 'such action as it deems necessary' . . . included in Article 5 *to make absolutely clear that each party remains free to exercise its honest judgment in deciding what measures it will take. . . .*" (Italics added.) Alliances convey the belief that a threat to one ally will bring about support from the other because this support is in the other's security interest. In an alliance of nuclear powers, the danger of nuclear war only strengthens the right of each ally to take separate action in a crisis; it does not diminish the value of expressing a common policy against other powers. The right of instant withdrawal and later return, and the coordination, rather than integration, of national military commands in a European force should meet the needs of an alliance of nuclear powers.

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would be differentiated from their nationally-controlled counterparts only by their command and control arrangements. The decision-making process in a crisis would inevitably supersede all advance planning, though the thought patterns established by such planning would probably provide a framework for the choices. Separate decision-making centers coordinated by secure and reliable communications links, including television, would ensure that the top political and military leadership of the nations remaining in the force during a crisis could consult on a continuous conference basis, even though geographically separated.

Third, if the European force cannot be activated, any member whose territory *or* armed forces were attacked by nuclear weapons would be permitted to use the European nuclear weapons entrusted to its military services. This right would also apply to members who had withdrawn from the force and then had been attacked with nuclear weapons. This is the only way in which a European force might convince some of its members who might otherwise build national nuclear forces—in particular, West Germany—to rely solely on the European force. It may be objected that an assertive member could take actions which the others opposed—perhaps action by conventional troops—and still be permitted the use of nuclear weapons if subjected to nuclear attack. But this objection is weakened by the right of every member to withdraw from association with and responsibility for the assertive member. Moreover, the isolated member could not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. This provision would furnish each nation a shield against nuclear attack when use of the European force was vetoed. Combined with the right of members to withdraw rather than to veto, this provision would endow the coordinated European force with a highly credible nuclear deterrent. In addition, it is important that the members who withdraw have the right to use nuclear weapons in defense as a means of protecting their armed neutrality; otherwise, they might feel compelled to submit to hostile threats against them.[3]

[3]The technical control arrangements for the nuclear weapons in such a force should thus meet the following criteria:

a) The weapons are to be fired once the required number of countries send a positive signal throughout the force.

b) Nuclear detonations by nonmembers on the territory or armed forces of any of the members are to release the control system so that the weapons manned by the national military services of each attacked country may be fired by the host country alone, if the European force is not activated.

c) The nuclear weapons are to have characteristics such that they can be positively identified if detonated. Thus, if a member exploded nuclear weapons

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It is true that some potential proliferation of national control over nuclear weapons is implied, but only under the worst circumstances—a nuclear attack in which the European force was not activated. To those who oppose all forms of proliferation, I would argue that if proliferation in Europe is to be impeded over a long period of time, the following conditions will have to be met: (1) the European states must be given access to nuclear weapons subject to greater national control than the present U.S. veto, or any single-state veto, allows; (2) each member must believe that the nuclear power of a joint force would be available to him in all circumstances bearing upon vital national interests; and (3) each member must have the means to avoid entanglement in other states' nuclear actions. None of the present efforts to halt nuclear proliferation meets these criteria.

Decision Making

The voting arrangement for political control of a European force is the most difficult problem to solve. Member-states by voting against use of the force and then withdrawing—thus disavowing all responsibility for such use—would presumably be free of the fear of becoming involved in a nuclear war against their will. Under these conditions, a proposed use of the force could be vetoed only by failure to reach a qualified weighted majority of positive votes.

What would constitute a qualified weighted majority? Two cases will be considered: 1) Britain is a member of a European force built around the six EEC states; 2) Britain is not a member, but the Six are. On questions involving the *use* of the force, in the first case, the affirmative vote of *two* of the three major powers—Britain, France and West Germany—would be sufficient to activate the force. In the second case, without Britain, the affirmative vote of *one* of the two major powers—France and West Germany—*plus either* Italy or the three Benelux countries would be sufficient. The addition of other EFTA states would not change this majority needed for positive use.

Critical decisions about the use of the force should rest on

belonging to the European force on its *own* territory or armed forces, or on that of another member, the whole European force would still be controlled by procedure (a), i.e., the required number of positive signals, and not by procedure (b), i.e., individual control by attacked members.

d) Tampering with the control mechanisms of the nuclear weapons would release a warning signal to all members indicating that tampering had occurred. Procedure (a) would still apply.

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the affirmative vote of at least two of the major centers of power in Western Europe, preferably among Britain, France and West Germany, but, if Britain were absent, including Italy and the three Benelux countries (Italy and the Benelux countries alone would not be sufficient to trigger the force). Dissenting members would presumably withdraw. This requirement for an affirmative decision seems to be neither too trigger-prone nor too difficult to achieve. The latter consideration is vital, for a European force must not suffer the debility of being based on a consensus among too many nations—a consensus which probably could not be obtained in the more likely and more ambiguous kinds of possible nuclear crises.

Most of the decision making with regard to the European force will not be concerned with its use, but rather with choices about the strategy, sharing, production and deployment of its nuclear weapons systems. Compromise and a wider consensus rather than withdrawal should characterize these choices. Voting on these decisions could be based upon a modified version of the method now used in the Council of Ministers of the EEC. That formula gives France, West Germany and Italy 4 votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands 2 each, and Luxembourg 1, with 12 votes constituting a qualified majority on important questions. But in terms of actual military and political power, France and West Germany would have to be given more weight than this scheme allows. Decisions not involving the use of the force should therefore be made by a simple majority or a qualified majority of the weighted votes of the members as follows: Britain, France and West Germany 4 votes each, Italy 3, Belgium and the Netherlands 1½ each, Luxembourg ½, and other EFTA countries ½ to 1½ each, depending on size.

In the present European Economic Community, a simple majority would be 8 votes of 14½; a qualified majority might be 11 votes of 14½. This means that France and West Germany together could control decisions, if a simple majority were used, and no decision could be taken to which both were opposed. However, Italy and the Benelux countries might insist that their support be obtained for these decisions. Therefore, it might be preferable to rely on a qualified majority of 11 votes of 14½. This would mean that France and West Germany would need the concurring vote of either Italy, or Belgium and the Netherlands together, to make a decision. If Britain were added, a

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decision on matters other than the use of the force should certainly be taken on the affirmative votes of more than just two of the three major powers; France and West Germany alone should not be able to make decisions. This, too, seems reasonable, since the opposition of Britain, Italy and the Benelux countries is too important to be ignored. British membership would require the use of a qualified majority of at least 11 votes of 18½. In any event, the criteria of these arrangements should be (a) that the major states be given effective power in regard for their actual military weight, and (b) that they should be incapable of overriding the others if the opposition represents almost half the effective power of the grouping.

Sharing

A coordinated European force would involve the following degree of sharing: (1) There would be coordination of its elements among the national military services, including general strategic doctrine, targeting, early warning, and jointly-shared or compatible communications and command and control systems. (2) There would be a large margin of redundancy in the communications systems as well as in the use of hardened underground command centers in order to ensure that political-military centers of decision would survive a nuclear attack and that control over the weapons would be maintained. (3) A substantial redundancy in numbers of nuclear weapons systems would also be necessary so that the force would still be adequate after several members had withdrawn, taking out the European weapons systems manned by their services. These weapons systems would be apportioned to the national services according to the financial and technological contribution of each member. (4) There would probably be a sharing of the cost of research and development of weapons delivery systems and perhaps of communications systems, including British and French sales of technology or patents for developed products. Sharing of production is also conceivable. (5) The nuclear weapons would be produced by those members with adequate facilities—Britain and France at present. (6) A planning, targeting and communications link with the United States strategic force would probably be maintained.

A Coordinated Atlantic Force

Similar characteristics could be applied to the organization

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of an Atlantic force. It should be structured so that the United States could not singly veto its use. Otherwise, the protection of Europe by nuclear weapons would be as absolutely dependent on U.S. decisions in the Atlantic force as it is now on the unilateral American guarantee to Europe based on the U.S. strategic force. This condition is no longer acceptable to France, and in the future is not likely to be acceptable to other European states. Second, all members should have the right of withdrawal at any time; this would reduce the U.S. fear of giving up the veto. The voting arrangements controlling the *use* of the force could follow Professor Knorr's proposal: affirmative votes by three of the five major powers—the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy—would be sufficient. This means that the United States and Britain could not veto the use of the force, and this prospect should reassure General de Gaulle; on the other hand, France and West Germany would need the support of either Italy or Britain before they could override the wishes of the United States. Again it should be emphasized that the United States or other members could withdraw, and rely either on their own nuclear force or on their right to use the joint force's nuclear weapons assigned to their national military services in case they were attacked with nuclear weapons and the Atlantic force was not activated. All the other provisions and characteristics of a coordinated European force could apply to a coordinated Atlantic force. In fact, a European force could become a coordinated Atlantic force at a later date by the addition of an American contribution, if Atlanticism followed Europeanism in the Western world.

French, German and British Reactions

A coordinated force would seem to fit the political requirements of France, West Germany and Britain. The minimum French requirement is that she retain her national force for the foreseeable future as a "reserve parachute," even with the existence of a European force. This position will not change after De Gaulle leaves office, for even now the debate in France is moving from the subject of whether France ought to have a force to the question of how it might be used and what purposes it should serve. France will have a credible minimum deterrent by 1972, composed of at least 62 Mirage IV strategic bombers; 50 to 100 IRBM's (of 2,000-2,500-mile range), emplaced in hard-

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ened silos; and three to five nuclear submarines, each with 16 Polaris-type missiles.[4] Unless Soviet missile defenses become very respectable (which *is* possible), the French hardened IRBM's and submarine-launched missiles should constitute an adequate, survivable second-strike force. As long as France has the capability to destroy Moscow, she possesses a deterrent against nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. The French will probably place some strategic bombers on continuous air alert in any crisis, and could conceivably protect their bombers by basing them within mountains. The sea will likely provide all the mobility and protection that European forces need. Under consideration in the United States today is the concept of an advanced sea-based deterrent, in which improved Polaris-type missiles would be stored in the ocean, ready for firing, and perhaps moved about at irregular intervals. In time, the Europeans could create this type of sea-based deterrent, for the French are a leading nation in underseas research.

France will exercise her option to construct a credible second-strike deterrent. The advantages of a national force are felt by the Gaullist leadership to be as much their effect on French morale and France's position among the nations as on strict French security.[5] A joint force cannot match the benefits of increasing France's power relative to other nations; as things now stand, the French force will make her the world's third most powerful military nation. The national force is also a means of asserting the nation's right to be a bargaining partner in all transactions affecting it: the *force de dissuasion* is also a *force de discussion*. The Gaullist politicians are not the only ones in France who feel this way: a survey carried out by the Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique in April 1964 showed that 39 per cent of the French respondents favored the *force de dissuasion;* 41 per cent were against it, and 20 per cent had no opinion.[6] The percentage favoring the force may be expected to rise; in any case, the policy can easily be carried out when roughly 40 per cent favor it and 40 per cent do not.

Why would France support a European force? Primarily be-

[4]For a good discussion of the French procurement plans, see *Interavia,* June 1964, p. 799ff.

[5]For the best statement of this view, see French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer, "Our Military Policy," *Revue de la Défense Nationale,* May 1963; translated in *French Affairs,* No. 155 (New York: Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information), pp. 11-12.

[6]*Interavia,* June 1964, p. 801.

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cause the French, including De Gaulle, wish to organize some type of political system of interstate relations called "Europe." The West Europeans seem to have accepted to a degree the belief that their states can obtain benefits from a continental-sized European organization. General de Gaulle spoke on February 4, 1965 of "the union of Europe—which became the indispensable condition for its independence and development. . . ." This belief is present, but not yet firmly rooted. A European force might be desired by the French as a means of increasing the deterrent power protecting the European states and controlled by Europeans; offering Western Europe the option of giving up U.S. nuclear protection, thereby enlarging the relative influence and independence of Europe, of which France would be the leader; and providing an instrument which, by its common ownership, forces the participants to concert policy more closely.

The greatest impetus to French willingness to accept a European force will likely be supplied by the question of West German control over nuclear weapons. Will the West Germans decide to "go nuclear" for themselves unless a European force is formed, and to what extent will the French desire to prevent this development? This problem will help to generate positive pressures for a European force, and together with the appeal of Europeanism, these pressures should sway the French to initiate a joint force—provided that their national force is allowed to remain—rather than to do nothing.

There is no doubt that powerful inhibitions deter the West Germans from deciding to build a nuclear force of their own. These include the expectation of world-wide outcries and pressures against such a course: the United States might threaten the withdrawal of its troops and the U.S. nuclear guarantee of West German territory, the French might threaten to break up the West European grouping, and the Soviets might threaten war. It is unlikely that any of these threats would be carried out: the United States and France could not afford to leave West Germany unprotected against a Soviet attack or to cut Germany loose to fluctuate between East and West, and the Soviet Union of the 1960's appears too cautious a power to engage in a preventive war to stop the development of a German force. Nevertheless, the West Germans may be deterred for many years from building a force because of their unwillingness to face these pressures and because they might feel that by choosing

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nuclear armament they would harm their chances for reunification.[7]

Even if the West Germans are deterred from such a course, the internal pressures for a national nuclear force will build up in West Germany. The "soft shell problem" of security during the building of a nuclear force may be acute, but the Chinese are showing that they can live through it quite well, and the West Germans may eventually feel that they would survive it, too, whether or not they were cast loose by their allies. If Japan sets out to achieve nuclear status by the early 1970's, West Germany will be the only great power without nuclear weapons. West Germany may eventually accept the core of the Gaullist argument, as expressed by the General on April 11, 1961: ". . . it is intolerable for a great state to leave its destiny up to the decisions and actions of another state, however friendly it may be" by failing to develop its own nuclear force when it has the technological and economic resources to do so.

A deep sense of diplomatic isolation may grow in West Germany if it is perceived that the United States places increasing priority on European stability and an East-West *détente* over German reunification, and that France's interests no longer converge with those of West Germany on the question of German reunification. For West German security and foreign policy to be kept indentured to the United States or to France will certainly frustrate the Germans. As for the effect of such frustration, it is worth noting that the Mollet government decided to go ahead with the manufacture of French atomic bombs by a decree of December 5, 1956—one month after Suez. If West Germany can

[7]It is often asserted that a German nuclear force is inconceivable because the Soviets would prevent it from being built, by using force if necessary. The argument that the Soviets would attack West Germany to prevent the establishment of a German nuclear force is not persuasive for a number of reasons in addition to those mentioned above in the text. For example, what would happen to the security of Western Europe and the U.S. position in Europe if West Germany were attacked or even threatened without receiving U.S. support? If Germany were unsupported and forced to back down, would we not thereby lay the basis for an even more assertive Germany and even greater German-Soviet tension in the future? It is notable that the United States was deterred from attacking either the budding Soviet nuclear force in the early postwar period or the Chinese communist nuclear facilities in the early 1960's. There are other factors inhibiting the formation of a German nuclear force that seem to be as important as Soviet pressure: the opposition of the United States, Britain, France and other West European countries, and West Germany's strongly felt need for political respectability and allies. Despite their opposition to a German force, the Western powers could scarcely afford to sit by if the Soviet Union attacked West Germany following a decision by the Bonn government to build a nuclear force.

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gain control over her own defense through possession of nuclear weapons, she will increase her freedom of action in foreign policy. A West Germany of great vitality that faces increasingly powerful odds in trying to achieve reunification will have very strong reasons for wanting to control her own nuclear force.

How will West Germany satisfy this urge? German participation in a European force would probably be accepted, if grudgingly, by other Europeans, since the force would not be German-controlled.[8] Faced with the specter of a future German national force, Americans, Europeans and even the Soviets might prefer German membership in a European force to the growth of West Germany as a nuclear power outside such a force. This specter is the strongest reason for a European force. Moreover, a coordinated European force might go far toward satisfying the natural "nuclear appetite" of the West Germans; it would provide a credible deterrent that would not be veto-prone, and would allow West Germany the use of European weapons in the hands of her military forces if her territory or armed forces were attacked with nuclear weapons and the European force was not activated. Thus, West Germany would have an incentive to make a substantial contribution to the European force, as would the other members.

Two important objectives of West Germany could be secured by a national force or a coordinated European nuclear deterrent:

[8]It is often forgotten that the Germans have pledged *only,* in acceding to the Brussels Treaty in 1955, *not to manufacture atomic weapons in their territory;* they are not committed to abstain from possessing or controlling nuclear weapons manufactured elsewhere. West Germany also pledged in this treaty not to manufacture in its territory the following strategic delivery systems: long-range missiles, guided missiles, warships of over 3,000 tons displacement, submarines of more than 350 tons displacement, and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes.

In July, West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder stated two conditions for West Germany's accession to a nonproliferation treaty. According to the *New York Times,* "One condition was the creation of a multilateral atomic force or an equivalent Atlantic 'construction' to assure West Germany of a nuclear defense against aggression. The second was Soviet agreement to basic and irrevocable steps toward the reunification of West Germany. Without these, the Foreign Minister said, West Germany could not rule out the possibility of acquiring atomic weapons for national defense." The *Washington Post* added that "Schroeder told a German journalist that the establishment of [an MLF] or similar inter-allied nuclear arrangement would make any West German national nuclear contingent unnecessary." (See the *New York Times* and *Washington Post,* July 13, 1965.) But from which country could West Germany acquire nuclear weapons? The *New York Times* commented that "France, like the United States, offers Bonn the protection of its national atomic force while making it clear that it would remain French-owned and controlled." It would seem for the present that Germany could acquire nuclear weapons only as a member of a European force. The alternative for Germany, as long as the Brussels Treaty remains in effect, is to renounce her 1955 pledge if she is to become a nuclear power.

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(1) she would be assured that nuclear weapons would be available for use if the national soil were attacked, and (2) she would reduce her reliance on a superpower for her primary means of defense. Other German objectives which might be attained by building a *national* force would be achieved only in part or not at all by joining a European force: increased power and influence to support the particular foreign policy goals of West Germany, increased prestige as a participant in international bargaining on all issues of basic concern to the nation, enhanced stature among the nations, and enhanced pride and morale at home. Possession of a national nuclear force may be necessary to the attainment of German nationalist goals, and, since reliance on multilateral support for reunification has not been crowned with success, West Germany may rely increasingly on her own national efforts. Thus, although participation in a European force may be valuable or even essential for West Germany, a German national force may still follow.

Britain has defined her primary foreign policy requirement as the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance, that is, maintaining the closest possible relationship with the United States consistent with her interests. As Raymond Aron has written: "the Europe of which General de Gaulle dreams is first of all political and military, but, in these matters, Great Britain is first of all Atlantic."[9] Britain, therefore, may not be an original member of a European force, despite the fact that Britain and France, as the two powers in Europe with strategic nuclear arsenals under their control, are the obvious starting points for such a force. Clearly, Britain could make a major contribution to Europe's power and influence.

The French have made at least two exploratory approaches to the British on the concept of an Anglo-French basis for a European strategic effort. The British did not respond to either of them.[10] Yet there are many signs that Britain still wants to have

[9]Aron, "Europe and the United States," *Commentary,* August 1964, p. 56.

[10]At the Macmillan-De Gaulle meeting at Rambouillet on December 15-16, 1962, and at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on September 23, 1963; see Robert Kleiman, *Atlantic Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), p. 49, and the *New York Times,* September 25, 1963, p. 1, respectively. According to Anthony Hartley, "the British Government did apparently make a tentative approach to Washington during the summer of 1962 for permission to pool British nuclear knowledge . . . in an Anglo-French deterrent. Consent was not given, and the British Government . . . seems never even to have considered proceeding without at least tacit American approval." *Survival,* July-August 1964, p. 178, note 12; reprinted from *Encounter,* May 1964.

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the option to join the EEC and to maintain her independent nuclear deterrent.[11] These are symptoms of an inability to decide whether her role should be to play the part of Robin to the American Batman, to stand alone as a great power with an independent deterrent, or to reverse centuries of tradition in differentiating herself from the Continent and become committed to a leading role in a future "Europe." Britain will probably not decide soon, as De Gaulle recognized, and in the meantime she will have to show a greater degree and scope of commitment to Europe in order to interest the EEC members in new negotiations for British entry. A future British bid will probably have to include economic, political and defense matters.[12]

Whether Britain will join a European force in the foreseeable future will be determined in large part by U.S. policy toward Europe and Britain.[13] A coordinated European force would seem to be the kind of joint European deterrent that would be most acceptable to Britain, considering its preference for separate national forces, for the right of withdrawal, for coordination rather than integration of command, and for a considerable degree of choice in foreign policy. These characteristics should also appeal to France and West Germany.

In summary, a coordinated European force would seem to offer a number of important advantages for the West European countries. First, no attempt would be made to accomplish the improbable feat of eliminating existing British and French nuclear forces. The combination of a joint force and national forces would support the present political desires and objectives of these countries, as expressed by their governing political, foreign policy and

[11]For example, Britain has not canceled her role in developing the Concorde supersonic transport with France, though she is stretching it out; after giving up the manufacture of large military missiles, she is now providing the large first-stage booster for the ELDO European space rocket; she is interested in joint development with France of a medium-range missile and of large, advanced electronic systems (*New York Times,* March 4, 1965, p. 15); she is reconsidering air-to-ground missiles after failing to invest more money to develop the Skybolt missile; and after announcing in 1962 that her strategic objective was only to provide a "British contribution to the Western deterrent," she now insists on limiting her role in the proposed Atlantic nuclear force to a national force that could be withdrawn in an emergency.

[12]See Miriam Camps, *What Kind of Europe?* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[13]Washington could do no better than to make clear that the United States supports the attitude expressed by Prime Minister Macmillan, shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, on the need for an independent British deterrent: Britain "should be able, should the necessity arise, to make her independent decisions on issues vital to her life."

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technological elites who favor a mixture of national nuclear independence and interdependence.[14] In this respect a coordinated European force differs from most previous proposals for a joint European or Atlantic force.[15] It is a *sine qua non* of any joint Western force that it must exist alongside national forces controlled by the former great powers of Europe which have not forgotten that they are "old military nations" and whose power, prestige and interests dictate the maintenance of national nuclear establishments.

Second, it is designed to offer the West Germans additional nuclear protection and a nuclear role short of a deterrent force of their own, while at the same time not disrupting relations between the Germans and their neighbors to the East and West. If the German nuclear problem is to be solved short of the creation of a German nuclear force, a European force must be established independent of an American veto.

Third, a coordinated European force, as compared to separate national efforts, would promise much greater efficiency from the pooling of technological and economic resources. While national forces could gain some increased efficiency through interstate cooperation on military research and development and perhaps production, the pooling of resources for a joint force would provide

[14]It is often argued that the British Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) proposal provides a way for the Labor Government gracefully to renounce the British deterrent. This is an incorrect view. The British proposal specifies that Britain's contribution to the ANF is not to be part of the mixed-manned element of the joint force. The purpose of mixed-manning is to prevent national elements from being withdrawn, divested of their joint electronic locks, and then used for national purposes. But if national elements are nationally manned, they can certainly be withdrawn if necessary, despite their "irrevocable" commitment to the joint force so long as NATO lasts. Except for the mixed-manned element, the ANF represents no real departure from the Nassau Agreement of 1962, which specified that the British force contributed to NATO could be withdrawn "if supreme national interests dictate." Max Frankel has described the ANF as "a nuclear force under joint management but still clearly under national control." (*New York Times,* October 12, 1965, p. 3.) The fact is that the Labor Government is not giving up Britain's national nuclear force.

[15]The Knorr concept of a joint NATO MRBM force allowed for independent British and French deterrents. The other proposals have not. In 1959 General Norstad proposed making NATO a nuclear power, with integrated, joint control over national units. Separate *European* national forces would then be given up. His 1963 plan called for control of a joint NATO force by majority vote of the United States, Britain and France, with allowance for dissenting members to withdraw their forces. Again there was no provision for separate European forces. (See the *New York Times,* January 15, 1963, and Norstad's May 8, 1963 speech to the Academy of Political Science in New York.) The concepts of a joint European force advanced by Nelson Rockefeller on April 24, 1963, and by Henry Kissinger in *The Reporter* (March 28, 1963), both assume that European national forces will be incorporated into the joint force.

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for a much larger total effort and a higher quality European-controlled deterrent. As a result, it would also enhance the military credibility of the force and the survivability of its command structure.

Fourth, a coordinated European force would entail a form of political-military organization most acceptable to France and Britain, as shown by the loose confederal type of organization proposed in the Gaullist Fouchet Plan for a political treaty among EEC members, and by British distaste for joining a federal Europe. It avoids the integration that is anathema to De Gaulle and that involves a degree of surrender of national sovereignty most European states are presently unwilling to make.[16] Instead it would foster national coordination where it is essential for a joint force—in decision-making, command and control, R&D, production, and early warning and alert. The right of withdrawal would permit the members to forgo the veto power. Withdrawal would be more feasible because each member could count on unilateral nuclear protection by its own portion of the European force if it were attacked with nuclear weapons and the joint force were not activated. The degree of political commitment required by the joint force would coincide with the present limited political cooperation among West European states and would make it easier for a large number of nations to join. It might thereby help to heal the split between the EEC and EFTA states.

Fifth, such a force would have significant political-strategic value for West Europeans, enabling them to provide for their own defense, increase their freedom of action in relation to both superpowers, and join in a strategic project that should improve the coordination of their foreign and defense policies. It might

[16]Although the EEC treaty provides that on January 1, 1966 decisions in the Council of Ministers will be made by a weighted majority vote, instead of by unanimity, the French are quietly obtaining approval from their EEC partners for a tacit understanding that the majority rule shall not be invoked to infringe upon any member's vital interests. Bernard Nossiter writes from Europe that "the Dutch are virtually alone these days in seeking a European order based on something more than nation states. For example, the German Minister of Economics, Kurt Schmuecker, has been saying for months that Bonn would never permit any majority to lower the common grain price that Germany worked so hard to push up last winter. . . . Even in Brussels, Commission officials say that a silent understanding about the restrained use of majority voting will cause no pain. They . . . contend that everybody has always known that a vital national interest like safeguarding high cost farmers could not be threatened by mechanical votes." (*The New Republic,* October 9, 1965, p. 14.) Such is the present strength of national sovereignty in Europe. Can the Europeans be expected to go far beyond this point now in the field of joint military action?

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lead eventually to the construction of closer political cooperation among the West European states.

Europeanism Before Atlanticism

In addition to meeting the political needs of these three European powers, a coordinated European force harmonizes with political tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic that favor the development of a European rather than an Atlantic force. In U.S. policy, our discriminatory opposition to the French force, but not to the British force, encourages French opposition to any Atlantic project. The West Germans must be concerned about the U.S. reaction to the French force and its implications for U.S. policy toward a possible future German force. Moreover, as the West German and Belgian reactions to the MLF indicated, the European members of the EEC seem unwilling to participate in any defense project that excludes and isolates France. The French in turn can place effective pressure on the Germans over any Atlantic strategic force: witness De Gaulle's warnings that if West Germany joined the MLF, he might break the Franco-German Treaty and deal separately with the East Europeans in a way deleterious to German reunification.[17] Surely the January 1965 caucus vote of the parliamentary members of the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.) to put off any decision to join the MLF may be construed as an owl hooting on the battlements.

The United States has offered many important reasons for opposing European national forces, but these arguments have also been manipulated to support our dominant political desire to maintain our position in Europe.[18] It is implicitly understood in the United States that nuclear proliferation will result in a relative decline of U.S. power because nuclear weapons are, to a

[17]See the *New York Times,* December 7, 1964, p. 3; January 13, 1965, p. 7; and January 19, 1965, p. 2.

[18]The U.S. double-purpose argument seeks to discredit European national forces because they are only large enough to be targeted against cities and not against opposing nuclear forces. Secretary of Defense McNamara declared at Ann Arbor in June 1962 that, for the United States, "principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war . . . should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population." However, from 1961 on, Secretary McNamara has stated his belief that the Soviet Union would probably not refrain from striking our cities in a nuclear war, thus discounting the likelihood of city-avoidance. In January 1963, *six months* after his Ann Arbor speech, Secretary McNamara testified to the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1964 Defense budget: "I personally believe that it is extremely unlikely that, in the event of a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union against this country, they would do anything other than to strike all of our nation with all of their power in the

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considerable extent, the modern "great equalizers," tending to produce subjective mutual deterrence between unequal nuclear opponents. None of the present trends in the Atlantic world—such as U.S. opposition to proliferation in general; the continuing growth of European self-confidence; De Gaulle's willingness to use shock tactics to force West Germany, and the rest of the Six, to forsake reliance on the political and military support of the United States; and the period of re-evaluation into which West Germany may be entering—is likely to encourage the United States to abandon its opposition to "separate national forces in Europe." Yet, unless Americans can accept the proposition that a joint force will not supplant the various national forces (just as we have no intention of integrating even the major part of our own deterrent in a joint force), it is doubtful that a joint Atlantic force will ever be achieved.

The curbing of separate national forces has been the essential U.S. purpose in proposing a multilateral force. Moreover, there are other divisive factors: the Europeans' dislike for our doctrine of flexible response; President Kennedy's blunt warning in West Germany on June 25, 1963 that "only a fully cohesive Europe . . . will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean. . . . With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals";[19] and the persistent doubts in Europe and America as to whether Washington would ever give up its veto in a joint force.

The poor prospects of Atlanticism are underlined by the much stronger prospects of Europeanism. It is sometimes forgotten that the original consensus behind the European movement included the notion of an independent and autonomous Europe that could compete in power with the United States and the Soviet Union. If "Europe" is to be built, it must be based on mutual interests which tie together the European states and separate them from the two superpowers. In fact, a comparison of the interests of the

very first strike." In his most recent testimony on February 18, 1965 on the FY 1966 Defense budget, Secretary McNamara indicated that U.S. strategic planning is now based on the assumption that American cities *will* be struck by the Soviet Union in a nuclear attack, either simultaneously with an attack on our military targets, or after a delay long enough for the United States to use its missiles against the enemy's military targets. Now that the argument that general nuclear war will avoid cities has been given up, will American opposition to European national forces lessen to any degree? I do not think so.

[19]The American emphasis on European integration *before* Atlantic Community-building shows an awareness of what can be done first, and what the United States would like to see done first. It indicates our priorities and desires, and is a way of postponing difficult or infeasible steps toward Atlantic integration.

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West European and East European states with those of the United States and the Soviet Union indicates that neither European grouping shares strongly *convergent* interests with either of the superpowers;[20] rather, the two Europes may increasingly grow independent of them. In this context, U.S. influence and protection as a control on Western Europe—to hold down Europe—parallels important Soviet interests in Europe; the Europeans may wish to be free of control by either superpower.

The "twin pillars" or "dumbbell" concept of an Atlantic Community always suffered from the doubt that such a United Europe would find it worth the cost to enter into an intimate and equal partnership with the United States, once its security position was so vastly improved by the combination of European powers. The decline of the Soviet threat to Western Europe reinforces this doubt as to whether Atlanticism will follow Europeanism. Either a "European"-oriented political grouping in Western Europe or an all-European security arrangement seems more likely in the long run. If West Germany and France join efforts in choosing to construct a political-military Europe, then Atlanticism will lose in competition to Europeanism. Thus, the political interests of the West European states, the continued impetus of Europeanism, and the divisive factors operating against Atlanticism suggest that a European force, in the foreseeable future, is likely to be more feasible politically than any Atlantic force.

One caveat must be entered in the light of General de Gaulle's recent hardening of attitude toward West Germany, his reported insistence on the maintenance of integrated Allied control over German—but not French—forces, his reported opposition to giving the Germans any role in nuclear planning or the use of nuclear weapons, and his implied cooperation with the Soviets in seeking to keep Germany under control. Should this line of French policy be continued, the political basis of cohesion in Europe sufficient for a joint European force would seem to be lacking, just as the political consensus for an Atlantic force is lacking today. Perhaps, if the Germans opt for European autonomy and give up dependence on the United States, De Gaulle will return to the spirit of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963. One can only speculate whether De Gaulle is trying to force Germany to adopt his view

[20]See "European Defense, American Interests, and the Prospects for NATO," by Edmund Stillman and Anthony J. Wiener, in collaboration with Francis E. Armbruster and David Robison, Hudson Institute, HI-331-IR, March 30, 1964, pp. 161-166.

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of Europe's future as an autonomous power, or whether he prefers to organize an entente against Germany. In the latter case, the result would be a resurgence of nationalism in Europe even greater than today, and the absence of any European political cohesion. A Franco-German entente remains the precondition for a West European political grouping.

Costs and Benefits for the United States

Would such a coordinated European force be in the interests of the United States? Two considerations seem especially important. U.S. opposition to independent European forces and centers of decision—for the sake of stability, competitive position, or nuclear "responsibility"—indicates a sublimated American understanding that a united, independent and powerful West European power center not tied to us in a Grand Design may not be to our interest. We have understood that one of our vital interests is to prevent the domination of Western Europe by any external power —today, the Soviet Union. But the threatening power need not be external to Europe; we have opposed, in 1917 and 1941, the domination of Western Europe by a power within Europe. One day U.S. policy may be opposed to the domination of Europe by any one power—such as a European Political Community—and to the expansion of power and influence by that United Europe, so long as it is not our "partner" in an Atlantic Community. This opposition will probably be based, not on the fear that a European power center would become our military opponent, but rather on the realization that it could become our political, diplomatic and economic opponent or competitor in all areas, including the present EFTA countries, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China and the present Third World.

The emergence and flowering of the Atlantic Community concept among our politically most sophisticated citizens since 1961 —as the United States began to perceive that the Soviet threat to Western Europe was declining, that European strength and assertiveness were reviving more rapidly than expected, and that American influence in Europe was consequently on the wane— suggests that we do experience great uneasiness at the prospect of any one power center controlling Western Europe. This is not to deny that there have been other important motivations for U.S. support of an Atlantic Community. But the Atlantic Community concept certainly was related to American desires to main-

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tain our control and leadership of Western Europe. A coordinated European force which helped to strengthen Western Europe politically and militarily would contribute, to some degree, to the decline of our relative power and influence in Europe, and eventually, in the rest of the world.

On the other hand, there is one important benefit for the United States in the building of a coordinated European force, namely, a much broader option with respect to becoming involved in a nuclear war as a result of our interests in Europe. We have an overriding concern in avoiding the choice of whether to risk our cities for Europe's, at a potential cost of tens of millions of American dead under the worst circumstances, or to see Europe damaged, destroyed or occupied as a result of our abstention. This interest has been obscured by our fear of Europe's loss of confidence in the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and by the doctrine of unified nuclear control used to bolster U.S. opposition to proliferation. After estimating that the United States would lose from 40 to 150 million people in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union in 1970, depending on the extent of our damage-limiting preparations, Secretary McNamara stated on February 18, 1965 that "although the United States would itself suffer severely in the event of a general nuclear war, we are fully committed to the defense of our allies." We should not be content with this situation. A better solution must be found that affords both protection for Europe and more reasonable options for the United States. A European force might do so.

On balance, then, a coordinated European force would seem to be to the U.S. advantage. It would improve the defense of Europe in a way that would allow us to face the era of nuclear plenty with greater freedom of action in our foreign policymaking. At the same time, we should be able to meet the challenge of an assertive European power center in the future. The effect of powerful competition from Europe would be a mixture of costs and benefits. These would include an American-European dialogue, however discordant, about the uses of power; a reduction of our responsibilities, but also of some unwanted obligations which we find it difficult or dangerous to meet (German reunification, for example) ; a relative reduction of U.S. power, but also of the sterility of the bipolar world conflict in which all other areas have been seen as parts of a giant United States-Soviet scoreboard; and an increase of vitality in other nation-states and cultures. Since there

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is a core of common interest in the West in the basic security, political and economic health, and survival of both Europe and America, a coordinated European force could be expected to be on our side, and not against us, in any great conflict. The development of a large European nuclear force protecting Europe and remaining in at least residual alliance with the American nuclear force would have considerable political influence in our times. One day, we might need its aid.

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PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GAMING*

by David C. Schwartz

IT is the purpose of this article to examine some basic methodological problems in man-gaming or simulation for research and policy evaluation in political science, and suggest a framework within which alternatives of gaming method may be considered. Its principal concern is to answer questions regarding the suitable conception, design and administration of political games in order to suggest theoretical and practical guidelines for dealing with game-related problems of modeling, strategy analysis, orientation to games, personality and involvement biases, and general research techniques.

The validity of game findings depends upon the soundness of the epistemological basis which underlies gaming. Technical research problems seem trivial unless they are placed within the broader context of a fundamental question, namely, how relevant are game experiences to the real world? Does what happens in a game bear any demonstrable relationship to what will happen in real life? Perhaps equally important, are there valid or persuasive theoretical reasons to believe that such a relationship will develop? These important questions are but variants of a theme which preoccupies the modern philosophy of science. Clearly, they deserve careful treatment in the light of both pragmatic results and epistemological criteria.

But among the bases of legitimate inference from games to real political systems, matters of method must also be prominently considered. If research techniques are handled uncritically, unchecked systematic bias may impair the validity of game findings. Thus, it would appear that, at present, questions of the ultimate utility of gaming can be left open, and that immediate attention might properly be directed toward the making of those refinements in political gaming which will increase its rigor.

As a working statement, simulation may be defined as "the building of an operating model of an individual or group process

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and experimenting on this replication by manipulating its variables and their interrelationships."[1] Political games are a subset of social science simulations, "in which human actors participate within the simulated system, generally in a competitive situation."[2]

More than a decade ago, the technique of role-playing simulation or gaming was differentiated from its intellectual forebears[3]—military strategy analysis and small group research—and applied to problems of a more or less explicitly political character. Since then, political scientists have learned much through and about gaming. The number of games, of kinds of games and of gamers has grown. Emphasis has shifted from the teaching and training functions of political games to their utility as a research and analytic tool. More and more problem areas are coming to be examined by means of gaming. A growing body of social science literature on simulation reflects expanding scholarly interest in the method. If the frequency of conferences or the size of research grants is admissible evidence, interest in gaming seems also to be growing in government quarters.[4]

All of this, probably, is to the good. Yet the prospects for gaming, if generally hopeful, are still limited by a number of problems. Fulfillment of the bright promise of gaming may be facilitated by subjecting some theoretical and practical problems of gaming to more thorough professional scrutiny than has heretofore obtained.

It is perhaps understandable that many available essays and reports on games emphasize hypotheses and tentative findings rather than theory and methods. The relative novelty of gaming has reinforced the laudable caution of its practitioners in not wishing to claim too much, too soon. Yet the relative neglect of logical and procedural problems may prove unfortunate. Methodological refinement in the social sciences seems to depend, in part, upon public discussion. Then, too, the professional literature affords too little guidance to novice gamers, whose numbers are increasing. Many game project manuals remain

[1]Richard E. Dawson, "Simulation in the Social Sciences," Harold Guetzkow, editor, *Simulation in Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 3.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 9.

[3]As dated from the beginning of its American application. See Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," *World Politics*, October 1959, pp. 71-83.

[4]See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political Military Exercise: A Progress Report," ORBIS, Winter 1965, p. 855 and *passim*.

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unpublished. Few of the available handbooks provide detail sufficient to evaluate and choose between alternative procedures.

The Need for Guidelines

If, in the interest of methodological improvement, constructive critical assessments of gaming are to be made, some reasonably objective and generally accepted criteria of evaluation need to be established. Such criteria could serve two important functions. First, they might operate as a set of much-needed standards for the design and administration of political games. Second, they could facilitate comparison of current gaming practices in political science with "ideal" standards, thereby permitting systematic consideration of important problems.

The elaboration of such standards (derived, in this instance, from some logical requirements of social science experimentation and the embryonic theory of simulation), and their application to political gaming is the principal objective of this exploration.

There are, of course, alternative approaches to evaluation and problem-identification in political gaming. One might, for example, ask these questions: What do gamers and game-participants think of gaming? What problems do those most intimately involved in gaming perceive? Such a method of evaluation would be useful for certain purposes and has already begun to be explored.[5] Statements of subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction with gaming, however, can be useful only if the bases or conditions of satisfaction are made explicit. Scientific evaluation and problem-identification in gaming, rather than the necessarily subjective assessment of gamers, is needed for the refinement of that tool.

Sources of Gaming Standards

From what sources, and in what manner, shall we derive standards for the evaluation of gaming? Useful and relevant guidelines might be drawn from a wide variety of sources. Here, we will consider briefly the legitimacy of developing standards from four different areas: (1) the general purposes of the game; (2) the specific subject matter of the game; (3) some logical requirements of experimentation in social sciences; and (4) the need for simulation of, rather than direct experimentation in, political systems.[6]

[5]See, for example, Richard E. Barringer with Barton Whaley, "The M.I.T. Political-Military Gaming Experience," Orbis, Summer 1965, pp. 437-458.

[6]Specific problems in political gaming are examined in the light of these perspectives in a later section of this paper.

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The general purposes for which a political game is played conditions the relevancy of various criteria of evaluation. Games played for different purposes seem to require somewhat different criteria. Standards appropriate to games conducted primarily for teaching or training purposes, for example, will differ appreciably from those relevant to research or strategy-analysis. In games played for instructional purposes, one is principally interested in whether or not the student learns something about real political processes.[7] In research or strategy games, appropriate criteria legitimately concern both the outcome (i.e., the identification of significant, replicable relationships) and the procedures which determined the outcome. While many games are played for, or achieve, a "mix" of objectives, there is little likelihood that any one set of hard and fast standards will be useful in considering all of the various kinds of political games. Even with games having similar purposes, the specific objectives of a particular game vitally affect its proper construction and administration.

Another problem area encountered in seeking to establish criteria for political gaming is the relevancy of the simulation experiences of other disciplines. Role-playing simulations are currently used for a variety of purposes in economics, education, psychology, sociology, general operations research and military science. Adaptation of useful gaming techniques from these other disciplines has already commenced in political science—just as scholars in other fields have learned from the experiences of political gamers. In this respect, gaming constitutes still another example of the growing diffusion of research technology across increasingly shadowy and permeable disciplinary boundaries in social science. As with other methods—and theories, too, for that matter—interdisciplinary borrowing of game techniques has seemed to proceed largely on an *ad hoc,* trial and error basis. To some degree, this may be necessary. Still, it seems desirable, if difficult, to follow some explicit standards in assessing the applicability to political topics of techniques developed in other fields.

In general, legitimate interdisciplinary borrowing appears to depend upon isomorphism, or clear similarity of focus. To the extent that the environment and character of business strategies seem similar to those of national policymaking, for example, the

[7]There are some differences in opinion, among gamers, on the effectiveness of games for teaching purposes. See Bernard C. Cohen, "Political Gaming in the Classroom," *Journal of Politics,* May 1962, pp. 367-381.

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structure and standards of procedure of industrial and operations research gaming may prove useful in international relations research. If the formulation of crisis foreign policy seems peculiarly akin to, or is explained by principles of, small group decision-making, then the evaluative and methodological techniques of sociological game-type analyses may reasonably be borrowed for studies of crisis behavior. Recognition of such similarities is, of course, a matter of intuition. Yet, it seems of little help merely to tell researchers concerned with the selection of appropriate game procedures to "be creative." Guidance in the selection and employment of game techniques seems to require more specific standards.

Some more specific guidelines might be sought in the unique properties of given subject matters, for these inevitably influence techniques of investigation. Standards so derived, however, are difficult to apply generally. Problems investigated by simulation methods developed in other disciplines, for example, are often so dissimilar to political problems as to limit the utility for political gaming of techniques and standards developed for non-political phenomena. Thus, while the gaming experiences of other fields are clearly relevant to political science, they do not appear to provide detailed and comprehensive guidelines for simulating (and evaluating the simulation of) political systems. Additionally, as the types of political problems studied via gaming increase, even standards developed in one sub-discipline of political science may prove difficult of application in other fields of the science.

In the development of guidelines for gaming, due consideration must be accorded the general purposes and the specific subject matter of the game. If, however, these factors alone do not yield wholly satisfactory criteria for the proper construction, conduct and evaluation of political games, it may be useful to include some standards appropriate to the whole class of research methods into which gaming falls. If there are meaningful epistemological imperatives which apply to a whole category of research methods, and gaming can be observed to fit within that category, then logically the procedures of gaming can be evaluated in the light of these imperatives.

Political games exhibit many, though not all, of the characteristics common to social science experiments. In games, as in other experimental forms, one seeks to observe the responses ("moves" —perceptions, actions, strategies, policies) of subjects ("teams"—

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role-playing game participants) to selected stimuli (scenarios, control moves, messages from other teams) under conditions which are, or should be, controlled and replicable. Accordingly, each phase of the design and administration of a political game—including the selection and orientation of subjects, the presentation of stimuli, the control of extraneous stimulation (including effects of the game or experiment itself), and the observation and recordation of responses—presents problems and opportunities about which we already know something. From this it would appear that standards of good experimental practice may legitimately be applied to current practices in political gaming.

In some senses, however, a game is different from an ordinary experiment: it is an experiment conducted in a simulated environment. "The policy-type political-military exercise is basically a device for crudely simulating the decision-making process at the top governmental level."[8] All political games, whether directed primarily toward research or toward policy or both, involve the simulation of a political system or environment. This may be accomplished by the experimenter, a control team ("playing" nature and the political units not actively represented in the game), or a computer (in man-machine games). Because the experimentation in a game takes place not in the real system (e.g., among actual national policymakers, in real political situations) but in an operating representation of some aspect of the system (the simulation), gaming has been referred to as "pseudo-" or "quasi-experimentation."[9] In addition to standards deriving from the logic of experimentation, from the general purpose of games, and from the specific subject matter to be investigated, certain guidelines for the utilization, conduct and evaluation of political games relate to this need for the simulation of, rather than direct experimentation in, political systems.

Some Basic Problems in Political Gaming[10]

When Is Gaming Appropriate?

When is there a need to simulate political systems? In particular, when is there a need to simulate political systems via man-gaming? In considering problems of political gaming, it seems

[8]Bloomfield and Whaley, *op. cit.*, p. 857.

[9]See Richard A. Brody, "Simulations in International Relations Research," in Harold Guetzkow, editor, *Simulation in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 195.

[10]This section addresses itself to but a few of the more basic problems in political gaming. The effort is to be representative rather than comprehensive.

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logical to begin with that of gaming's appropriate employment. In discussing standards for political gaming, it may be useful to start with some guidelines for recognizing the conditions under which games are likely to be fruitful.

The character of the specific subject to be studied seems to be the prime criterion. In deciding whether or not to "game-out" a given political phenomenon, it may be useful to engage in a process of methodological elimination, opting for the employment of simulation only in the absence of more powerful research methods. If, for example, the situation to be investigated is amenable to relatively direct observation, methods of such observation are likely to be (and probably should be) at least tried before seeking synthetic data by the application of gaming techniques. Thus, where clear and frequent "natural experiments" occur, the political scientist can observe the real, and not a simulated, system in operation. Then, too, there are many instances in which relevant empirical data about political actors can be generated more or less directly, for example, via documents, interviews, biographical or social background analyses, content analyses or historical-analytic methods. One may subsequently wish to "feed" data so collected into a simulation, but role-playing techniques are infrequently employed initially where methods exist permitting inferences to the real world more directly.

The absence of more direct observational techniques is not to be taken as *prima facie* evidence that simulation is called for. Continuing the process of elimination, one is generally well advised to consider the possibility that the aspects of the real world which one wishes to study may be adequately represented by an already existing "solved analytic model." "[A]t the present stage of the discipline . . . [such a model] is likely to be drawn from the natural sciences or mathematics."[11] The advantages of such a model are obvious. "Natural science models are 'known'; their logic is clear and their language precise."[12]

Where appropriate mathematical models can be found, they are powerful scientific tools. The abstractness of the symbol system facilitates the recognition of similarities and congruences between models and therefore, between the realities they represent. In this way, the process of accumulating knowledge may be expedited.

Beyond this advantage, mathematical models can be made to yield information about a variety of states of the system without changing

[11]Martin Landau, "Political Theory and Due Process of Inquiry," paper read at 1964 Meeting of American Political Science Association, p. 13.
[12]*Ibid.*

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the basic model. The question, "What happens when the size [or 'power,' or some other variable] of a unit changes with respect to the system?" can be explored in the model. And this question can be asked and examined for many combinations of units and variables.[13]

Clearly, an intuition that an existing solved analytic model will plausibly represent some political phenomenon is but the beginning, not the end, of inquiry. There remains the work of rigorous testing—by clarifying the logical properties and basic concepts of the model, by stipulating correspondences between elements of the model, on the one hand, and aspects of the political phenomenon, on the other, and by researching the hypotheses which result from that stipulation and the logic of the model.[14] Yet, where this is successfully accomplished, the explanatory and predictive power which results is considerably greater than the present capabilities of simulation are likely to provide. It should be said, however, that simulation, and especially computerization, may facilitate the "cleaning up" of concepts and the formalization of the statement of relationships.

The foregoing seems to suggest that gaming may be thought of almost as a residual category of research method, most useful where "stronger" techniques of observation and representation do not apply. As the utilization of direct observation or mathematical models is often easier and cheaper than is the use of gaming techniques, it is not unreasonable to follow (and suggest) this "law of least effort." This, however, is surely no derogation of the utility of gaming for, in the social sciences, phenomena are legion whose problems of access, complexity and contemporaneity impede observation and representation. If, as one example, role-playing simulation is generally applicable in considering the subjective needs, values, perceptions, strategies, or priorities of inaccessible political actors, the vast and expanding number of propositions about domestic and foreign policy political elites indicates considerable potential utility for gaming in comparative politics, international relations and political development.

Man-gaming, then, may be said to be most useful in researching complex phenomena where concepts are not yet formalized (or quantified), where more direct methods of observation are difficult or impossible to apply, and where the character of available

[13]Brody, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

[14]For an excellent discussion of these matters, see Landau, *op. cit.;* and on the pre-scientific character of much political science thinking see Martin Landau, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Science," *Social Research,* Vol. 28 (1961).

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models does not admit of simple, rapid or direct manipulation of variables.

The Need for a Model or Frame of Reference

Because political games are most typically used as a means of "indirectly observing" complex phenomena, and because simulation models in political science are relatively new and often of unproven power, there is an understandable tendency to stress the exploratory and informal character of gaming. Gamers may emphasize the "hypothesis-seeking" functions of their technique or its utility in helping them to formalize their concepts. Indeed, in at least one gaming project, "minimal formalization" has been regarded as a "requirement" of game design such that "pre-established prescriptions automatically entailing certain consequences from particular types of moves" were deliberately eschewed.[15]

It is true that gamers sometimes have to work with imprecise models, but there is no wisdom in confusing necessity with virtue. Simulation requires an explicit model and, if man-gaming is a kind of simulation,[16] it too requires such a model.

> The central problem inherent in all simulation . . . is that of adequate reproduction of the real system. In simulation, the researcher . . . is trying to learn or teach about a real system by working with a model of it. If the simulator does not validly model the necessary attributes of the real system, the results found in solving problems in the simulated environment cannot successfully indicate the behavior of the real system. This means that the researcher must know a great deal about the real system before he can presume to simulate it. . . . If the replication of the system and the means of operating it are not valid, the experimenter will find the use of simulation dysfunctional rather than useful.[17]

> If now one asks why use models, it is clear that we must. We will either use those concealed in our natural language or those that are explicitly chosen in the interest of scientific language.[18]

There are excellent experimental reasons for not fully revealing the experimenter's model or purposes to the subjects. This is especially true in gaming. For example, games are sometimes played in which the participants, by virtue of their special competences, are expected to provide the model (or at least a model relevant

[15]Goldhamer and Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 ff.
[16]For a discussion of gaming as something other than a simulation, see Martin Landau, editor, *Management Information Techniques* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), pp. 32 ff.
[17]Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.
[18]Landau, "Political Theory and Due Process of Inquiry," *loc. cit.*

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to some aspects of the phenomena in question). We may hope, for instance, that game participants who are professionally engaged in the making of high-level foreign policy will teach us much about the nature of policymaking by their actions—and the way they structure their teams—in hypothetical crises, which they would be barred from revealing in interview situations. The gamer need not always provide a model of the environment, but he must seek to know the models or frames of reference which are assumed by the players to be operating in the game—or he will be unable to state the conditions under which his results obtain.

Frequently, one purpose of a game experiment is to identify and explain a given response or set of responses which is regularly associated with specific stimuli. Intervening between the game stimuli (i.e., the scenario problem, Control moves and messages from other teams) and the responses (i.e., moves), is the basic character and "set" of the subject (participants, teams). The stimuli "produce" the responses by activating the subject's predispositions (character and set). This basic set includes at least the initial attitude of the subject toward the stimuli. Thus, if one does not know the orientations and assumptions of role-players toward the ways in which their actions will affect events, their moves simply cannot be understood.

Personality factors, too often overlooked in gaming, will be considered separately below. Here, we discuss only some perception of the participants and their understandings of the processes of politics. There are several ways of studying these orientations, presuppositions, strategies, and the like, which are currently being used by gamers. Probably the simplest technique is the post-move questionnaire which asks about the relationships of perceptions to action. At one time it was feared that professionals would not sit still for such portraits, but a judicious use of suitable observation techniques is proving feasible and worthwhile.

Some basic orientations to politics and games are difficult to study in this fashion. Many of these do not yet seem to be well recognized as problems by gamers. For example, participants who, in fact, view politics as a zero-sum game do not tend readily to admit this. Here, the use of rapporteurs as participant-observers who are "on the team" but also part of the game project staff may be helpful. Rapporteurs are also useful in observing orientations to the game itself, such as styles of play. Some teams play

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a "game strategy" designed to put them ahead after n-moves—when they think the game will end. Other teams seem to pursue strategies which do not take into account the number of game moves—they are less affected by the game mechanics.

Again, whether the game is conducted for purposes of research or policy-evaluation, the gamer needs to know something about the strategies which underlie the participants' moves. Only to infer these from the observable actions misses the whole purpose of the game. The pictures of politics, in the heads of the participants, must somehow be examined. Rapporteurs can be of service here as can the requirement that teams brief Control on their strategies. In general, it is also important to know something about the range of strategies and policies considered, and to be aware of strategies which were not adopted. It is difficult, however, to ask participants about such dormant strategies in specific terms without running the risk of uncritically introducing new stimuli. Questions which relate to past moves or projected actions (generalized predictions from which strategies may be inferred) have been suggested as one way out of some of these difficulties.

Communicating the Model: On Orientation and Learning in Games

Whatever the participants think about the ways in which political events occur, it is the gamer's model of political processes which affects the game critically, for after each period of play the gamer "meshes" the moves and decides what has happened. These decisions, in the form of Control moves or new scenario-problems, are presented to the subjects as new stimuli. If gaming "requires the players to live with the implications of their chosen strategy,"[19] it also requires them to live with the gamer's model of political life from which these "implications" derive.

As indicated above, such a model of the environment almost inevitably exists. It may be explicit or implicit, precise or imprecise, pre-programmed or flexible—but it exists,[20] and it raises some important problems.

The gamer's model is important both to the players and, in several ways, to the validity of game findings. The political behavior of the game participant, just as that of the real political

[19]Bloomfield and Whaley, *op. cit.*, p. 870.

[20]A few political games have used wholly random meshing procedures, but this is a special matter and is not considered in this paper.

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actor, derives, in part, from factors of need, value and perception, and from expectation of the future and of "the way the world works." A political actor seeks to determine "what he wants (needs)" and "what will happen if he does 'x' to get it?" Because the experimenter's model of political processes determines what will happen under various conditions, the players must either learn that model or, in some sense, "be penalized." More important, if at least some players do not learn the essential features of the model, and play accordingly, realistic, controlled simulation of the real world does not take place.

On the other hand, if all aspects of the model are learned too quickly, the range of possible actions and hence the utility of the game may be severely restricted. In most real political situations, the actor has incomplete information about the ways of the political world. In teaching or orienting the game participant about the model of the real world operative in the game, a balance must be struck so that the role-players know enough to be able to play meaningfully, but not so much as to preclude the making of interesting choices.

In analyzing the responses of game participants, it may be important to know (1) how much learning has taken place, and (2) the differences between players in this respect. For some research purposes, comparability of information and understanding will be important. These matters are also important in understanding the dynamics of gaming itself, in order to compare game phenomena with the real world. Questionnaires, observation and briefings may be helpful in ascertaining the information level of the players.

There are essentially two ways in which the participants learn the basic model operative in the game. First, background papers and the scenario-problem constitute initial orientation. Second, learning takes place through the actual play, especially the early moves, of the game.

The more detailed, explicit and historical the background papers and scenario, the more likely are the essential elements of the gamer's model to be recognized by the game participants. The logic of experimentation requires that these be communicated; the nature of the model, the phenomena and the participants condition the ways in which this requirement is met.

The learning of the model which takes place during actual play may be even more important. Here the participant can

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observe the effects of his actions. It is essential for the gamer to keep tabs on how much learning is taking place. To reduce the biases involved in differential rates of learning, the gamer may wish to regard the early moves, up to the point where sufficient or comparable understanding of the model occurs, as an initial, orientational learning period and record only those responses which are made after that point.

Involvement and Personality Biases

If man-gaming is likened to a generalized or "idealized" simplified social science experiment, the major problems which emerge from this comparison relate to (1) the presentation of stimuli, (2) the observation and recordation of response, and (3) the systematic examination or control of intervening variables. Major unsolved problems in political gaming, however, concern the examination and control of subjective factors—or intervening variables. The importance of several such factors—perceptions, calculations, information and learning—has been indicated above. Perhaps the most significant unsolved problems in political gaming are those posed by personality and involvement.

The personalities of role-players have considerable effect on games. Two participants, confronted with an identical situation (i.e., role definition and stimuli) with objectively identical information and with the same political resources will, nevertheless, structure differently that situation, perceive differently that information and understand and utilize differently those resources. In this respect, at least, games do seem to mirror the real world: similarly situated real political actors often behave very differently from each other. Presumably, these differences—both in games and in the real political systems—are due, in part, to personality effects. We know that differences in basic personality or need structure are normally associated with differences in values, perceptions and role performance. Yet, presumption is not enough. In order to develop a comprehensive body of empirical political theory, arrived at by the use of political gaming, we must know in detail what aspects of personality will "produce" various political and game effects.

It is surprising that relatively little attention has thus far been paid to the effects of personality in games, for in this area gaming may be able to make a unique contribution to contemporary

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understanding of political life. Knowledge, in the form of data and interpretive typologies, about the personalities of real political decision-makers has begun to develop. It is, however, often difficult to observe directly the effects of personality patterns on political behavior in the real world. Systematic matching, and variation, of personality characteristics (and sets or structures of such characteristics) with political situations as represented in games might be expected to yield a more precise and comprehensive appreciation of the role of personality in political decision-making—for example, in self-definition of role; in establishing priorities of values; in affecting perceptual biases; in the fact or perception of congruence in personal styles which affects compromise, cooperation and consensus.

It is becoming increasingly feasible to administer standardized personality instruments even to real political actors. It should certainly be possible to secure personality data on at least some game participants—particularly in games where the players are students or faculty members who can be expected to understand the potential value of this kind of research. Accordingly, a personality "test" appears to be a feasible and potentially important research adjunct to political games. The important matter of personality change might be studied by administering the test both before and during the game.[21]

Another important potentially biasing factor in games is the matter of cultural background. Most of the participants in our games have been Americans, usually highly educated, urban persons. These people are asked to play the role of decision-makers whose background and operating arena are very different from those familiar to the players. Can "Blue" players really think "Red?" What effects has this "cultural gap" on choices in games? Here again, we can only speculate about these difficulties because at present we have little or no "hard" data about them. To be sure, we must make explicit the cultural backgrounds of our players. More significantly, we might well strive to use foreign nationals (perhaps students) in our political experiments and to investigate the game effects produced by these cultural differences.

Even if the effect of the personality and culture of participants

[21]The effect of the group on individual decision-making, a matter not treated in this paper, seems also to be related to personality factors. Thus the use of psychological instruments might be expected to facilitate inquiry on a range of interesting problems.

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may be expected to be relatively stable during the course of a game, other possibly biasing factors are more transitory. Learning, discussed briefly above, is one such factor. "Involvement" is another. Simulation administrators and participants have noted that different role-players seem to invest different degrees of self in the game or role; that some players are more interested, more attentive, more "involved" than others. It is also true that the game player may be more involved in the game or role at one point in the game than at other times. The first phenomenon may be described in terms of a "game or role involvement gradient"; the second may be referred to as "involvement change."

Are the involvements of game participants similar to those of the real actors being studied indirectly; or, in other words, are the participants effectively playing the specified roles? Are there significant, regular, observable covariations in role performance and involvement?

Unfortunately, the recorded experiences of political gamers can provide but little in the way of satisfactory answers to these important questions. Until recently, the professional literature had ignored this problem. Yet, it is both possible and desirable to use post-move questionnaires to secure a "self-ranking" of involvement and to use participant observers and secondary analysis of message content to obtain independent assessments of involvement.

Some Problems of Gaming Procedure

Drawing upon the logic of social science experimentation, it is relatively easy to state at least some general standards for assessing the effectiveness of practical game procedures. The real difficulties arise in trying to apply such standards to concrete game situations. Certainly, (1) the presentation of stimuli should be clear; (2) the recording of responses should be accurate and complete; and (3) the procedures of the game should not introduce extraneous, unexamined stimulation. But these standards do not tell one what to put in a pre-game briefing or background paper; how best to observe and record responses; or how to make specific gaming techniques unobtrusive, non-biasing or neutral. Decisions on such matters of detail depend largely on the critical judgment of the individual gamer. General criteria of evaluation can, however, inform the intuitive judgment or "feel" of the

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gamer by suggesting means whereby the effectiveness of game procedures can be tested and improved.

In pre-game briefings or background papers, for example, one should orient the participants to the game and teach them something about the character of the operative model being used. In theory, the clarity of these documents could be assessed by questioning the participants after they have read them. In practice, it is patently infeasible to stop the game and test the effect of each game procedure immediately after it has been employed. Often, therefore, the game proceeds on the assumption that the participants have adequate understandings of roles and models in the game—sometimes with unfortunate results when that presumption fails. To minimize these risks, gamers should take a page from the experimentalist's and survey researcher's book by subjecting orientational and other materials to rigorous pretesting on persons who are similar in important respects to game participants.

Again, certainty of accurate and comprehensive observation and recording of game responses is desired. The formal "moves" in a typical game are relatively simple to record and, except where excessive, ill-timed or seemingly artificial paper work is required of participants, this is probably non-biasing. But the gamer is generally interested in more than the content of the formal moves. The bases of the actions taken in the game (e.g., the perceptions, calculations and strategies) are also of interest, as are matters of decision-making structure and style. Questionnaires, participant-observers, one-way mirrors, hidden cameras and microphones might be used. The employment, or even suspected employment, of some of these techniques, however, might destroy the involvement of the participants in the game. Although gamers may disagree about the benefits and liabilities of various observational methods, the generation of presently unavailable hard data on these problems might help to settle the arguments. It would seem worthwhile to run a reasonably large number of inexpensive (perhaps student level) experiments to examine more closely the dynamics of political games. An evaluation routine for various alternative game procedures might well develop from such a project. In this manner, even the most potentially biasing practical gaming problem—insuring enough time for players to read the game documents carefully and, thereafter, to study and play their roles competently—might be examined and moved toward solution.

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Conclusions

The plain fact is that we presently know too little about the all-important limitations of the game as a research and strategy tool in political science. In far too many cases, the use of man-gaming as a technique for political study has been little better than attempting to look into the black box of political life, using, as a vantage point, another black box—political gaming. The promise of gaming requires, for its fulfillment, a greater appreciation of the relationship of gaming to the epistemology of political analysis, of the character of the models used in games, and of the processes or inner-dynamics of the game itself.

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NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE REALM OF OBSCURITY

by Wesley W. Posvar

ONE of the common criticisms of U.S. national security policy is that we need a more explicit statement of the objectives and priorities of national action. The lack of precision in policy statements is sometimes attributed to the muddled thinking of national leadership. At other times the blame is assigned to the bureaucratic system itself, which allegedly requires all officials so to compromise and obfuscate their individual viewpoints that the result is a catalogue of vague generalities instead of a set of clearly-defined policy positions.

The problem of obscure or contradictory expressions of national goals is epitomized in attempts to provide a statement of national security policy at its most general level. Frederick M. Sallagar's hypothetical construction of such a policy illustrates the difficulties:

> The policy of the United States is to frustrate the Soviet design for world conquest. For this purpose we must rely on a great capacity for massive retaliation at times and with means of our own choosing, though we must be extremely careful not to incur the risk of a devastating atomic war. American policy must be ever mindful to strengthen the coalition of free peoples and to prevent the loss of additional peripheral areas to Communist conquest. At the same time, however, the United States must not spread its armed strength so thinly in scattered areas as to make itself vulnerable to direct Soviet attack. While there is no indication of war in the immediate future, there is always a possibility that the United States might be involved in a war not of its own choosing on extremely short notice. It is therefore imperative that American forces be maintained at a strength and in a degree of readiness sufficient to carry out the objectives of the United States, but without inflicting such burdens on the American economy as to imperil domestic stability.[1]

General Maxwell D. Taylor, reporting on his own experiences, notes that such expressions can be interpreted to mean anything and everything. He refers to one high-level policy document as being

> so broad in nature and so general in language as to provide limited guidance in practical application. In the course of its development, the

[1] *The Search for Decision in National Defense*, P-848-RC, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, October 15, 1955, pp. 16-17.

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sharp issues in national defense which confront our leaders have been blurred in conference and in negotiation. The final text thus permits many different interpretations. The protagonists of Massive Retaliation or of Flexible Response, the partisans of the importance of air power or of limited war, as well as the defenders of other shades of military opinion, are able to find language supporting their divergent points of view.[2]

If these are accurate representations of important policy documents, do they suggest that at the highest level it is impossible to see policy goals clearly? Is policymaking at that level perforce undertaken in a "realm of obscurity?"

To explore these questions will require examining that realm of high policy where the ends and means of national strategy are devised. The policymaker is faced with certain fundamental problems of perceiving strategic objectives and relating them to one another. We shall consider to what extent the criticism of the lack of clarity in national policy may *not* be justified. Undoubtedly, the ambiguities of high policy can be reduced somewhat by more precise formulation of that policy and perhaps by better organization for decision-making. There are impressive forces working to assist in this effort. They include experts in public administration, theorists of decision-making, and, in particular, those who apply intellectual effort to strategic problems in the method characterized as systems analysis. The aim here, however, is to explain that there should be limits to the aspirations of public administrators and systems analysts to bring the basic objectives of strategy into focus.

The realm of obscurity will be described in several ways. First, it will be shown that policymakers themselves operate in different dimensions and even employ fundamentally different modes of analysis. Thus they are often unable to find common ground for understanding the purposes of national strategy. Further, we will see that no matter how concrete their data or impartial their judgment, all policy officials are plagued with the unavoidable effects of subjectivity as they assess those factors that influence their decisions.

The realm of obscurity in national security policymaking proves particularly troublesome for those who must choose among major strategic programs. This kind of responsibility, which rests mainly in the Department of Defense, requires that immediate and specific decisions be made about the development of

[2]*The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 82-83.

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military hardware—decisions which will have a profound impact upon national interests and values. Officials of, and advisers to, the Department of Defense often find themselves in a quandary. They are obliged to define their problems in specific terms, yet some of the targets of analysis are inscrutable. Therefore, the techniques of analysis are fundamentally inadequate to the whole task of reaching strategic decisions.

Dimensions of Policy

An elementary reason for obscurity in national security policy is that it now must be made in two dimensions. While the traditional orientation has been geographical, the advent of the nuclear era has added the technological dimension, in which policy is directed to the practical tasks of erecting a military posture capable of meeting long-term security needs.

In its geographical dimension the problems of policy, as they present themselves to the policymaker, are those associated with specific nations or regions. Although there are many aspects of external policy which are organized on a functional basis, such as foreign assistance, trade and information programs, the final applications of these programs are geographically determined. Policymakers are habitually concerned with problems arranged in a geographical matrix—the democratic orientation and economic prosperity of Japan; the integrity of the NATO region; the independence and stability of India, Pakistan and Indonesia; and security against communist penetration of Southeast Asia. A geographical propensity is reflected, too, in the academic sphere, where studies of international politics and the foreign policies of nation-states are frequently organized along regional lines.

Policy formulation in a geographical framework is suited to the global range of U.S. commitments. Since it is tied to places and immediate problems rather than to ideas, the geographical approach may be conducive to the development of a mental framework which has a predilection for the status quo in international politics. The achievement of immediate solutions for pressing problems, rather than long-range planning, characterizes the geographical orientation.

In contrast, the matrix in which decisions are reached in the technological dimension of national security policy is comprised of lead times and military functions and capabilities.[3] Whereas

[3] "Lead time" means the period between the conception of a strategic program and its completion or implementation.

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the orthodox planner usually focuses his attention upon current policy problems, the technological planner must think of components of national power plotted against future time. He too must make concrete decisions, but they pertain to the initiation of programs, the development of weapons, and the procurement and training of forces. The ancient national act of "laying down of keels" in anticipation of military need has become increasingly intricate. Of course, a multitude of potential spatial requirements —e.g., the specification for range, speed and dispersibility of tactical bombers, as determined by overseas base structures and deployment possibilities—must be evaluated.

The geographical and technological dimensions of policy formulation are reflected in U.S. organization for national security. The bureaus of the State Department, the AID program, and the system of unified military commands over specific regions operate largely in the geographical dimension. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, segments of the planning staffs of the armed services, the service organizations for research and development, NASA, and the commands specifically focused on the contingency of general war—SAC and NORAD—function largely in the technological dimension.

The courses of action pursued in these two dimensions of national security policy ought to complement one another. By setting the limits of future U.S. positive action as well as performing the negative function of averting military destruction, the technological decisions of today establish the strategic environment of tomorrow. While the policy planner fixes his attention upon military commitments which were established yesterday, the military technologist, because he determines the kind of weapons systems appropriate to the future, may thus provide the framework for foreign policy a generation hence.[4]

Modes of Analysis

A less apparent reason for the obscurities of high-level policy statements is that participants in the policy process often ap-

[4]To select one example, the obsolescence of medium-range ballistic missiles was an imminent problem for technological planners some years before the withdrawal of Thor and Jupiter from Europe became a problem for U.S. policy. Furthermore, the difference is not only one of lead times. The problem of replacing these weapons may seem on the surface to have been a routine matter. Yet in the technological dimension, it called for a solution in terms of improved performance characteristics in a follow-on missile; in the geographical dimension, it called for a political solution involving delicate adjustments in our relations with our allies.

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proach the problems of strategy from fundamentally different perspectives. Strategic analysts can be divided according to intellectual preparation and accustomed style of dealing with the broad questions of strategy. Yet it would be absurd to represent strategists as adhering to one or another category; the actual differences among them exist in ambiguous form and in various combinations within groups and within individuals.

At the risk, then, of oversimplification, one can say that there is a contrast between those analysts who are schooled in the ways of philosophic speculation and those who are trained in the methods of scientific thought—an age-old contrast which persists in contemporary policymaking. According to intellectual background and inclination, strategic analysts tend to rely upon different kinds of evidence—more theoretical and abstract on the one hand, more empirical and concrete on the other. They are likely to hold quite different assumptions about their ability to cope with the challenges of strategy, and they tend to be aligned according to a dichotomy of classical form: a search for traditional values in a historical context versus a pragmatic response to the demand for immediate decisions about strategic programs. According to these tendencies, two general modes of strategic analysis, "traditionalist" and "pragmatist," may be identified.

The difference between traditional and pragmatic modes of analysis becomes more obvious when the question arises of establishing a hierarchy of national security objectives in the "realm of obscurity." The traditionalist concentrates first upon a general statement of policy and from it then deduces specific objectives and programs. The pragmatist looks upon national policy as a pyramid of detailed, practical decisions, building one upon another to support, or even to induce, the abstract goals.[5]

Granted that it is unreasonable to fit an individual neatly into any such mold, the statements of strategy experts illustrate these tendencies. Henry A. Kissinger, for example, is a vigorous spokesman of the viewpoint that the highest values must first be identified. He calls for the ascendancy of strategic doctrine, which "transcends the problem of selecting weapon systems," works above organizational differences, and rationally employs all instruments of power with an overall understanding of that power. He deplores the "penchant for treating our problems as primarily

[5]Cf. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (1959), pp. 79-88.

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technical and to confuse strategy with the maximum development of power." Kissinger criticizes the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, where "thoughts run more naturally to administrative efficiency than to the elaboration of national objectives." In matters of strategy he questions "American empiricism and its quest for certainty: nothing is 'true' unless it is 'objective,' and it is not 'objective' unless it is part of experience."[6]

In contrast, Henry S. Rowen and Alain C. Enthoven, both former economic analysts at The RAND Corporation and both now high officials of the federal government, represent a relatively pragmatic position. They hold that the problems of strategy must be approached at a level where concrete analysis is feasible, and that any technical analysis, provided it combines appropriate elements of policy judgment, is better than no analysis at all. On the selection of criteria (analytical tests of "preferredness") for strategic programs they argue that "one cannot deduce intermediate criteria 'from the top down' nor construct them 'from the bottom up.' One must break into the problem somewhere in the middle, work up and down and out, attempting to carve out reasonable partial orderings of alternative possibilities."[7] Analysts who apply scientific methods to defense problems, it is said, are pragmatists whose "primary concern is with more effective manipulation of the real world, even if this may have to be accomplished without the desirable degree of understanding of all the underlying phenomena."[8]

There exists between traditionalist and pragmatist modes of policy analysis, then, what may be called an analytical gap. This gap poses an obstacle to communication and becomes a major source of misunderstanding about the issues of strategy. The effects of the analytical gap can be illustrated in the selection of objectives and criteria for strategic programs. The traditionalist concentrates upon formulating a statement of the fundamental doctrine, the grand strategy. For example, he expresses his objective for a strategic force in its broadest form—the deterrence of general war.

[6] *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 403, 406, 424.

[7] *Defense Planning and Organization,* P-1640, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, July 28, 1959, pp. 39-40.

[8] Olaf Helmer, *The Systematic Use of Expert Judgment on Operations Research,* P-2795, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, September 1963, p. 1.

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This kind of guidance, however, may be of little direct use to the more pragmatic strategic planners, those more immediately concerned with establishing criteria for the selection of a strategic weapons system. To be useful, such criteria must be both explicit and applicable to the various alternatives under study (such as the RS-70, the Titan, or the Polaris), and must be expressed in terms which are amenable to measurement. For instance, one possible criterion for choosing a certain weapons system is maximum target destruction per unit cost--a determination made by testing different available weapons in flight operations simulating combat or in mathematical models of conflict.

The pragmatic planner, concentrating on the analytical task at hand, may give little direct attention to the kinds of general objectives which command the attention of the traditionalist. While the pragmatic planner is faced with the need for concrete decisions and is thus compelled to employ a criterion which is manageable in analysis, the higher objective of his task may be only a matter of casual interest to him. The higher objective may be only assumed, implied or guessed by the pragmatist. Perhaps he will never give it any explicit consideration at all, so long as his own task remains clear.

Such a situation can create doubt and inconsistency in the ordering of objectives for strategic action. Between the general objective as sought by the traditionalist and the specific criterion as expressed by the pragmatist lie a host of neglected questions. In the example given--an objective of deterrence of nuclear war and a criterion for strategic weapons--certain intermediate questions arise: Which side is assumed to strike first if nuclear war occurs? What is the length of warning time for the defender? What is the reliability of warning and what are the destruction rates of defensive weapons? Does the enemy hold different beliefs about the likelihood that the United States will use various weapons in retaliation--for example, what is the "credibility" of ballistic missile X versus bomber Y in a deterrent force?

It would be extremely inaccurate and unfair to imply that either traditionalist or pragmatist strategic planners necessarily ignore the intermediate questions. To the contrary, such questions receive the attention of both groups. The point is that planners are inclined to approach these questions in widely separate ways, armed with different methodological techniques and attitudes about the nature of policy. In these circumstances it is

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difficult to achieve agreement upon the ordering of strategic objectives and criteria.[9]

The Element of Subjectivity

Differences among policy planners do not result solely from distinctive policy orientations or modes of analysis. If that were so, a science of public policy might prove ultimately feasible. It would only be necessary to eliminate existing differences through improved organization and perfected techniques for collecting and analyzing data. There remains, however, the fundamental element of human subjectivity, which accounts for differences among policy planners that can never be eliminated.

Subjectivity in the most general sense refers to the conditioning by the individual mind of all perceptions of objective phenomena.[10] Subjectivity weighs heavily upon the definition and ordering of the goals of strategy. In matters of policy, the term subjectivity is frequently employed in a narrower sense to connote personal bias or emotional coloration of the objective elements of the strategic environment. As Senator Fulbright has suggested:

> There is an inevitable divergence, attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it.

As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when

[9]It should be re-emphasized that the differences identified here are ambiguous, that the leaning for traditionalism versus the leaning for pragmatism are combined in individuals. No one who adheres to lofty goals believes that policy should not be practical and useful. Nor is anyone opposed to primary objectives as such, even if he is dubious about prospects for their discovery or explicit definition. Scientific analysts, even as they pursue the pragmatic chores of evaluating strategic programs, understand well the abstract nature of the scientific tools they are using. They too have their preference for general theory. Social scientists of a more traditional bent may also be frustrated by the elusive search for relevant values. They also yearn for practical applications of their ideas.

[10]Another factor contributing to the obscurity of high-level policy should be mentioned. It is the presence of "uncertainty" in the information available to the analyst. Many objective phenomena are unknown and many are unknowable in matters of strategy. There are statistical uncertainties which result from the random occurrence of events. There are uncertainties which result from the inability of any analyst to count, measure and employ all of the manifold existing data about performance, costs and technology. There are other uncertainties about the future, the course of scientific development and the actions which an antagonist may take. All of these uncertainties in the objective world are quite different from subjectivity as it is discussed here. Some of them are being treated with increasing effectiveness by techniques of data handling, statistical theory, and gaming and game theory, each of which is a major topic in itself.

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we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm and actions become irrelevant and irrational.[11]

If it were realized that subjectivity is an inherent element in all policymaking, human judgment—itself a form of subjectivity—might be better identified and more effectively employed in the formulation of strategy.[12]

Subjectivity is inherent in policy formulation because of the presence of political values in all questions of public policy. Public policy, and strategy in particular, cannot be separated from questions of political value and hence cannot be decided except through the exercise of human judgment. The ingredient of human judgment—be it only the simplest kind of intuition—is therefore an essential part of any study of policy, no matter how analytical such a study might be. Judgment can be aided and guided by the techniques of scientific analysis, but it can never be supplanted.

In strategy, then, the ingredient of human choice is essential because of the political value content—even the profound human implications—of strategic decisions. At the very minimum, whenever a strategist states or assumes an objective of national security policy, his expression stands for a value judgment that the nation (or whatever interest is meant to be served) will be better off if the objective is attained. The employment of a particular method of analysis of strategic programs, such as marginal utility or cost effectiveness, contains the value judgment that this method is relevant to the choice to be made. Economists may define an "efficient" decision as one which obtains an increase of one output of a system without any decrease of another; this implies the judgment that "efficiency" is beneficial to the whole system. In matters of strategy, there may be ethical considerations of the highest order. Such is the case in studies which compare alternative deterrent postures on the basis of the "expected values" of war for each posture. The posture chosen is that which results in the lowest product of expected destruction and the probability

[11]Address by Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, *New York Times,* March 26, 1964, p. 12.

[12]By "judgment" is meant the discrimination and comparison of values by the human mind. The term "value" is used throughout in an ethical rather than an economic sense—that is, to mean a quality that is unique and intrinsic in human existence, desired for its own sake, and not translatable into other qualities. A reader who does not agree that such values exist will also not agree with most of the arguments presented here.

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of receiving that damage. This represents a value judgment of great weight: a nation ought to minimize the "expected value" of war so defined. It is to assert what is "good" for society in a fundamental sense.[13]

The inherent presence of subjectivity in strategic thought is exemplified by the strategic debates of the past fifteen years. The U.S. Air Force has been accused of fostering its "preferred" strategy—a strong posture for general nuclear war. The Army has been charged with advocating its "preferred" strategy of minimizing general war needs in favor of conventional limited war forces. These were quite contradictory positions. Yet who was in error? There seems to be no adequate test. The protagonists were all products of the same society, they had the same information at their disposal, and they addressed themselves to the same external threat. Advocates of both strategies were undoubtedly sincere in their positions. Nevertheless, when there are disagreements with broad policy ramifications such as these an objectively "correct" side to a dispute may not exist. There is instead a conflict of positions, each of which is an aggregate of the subjective values of the group or institution which advocates it. It may be possible to eliminate some of the overt bias from such a dispute through better communication among the disputants. However, if the basic conflict remains, there is no way to resolve such an issue except through the application of subjective judgment at a higher level of authority.

But what, one may ask, of historic cases of "preferred" strategies which were later proved wrong? Do not they demonstrate in retrospect the existence of a "correct" policy? What of the horse cavalry, the battleship and the Maginot Line? What now of the heavy bomber? In all such historic cases, we must acknowledge that the only firm evidence of error has been furnished by hindsight. There were long periods when the advocates of such weapons had much evidence of success on their side. At any given point in history, such issues refuse solution in objective terms and require the use of subjective judgment.

In view of the historic cases of "preferred" strategies, can it be said that strategic subjectivity tends to be conservative because it is influenced by past successes? Perhaps. But in the present

[13]Similarly, the "minimax" strategy in game theory represents a value judgment that the player—or the nation—ought to take the conservative course of minimizing the worst contingency possible.

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era there seems to be a progressive bias too. Those who deal with technological developments tend to think of the future as if it were the present. Rather than discounting future military values, they may anticipate them and put them at a premium just as investors often establish stock market prices to reflect expected future earnings of securities rather than current earnings. For a time the power of the Soviet Union was inflated by her achievements in space; the anticipated missile gap was looked upon as if it already existed. The mere prospect of a Communist Chinese nuclear test explosion seemed in itself an element of Chinese strength; when such an explosion occurred, many regarded it as tantamount to a full-scale operational capability. Observers may thus needlessly or erroneously anticipate important changes in power relationships.

The contemporary policy arena is marked by contradictory viewpoints about strategy which demonstrate the presence of subjectivity. Some critics allege that there is a U.S. tendency to overestimate Soviet power. Others believe that U.S. defense policies are biased by an infatuation with missiles, and that we act as if extremely high missile performance and reliability were already at hand. In turn, this group of critics is charged with holding their own bias in favor of manned aircraft. Either group with utmost sincerity can marshal scientific arguments to top those of the other group. Missile proponents might emphasize objectives like cost effectiveness in a single strike, penetration ability, and a stable military posture (i.e., poor for first strike, good for second strike) —adding up to "good deterrence." Aircraft proponents might emphasize objectives like cost effectiveness in repeated strikes, recovery of aircraft to help to impose terms and conclude hostilities, flexibility in crisis situations, and collateral use in local wars—adding up to "good deterrence-plus-defense" (with some loss in deterrence compensated by some improvement in defense). The differences between positions such as these are inherently subjective. The issues cannot be decided on an objective basis alone.

The assertion of the value content of strategic decisions thus is of more than academic importance. If the value content is neglected, the input of judgment appears as merely another aspect, together with scientific data and the techniques of analysis, of the process of policy formulation. In such a mechanistic view, judgment and scientific analysis may be regarded as interchangeable

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factors, and it might seem feasible and desirable to favor the latter over the former wherever possible in order to attain scientific "objectivity." At the highest level of policy, according to this interpretation, an especially large role falls to judgment—in order to cope with the multiplicity of data—but even at this level, as techniques improve, the role of judgment supposedly can be reduced.

Failure to account for the nature and role of judgment poses an even greater obstacle to effective analysis than overt bias, which is not too difficult to recognize and counteract. Subjectivity may be veiled in the very complexity of a study. The assumptions which form the groundwork of an analysis may contain implicit human judgments which are inadvertently disguised from the decision-maker and even from the analyst who designed the study. The higher the level of policy under consideration, the more numerous are the subjective elements and thus the more dangerous this hazard becomes. The decision-maker—and the analysts who advise him—performs a role which transcends the collation of data. The decision-maker or the analyst, in perceiving a solution, may only be deceived by the weight of his own preferences.

On the other hand, by acknowledging the inevitable presence of the factor of human judgment—the constructive meaning of subjectivity—we recognize that the important task is not one of reducing the human element but of clearly identifying it and integrating it into the concrete elements of analysis.

Problems of Systems Analysis

The highest levels of national security policy have been represented as a realm of obscurity, where the objectives or criteria for strategic action cannot be placed in clear relation to one another. This obscurity directly affects the study of military problems, often characterized as systems analysis,[14] in some of its most important aspects, for strategic analysts are obliged to perform some of their major tasks within that realm.

In the technological dimension of policy it is necessary to translate broad problems into concrete terms and to seek solutions to

[14]Systems analysis is a term often loosely applied to various activities of experts in the field of military technology and policy. One possible definition is a coherent study of a system (problem) which has been set off from its larger context by a set of assumptions, and which integrates the use of various scientific techniques of data collection and analysis with elements of judgment, in order to measure the effectiveness (and cost) of that system in comparison with other systems.

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problems according to a scientific mode of analysis. But systems analysts themselves, no less than more traditional policymakers, are affected by subjectivity. The choices they must make impinge upon political values and require the exercise of judgment on their part, even if that judgment is only implicit in their actions. The role of judgment thus becomes a question of direct relevance to the validity of their work.

In examining the role of judgment in systems analysis, one should bear in mind that, in high-level policy formulation, obscurity is a function of the degree of abstraction involved in defining strategic problems: the broader the problem, the greater the obscurity. The most general national objectives—the very ones we seek to make more explicit and useful in statements of basic national security policy—are necessarily the vaguest and most likely to be given widely differing subjective interpretations. In contrast, the immediate objectives, such as those of strategic analysis, are more easily stated in precise, unambiguous terms. The contrast between the obscurity of general national objectives and the precision of immediate objectives can contribute to underestimation of the role of judgment in strategic choices.

Several of the operations or concepts involved in systems analysis tend to produce misunderstandings about the relative importance of fact and value in policy formulation. They represent points of conjunction—or collision—between traditionalist and pragmatist modes of thought. One of these operations is the selection of criteria for strategic programs; another, the technique of suboptimization; and a third, the treatment of incommensurables in making a selection among major strategic programs or courses of action.

Selecting Strategic Criteria

In systems analysis the identification of the objective and the criterion constitute separate steps. The objective may be defined as the result which is sought from a certain course of action and the criterion as a standard for judgment or selection. In questions of strategy, the objective is presumably set by political leaders. The criterion is then designed by the analyst so as to serve the objective.

It is difficult, especially at higher levels of policy formulation, to maintain a distinction between the objective and the criterion.

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For example, improvements in the speed of bomber aircraft may be prescribed as an objective of a development program. Speed may also be employed as a criterion for judging the capability of a bomber to penetrate enemy defenses. In either case the goal would be to obtain the highest speed possible under any given set of constraints. "Efficiency" may be treated as an objective in itself or as a criterion for some broader goal. Thus any objective can be made to serve as a criterion for another objective, and vice versa.

The ambivalence between objective and criterion is further illustrated by the fact that these terms are sometimes used interchangeably. The literature of military affairs contains references to criteria ranging from such generalities as "military worth" and deterrence to specific statements about, say, aircraft attrition in a given combat scenario. Each can also be regarded as an objective. In questions of national defense the criterion itself becomes an expression of high national policy. Such a situation results from the ambivalence between objectives and criteria. It is accentuated by the analytical gap between traditional and pragmatic modes of analysis which often compels analysts to supply their own version of the objective.

In strategic analysis, therefore, the task of criterion selection can become tantamount to the identification or determination of fundamental strategic doctrine. For instance, Henry Rowen and Alain Enthoven suggest:

> There are many areas in which there is widespread agreement among informed people on at least the broad outlines of criteria. For example, there now appears to be widespread agreement that an important criterion for the performance of our strategic offensive forces is their ability to survive a surprise attack designed to destroy them, and then be able to carry out their missions.[15]

Those who occupy positions of authority in the defense establishment, or who advise people in such positions, set criteria for defense programs which will affect the ability of the United States to fight major and minor wars. Such considerations as the feasibility of arms control and disarmament, the probability of escalation of local into general conflict, and even the general policy of deterrence may be influenced by these criteria. This is not to criticize the participation of systems analysts in the task of criteria selection. It is rather to emphasize the important role

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

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which systems analysis can play, through the incorporation—not the exclusion—of subjective judgment, in the process of reaching major strategic decisions.

If the higher objectives of policy remain obscure, the analyst may concentrate upon the criterion of his own analysis without an adequate awareness of the broad implications of his action. Inconsistencies between the criterion and objective may result. Thus the B-70 seems to have been designed initially according to criteria extrapolating the performance characteristics of the B-52. However, a criterion of ground survivability, even at the expense of performance, would have been more compatible with the objective of a secure second-strike posture.

The question of values in strategy is rendered the more anomalous because to the individual analyst it need not appear to be important. It is simple enough at any time for him to infer an objective to fit a given working criterion, and, if he does not, he at least remains aware that he possesses the logical capability to do so. He can assume the existence of a relationship between his criterion and an unstated objective; for him there is no ambiguity between them. His colleagues may view their own individual analyses in the same way. In such a situation there is no necessary consistency among the various implicit goals which they may be pursuing separately.

Suboptimization

The role of judgment may also be misunderstood in suboptimization, i.e., the moving of analysis of military problems to lower levels for the sake of practicability.[16] In suboptimization many variables which would have to be considered in a more complex manner at a higher level are taken as given. A system —for example, a weapon for counterinsurgency warfare—can thereby be examined within a narrow context in which the cause of war, the locale, and the logistic support and training are assumed. In the same sense that an analytical model is a simplification of the real world, a suboptimization is a compartmentalization of the real world in order to make a study feasible or more manageable.

The need for suboptimization may be illustrated by the study

[16]The case for suboptimization is stated by Charles J. Hitch in "Economics and Military Operations Research," *Review of Economics and Statistics,* August 1958, pp. 199-209.

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of a new weapon in relation to the U.S. requirement for general war forces. Let us assume that the United States wishes to possess the capability of absorbing a surprise first strike by the Soviet Union, together with retaliatory forces sufficient to inflict "unacceptable" damage. Suppose there are two possible Soviet choices of targeting (extensive or intensive attacks on targets), of target system (high or low counterforce), and of general scales of attack (large scale with high risk of detection, lower scale with less risk of detection). Assume that possible errors in U.S. intelligence permit four general alternatives in the composition of the Soviet force (high and low numbers of missiles, high and low numbers of aircraft), and that there may be three discrete levels of warning to the United States (probable strategic warning and high alert, good tactical warning, poor tactical warning). The United States may respond to the threat, let us suppose, with three different levels of defense monies and a variety of budgetary allocations to defense forces representing combinations among the following: local or area, anti-aircraft or anti-missile, force-protecting or city-protecting active defenses; and high or low civil defense. The United States may also choose to respond with tactical choices similar to those of the Soviet offense, only to encounter perhaps as many as four possible kinds of Soviet defense. Even with such simplifications, there are over 70,000 combinations of these factors which might be considered even before studying the effectiveness of, say, an "advanced manned penetration system" in the environment posited.

Suboptimization is therefore essential. It is achieved not by *reducing* the element of judgment in strategic analysis—as one might expect at first impression—but by *employing* it. In the example above most of the alternatives may be eliminated because values for them are assumed. These assumptions may derive from the results of other studies, or they may stem from interpretations of Soviet intentions. Moreover, the analyst is aided by general knowledge of the military postures of the United States and the Soviet Union and the prevailing consensus about U.S. military objectives in peace and war. Mechanical means also ease the task of simplification. With the aid of high-speed computers, many assumptions can be tested in games and revised or affirmed in accordance with the results. Most of these simplifying steps, nevertheless, involve the exercise of judgment.

The process of suboptimization is complicated by contradictory

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methodological pressures upon systems analysts. Against the economist's desire for suboptimization for the sake of practicability is the contrary impulse to study problems at their highest level. Economists and other pragmatists, by the expanding nature of their interests, as well as by the desire for technical improvement of their studies, are prompted to develop generalizations despite the merits of suboptimization. Suboptimization is always a compromise: it involves the danger of selecting a proximate criterion which is inconsistent with higher level criteria. For example, a weapon for counterinsurgency warfare—such as napalm used against villages—might be selected for its efficiency in accordance with a criterion of inflicting casualties upon the maximum number of insurgents, but it might prove counterproductive on a higher level. Because of its lack of target discrimination, this weapon might kill innocent persons and antagonize the civilian population—a result inconsistent with the objectives of counterinsurgency warfare.

As cogent as the need for suboptimization may be, the impetus for expanding the scope of strategic studies comes in part from the realization that answers to higher questions are implicit if not explicit in the selection of a criterion. If, in the absence of clear political guidance from above, the analyst must make his own assumptions about the strategic environment, one of the most important reasons for suboptimization is eliminated. But in expanding his scope of study to more general levels of policy the analyst is not really advancing the frontier of scientific methodology. He is not capable of replacing judgment; on the contrary, in taking up broad strategic questions, he is incorporating in his studies a greater need for judgment. And if it is his own version of national policy that is to be served, or his own interpretation of a policy consensus, that fact ought to be recognized.

Dealing with Incommensurables

That subjectivity exists in strategic analysis is widely recognized. Efforts have been made to account for subjectivity by identifying as "incommensurables" those phenomena which cannot be measured and compared. For example, in typical economic studies which undertake the comparison of alternatives—and in similar military systems analyses—it is necessary to employ a common denominator. This may be monetary cost, or a particular common measure of performance such as rounds expended or

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targets destroyed. It becomes relatively simple to compare, for instance, two kinds of new rifles—either on the basis of costs for a given level of performance or on the basis of performance per unit cost. In such cases, the common measures of money, range or accuracy are sufficiently clear and easily applied.

When the scope of study is altered, however, to account for any human or political effects, values assume a place of considerable importance. The alternatives become incommensurable. Their comparison demands the application of judgment. There can be no really "correct" ordering among objectives such as a nuclear test ban which is intended to reduce the possibility of general war, an overseas military deployment which is designed to stem communist aggression, and an economic assistance program which is aimed at improving the prospects for democracy in a developing nation, since all of these objectives are related to political values which do not lend themselves to precise measurement and comparison.

The importance of incommensurables may not be realized if the degree of applicability of economic theory to questions of defense policy is overestimated. The scope of economic studies now transcends the traditional bounds of wealth or resources, as measured by common denominators such as money. Welfare economics is concerned with broad societal objectives. Welfare economics provides a theoretical basis for selection among alternatives which need not be commensurable, and which share only the character of being the objects of choice. Thus "satisfactions" may be compared through devices such as indifference curves.

Similarly, in applying economic methods to strategic problems, analysts deal with the abstract "commodity" of national power and refer to broad objectives such as military worth or national security. Military worth, like social welfare, is a useful concept which denotes the kind of value whose maximization may be sought by a whole range of strategic actions. Such formulations, however, do not render obsolete the factor of judgment. Instead, they provide a mold in which judgment may be systematically applied. Incommensurables remain. Military worth is itself a value, but it exists only as an abstraction of all the values implicit in the military decisions which underlie it. Military worth is attained, at least hypothetically, by the aggregate choices of a host of analysts, each exercising his own subjective judgment about incommensurables. National security—like the "greatest

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happiness for the greatest number" and plain "success"—may be agreed by all to be a desirable general goal, but such agreement does not necessarily illuminate the way to its attainment.

Conclusion

The ambiguous relationships between fact and value described above are embodied in the strategic choices which face the Secretary of Defense. For example, there have been few livelier political issues in recent times than those resulting from the decision to cancel the Skybolt air-to-surface missile and from the choice of contractors for the building of the TFX. In each case, the debate revolved about such basic issues as Congressional-Executive relations, the principle of political control of the military, and the question of the appropriate role of expert or professional advice. Central to these factors, and complicated by them, was the need to reach a decision which would enhance military effectiveness.

The Secretary of Defense and some members of Congress evidently approached these questions from different viewpoints. Perhaps they dealt with them in different dimensions, asking altogether different questions about the utility of Skybolt and the design specifications of the TFX. The role of judgment was indispensable. In the Skybolt case, how else could account have been taken of incommensurables like the military worth of a weapons system and the political impact upon an allied government? The TFX affair, so it appeared, was a narrower, more technical question; but even here, judgment was of fundamental importance. By adopting the TFX over more expensive alternatives, a judgment was made that the expected savings of one billion dollars could be translated into more useful programs, outweighing any reduction of flexibility which might result from a decision to combine two aircraft specifications into one basic design. Such an issue may come to be a comparison between aircraft performance in one kind of conflict and alternative military capabilities in a completely different kind of war—for example, top airspeed versus counterinsurgency training. Ultimately, this is the kind of choice between incommensurables that must be made if scarce resources are to be allocated efficiently among different security programs.

The presence of subjectivity, therefore, must not be regarded

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merely as a problem to be deplored with the advantage of hindsight, to be better anticipated with foresight, or to be eradicated in games of strategy with the enemy through flawless logic. Subjectivity is an intrinsic part of strategic choice. The missile protagonists and the proponents of manned aircraft cannot purge themselves of subjectivity. Instead, they must accept the role of human judgment and seek to insure that they derive from it the benefits of maximum wisdom and experience.

Whatever the obscurities inherent in the process of high-policy formulation, strategic analysts should not abandon in despair their efforts to expand the scope and improve the validity of their studies. It is important for "traditionalists" in policy formulation to be aware of the techniques of the systems analyst. It is equally important for "pragmatist" systems analysts to remember that there is an upper limit of feasibility to their technical efforts and that these are destined to remain "suboptimal" in relation to the broad creative challenges of strategy. The systems analyst should nevertheless attempt to broaden his perspectives at those high levels of policy where his methods have limited application and where his own judgment will inevitably be called into use.

In this way alone can creativity be assured in matters of national security policy. One of the penalties of the economic method of choice is that it naturally sets a premium on existing and foreseeable alternatives. Yet the great initiatives in international politics derive from the impetus for change. The decision to send a manned expedition to the moon was essentially a creative decision which is not sensible according to available economic criteria, as its critics are eager to point out. The companion of creativity in dealing with the challenges of strategy must be humility—continuing respect for the magnitude of the task and awareness of the inadequacy of scientific technique alone to deal with it.

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REGIONAL STABILITY AND WEAPONS TRANSFER: THE MIDDLE EASTERN CASE*

by John H. Hoagland, Jr., and John B. Teeple

THE purpose of this case study of the transfer of weapons from industrial to developing nations is to examine its economic dimensions and to suggest some of the means by which the traffic in weapons might be controlled. Today's large-scale transfer of sophisticated military hardware, particularly aircraft and missiles and their related technology, is taking place for a variety of motives: for example, to correct a potentially dangerous regional military imbalance; to cultivate support in the developing world for the major powers; or, occasionally, to bolster trade balances. In spite of some immediate economic and political advantages, however, the continuing transfer of delivery systems may not benefit the long-term security interests of any nation.

The focus is on Israel and Egypt, whose arms race has represented, since the mid-1950's, a sporadic threat to world security. In the hope that valid inferences can be drawn for other regions as well, we will review in some detail the means by which the present Egyptian and Israeli military postures have been achieved.

The Diffusion of Weapons Technology

The diffusion of weapons technology represents one aspect of a general trend toward the increasing flow of science and technology into the less developed world. Because the acceleration of economic growth in developing regions depends directly on it, this influx is encouraged by the international community. In the industrial countries of the northern hemisphere, however, a significant proportion of technological effort is applied to military development, and it is not surprising to find a reflection of this fact among the developing nations as well. The wave of new military technology, now passing into the modernizing states, is draining off their scarce resources, contributing further to inherent instabilities, and insuring that, when regional war breaks out, its destructive effects are significantly greater.

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The NATO countries currently spend an average of about 5.5 per cent of their Gross National Product annually on military forces.[1] In comparison, the United Arab Republic (Egypt) spent nearly $320 million, or about 7.7 per cent of its GNP, on military forces in 1963, and is currently spending about $500 million per year on the military sector.[2] The proportion of GNP devoted to military spending in the more active developing countries is increasing, and it is not difficult to foresee allocations of 10 per cent and higher in countries such as India, Egypt and Israel within the next few years, due largely to their attempts to develop and produce relatively sophisticated aircraft and missile delivery systems of both nuclear and conventional types.

Thus, while negotiated arms limitation appears to be as unlikely among secondary powers as it is among the major nations, it may be enlightening to indicate the degree to which regional arms races such as the spiraling buildup of Israel and the Arab nations still depend on the direct or indirect support of the industrial nations. In every phase of weapons programming—design and development, production technology and materials, operational training, maintenance and overhaul—the industrial nations have been deeply involved, and it is primarily on the supplier nations of the north that the burden of control, if there is to be any, must ultimately fall. It should be stated at the outset, however, that since any workable agreement would depend on full-scale East-West cooperation, the possibility of controlling weapons transfer is slim indeed. Nevertheless, the need for such control is great enough to warrant the most thorough survey of available means.

The Egyptian Acquisition of Weapons

An examination of the Egyptian buildup of military forces since 1955, particularly with regard to aircraft and missile systems, reveals two main phases of development which are probably characteristic of the effort by any developing nation to establish strategic capabilities. The first stage is the direct importing of weapons systems from a foreign power, together with the neces-

[1]For the major nations averages are actually somewhat higher: for example, in 1964 U.S. military spending stood at about 9 per cent, that of the UK about 7 per cent and of the USSR about 12 per cent (Denis Healey, quoted in *Flight International*, March 11, 1965).

[2]See H. Roberts Coward, *Military Technology in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 1964), and *New York Times*, July 29, 1965.

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sary training and logistical support. The second stage is the development of weapons systems under domestic control, but using the technology provided by personnel, processes and materials imported from abroad. In neither stage, as a general rule, can a developing nation proceed independently of foreign help. The availability of foreign technical personnel, design and production technology, and materials, will continue for a long time to be an essential feature of such programs. However, although true self-sufficiency is still years in the future, Egypt, India, and other less developed nations have not been prevented from initiating major weapons programs under indigenous control.

Egypt's initial phase of weapons acquisition began in 1955 when it signed its first military assistance agreement with the USSR.[3] In the course of an extremely rapid transfer of matériel, Egypt received nearly 200 Soviet jet fighters and tactical bombers, hundreds of tanks, and several destroyers and submarines. This sudden destabilization of the regional military balance precipitated in turn the British-French-Israeli pre-emption of October 1956, in which much of the Soviet military equipment delivered to that time was destroyed. It is vitally important to note that the presence of Egyptian weapons, not their use, led to the Suez conflict; and that pre-emption by a frightened neighbor is at least as real a danger as attack by the ostensible aggressor.[4]

Immediately following the Suez crisis, the Soviets began once again to ship weapons into Egypt. By 1963 the Egyptians had received large numbers of IL-28 tactical bombers, MIG-17 and -19 fighters, supersonic MIG-21 fighter-interceptors, TU-16 medium bombers, and SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles.[5] This equipment has given them a vastly-increased delivery capability.

The most notable feature of this massive transfer is that it apparently proved less than satisfactory to the Nasser government. It is probable that dependence on the USSR for spares and maintenance has been unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons: first, be-

[3]The conclusion of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty came after the United Kingdom and the United States had refused, for several years, to extend any major military assistance to the Egyptian regime without restrictions which Nasser considered intolerable.

[4]For a discussion of the 1955-1956 Egyptian buildup which led to the Suez crisis, see Catherine McArdle, *The Role of Military Assistance in the Problem of Arms Control,* Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964, Report C/62-64. See also *RAF Flying Review,* January 1957 and October 1960.

[5]For reports on Egypt's increasing military strength, see *RAF Flying Review,* March 1958, October 1960, September 1961 and May 1963.

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cause Soviet technical support is inadequate; second, because the Soviets have almost certainly attempted to exercise controls or demand favors which the Nasser government finds unacceptable; and finally, because the essential purpose of a national military force in a developing nation is to symbolize the concept of independence. Consequently, beginning in the late 1950's, Egypt entered its second and more sophisticated phase of weapons acquisition; it turned to the West for personnel and technology to support the development of weapons in Egypt under Egyptian control. The Egyptian program provides an example of the means by which the transfer of weapons technology occurs.

On July 25, 1962, President Nasser officially opened the Helwan Air Works, near Cairo, which had been in pilot operation for several years. The facility was established to produce, under license from Hispano-Avacion of Spain, the HA-200 'Saeta' jet aircraft, suitable either as an advanced trainer or close-support fighter. The HA-200 had been designed for Hispano by Willi Messerschmitt of Germany, who transferred his aircraft development activities to Spain in the years immediately following World War II. At Helwan, a Spanish Hispano-Avacion design and engineering staff of about 100, working under Messerschmitt's personal direction, established the HA-200 production program. In addition to the Spanish staff, German workers began to join the Helwan enterprise. By early 1964, they had produced some twelve to fifteen HA-200 aircraft, each powered by two Egyptian-built French Turbomeca Marbore jet engines.[6]

More significant, however, is the Egyptian development of the HA-300 supersonic fighter-bomber. Initially, the HA-300 was a Messerschmitt supersonic fighter design project at Hispano in Seville. The Spanish government decided, in the late 1950's, to cancel the project, and a tripartite agreement was apparently reached among Hispano, Willi Messerschmitt and the Egyptian government to move it to Helwan. The German and Spanish workers already assembled at Helwan were available to proceed with design and development, and Messerschmitt himself visited Egypt to supervise the program.[7] Indeed, Messerschmitt was re-

[6]For further discussion of Helwan and the HA-200 program, see the following: *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1964-1965; RAF Flying Review,* September 1961 and January 1963; *Boston Globe,* March 4, 1965; *Flight International,* March 26, 1964; and *Aviation Week,* March 16, 1964.

[7]The HA-300 program is reported in *Air et Cosmos,* December 12, 1964; *Flight International,* March 26, 1964; and *Aviation Week,* March 16, 1964.

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portedly offered the directorship of the Egyptian aircraft industry but refused. As a result, the Austrian aeronautical engineer, Ferdinand Brandner, became head of the project.[8] According to press reports of 1963, the various West European engineers recruited for work at the Helwan complex actually signed contracts with two Swiss firms known as MECO (for airframe personnel) and MTB (for engine personnel).[9] Recent reports have indicated that the hard currency operating costs of the various Egyptian weapons development programs, apart from capital investment, are on the order of $50 million a year.[10]

The HA-300 program, including both airframe and E-300 engine, has depended to a considerable extent on the cooperation or permission of the major industrial powers. Some component parts have reportedly been fabricated in Europe; engine technology has been transferred; production tooling and critical materials have been purchased abroad. More important, a complement of German aircraft engineers totaling approximately 300-350 has been occupied at Helwan in recent years.[11]

Although severe technical difficulties have been encountered in the program, its disruptive international effects and toll on the Egyptian economy have in no way abated. The aircraft flew for the first time in March 1964. Should the project be brought successfully to series production as scheduled in 1966, HA-300's would be used not only for service in the Egyptian Air Force, but probably by other Arab nations as well.[12] Furthermore, the technology involved seems destined for further transfer. The governments of Egypt and India have agreed to cooperate in the development and production of the HA-300 and the Indian supersonic fighter HF-24, which is being built in India under the supervision of former Focke-Wulfe chief designer Kurt Tank.[13] Recently, reports have appeared that the Chinese communist government is interested in buying jet engines from Egypt.[14]

[8]The surprising mobility of skilled engineering talent is illustrated by the fact that Brandner also is said to have helped to develop the engine for the Soviet TU-95 intercontinental bomber. (*Aviation Week*, April 8, 1957, p. 53.)

[9]*New York Times*, April 5, 1963.

[10]*Ibid.*, August 1, 1965.

[11]See *Aviation Week*, March 16, 1964, pp. 297-301; *RAF Flying Review*, September 1962 and January and September 1963; McArdle, *op. cit.*, p. 43; and *New York Times*, April 5, 1963, p. 1.

[12]Jordan, for example, has already shown interest in purchasing several aircraft. (*Air et Cosmos*, January 30, 1965; and *Flying Review International*, May 1964.)

[13]*Flight International*, March 26, 1964.

[14]*Interavia*, July 1965.

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With regard to Egyptian missile development, German work began in Egypt as early as 1951, but it was not until 1959-1960 that the rocket program began to operate on a significant scale. In 1960, the eminent German rocket designer Eugen Saenger, head of the Stuttgart Institute of Jet Propulsion, went to Heliopolis, where the former aircraft works were being converted to missile activity. With him went several specialists in missile technology including Wolfgang Pilz, Paul-Jens Goercke and Hans Kleinwaechter. Under pressure from the West German government, Saenger terminated his activities in Egypt in 1961, but his colleagues remained, and Pilz was until recently identified as head of the Egyptian rocket program. By 1961, a rocket design team of about 100—mainly German but also including Austrians, Swiss and Spanish—had been assembled at the Heliopolis missile complex, where the total labor force numbered about 1,000. In June 1963, according to West German estimates, the number of German scientists working on missiles in Egypt was about 150.[15]

On July 21, 1962, two surface-to-surface missiles, the Al Zafir (Victory) of 200 nautical-mile range and the Al Kahir (Conqueror) of 325 nautical-mile range, were test-fired for President Nasser. Two days later, on Revolution Day, ten each of these two types of missiles were paraded through the streets of Cairo. Both appeared to derive generally from the V-2 configuration. A year after the appearance of the first two rockets, a new two-stage missile of considerably longer range, identified as Al Ared (Vanguard) was shown in Cairo. This missile, apparently liquid-fueled with a first stage similar or identical to Al Kahir, is claimed to have a range of 510 nautical miles and is also believed to be in series production at Heliopolis. The rates of production have not been published, but one source indicates that, to late 1964, a total of 250 surface-to-surface missiles had been produced.[16]

The Israeli Acquisition of Weapons

The story of the Israeli buildup in delivery systems is primarily an account of French aeronautical exports. Since the time of their close liaison in the Suez crisis, France has exported to Israel sub-

[15] *Missiles and Rockets,* February 24, 1964; *New York Times,* April 5 and June 16, 1963.

[16] *Aviation Week,* September 9, 1963; March 16, 1964; and May 11, 1964; see also *The Military Balance 1964-1965,* Institute for Strategic Studies (London), November 1964.

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stantial quantities of jet aircraft as well as nuclear technology. The exports began in earnest in March 1958, when it was announced that Sud Aviation of France would supply Israel with one squadron of Sud Vautour twin-jet tactical bombers. Procurement of the Vautour, closely similar in configuration and mission to the Soviet IL-28 tactical bomber, represented a direct response by Israel to the growing Egyptian IL-28 inventory. In 1961, probably as a result of reports of MIG-21 procurement in Egypt, the Israelis placed their initial order for the Dassault Mirage III supersonic interceptor and fighter-bomber, with deliveries scheduled to begin in 1962.[17] In late 1962, to counter the threat posed to Israel by Egypt's Soviet-supplied TU-16 jet medium bombers, the United States agreed to equip Israel with Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions and to train the Israeli crews in the United States.

The domestic Israeli capability to produce delivery vehicles is represented at the present time by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), established in 1950 at Lod Airport near Tel Aviv. IAI is a highly developed industrial complex for the repair, maintenance, overhaul and production of high performance jet aircraft; it holds service contracts not only with the Israeli Air Force but with the U.S. and French Air Forces as well. Maintenance contracts are also held with several leading commercial carriers, and engine overhaul certificates have been issued to IAI by most major manufacturers, including Hispano Suiza, SNECMA, Turbomeca, Bristol Siddeley, Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney.[18]

In June 1960, the first Magister jet trainer and close-support fighter, produced under license from Potez of France, rolled out at Lod. The early Magisters at IAI were assembled largely from French parts, but by 1961 they were being manufactured largely in-plant. Some 100 of the aircraft have been produced to date by IAI, many of which have been exported.[19]

[17]The dependency of Israel on the French industry, particularly on General Aviation Marcel Dassault, is illustrated by the following estimated inventory of the Israeli Air Force: 72 Dassault Mirage III C fighter-interceptors; 72 Dassault Mystere fighter-bombers; 24 Dassault Super-Mystere day interceptors; 24 Sud Vautour II A tactical bombers; about 50 Israeli-built Potez Magister close-support aircraft. See Green and Punnett, *MacDonald World Air Power Guide* (New York: Doubleday, 1963) and *The Military Balance 1964-1965, op. cit.*

[18]See *Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1960-1961* and *Flight International,* March 26, 1964.

[19]Also, the IAI electronics division, under license from the French electronics firm CSF, manufactures a transistorized radio-compass used in the Magister. The development of capabilities in electronics, guidance, control and navigation systems will have substantial bearing on Israeli weapons production.

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Offsetting the numerically-superior Egyptian air forces, then, is a more sophisticated Israeli maintenance base which results, at least for the present, in an improved combat-ready status. In comparison, the Egyptian Air Force and industry—and to an even greater extent those of the other Arab countries—have experienced severe difficulties in the maintenance of Soviet combat aircraft. This gap must be apparent to the Nasser government and must inevitably lead to a greater Egyptian effort to strengthen its military forces.[20] (See Table I for a comparison of military force levels in the Middle East.)

Problems of the Supplier Nations

Although the economic pressures which are now compelling the industrial nations to increase their exports of aerospace products are not to be ranked with political motivations,[21] they appear to be of growing importance. The current situation in France will, to some extent, illustrate some of the problems facing other industrial nations of both East and West.[22] France has, in recent years, been the most active and successful West European exporter of aerospace products. In 1963, for example, her aerospace industry exported over $300 million worth of aircraft, tactical missiles and related products (roughly 15 per cent of the total value of French exports). In 1964, the industry employed nearly 90,000 workers and occupied over twenty million square feet of covered floor-space. Current government forecasts call for annual aerospace exports in the amount of $440 million by the

[20]Little information has become available publicly on the Israeli rocket program, and no clear evaluation can presently be made of its status. On July 5, 1961, the Israelis launched a multi-stage solid-propellant sounding rocket designated Shavit Shtayem (Comet II). Developed by Israeli engineers, Comet II had a launching weight of about 600 pounds and reportedly reached an altitude of 50 miles. (*Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1961-1962.*) In view of the close liaison between the Israeli and French defense establishments, together with the rapidly-improving French tactical missile production capability and the French drive for exports, it seems likely that Israel would import various types of tactical missiles from France or manufacture them under license.

[21]Of the Free World nations, the United States is by far the largest exporter of weapons—several times larger than all of its allies combined. It is not selected for detailed discussion here mainly because the purposes underlying U.S. weapons exports in recent years have been so largely of a strategic nature, representative of Western interests as a whole. To the extent that these motivations are other than strategic, the generalizations in this study are applicable.

[22]France is selected merely as one example of general and widespread international trends. For detailed discussions on which this brief review is based, see *Interavia,* June 1965; *Air Force/Space Digest,* June 1965; and "France and Its Armed Forces," French Embassy Press and Information Service, New York, December 1964.

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TABLE I
MILITARY FORCE LEVELS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1964-65

	Israel	Egypt	Syria	Saudi Arabia	Jordan	Iraq
Population (millions)	2.5	28	5.3	8	2	7
Area (thous. sq. miles)	8	386	72	870	37.5	172
GNP (million dollars US in 1961)	2000	4000	815	1155		1142
Military Manpower (active)	Army 55,000 Navy 3,000 Airforce 12,000	Army 97,000-100,000 Navy 6,000- 10,000 Airforce 15,000- 20,000	Army 60,000 Airforce 5,000	Army 31,000 Airforce 1,000	Army 35,000 Airforce 1,000	Army 70,000 Airforce 4,000
Combat Air Forces	72 Mirage III interceptors 72 Mystere fighter-bombers 24 Super-Mystere day interceptors 24 Vautour tactical bombers 50 Magister tactical fighters	150 MIG-15/17 fighters 111-150 MIG-19 interceptors 50 MIG-21 interceptors 100 IL-28 tactical bombers 25 TU-16 medium bombers	60 MIG-17 fighters 36 MIG-21 interceptors	1 Sqdn. F-86F fighters 1 Sqdn. B-26B tactical bombers	27 Hawker Hunter interceptors 1 Sqdn. Vampire Venom fighter bombers	1 Sqdn. each: Hawker Hunter, MIG-17, 19, & 21 IL-28 tactical bomber Fury fighter bombers Vampire fighter bombers
Missile Forces	1 battalion Hawk SAMs Shavit II sounding rocket	10 batteries SA-2/3 SAMs 250 tactical SSMs				38 SA-2 SAMs
Ground Forces	number of tanks unknown	over 600 Soviet-built medium and heavy tanks				300 Soviet-built medium tanks 100 Soviet-built heavy tanks
Naval Forces	2 Destroyers 2 Frigates 2 Submarines 12 MTBs landing craft	4 Destroyers 6 Frigates 8 Submarines 5 MTBs				

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year 1970. Since jet transport orders are declining, it is probable that exports of combat aircraft and missiles will be necessary to achieve such a goal. The pressure for increasing exports (currently to more than twenty countries) can be more fully appreciated when it is remembered that nearly 40 per cent of French aerospace production is normally absorbed by foreign orders.[23]

With regard to possible future missile exports, it should be noted that French strategic military planning calls for the phase-out of Mirage IV strategic bombers to begin in the late 1960's in favor of long-range missiles. The 1965-1970 budget provides for about $1.1 billion to be expended on ballistic missile development and production, as compared with $600 million to be spent on further Mirage IV procurement during the same period. This shifted emphasis could possibly be reflected within a few years in the composition of French military exports. To date, the French company Nord-Aviation has built over 150,000 short-range missiles of various types, substantial numbers of which have been exported. The increasing French missile and space capability, furthermore, indicates the possibility of substantially increased French exports of tactical missiles by 1970. In addition to the 2,000-mile surface-to-surface missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles currently being developed for the French strategic nuclear force, there are also several different tactical SSM's with ranges up to 75 miles which will have obvious export possibilities.

The West German experience is somewhat different but nonetheless useful. Here the key factor is the transfer of personnel, due to the inability of the government to provide full employment for its aeronautical scientists and engineers. In a relatively mobile society, West Germany's skilled manpower has been free to move outside its national borders. Unemployment in a national military industry can have widespread international effects through the transfer process.

The Future Course of Weapons Transfer

The market for weapons and weapons technology in the developing world is a large one which will not be saturated in the near future. Depending on the terms of trade, it could probably

[23]The supersonic fighter-bomber and interceptor Mirage III produced by General Aviation Marcel Dassault, one of the most advanced combat aircraft in the world, has already been exported to five countries in numbers totaling over 300. It is now being produced under license by factories in Switzerland and Australia.

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absorb an increasing volume of exports from the industrial countries. As a result of economic pressures, brought about largely by the expansion of capacity and decline of nonmilitary orders, the aerospace industries of the industrial nations, both East and West, may in the future be more aggressive in the pursuit of export markets for aircraft and missiles. In the absence of restraints among northern nations, it is not difficult to foresee a steadily growing proliferation of strategic delivery systems, either in the form of manned aircraft or ballistic missiles, or the personnel and technology to produce them.

Even in the absence of nuclear warheads, the availability of relatively long-range delivery vehicles (for example, with a range of 1,500-2,000 miles) —if there is a willingness to target cities— represents a threat of some magnitude to regional and world security. It is true that escalation from regional to global conflict is not automatic: the great powers will probably be capable of exercising considerable restraint even in the presence of a regional nuclear exchange. This conclusion is all the more valid with regard to a nonnuclear exchange, no matter how destructive it might be to the great cities of a region. Yet regional conflicts almost always lead in varying degrees to great-power intervention and confrontation.

More importantly, regional arms races hold economic perils for the West as well as the underdeveloped nations. Delivery capabilities have already risen rapidly as a result of the Israeli-Egyptian arms race. If war should break out, destruction would be substantial. The comparatively slow rate of economic growth in the developing world is already a cause of great concern. A major regional war among the more progressive developing states—for example, between Israel and its Arab neighbors—would damage industrial centers, give vent to national hatreds, and bring economic progress to a standstill, perhaps for many years. And even without such a war, the slowdown in rate of growth due to increased military expenditures does not favor the West.

The nations of the developing world have argued, with some logic, that the major powers cannot justly outlaw for secondary powers the types of military establishments they regard as essential for themselves. Furthermore, the major nations cannot argue logically against a buildup for which they are directly responsible. It is here that the divergent interests of the major powers come to light. Without Soviet restraint in regard to weapons exports, the

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United States could scarcely permit dangerous imbalances to be created. Without U.S. restraint in weapons exports, the other nations of the West could hardly be expected to punish themselves in economic terms when such restraint does little to improve world security.

Consequently, the first problem with respect to delivery vehicle proliferation is undoubtedly to examine the circumstances under which the major powers might reach some agreement on prohibiting commerce in weapons and weapons technology to the developing world. The assumption that regional instability always benefits the USSR needs to be tested in the new light of the Sino-Soviet dispute. During the several years still remaining before China is able to export major weapons systems to the developing world, there may be time in which some agreement is possible. Only after the possible areas of mutual self-interest among the major powers have been examined would it be worthwhile to study agreements that might be reached within the regions themselves.

The first major arms control agreement relevant to the Middle East after World War II was the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. The United States, the United Kingdom and France declared their opposition to an arms race between the Arab states and Israel and suggested that "all applications for arms would be regarded in the light of defense needs of the area as a whole and the necessity for self-defense."[24] There was, however, no decision-making body set up to judge "defense needs," and the Declaration proved of no practical validity.

In the first Eastern initiative, Yugoslavia suggested a regulation on arms in the Middle East in February 1956. Shortly thereafter Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in an interview on April 27, 1956, commented: "We should sell arms to states which urge us to do so, and the reason for that is that shipments are being made by other countries. If it were possible to agree through the U.N. or otherwise that this would not take place, we would welcome that and we would be prepared to take part in such an understanding."[25] No specific response to Khrushchev's statement or to the suggestion of UN participation in such a measure has been found. Soviet deliveries of MIG-15's to Egypt were

[24] *Control and Reduction of Armaments,* Final Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament (Report No. 2501), August 1, 1958.

[25] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* Vol. I, p. 615.

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justified by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in terms of the "massive Western aid" given to Baghdad Pact countries.[26]

In February 1957 the Soviet Union presented to the United States a formal draft declaration on nonintervention in the Middle East. This, like all major Soviet disarmament proposals since 1955, contained a provision for the removal of foreign bases —a provision aimed primarily, in the Middle Eastern area, at lessening the effectiveness of the U.S. Strategic Air Command's B-47 force. Among its points were: (1) reciprocal refusal to deliver arms; (2) renunciation of formation of blocs; (3) noninterference in internal affairs, and (4) liquidation of foreign bases.[27] Until the end of 1958, there were repeated Soviet initiatives concerning the Middle Eastern arms race, but these diminished as the Soviet long-range missile threat became a more dominant theme of Moscow's diplomacy.

There are a number of arms control and disarmament measures which might still be explored for the Middle East. These include:

Arms and Technology Embargo. An agreement among northern nations to place an embargo on complete weapons systems, their parts and components, their engineering and production technology, as well as critical materials, would have a pronounced effect on the rate of delivery vehicle proliferation. The overwhelming obstacle, of course, would be the lack of common interest in such an agreement. Given the large number of potential suppliers, a conviction of common interest among the parties would be essential.

Guarantee of Borders. The major powers might, through appropriate mechanisms, attempt to guarantee national borders in the developing world. Should borders be violated, the invader's forces would be turned back and punitive action taken. Such a guarantee would require agreement on the identity of the aggressor, an identification on which the major powers seldom agree. Furthermore, such a proposal would simply formalize the existing probability of major-power intervention in regional conflicts when a critical threshold is reached.

Regional Arms Freeze. Although agreement among recipient nations is unlikely, there would be utility in a regional agreement to freeze the level of armaments. Such a freeze would curtail

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 667.
[27] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 742.

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or stop both the importing and indigenous production of weapons systems. A high degree of inspection would be required.

Even partial disarmament in developing regions cannot be expected unless there is some disarmament and disengagement on the part of the major powers. Otherwise the unequal treatment of Middle Eastern nations would be construed as massive neo-colonialism, intended to deprive them of sophisticated armed forces which provide much needed national prestige if not security.

The Economics of Nonnuclear Proliferation

One may argue, as has frequently been done in the case of general disarmament, that the industrial nations cannot afford to cease exporting weapons systems and that nonnuclear proliferation is therefore an economic necessity. Such an argument might be valid only if there were not other costly goods and services required by the developing world which the leading industrial nations could provide.

Developing countries have three major needs in their attempt to strengthen their independence, security and economic stability. These are (1) a means of self-defense; (2) an economy which meets the needs of a growing population; and (3) the ability to meet these first two needs without at the same time becoming solely dependent on a single supplier country. The current pattern of weapons acquisition diverts scarce resources from application to civilian needs, increases the risk and severity of conflict, and assures dependence on supplier countries or their citizens. A refusal of the industrial north to supply them with sophisticated offensive delivery systems and related technology might enable developing states to concentrate on programs aimed at satisfying the "revolution of rising expectations." It would also require the industrial nations to shift production priorities in order to meet genuine economic needs of the less-developed world.

Conclusions

No one would attempt to reason that conflict in the Middle East is the result of the weapons introduced into that area. Enmity among Middle Eastern nations and peoples is as old as history. But acquisition of sophisticated weaponry has not lessened the discord or provided regional stability. Reliance on

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such weapons only assures a more widespread conflict should war break out, and their purchase diverts resources urgently needed for the solution of pressing economic and social problems.

The foregoing discussion has raised a number of questions and provided some tentative conclusions. First, can a reasonable limit be placed on the types of weapons provided? We are aware that trade follows technology, and that once the provision of sophisticated delivery systems has begun, it is difficult, but probably not impossible, to control the quality of weapons provided. What one supplier may deny for military reasons, another may provide for economic motives. Second, will the control of such trade necessarily prevent the development of a regional arms race? Probably not, but the Middle Eastern experience indicates that such controls may slow down the process and provide time to find better solutions. Finally, are there implications from the Middle Eastern experience which can be applied elsewhere? Perhaps the clearest lesson is that controls are probably easier to exercise when weapons levels are low, a situation characterizing present-day sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, or in an immediate post-conflict environment such as the aftermath of the Pakistan-India conflict.

Most international conflicts since World War II have been limited regional conflicts in which the industrial nations have found themselves involved to varying degrees. We should seek controls over the magnitude of these conflicts, and the search can appropriately begin with a careful scrutiny of the arms trade. A basis for mutual interest may exist. The nuclear test ban experience indicates that the source of mutual interest is often obscure and the content of an agreement difficult to predict. Protracted negotiations do not guarantee success, but if we do not try to seek agreement, we may guarantee failure and enhance the prospect of future regional conflicts.

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POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA

by Lorna Hahn

EVERYTHING may be politics, as Napoleon once remarked, but many North Africans could add that politics is not everything. It is not, for example, the sole ingredient of political power, as some recently displaced politicians in Algeria and Morocco have learned. Nor is it the open sesame to personal fulfillment that it appeared to be in the early post-independence period, as their many colleagues who have voluntarily abandoned the political arena might testify. And many of their hungry compatriots now know that, while politics usually provides ample circuses, it is neither a reliable source of, nor a substitute for, bread and other basic necessities of life.

Nevertheless, as Morocco's King Hassan has shown, clever politics can permit a king to keep his throne in an era and area where monarchies are hardly the fashion. His partner in political longevity, Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba, has proven that politics is still the way to parlay weakness into strength, poverty into progress, and *realpolitik* into statesmanship. Since politics has come to mean different things to different North Africans, let us examine the political scene in each Maghrebian country separately, giving especial attention to the area's political problem child, Algeria.[1]

Replacement of Ben Bella

Political fiasco of the year is doubtless Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella, whose career as head of state, government and ruling party ended rudely in the early hours of June 19 when he was awakened by close collaborators, placed under arrest by his personal bodyguard, and accused of treason. That Defense Minister and first Vice President Houari Boumedienne should have planned the coup is hardly surprising, since his recent and fairly open quarrels with Ben Bella made a day of reckoning between them seem almost inevitable. What is surprising, perhaps, is Ben Bella's lack

[1]For background information on the current political scene, see the author's "North Africa: A New Pragmatism," Orbis, Spring 1964, pp. 125-140.

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of preparation for such an eventuality, and thus the ease with which Boumedienne and his hundred or so comrades in complot were able to succeed. Ben Bella's overconfidence in this case was symptomatic of an overinflated sense of destiny, and of a tendency to mistake the trappings of power for the substance of power. Therein lie the basic reasons for his downfall.

Inspired and encouraged by President Nasser, who wanted a protégé, and by President de Gaulle, who wanted a dependable partner in exploiting the natural resources and atomic testing grounds of the Algerian Sahara, the impressionable Ben Bella convinced himself that he should be the undisputed and indispensable master of Algeria. By 1965 he had many reasons for thinking that he had achieved his goal. Through the adroit use of a long carrot and a short stick, he appeared to have emasculated or neutralized all of his important opponents. Revolutionary veterans who had openly opposed his seizure of power in 1962 remained impotently in exile or in political retirement (for example, the ousted President of the Algerian Provisional Government, Mohammed Ben Khedda, who now practices pharmacy in Algiers). Several others who had discarded their original policy of cooperation after Ben Bella promulgated his constitution in 1963, notably Ferhat Abbas and Hussein Ait Ahmed, had been imprisoned. The latter was even sentenced to death for leading the rebellious Kabylia-based Front of Socialist Forces. But since the aging Abbas seemed incapable of causing any real trouble, and since Boumedienne's troops had successfully pacified Ait Ahmed's bailiwick, Ben Bella decided to return to the tactic of conciliating erstwhile enemies wherever possible, lest they become hero-martyrs to their constituents. Abbas was thus released in May 1965 and, although several of his military cohort had been executed as traitors, Ait Ahmed was reprieved and placed under house arrest. Ben Bella even hinted that he would ask him to participate in the government, a gesture of reconciliation which would, it seemed, enhance Ben Bella's prestige on the eve of the long-planned Afro-Asian conference. The move also seemed likely not only to strengthen Ben Bella's position in the rural areas, but also to discourage a possible entente between Ait Ahmed and Mohammed Khider, another quondam Ben Bella ally who had gone into exile following quarrels concerning his own role within the ruling Front of National Liberation (FLN).

The FLN, in Ben Bella's scheme, had become the cornerstone

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of his personal power structure. The congress of April 1964, which had consecrated the party (rather than the state) as the fountainhead of Algerian socialism, had also elected an enlarged central committee and political bureau for the ostensible purpose of giving expression to all "tendencies." While adding an aura of democracy to the party, this move also permitted Secretary General Ben Bella to place many protégés in prestigious positions, as well as to conciliate some potential opponents who remained politically active. To build support closer to the grassroots, Ben Bella had used the party as a sort of glorified job corps: not only did it support a large number of officials and accoutrements (in Algiers alone, it maintained an estimated 8,000 officials and 400 automobiles), but it also directed several nationalized enterprises. Furthermore, the fact that the FLN had absorbed all other political parties (notably the communist), and controlled all "national organizations" (i.e., veterans, trade union, youth and women's groups), seemed to give it and its leader a secure grip on all important phases of Algerian life.

Since Algeria lacked experienced administrators—and since the communists might have presented a formidable opposition—many responsible posts in the party or its affiliate organizations were entrusted to trained Marxists or (unofficial) pro-Moscow communists. These persons, sometimes assisted by expatriate communists, were particularly useful to "Le Frère Ben Bella" in building his image as the leader not only of and for the Algerian people, but of oppressed people everywhere, particularly in Africa. If their presence encouraged the Soviet Union to increase its aid to Algeria or to enhance Ben Bella's prestige among anticolonial peoples by such gestures as awarding him a Lenin peace prize, so much the better for him and his country.

While relying on the FLN somehow to make his will fiat throughout Algeria, Ben Bella increasingly treated the government as its (or his) adjunct. The National Assembly had no real voice in decision making, and the men in the Cabinet, mostly young protégés of Ben Bella or perhaps Boumedienne, seemed to have little will or little way to oppose their chief—at least for long. The outspoken former Interior Minister Ahmed Medeghri, for example, had dutifully resigned in 1964 because Ben Bella himself wished to assume these ministerial duties. Others who disagreed with the chief seemed to have little alternative other than to retire from politics. As for Boumedienne, Ben Bella found it

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hard to imagine this pale, thin ascetic as anything other than his weapon-wielding right arm.

On the surface, then, Ben Bella was the powerful and popular keystone of a political system that was inexorably leading the people toward fulfillment of their high revolutionary expectations. A closer scrutiny by a number of unbiased observers, however, revealed that the party-led power structure was actually, in many places, little more than a house of cards, and that what Ben Bella considered "popularity" was often either passive or grudging acquiescence on the part of a bored and sometimes disillusioned populace. This meant that in a real test of strength, Ben Bella's "personal power" would prove to be little more than just that.

For one thing, the FLN never became a neatly disciplined, nationally organized monolith comparable to the Neo-Destour of Tunisia or to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with whose Presidium the FLN Political Bureau had recently established ties. While its membership was high, even top-heavy, in Algiers and other major cities, its cells in the hinterlands were often widely scattered and poorly coordinated with regional or central offices. This was due, in part, to the sheer size of Algeria and the difficulties of organizing rural activities. It was also due to the fact that, in trying to surround himself with faithful followers, Ben Bella had weeded out many skilled political organizers and had neglected many fundamental administrative tasks. As a result, whatever organizational support he possessed had little strength or depth.

Furthermore, while most Algerians agreed that the party should be charged with "elaborating" Algerian socialism and explaining national objectives, many disliked the Marxist jargon in which the ostensible aims of Algerian socialism were so often expressed. Because they had fought a bloody war of liberation specifically to create an Algerian nation, many also objected to having their hard-won state and its institutions submerged beneath the party. Particularly annoying was the frequent duplication of party and government officials and functions on all levels, a practice which produced bureaucratic frictions and popular confusion, and often resulted in public apathy toward, or ignoring of, official directives from any source.

Had the economy been improving—or at least not deteriorating—Ben Bella might have been able to convince his more astute col-

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leagues that these growing pains of socialism would pass. But in three years of independence, Algeria's overall production had dropped, disparities between prosperous and poor classes and regions had increased rather than decreased, and employment had remained at approximately two million. Ironically, the most serious grievances concerned that hallmark of Algerian socialism, the "self-management" system, wherein agricultural and industrial workers theoretically ran their places of employment under the guidance of party and/or state officials. These self-managed enterprises were saddled with insuperable problems: a lack of properly trained workers and supervisory personnel producing much waste; frequent increases in work forces and production costs rendering many of them noncompetitive; the occasional refusal of workers to accept any direction whatsoever, producing near-anarchy; and low salaries—frequently paid late—in all but the most technically advanced enterprises. The more inept the management and the less productive the enterprise, the greater the discontent of the workers and the smaller the chances for raising production in the foreseeable future. Since conditions were particularly poor in rural regions, many of the peasants, the alleged backbone of the revolution, were hardly a bastion of support for the incumbent leader of that revolution.

Those enjoying relatively high standards of living, i.e. the inhabitants of the more modern self-managed enterprises, owed their good fortune not so much to Ben Bella, but mainly to their own initiative in occupying these former French enterprises in 1962 when their owners had fled. Ben Bella had only ratified their actions and extended and elaborated their self-management principle. A great many people, then, had reason to be disappointed with Ben Bella and his ineffective leadership; few had any reason for gratitude. Propaganda glorifying the leader as the spokesman or sponsor of liberation movements elsewhere offered few compensations; revolutionary benefits, after all, must begin at home.

Had Ben Bella been willing to admit the gravity of Algeria's administrative and economic problems, and to discuss them frankly with the people most directly concerned, he might yet have retained the confidence of his associates. But along with that lack of interest in detail characteristic of many nationalist prima donnas, he also displayed a mystic belief that things would somehow straighten themselves out, and he insisted that others

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indulge this belief. At the beginning of June, for example, Ben Bella reportedly vetoed the presentation of a report analyzing the nation's economic difficulties, particularly in the agricultural self-management sector, on the grounds that it might "disturb" party militants. Rather than rallying other leaders around him, such gestures only served to consolidate diverse and mounting opposition. Sensing a growing dissatisfaction among his colleagues, Ben Bella decided to silence criticism in his usual direct way, i.e. by removing the critics. Thus, just prior to his own removal, he was evidently planning to purge the party Central Committee, and to remove from the Cabinet such men as the young Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, protégé of Colonel Boumedienne, who had indicated that he wanted to handle foreign affairs himself, not relegate them to the President. Ben Bella apparently was prepared even to try to oust his Defense Minister, with the possible assistance of Egyptian agents.

In thinking that he could displace Boumedienne, Ben Bella displayed a classic misunderstanding of the nature of power and a glaring weakness as a national leader. For when the chips were down, the greatest organized power in Algeria lay not within the haphazardly functioning FLN but within the 60,000-man army—a tightly knit force bred on Boumedienne's belief that the people's army should be at the vanguard of the people's revolution. The army, recently strengthened by weapons supplied by the Soviet Union, was loyal to the man who had forged it. Its troops patrolled much of the countryside and maintained a steady, albeit muted, presence in Algiers. Many ordinary citizens might have feared or disliked this army or disapproved of a military coup d'état, but few would or could oppose it. Since there already was considerable resentment of Egyptian influence in Algeria, any help that Cairo might have provided would probably have been counterproductive to the Ben Bellist cause.

Ben Bella was right in feeling that the army's quiet commander, who had always shunned the limelight and the lectern, was ill-suited to the role of dynamic leader. But he failed to realize that responsible officials had become increasingly disposed to follow a man who was more interested in work than in words, more concerned with the complaints of his own countrymen than with the applause of foreigners. He tended to scoff at reports that Boumedienne had become a sounding board for complaints against the regime, and that malcontents were planning action

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during the months prior to the coup. Left largely to his own devices, Boumedienne was thus able to select and organize strategically-placed conspirators in the army, the government and the security services. The precision and ease with which they occupied key centers in the capital, and the weak and sporadic resistance that followed, indicated that Algeria was surfeited with rule of one man and that this man had failed miserably as a national leader.

Boumedienne's first months in power represent a sort of reformation period in the history of Algerian socialism. They have been marked by repeated disavowals of Ben Bella's excesses and by emphasis on returning to the roots of the Algerian revolution and the principles upon which the FLN was founded. Whereas the Ben Bella era was noteworthy for the presence of foreign ideas and even advisers, Boumedienne has emphasized the Arabic Islamic heritage as the proper basis upon which to build Algerian socialism and the Algerian nation. He has even expelled foreigners whom he suspected of interfering in Algeria's internal affairs, notably some Cuban press representatives. In brief, although he himself benefited from the doctrines of Mao and Giap, he has insisted that ideas or assistance accepted from the outside be tailored to suit Algeria's needs.

The transitional system of government, officially announced on July 10, reflects the new regime's antipathy toward a "state contained in one man," and its desire to resurrect the old FLN principle of "collective leadership." Pending promised revisions in the constitution, Boumedienne heads both the twenty-man National Council of the Revolution (CNR), the "collective head of state" which is considered the "depository of national sovereignty," and its theoretical offshoot, the Cabinet, in which he retains the Defense Ministry. While his own power is obviously great, he has displayed the ability to delegate authority, and to do so on a basis of more than mere personal loyalty. Thus while most members of the CNR are military leaders or army veterans (apparently chosen to represent revolutionary continuity as well as discipline), the Cabinet is composed mainly of civilians, apparently chosen for their technical competence and efficiency. In addition to Foreign Minister Bouteflika and Interior Minister Medeghri, prominent posts were given to such technicians as Minister of Education Ahmed Taleb, Minister of Commerce Nourredine Deleci, and

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Minister of Industry and Energy Belaid Abdessalem, who recently led the petroleum negotiations with France.

Perhaps more indicative of Boumedienne's desire to strengthen national institutions and willingness to share responsibilities is his refusal to become head of the FLN, and his repeated demand that the party "elaborate and orient," not "manage or take the place of the state."

On July 20 he announced the formation of a five-man FLN Secretariat composed of CNR members and army veterans, whose task would be to restructure the party as an organization of trained militants capable of providing guidance, thus minimizing its mass movement character, and to prepare for a national party congress. Within a month this group submitted a report to the CNR recommending the removal of party officials who were needlessly duplicating governmental functions or simply wasting time and resources, and also the dispatch of delegations to meet with persons at the local cell level. Plans are also underway to reorganize the unions and other national organizations—including stripping them of their communist officials—so that they can play a more effective role in ameliorating Algeria's pressing economic plight.

While Boumedienne's chief concerns have been domestic, his statements on foreign affairs also reflect his emphasis on fundamentals and a resistance to trifles and flattery. Thus, although Communist China was among the first countries to recognize his regime, he did not display particular gratitude for what was obviously a pragmatic gesture designed to increase Peking's influence in Algeria at the expense of Moscow's. Conversely, he was not perturbed at the reluctance of the Soviet Union, and of several African states, to grant him formal acceptance: he realized that these states had little choice other than eventually to accept him, which they did within a few weeks. While he did not hide his disappointment at the postponement of the Afro-Asian conference—resulting largely from the apprehensions of many Africans toward the abrupt change of Algeria's government—he left most of the discussions on the subject to Bouteflika.

Boumedienne took pains to reassure France that he would maintain the friendly relations Paris had established with his predecessor, thus guaranteeing that the recently negotiated petroleum accords—which are extremely favorable to Algeria—will be honored. Perhaps more important, he also took positive steps

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to mend fences with the United States, with whom relations had been rapidly deteriorating. On July 27, for example, Ambassador Cherif Guellal had a meeting with President Johnson which led to optimism in informed circles concerning improved relations between the two countries. Furthermore, he promised his Maghrebian neighbors increased cooperation, particularly in the sharing of Algerian oil and natural gas, and even reassured Morocco that there would be no repetition of the border disputes of 1963—which he blamed on Ben Bella. This last gesture, ironically, served to bolster the Moroccan leader whose precepts and style of government are quite different from those of Boumedienne.

Reinforcement of King Hassan's Power

At the same time that Algerians witnessed the overthrow of a man who gloried in personal power but claimed to act in the name of collective power and national institutions, Moroccans witnessed the overthrow of national institutions by a man who consciously and openly wields personal power. On June 7-8, following a long parliamentary crisis, King Hassan II dismissed the Parliament and Cabinet of Premier Ahmed Bahnini, and installed himself as Premier as well as King of a country whose political parties had failed to provide adequate political leadership.

The young monarch was able to carry out this coup, which he justified by emergency powers implied under Article 35 of the Constitution, because he, unlike Ben Bella, understands the nature and uses of political power. His strength still stems, in part, from the respect traditionally accorded to the Moroccan ruler as leader of the faith as well as chief of state. He depends, however, not on the large crowds who cheer his every public appearance, but on the modern 36,000-man army which he built mainly to curb internal threats, and on the security forces which have repeatedly thwarted all plots to unseat him or reduce his power—plots which he had the common sense to realize were inevitable. Hassan continues to rule as well as reign because he comprehends the strength and weaknesses of Morocco's political institutions and personalities, and is willing to act when they cannot or will not.

Morocco's first Parliament, elected in 1963, provides a classic case of collective political impotence. In two years, for example, it passed only four major bills. Part of the problem stemmed from the Constitution of 1962 which left the locus of power in the palace, and part of it derived from dissatisfaction with the con-

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duct of the parliamentary elections, which the Istiqlal party charges were rigged in order to give the various supporters of the king a majority. The real source of the trouble, however, was the existence of many political parties and cliques, and the fact that they were led by men who, with but few exceptions, cared little about constructing responsible mass-based movements and effecting necessary reforms. Instead, their interest too often lay merely in attracting the attention of the king or of other politicians who might have favors to dispense. Politicians frequently changed their "beliefs" or party affiliations in order to obtain some immediate personal benefit, such as a cabinet post or ambassadorship.

This situation encouraged the fracturing of parties (which numbered approximately a dozen by June 1965), and rendered the formation of parliamentary coalitions increasingly difficult. It also drove from the political arena many capable and experienced individuals who were repelled by the growing political prostitution. Furthermore, popular disgust with politicians increased to the point where trade union leaders, businessmen, intelligentsia and *fellahin* were willing to accept almost any alternative to a parliament and a government which had blatantly failed to handle such critical problems as steadily rising prices and growing unemployment.

Hassan was partly to blame for the crisis, since his past encouragement of political divisions had made it easier for him to rule, but he was not anxious to scuttle the parliamentary institutions he had created. Hence, when general discontent erupted in a series of riots in March 1965, he asked the parliamentarians to place country ahead of personal interests and to form a strong "government of national union" capable of instituting economic and social reforms. Since the erstwhile bastion of royal support, the Democratic Front of Socialist Forces (FDIC), had crumbled, Hassan appealed first to the conservative Istiqlal party to form a new government. Its leaders responded, however, by demanding that new elections be held first—a suggestion which insulted the king by implying that he had condoned the rigging of the 1963 elections, and would not have resulted in expeditious action. Rebuffed here, Hassan turned to the National Union of Popular Forces (UNPF), offering its leaders support for the socialist-type measures they had long advocated and releasing several of its adherents who had been under sentence of death for trying to assassinate him. The UNPF minority responded by demanding

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complete control of the government and constitutional changes to strengthen the powers of parliament. These conditions clearly were unacceptable.

Given the opportunity to display qualities of leadership, politicians on all sides proved incapable of rising to the challenge. By creating a power vacuum in the parliament at the very time they might have strengthened it, they in effect forced the king to seize full powers himself and form a "transitional" government. The move has been harshly condemned by the Istiqlal and some smaller parties, but approved by the UNPF, which expects it to lead to desired constitutional reforms. On the whole, the people have reacted favorably.

The program of this transitional government includes the preparation of constitutional changes and their submission to popular referendum, but the more immediately important task is to effect rapid social and economic changes. The first measure in this direction was taken in July when Hassan, in an effort to increase national revenue and check the growing imbalance of trade, announced the nationalization of about 35 per cent of Morocco's export trade. With the large phosphate industry already under government control, this means that about 60 per cent of Morocco's exports are now nationalized. Although a large part of the foreign and local business community (particularly the exporters) were estranged by the move and are now more reluctant than before to invest their profits within Morocco, Morocco's growing pro-socialist elements have applauded it. Furthermore, since foreign countries, notably France and West Germany, have shown a willingness to increase their investments in Morocco, King Hassan seems likely to gain both political and economic capital from this and other socialist-type measures he has recently advocated. So long as Moroccan politicians, whether of the Left or Right, fail to offer an alternative to the king's strong leadership, his personal position will remain impregnable.

Refinement of *Bourgibisme*

While inept political leadership has placed both revolutionary Algeria and monarchial Morocco in states of political "transition," accompanied by economic and social disruption, Tunisia's adroit leaders continue uninterruptedly to refine *Bourgibisme,* the state ideology which has made their country one of the few newly-in-

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dependent states never to have experienced a serious internal crisis.

Habib Bourguiba carries the same battery of titles as did Ben Bella, and is at least as insistent on being considered the putative father of his country. Yet the *combattant supreme* has avoided the gross errors of Ben Bella because he, unlike his erstwhile colleague, is a political professional rather than a spotlight-seeking amateur. Hence he had long since realized that "popularity" means little without carefully organized support, and that his support—which has always rested on the mass-based single party—would not long remain either unified or loyal unless it was responsive to the opinions of lesser leaders and the needs of the nation. While receptive to criticism, he and his closest associates have usually insisted that major innovations be effected only after careful deliberation. Many blueprints were studied before Tunisia officially adopted "Destourian Socialism" in 1961, and many Young Turks had to prove their political mettle before their elders officially agreed, at the congress of October 1964, to restructure the party along more democratic lines and to change its name to "Socialist Destour."

The knowledge that changes can be made through established channels has not only kept the ruling party intact behind the chief, but has also permitted his authoritarian method of governing to be tempered with considerable popular—and increasingly responsible—participation. This, in turn, has fostered the development of the national institutions described in the Constitution of 1959, so that the Tunisian state is not, in effect, either synonymous or coterminous with its one outstanding leader.

The 62-year-old Bourguiba has recently shown considerable interest in demonstrating, to Tunisians and foreigners alike, that the stability Tunisia currently enjoys will outlast his tenure of office. Long ago he recognized the necessity of delegating administrative responsibility; recently he began to provide wider publicity to men who might some day replace him. Thus, Bahi Ladgham, Secretary-General of the party and Secretary of State for the Presidency and for Defense, is now prominently featured by the news media and frequently referred to as the "Vice President" and the man who would take charge of the country in case of emergency. To avoid giving the impression that the succession is a *fait accompli,* however, attention is also given to the younger Ahmed Ben Saleh, who was largely responsible for the shift to-

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ward socialism. Habib Bourguiba, Jr. also boasts growing popularity, although the important posts he holds within the government and the party exaggerate the amount of responsibility, experience or prestige that he actually possesses.

Not everything in Tunisia is going smoothly. Inefficiencies on some of the cooperative farms managed by the General Union of Tunisian Workers, for example, precipitated the removal of union leader Habib Achour on charges of graft. This was followed by the imposition of more centralized governmental supervision over parts of the agriculture sector, and by some controversy concerning the proper relationship between union and government. Tunisia is also plagued by an imbalance of trade, and by difficulties in exporting products such as citrus fruits and wines which compete with those of Common Market countries. There is a good chance that Tunisia will be able to solve its more pressing problems, however, since the government at least recognizes that they exist, and is tackling them in a rational manner. The politically astute Bourguiba makes a point of discussing them publicly, rather than trying to pretend to the people that they are not there; in this way he retains popular confidence in himself, while also obtaining popular cooperation when new programs are announced.

Bourguiba's position was further strengthened in the spring of 1965 when he went beyond the role of national leader to that of world statesman by advocating an Arab-Israeli *détente*. The move not only netted Tunisia increased investments and aid from West Germany and other countries, but also brought him world acclaim as a possible candidate for a Nobel Peace Prize. Furthermore, since neither Boumedienne nor Hassan holds any brief for President Nasser and his repeated attempts to interfere in their affairs, Bourguiba's anti-Egyptian stand should promote plans for increased Maghrebian economic and cultural cooperation.

Conclusion

The North African countries are learning to put politics and politicians into perspective, with some interesting lessons for outside observers. Recent events in all three countries indicate that, while a weak country needs a powerful individual at its head, personal power cannot be the sole or even the major interest of that person if he wishes to retain his position for long; he must also consider the national interest. Although the country may

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lack a democratic political tradition as we know it, economic and social—if not "political"—pressures will soon force a leader to listen to his discontented people or be evicted from his job. To the cliché-burdened student of political systems, the Algerian and Tunisian experiences demonstrate that uniparty regimes are not necessarily efficient, but neither are they necessarily oppressive. While neither the FLN nor the Socialist Destour has permitted the growth of the responsible opposition parties which we consider an indispensable feature of democracy, the multiparty system of Morocco, by contrast, has fostered little but opposition and irresponsibility among the politicians, with the result that they proved themselves and their parties easily dispensable in the governing of Morocco. North Africans are learning that the duty of a political leader is to govern—and governing consists of far more than politics for the sake of politics.

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THE FEASIBILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN LATIN AMERICA*

by Edward Bernard Glick

WHILE Central Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East and Africa have frequently been mentioned as possible regions for initiating regional arms control and disarmament schemes, many proponents of this approach have suggested Latin America. In December 1962, for example, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, made a strong plea for regional arms control, singling out Latin America as an "area in which we can most profitably pursue the regional approach to disarmament and arms control."[1]

This is a noble sentiment, but is it also feasible? If it is, from whose point of view is it feasible? When we talk about disarmament and arms control, are we dealing with so-called conventional arms and nuclear arms: what are the special problems associated with each of them? Also, can one generalize about an area so large, so diverse and so changing as Latin America? For besides eighteen Spanish-speaking republics, that term encompasses tiny French-speaking Haiti and gigantic Portuguese-speaking Brazil, whose more than 70 million inhabitants and 3,287,000 square miles make her the largest and most populous Latin nation in the world. Put another way, is there a great deal of political and military commonality between, say, Mexico and Central America, which are geographically close to the United States, and Argentina, whose capital city of Buenos Aires is farther away from Washington than is Moscow? These are the types of questions we must consider in this inquiry, whose central purpose is to evaluate the practicability of reducing and controlling conventional and nuclear weapons systems in Latin America in the foreseeable future.

*This article is a revised and updated version of a paper delivered at the Second International Arms Control and Disarmament Symposium, jointly sponsored by the Bendix Corporation and the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, January 24, 1964.

[1]U.S. Congress, 88th Congress, 1st Session, *Congressional Record-Senate,* February 14, 1963, p. 2239. His speech was delivered at the First International Arms Control Symposium, Ann Arbor, Michigan, on December 20, 1962.

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The Military Presence

No single country or combination of countries in Latin America is capable of successfully resisting extraregional invasion. This is a fact known to Latin America, the United States and the Soviet Union. Out of a total population of about 200 million, probably not more than 665,000 men serve in Latin American armies.[2] Yet an inordinately large share of the region's income is devoted to military establishments. For most of this century, *official* annual expenditures for Latin American armed forces have averaged from one-fifth to one-fourth of the national budgets.[3] There are wide differences among countries: Costa Rica today has no army, but relies on a 1,200-man police force, while in dictator-ruled Paraguay it has been estimated that there is one soldier for every thirty inhabitants and that the armed forces are draining off about 60 per cent of the national budget.[4]

In addition to paying military salaries and purchasing arms and naval craft (largely from the United States but also from England, France, Italy, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands and elsewhere), most of the Latin American countries have entered into military missions and/or assistance agreements with the United States. The sum of all United States military grants to Latin America from April 1948 to June 1964 amounted to $660.5 million.[5] For fiscal year 1966, President Johnson's military aid request for Latin America was $77 million.[6] The upshot is that military missions in Latin America formerly staffed by Europeans are now staffed by North Americans and that the United States and some of our NATO allies are supplying Latin America (Cuba excepted) with large amounts of military aid and training.

Critics often blame this situation on the United States. In the name of anti-communism, they say, we are spurring a costly arms race and using military means to accomplish essentially political objectives. This is too facile an argument. First, arms races in Latin America are not new. They pre-date communism and the

[2]Enrique Martínez Codó, "The Military Problems in Latin America," *Military Review*, August 1964, p. 14.
[3]Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*. (Revised edition.) (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 147.
[4]Center of Latin American Studies, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1962* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1963), p. 41, and *The Sunday Star Ledger* (Newark, New Jersey), February 17, 1963, sec. 4, p. 3.
[5]U.S. Agency for International Development, *Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1966: Summary Presentation to the Congress* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 226.
[6]*Ibid.*, p. 22.

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Cold War, being tied as much to nationalism, prestige, sovereignty and power politics as to personal aggrandizement and despotism on the part of individual military and political leaders. In the mid-nineteenth century, long before the rise of Marxism-Leninism, President Ramon Castilla proclaimed: "When Chile purchases one ship, Peru ought to buy two."[7] Regrettably, this point-counterpoint approach to arms has been a feature of Latin American history for decades. Thus, when Brazil bought an aircraft carrier from Great Britain in 1956, Argentina immediately began to negotiate with London and Washington for a similar purchase in order, according to her Navy Minister, "to offset the carrier bought . . . by Brazil."[8] In February 1963, the Brazilian Army Minister announced that his country planned to manufacture many military vehicles "totally independent of foreign help."[9] Recently a Brazilian diplomat took great pains to point out privately to the author that, as the largest country in Latin America, Brazil must have a respectable military establishment and "keep ahead of other countries in the region. If nothing else, it is a matter of our national prestige." This was said quite apart from the realities of Cuba, communism and the Cold War or from the fact that in the very week of our conversation the Brazilian President joined the Mexican President in calling for a denuclearized Latin America.

A peso that is spent for military purposes, justified or not, is a peso that supposedly cannot be spent on education, economic development, or social and cultural betterment. For that reason alone one should deplore unnecessary military expenditures especially in underdeveloped countries. Such expenditures in Latin America may well be wasteful and burdensome. But critics often fail to observe that in comparison to areas like the Middle East, Southeast Asia or parts of Africa, Latin American militarism does *not* represent a great danger to the peace of the world, to the peace of the region, or to the territorial integrity of the nations of the region. For all of their militarism, coups, juntas and caudillos, Latin American armies simply do not do much fighting, they do not kill very many people, they do not engage in vicious

[7]Quoted in Donald E. Worcester, "Naval Strategy in the War of the Pacific," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* January 1963, p. 32.

[8]U.S. Congress, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Control and Reduction of Armaments: Disarmament and Security in Latin America,* Staff Study No. 7, May 12, 1957, p. 16. Cited hereafter as *Senate Disarmament Study.*

[9]Quoted in *Hispanic American Report,* April 1963, p. 178.

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propaganda, they rarely violate international frontiers, and they almost never engage in extraregional aggression. Except for the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, which took place in the 1930's, one cannot point to a major international conflict in recent Latin American history.

In short, the typical Latin American military conflict produces few external effects or fears of escalation upward or outward. From the point of view of global peace, Latin America has been and is one of the world's most pacific areas. (The only exception to this general statement has been Cuba, a very special case, in that she received nuclear arms from the Soviet Union, whose military advisers remain on her soil and whose foreign policies and ideology Cuban leaders support.)

There is another point that critics of the Latin American military are apt to ignore. In some cases Latin American military forces play positive political roles in their countries. For example, it was the military who overturned the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in Venezuela, and it was also the military who supported leftist but democratic President Rómulo Betancourt against the violent opposition of Castro and the communists. Likewise, it was the military who brought their fellow officer Juan D. Perón to power in Argentina and now it is the military who are preventing his return. In some countries military forces are engaged in important nonmilitary chores. In Mexico they are helping to eradicate disease. In Bolivia they are doing important work in colonization. In Honduras and El Salvador they are contributing to the planning and execution of public works. In Chile all weather forecasting lies within the province of the military and Chilean representatives at world meteorological meetings are either military men or civilian employees of the military establishment.

The military has also played a role in social achievement, as surprising and paradoxical as that might seem to the liberal-minded observer. Hans Speier of the RAND Corporation has remarked that "as a revolutionary force" military men in underdeveloped countries have

> contributed to the disintegration of traditional political order; as a stabilizing force they have kept some countries from falling prey to Communist rule; as a modernizing force they have been champions of middle-class aspirations or of popular demands for social change and have provided administrative and technological skills to the civilian sector of countries in which such skills are scarce.[10]

[10]In his preface to John J. Johnson, editor, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. v.

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Perhaps the best description of this phenomenon in the Latin American context was made by Vernon Fluharty in his book *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956.*[11] Discussing the military dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, he said that Rojas

> has turned the clock forward on social achievement for the masses. He gave them status and a sense of their importance, if only because his government has emphasized their welfare. That lesson they will never forget, and nothing less will be acceptable from other governments to come. . . .
>
> In this sense, paradoxically, the military dictator is making a substantial contribution toward democracy. Every social, educational, political, and economic gain in status is a step toward the creation of the substantive basis upon which true popular democracy may one day rise in Colombia. . . .
>
> Ultimate accomplishment of this process may require many Rojas Pinillas . . . . But the military dictatorships make their necessary contribution, a lasting one, with their emphasis upon substantive democracy. Nothing can be the same after they have come, spoken to and for the masses, and gone their way. It does not even matter, in the long run, whether they were sincere in their solicitude for the people, or merely self-seeking. The important thing is that the masses will not forget. They will slowly grow into the new concept that they, too, are men, and they will demand more from the parties in the future than ever they dared demand before.
>
> Sooner or later those demands will be met . . . . Even though it may appear negative and temporary, this contribution is a gain for the future of popular democracy in Latin America.

This brief description of the military presence in Latin America has been sufficient to show the pervasiveness of the military influence, to remind us that the military are frequently the actual political rulers, to indicate that the role of the military has often been a progressive one, and that good or bad, its role has definite and far-reaching implications for the feasibility of arms control in Latin America.

In order to reach any conclusions on arms control feasibility, one must distinguish between types of arms and of controls. The first distinction that crosses the mind is the one between so-called conventional arms and nuclear arms. Even this distinction causes a problem. For what may be considered unconventional today—for example, nuclear infantry weapons or artillery systems like the Honest John—may be considered conventional tomorrow. Let

[11](Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), pp. 316-317.

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us examine briefly the historical background and the feasibility of controlling each of these types of weapons in Latin America.

Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems

Modern Latin American history records many calls for disarmament and even limited success in achieving demilitarized frontiers or zones. Among the more recent examples was the statement by former President Jorge Alessandri of Chile before the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) in December 1962:

> I have placed special emphasis upon calling on the conscience of America in favor of a fight against armaments; for that reason the representatives of Chile in international organizations have lent and will continue to lend their support to every idea that tends to erase from our countries the possibility of war, which could serve as a pretext to justify heavy expenditures for armaments that are a burden upon the budgets of so many nations.[12]

Other instances might be cited.[13] In 1829 Peru and Colombia agreed to reduce military forces along their common border. In 1858 Costa Rica and Nicaragua agreed to allow no hostilities between them "even in case of war" in part of the San Juan del Norte area and on Lake Nicaragua. In 1881 Chile and Argentina neutralized and demilitarized the Straits of Magellan. In 1902 Argentina and Chile concluded a naval limitations agreement, but neighboring Brazil shattered it a few years later by increasing her own naval program. A comprehensive disarmament treaty involving limitations on aircraft, warships and troops was signed in 1923 by the five Central American republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. With no inspection and enforcement stipulations, however, it eventually fell into disregard, finally to expire when Honduras formally denounced its major provisions in 1953. In 1936 the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace called for arms control, and in 1947 the conference at Rio de Janeiro resolved that the Rio Treaty should not be viewed "in the sense of justifying excessive armaments."

There is also the interesting case of Costa Rica. As already indicated, she abolished her army in 1948 and, in a kind of ful-

[12]Organization of American States, Press Release E-508/62.

[13]The material in this paragraph was taken from *Senate Disarmament Study*, pp. 21-23; J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, *Geographic Disarmament: A Study of Regional Demilitarization* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 50, 64, 83-84; and Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," in Johnson, editor, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

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fillment of the Prophet Isaiah's swords-into-plowshares prophecy, she recently exchanged 2,000 old rifles for six new tractors.[14] In 1958 she presented a proposal to the OAS Council calling for a study of

> whether it was possible for Latin American countries (a) to renounce the use and possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons; (b) to place greater emphasis on the civilian engineering functions of their armed forces; (c) to limit their military expenditures; and (d) to allocate the funds obtained by reducing military expenditures to the financing of national or inter-American economic development programs.[15]

Nothing came of the proposal because, like similar formulas for limiting conventional arms and armies in Latin America, it was not—and is not yet—feasible. Before limitations can be imposed on conventional armies and armaments in Latin America, a number of other changes must be introduced.

First, a method must be found to prevent "overdisarming," that is, a method to tell us when each Latin American nation would have disarmed enough to meet the political, moral and economic imperatives of disarmament but had not disarmed so much as to interrupt the maintenance of legitimate law and order, including protection against the counterinsurgency problems posed by communists and other subversives.

Second, we would need a system of retaining and redirecting into the nation's society the nonmilitary skills of the military forces, since in some countries these forces monopolize the available expertise in administration and technology.

Third, the United States would have to find a way, other than providing arms aid, for securing military bases and nonmilitary installations in Latin America. It has been reported, for example, that our missile-tracking station in the Dominican Republic was obtained in exchange for more military assistance to the late dictator Rafael Trujillo. A similar arrangement was made with Brazil in order for us to have a tracking station on the island of Fernando de Noronha.[16]

But above all, limitations on armies and conventional weapons

[14]Lieuwen, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

[15]OAS, "Draft Resolution Presented to the Council of the OAS by His Excellency Ambassador Gonzalo J. Facio, the Representative of Costa Rica, March 5, 1958," p. 2. Ambassador Facio delivered an address on this subject before the Overseas Press Club on January 2, 1958. A mimeographed transcript in Spanish was later distributed under the title "El desarme como factor económico en América Latina."

[16]Lieuwen, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

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in Latin America require acquiescence at several levels and in several directions simultaneously. The military establishments in Latin America, possessing much of the political power, would perforce have to acquiesce in a shrinkage of their funds and power. This presupposes a great deal more professionalization and depoliticalization of these establishments than has currently been achieved. Nonmilitary wielders of political power in Latin America must also acquiesce, and here we are likely to run into the problem of nationalism. A successful arms control arrangement must be preceded by a degree of "denationalism." We in the United States, lumping all the Latin American countries together as we usually do and forgetting how nationalistic we ourselves can be, often fail to appreciate how strongly nationalistic many Latin Americans are and how attached they are to their own national sovereignties. For nations, Latin American and others, the essential attributes of visible sovereignty are things like flags and embassies and soldiers and weapons.

Acquiescence is also needed within both the military and political communities of the United States. This will be difficult to achieve without first jettisoning what Professor Lieuwen has called the "myth of collective defense."[17] This is the myth that we extend military aid not for political reasons but because each and every Latin American country has a real *military* role to play in the contemporary collective defense of the Western Hemisphere. Many U.S. military officers believe this and thus are wary of Latin American disarmament, as are many members of Congress. Another myth that must be jettisoned states that communist influence decreases as military influence increases, and that as the latter increases so does local friendship for the United States and agreement with U.S. policies. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine implied as much on March 14, 1962 when she told the Senate "the greatest friends that the United States has in South America are the members of the military forces—and the greatest enemies of Communism are the members of the military forces."[18]

Then there is a need for acquiescence in the efforts of the OAS by countries within the hemisphere and by our friends and foes outside it. For Latin American arms control measures can hardly succeed if the Soviet Union, China, our NATO allies and others do not cooperate, and if those Latin American countries capable

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[18] Quoted in *Hispanic American Report*, April 1962, p. 101.

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of producing some of their own weapons do not cooperate. Some kind of international acquiescence to regional arms control programs and supervision of the world traffic in arms is imperative.

Finally, there is the problem of Castro Cuba. Cuba is to Latin American disarmament what Communist China (and to some extent France) is to world disarmament. In the same way that the success of global disarmament will ultimately depend upon linking China and France to it, a regional disarmament agreement that does not involve Cuba—now probably the second most heavily armed Western Hemisphere nation after the United States—might well prove to be unworkable. Cuba can be expected to favor arms limitations that limit the freedom of action of the United States and the OAS but not her own freedom to act. In this context Latin American arms control without Cuban participation is meaningless since Cuba poses the only real indigenous military danger in the hemisphere.

The above discussion suggests strongly that a "Costa Ricanization," that is, the disbandment of traditional armies in Latin America, is Utopian. Furthermore, significant arms control measures, short of disbandment, are not now feasible and may very well be undesirable. This does not mean that Latin American force levels and military expenditures could not be reduced without endangering the effectiveness and legitimate responsibilities of the various military forces. But it is very unlikely that this will happen.

Nuclear Weapons

As the August 1965 Mexico City conference[19] on Latin American denuclearization again illustrated, Latin Americans share with much of mankind elsewhere the fear of nuclear testing, atomic radiation, thermonuclear war, and their possible destruction should a future war engulf them. If these fears existed before the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, they certainly increased after it. Before and after the crisis various Latin American nations proposed measures to minimize their involvement in anything to do with nuclear weapons.

[19]From August 24 to September 2, 1965, representatives of twenty-one Western Hemisphere countries (excluding Cuba) met in Mexico City for discussions on declaring Latin America a nuclear-free zone. Several nations, including the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Japan, sent observers. When the conference adjourned without agreement on a draft treaty, the *New York Times* (September 3, 1965) commented: "All of the participating countries expressed support for the proposal. . . . But discussions made it evident that few of them were prepared to commit themselves now to specific treaty provisions."

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As already noted, the very first task mentioned in the Costa Rican resolution submitted to the OAS in 1958 was to determine whether it was possible for the Latin American countries to renounce the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. When Prime Minister Tancredo Neves presented his Cabinet's program of action to the Brazilian Congress on September 28, 1961, it contained this statement:

> The multilateral policy of disarmament will count upon our decided support and active collaboration. We will strive for the immediate suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, we will defend the principle [of the] limitation and inspection of the production of weapons of indiscriminate destruction, and we will favor all measures of gradual disarmament which meet the prerequisite of being in fact workable.[20]

In that same year, there was Latin American support for a United Nations General Assembly resolution requesting a canvass to determine the conditions under which the present nonnuclear states would refrain from joining the nuclear club. Also, the OAS Council approved by a 20 to 0 vote a Uruguayan resolution asking the UN to do everything possible to control nuclear testing. President João Goulart of Brazil called testing "the same as genocide." Uruguayan Foreign Minister Homero Martínez Montero called it "barbarism" and "an attack against humanity." President Adolfo López Mateos said that "Mexico will struggle . . . to prevent further testing . . . and the use of nuclear energy for warlike purposes." A petition signed by over one hundred intellectuals appeared in Mexican newspapers in November 1961 demanding an end to testing and criticizing the Soviet Union.[21] On April 4, 1962 the Brazilian President addressed a joint session of the United States Congress and declared that

> in the event of a nuclear war, even if we managed to save our lives, whether in victory or defeat, our very reason for living would be obliterated. The end of the dangerous emulation in armaments . . . must be sought . . . in negotiations insuring progressive disarmament through efficient control arrangements with the re-use of liberated resources for peaceful purposes in the interest of all peoples.[22]

Though Latin American nations have taken and supported initiatives with regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, a

[20]Brazilian Embassy, Washington, Press Release, n.d., p. 6.

[21]*Hispanic American Report,* January 1962, p. 1049. Many of the signers had reputations as *simpáticos* of the Soviet Union.

[22]Translation of the address supplied to the author by the Brazilian Embassy.

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nuclear test ban, and general nuclear disarmament, their main thrust in recent years has been in the direction of securing an internationally recognized nuclear-free Latin America. Taking advantage of the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962, the Brazilians introduced a UN resolution with these operative parts:

1. *Recommends* that the countries of Latin America, through the means and channels which will be found most appropriate, negotiate arrangements whereby the countries in the area would:
   (a) agree not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or carrying devices;
   (b) agree to dispose forthwith of any nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery vehicles which may now be in their territory;
   (c) agree to make provision for verification of these arrangements in order to ensure that they are in fact being observed;
2. *Calls upon* all States to co-operate in full with arrangements to be reached, and in accordance therewith to consider and respect the territory of Latin America as a denuclearized zone;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, upon request of the States of Latin America, to assist them to reach and implement the arrangements referred to in paragraph 1.[23]

It is interesting that paragraph 1 (a), while mentioning the manufacturing, receiving, storing and testing of nuclear weapons, says nothing about *transporting* them, perhaps because of the Panama Canal and its possible use by U.S. naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons. Also, paragraphs 1 (b), 1 (c), and 2, though not mentioning them by name, are directed toward Cuba and the Soviet Union. The resolution, later co-sponsored by Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador, received considerable but less than universal support. Ultimately it became mired in the unsuccessful negotiations related to on-site inspection of Cuban territory. Cuba signified her willingness to accept the resolution but with conditions unacceptable to the United States. These, it was reported, included the exclusion of nuclear weapons from Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone, promises that the "nuclear powers" (i.e., the United States) would not use nuclear weapons against "Latin American nations" (i.e., Cuba), inspection of the southeastern part of the United States to check on possible military training camps for Cuban exiles, and a Washington pledge for direct Cuban-American negotiations after the missile crisis had passed.[24] In any case, the First Committee of the General As-

[23]UN Document A/C.1/L.312/Rev. 2 (November 15, 1962), p. 2.
[24]*New York Times,* November 18, 1962.

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sembly decided to postpone voting on the draft until the 1963 Assembly. At that Assembly—in a vote that made headlines because Rumania bolted from the Soviet bloc—a mild resolution was passed encouraging studies and support of a denuclearized Latin America.[25]

Latin America has also turned to other measures and to other forums. On the initiative of Mexico, the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico made public on April 29, 1963 a unique joint declaration. "Motivated by the hope that the conclusion of a Latin American regional treaty may contribute to the adoption of a contractual instrument by all countries of the world," the five Presidents decided to:

1. state immediately that their governments are ready to sign a multilateral Latin American agreement providing that the countries will not engage themselves in manufacturing, receiving, storing or testing nuclear weapons or devices to launch nuclear missiles;
2. make known the present declaration to the heads of state of all the other Latin American countries, hoping that their governments will adhere to it in the manner they deem most adequate; and
3. work together with other Latin American nations adhering to this present declaration, in order that Latin America may be recognized as a denuclearized zone as soon as possible.[26]

Brazilian President Goulart circularized the declaration to all American Presidents asking them to support it. In May 1963 at the eighteen-nation Geneva disarmament conference, where they have been active participants, Brazil and Mexico invited other nations, particularly those in Africa and Asia, to imitate the Latin American example. At about the same time, the Brazilian Embassy in Washington repeated reports that the Kennedy Administration welcomed the joint Latin American presidential proclamation, and wished to increase its probability of success by suggesting "more ample measures of arms control in the region."[27]

Despite these steps, however, the prospect of a nuclear-free Latin America has generated many contradictions and doubts. The Brazil whose delegates at Geneva and New York actively support disarmament is the same Brazil in which, according to a 1960-61 survey, 26 per cent of the national legislators favored a

[25]UN Document A/RES/1911 (XVIII) (November 29, 1963), pp. 1-2.

[26]"Declaração conjunta dos Presidentes das Repúblicas do Brasil, Bolívia, Chile, Equador e México em favor da desnuclearização da America Látina." Mimeographed copy supplied by the Brazilian Embassy, Washington. See also Brazilian Embassy, *Boletin Informativo,* No. 83 (April 30, 1963), p. 1.

[27]*Boletin Informativo,* No. 85 (May 3, 1963), p. 2.

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long-range missile base in Brazil, if the United States wanted one there. Only 45 per cent of the legislators opposed a United States missile base and 55 per cent wanted a military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.[28] The Chile whose President associated himself with the nuclear-free declaration and whose chief UN delegate has spoken of a policy of "active pacifism"[29] is the same Chile that informed the UN Secretary-General that it "would be willing to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons and refusing to receive nuclear weapons in its territory on behalf of another country [the United States?] *provided that an equivalent undertaking was given by the other Latin American countries.*"[30] It is by no means certain that an equivalent undertaking will be given by all other Latin American countries. Paraguay, for example, answering the same UN inquiry sent to Chile, said that it was "not yet opportune for it to indicate the precise conditions under which it could enter into the specific undertaking"[31] relating to Latin American denuclearization. And Panama said that

> there is no reason why the countries not possessing nuclear weapons should of their own will and initiative enter into such an undertaking, which limits their sovereignty for the benefit of the countries possessing nuclear weapons—in other words, that the prohibition of the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons must be total, since that is what is demanded by the highest interest of humanity.[32]

Panama's reply is instructive. First, it suggests that a regional denuclearization pact is not practical unless it is part of a larger global effort to achieve the same result. Second, it mentions "sovereignty," a concept that has so many times in the history of nations stood as an impenetrable wall between aspirations and fulfillment—not the least in Latin America. Tied to sovereignty is the concept of prestige. And here the "tactical" nuclear weapon may soon join the tank, the aircraft carrier and the jet airplane as the latest military status symbol of national pride and prestige. It cannot yet be asserted that the international fear of nuclear destruction is stronger than the national desire for sovereignty

[28]Lloyd A. Free, *Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians* (Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1961), pp. 14-16.

[29]UN, General Assembly, *Official Records, Sixteenth Session, First Committee, 1175th Meeting* (October 24, 1961), p. 61.

[30]UN, Disarmament Commission, Document DC/201/Add. 2 (April 2, 1962), p. 14. (Italics added.)

[31]*Ibid.*, p. 55.

[32]*Ibid.*, p. 54.

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and prestige. Will Brazil, for example, live up to an undertaking for nuclear disarmament if she is in sight of achieving her aspiration of becoming a world power?

Besides sovereignty and prestige there are other stumbling blocks to denuclearization in Latin America. One of these is extra-regional acquiescence, as much a problem within the nuclear as the nonnuclear context. To avoid future Cuban missile crises, we must find a way to link Cuba and the Soviet Union to the denuclearization arrangement. To prevent Latin American countries from turning to non-Soviet sources, denuclearization requires the assent and active cooperation of West Germany, France, England, Canada, Sweden and Communist China, which are or may soon become capable of supplying cheap nuclear weapons. If France is any guide, this will be far from easy. Prior to the Latin American denuclearization conference of August 1965, French officials reportedly told the Latin Americans that France "will not cooperate" in such an undertaking.[33]

Then there is the matter of the definition, size and location of the proposed nuclear-free zone. If one defines Latin America as only that area of the Western Hemisphere which comprises Spanish-speaking, French-speaking or Portuguese-speaking peoples who are citizens of *independent* countries and also members of the OAS, then it is possible to conceive of a denuclearization of Latin America, perhaps under the aegis of the OAS. But Latin America impinges on French America, Dutch America and British America as well as North America (e.g., Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands). Should the zone include all of Latin America or part of it, and if the latter, then which part? However one defines Latin America and whatever the size or location of the zone, there are some very special problems in the Caribbean. Do we, for example, exclude Puerto Rico which has a Strategic Air Command base on it? What about Panama as a sovereign state and the Panama Canal Zone as a defense-sensitive United States-controlled area within sovereign Panama? Would a nuclear-free arrangement encompassing the Caribbean prevent Polaris-firing submarines from passing through the Canal and from being serviced while they were in the area? Would it prevent the passage of military and naval personnel armed with "tactical" nuclear weapons? What about Guantanamo and other present and future United States bases in the Caribbean?

[33] *Washington Post*, July 22, 1965.

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The above questions give rise to others. Will a nuclear-free Latin America seriously compromise the continental air and missile defense of the United States? For years the Strategic Air Command and the North American Air Defense Command have had a defense orientation that might be called "the North Polar projection complex." This is based on the notion that Soviet attacks, if they come at all, will be delivered largely over the North Pole. Thus, most of our continental defenses are in the northern portion of the United States and Canada. But what if—perhaps because of the perfection of the anti-missile missile—U.S. planners would have to consider the possibility of Soviet missile attacks by way of the *South* Pole and over Latin America? Might this not require U.S. defensive capabilities (nuclear and otherwise) farther south than at present, and how might the existence or nonexistence of a denuclearized Latin America affect this defensive capability? This is why the United States, like France, did not encourage Latin American denuclearization in discussions preliminary to the Mexico City conference.[34]

In short, a denuclearized Latin America poses problems as well as promise for the United States. As we ponder denuclearization in the Southern Hemisphere, it behooves Washington to weigh carefully the degree of defensive flexibility that might be lost in the future because of it. That is not to say that the loss of this flexibility is necessarily more important to us than denuclearization. But we should at least be aware that in order to achieve the one we must be prepared to give up the other.

Conclusions

Latin American states, like most of the world's militarily weak states, tend to regard arms control and disarmament as a good thing—until their own interests, as *they* define them, are affected. In this respect they are not very different from larger and more powerful states. Their leaders usually favor a decrease in world arms expenditures in the hope that this will decrease the probability of global war and release more foreign aid funds from the developed to the developing countries. But at the same time, they are unwilling or unable to cut their own military budgets and release more of their own funds for internal economic and social development.

[34] *Ibid.*

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Significant reduction of conventional forces and weapons does not appear to be feasible in the present Latin American climate. Considerations of prestige, sovereignty, domestic order and the internal power structure bring us to this conclusion. Even when the internal power structure is radically changed, as when Castro overthrew Batista or when Rómulo Betancourt replaced the military dictatorship of Venezuela's Marcos Pérez Jiménez, we find a rise, not a decrease, in the use of military or quasi-military forces. Both Castro and Betancourt, at widely separated points of the political spectrum, found it imperative to rely on military means to fulfill their almost diametrically opposed objectives. Castro destroyed the old Batista army, refashioned it, and then created a powerful additional force in the form of the militia. Betancourt neither had to nor wanted to destroy the old army; his regime was under almost daily attack from communists and Castroites. Consequently, from 1960 to 1962, the number of soldiers and sailors in Venezuela rose by more than 40 per cent.[35]

Second, denuclearization appears to be relatively more feasible than conventional disarmament, perhaps because it is less immediately important. After all, an early indigenous nuclear capability is a rather remote possibility. If denuclearization is attained at all, it will probably come as a denuclearization not of the entire continent but of a limited geographic zone within it. The most likely agreement would include South America and exclude the Caribbean. If it includes the Caribbean, then special arrangements will have to be made with regard to the Panama Canal, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo, and perhaps with Britain and France —arrangements so "special" that they may well vitiate the purpose of the agreement.

A third conclusion is that one cannot really separate regional and global disarmament. A Great Power nuclear test ban and arms control agreements need some sort of regional arrangements to prevent secret testing or rearming in the region by or on behalf of one or more of the major powers. At the same time, a regional agreement, on either nuclear or conventional weapons, can succeed only with the active cooperation of the Great Powers, and this support is inextricably tied to the progress in achieving East-West disarmament.

The fourth conclusion is paradoxical: a disarmed Latin America might make it more difficult for the United States to disarm

[35] *Statistical Abstract . . . 1962, loc. cit.,* and *ibid., 1961,* p. 18.

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significantly. For if the Latin American countries disarm, they will become more, not less, dependent upon the United States for their security against external aggression. They will agree to disarm only if they feel that they can and want to rely on U.S. protection to a greater extent than ever before. The pressure of this responsibility may adversely affect our own commitment to the principle of disarmament.

Fifth, "it has become almost axiomatic that an effective security system must precede disarmament. Nations will be reluctant to abandon their weapons of self-defense unless some alternative method is devised to guarantee their sovereignty and independence. The Latin American Republics are no exception."[36] A security system of such effectiveness has not yet been devised.

Finally, disarmament can be useful only if it lessens the possibility and severity of war with its accompanying social and economic ills. Latin American armies rarely fight wars and at least some of them engage in nonmilitary activities for the social and economic good. These nonmilitary activities ought to be encouraged until such time as disarmament in Latin America does indeed become feasible.[37]

[36] *Senate Disarmament Study*, p. 7.

[37] See my "The Nonmilitary Uses of the Latin American Military: A More Realistic Approach to Arms Control and Economic Development," *Background*, November 1964, pp. 161-173; my "The Nonmilitary Uses of the Latin American Military," in Norman A. Bailey, editor, *Latin America: Politics, Economics, and Hemispheric Security* (New York: Praeger, 1965); and my forthcoming book *The War of Our Times: The Nonmilitary Aspects of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION FOR LATIN AMERICA

by George W. Grayson, Jr.

CHRISTIAN Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva, on September 4, 1964, defeated a Marxist to become President of Chile.[1] Faced with opposition from both Left and Right, his government passed only a trickle of legislation during its first "hundred days." Congress even turned down Frei's request for special faculties—usually bestowed automatically with the Presidential sash—that allow a free hand in administrative organization. In March 1965, however, the Christian Democrats won a resounding victory in the country's parliamentary elections. Now for the first time in modern Chilean history, an executive elected by an absolute majority, and whose party holds a preponderant number of seats in the important lower chamber, is in a position to implement the major portion of his campaign program.

These events bear a twofold importance for Latin America. First, a party presenting a revolutionary but democratic alternative to communism has gained power in the most politically mature country on the continent. Second, despite its short period in office, Frei's government has evinced its competence and readiness to become a prime mover in Latin American affairs. In order to substantiate these two conclusions, we must first describe Chile's Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and then examine the Frei government's domestic and foreign policies.

Chile's Christian Democratic Party

Four features dominate the profile of the PDC: (1) a Social-Christian orientation, (2) a left-of-center and middle class status, (3) a modern organization, and (4) a high calibre of leadership.

A closely-knit group of Catholic students launched the forerunner of the Christian Democratic Party in 1935. Inspired by the Papal letters *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno,* the Conservative Youth, as the students called themselves, set about

[1]For a thorough analysis of the 1964 Presidential election, see Federico G. Gil and Charles J. Parrish, *The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4, 1964,* Parts I and II (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965).

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to transform the social conscience and political posture of the Conservative Party.[2] When they failed to attain this goal the Youth formed the Falange Nacional as a separate party in 1938.[3] Article I in the doctrine of this nascent organization reflected the enthusiasm of its leaders:

> Falange Nacional is a crusade that proposes to install a new order in Chile. More than a simple party, it is an affirmation of faith in the destiny of Chile and an unbreakable will placed at the service of the nation. Falange Nacional bases its principles on Christian thought. . . .[4]

Similar ideals shaped the orientation of the Christian Democratic Party which emerged in 1957 from a fusion of the Falange Nacional and the Social-Christian wing of the Conservative Party.

The impact of the Encyclicals and the influence of Catholic thinkers such as Sturzo, Mounier and Maritain account for the PDC's stress on human values and its "communitarian" concept of the economy. Avoiding the extremes of capitalism and communism, the communitarian system is one "in which capital and labor no longer belong to different groups . . . but are united in the same hands."[5] On the basis of this principle, the Christian Democrats favor as a long-run objective worker-owned factories resembling those in Yugoslavia, and the kibbutz method of agricultural exploitation. Until the PDC lays the groundwork for a concrete expression of this economic ideal, it advocates a mixed economy embodying private, public and cooperative sectors.

The Christian Democrats exhibit an overwhelmingly Catholic leadership. Frei, Leighton, Palma, Tomic and other founders have won respect for consistent devotion to their faith. All nineteen members of the PDC's National Council, the party's steering committee, have been termed "Catholic,"[6] although one has the reputation of being an atheist. Nevertheless, the statutes of the PDC assure its non-confessional nature, and no reference to religion appears on the party's membership form.

[2]Bernardo Leighton Guzmán, present Interior Secretary, spearheaded the formation of the Conservative Youth. He was aided by Frei, Manuel Garreton Walker (who has since died), Ignacio Palma Vicuña, presently a Senator, and Radomiro Tomic Romero, now Chilean Ambassador to the United States. Another founder, Alejandro Silva Bascuñan, describes the early activities of the group in *Una experiencia social-cristiana* (Santiago: Pacífico, 1949).

[3]Although the Conservative Youth was overwhelmingly pro-Franco, the name "Falange" was not copied from the Spanish political organization.

[4]"Los 24 Puntos Fundamentales de la Falange Nacional," *Lircay,* 1st week of April 1939, p. 1.

[5]Eduardo Frei Montalva, quoted in Sergio Guilisasti Tagle, *Paridos políticos chilenos* (Santiago: Nascimento, 1964), p. 214.

[6]Interview with Aldo Ramociotti, Secretary General of the PDC, August 6, 1965.

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The religious inspiration of the Christian Democratic program has undoubtedly enhanced its appeal to female voters.[7] Since gaining the ballot, Chilean women have voted for order and stability in Presidential elections (men and women vote separately in Chile). In 1952 they gave 43 per cent of their vote to General Carlos Ibáñez Campo, one of four candidates. Six years later they awarded Jorge Alessandri, a stern father image, the bulk of their support. Frei's campaign headquarters tailored a great deal of propaganda to the presumed concerns of the woman voter. One poster, showing a plump and smiling young lady, promised "Peace and Security for your Future with Frei." The *Chilenas* responded by casting 63 per cent of their ballots for the Christian Democratic candidate. In addition, the PDC boasts seven of the twelve female deputies elected to Congress in March. Obligatory voting in Chile and the fact that the number of women surpassed the number of men on the electoral rolls in 1965 underscore the importance of the female voter to the PDC.

The Christian Democrats present the unusual phenomenon of a middle class party which holds a left-of-center position on the country's political spectrum.[8] While the PDC eschews classifications of "left" or "right," Frei has stated that "if being with the people, the workers, the poor in their struggle for justice is to be on the left, then undoubtedly, we are there."[9] His party is "there" due to a determination to break with the established order and reshuffle the pyramidal arrangement of Chilean society. Remaining there poses a major challenge.

Two other predominantly middle class parties, the Democrats and the Radicals, pretended at one time to articulate the interests of the workers. Shortly after the turn of the century the Democrats veered sharply to the Right and have now all but disappeared. The Radicals occupied the Presidential Palace from 1938 to 1952 without providing the "bread, shelter, and clothing" which Pedro Aguirre Cerda, their first President, promised the masses. Frei's Christian Democrats stand in the shadow of the Radical failure.

[7]Unpublished findings of Professor Eduardo Hamuy, Director of the Center of Socio-economic Studies of the University of Chile, indicate that religion was a major factor in how Chileans voted in the 1964 Presidential election.

[8]An index of the social character of the party stems from the fact that eighteen of the nineteen members of the National Council belong to the middle class. (Ramociotti, as cited.)

[9]Eduardo Frei, "The Aims of Christian Democracy," *The Commonweal,* October 9, 1964, p. 66.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION

The PDC, one of the few modern political parties in the developing world, is basically bureaucratic (as opposed to personalistic) and democratic (although a high degree of cooptation exists in choosing party officials). An essentially bureaucratic structure has been developed despite the presence of such strong personalities as President Frei and Ambassador Tomic. Whereas the specialization of functions seldom exists in political parties in less developed countries, the responsibility of each official in the PDC has been defined. Forty staff members assist party officials in their functions. Specific departments handle activities among the youth, workers, women and *campesinos*. These departments contribute to the formulation of the party's platform and assist in preparing bills for Christian Democratic legislators (Chile's Congressmen have very limited technical and secretarial assistance on which to draw). The minimum of $18,500 needed for monthly operations, a considerable amount for a Chilean party, provides a clue to the scope of the PDC's activities.[10]

The National Junta exists within the party as a forum for discussion and dissent. As "the permanent body in which resides the maximum representation and authority of the Party,"[11] the National Junta serves to unify the major groups composing the PDC. Broad agreement exists among all sectors regarding party goals. Debate has more often been precipitated over the means to achieve them.[12] The sudden growth of the PDC, from a cadre party with three deputies and a few thousand members in 1953 (when the body was still the Falange Nacional) to a mass party with eighty-two deputies and over one hundred thousand members in 1965,[13] imposes the most formidable barrier to a democratic exchange of ideas. With 504 members the National Junta

[10]Interview with Alfonso Pérez Zañartu, official of the PDC's Department of Organization and Control, August 6, 1965.

[11]*Estatutos del Partido Demócratica Cristiano,* 1963, p. 16. Only the party's National Congress, which must meet at least every three years, is invested with greater authority.

[12]The party's left wing, often referred to as "populist" because of its Marxist though noncommunist inclination, has many times incited intraparty debate. Recently this group has manifested its discontent with the slow pace of the administration's program. At the July 31 meeting of the National Junta, populist leader Alberto Jerez openly challenged the moderate Patricio Aylwin for the party presidency. Powerful voices in the party—such as Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdés and Frei—solidified their support behind Aylwin. Still, he defeated his relatively obscure opponent by the slender margin of 224-188. For a description of the dialogue, see my article, "Troubles Beset Frei After Successful Tour," *The Washington Post,* August 24, 1965, p. 8.

[13]The PDC no longer makes available information on its membership; therefore, the 1965 figure is estimated.

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has become an unwieldy body which can scarcely be expected to air all points of view in its annual meeting. Hence greater decision making devolves upon the nineteen-man National Council, which is sensitive to pressure from the administration.[14]

Success in recruiting new members has made the PDC an impressively youthful party. Militants under thirty form more than half of the total membership.[15] The average age for Christian Democratic deputies is 39.8 as compared with 47.6 for Radicals, 47.5 for Communists, and 44.6 for Socialists.[16] Moreover, the party's youth have dominated the highly politicized Chilean Student Federation (FECH) for the past eleven years. In the 1965 balloting for the organization's Executive Committee, PDC students picked up 47.3 per cent of the vote, enough to win seven out of eleven offices including the presidency.

Finally, a high calibre of leadership characterizes the PDC. Despite a messianic commitment to their goals (seldom has the movement considered itself other than a "crusade," "force" or "struggle") and their infatuation with "communitarianism," the Christian Democrats have demonstrated a technical approach to economic and social problems. In contrast with the impromptu patchwork administrations of former presidents, Frei's program was meticulously distilled from special studies, technical congresses and task force reports. The Presidential team of advisers and ministers has been compared to the Kennedy Administration because it includes respected economists and other specialists. A noted intellectual, the fifty-four-year-old Frei has published seven books on the social and economic malaise that infects his country. The educational background of the Christian Democratic Congressmen further indicates the preparation of the party's leadership: 70.9 per cent of the PDC deputies have had university training or its equivalent, as compared with 70 per cent for the Radicals and 50 per cent for the Communists.[17]

Although it was the first Christian Democratic party formed

[14]Seventeen of the nineteen members of the National Council are elected by the Junta Nacional. The other two members are chosen by the PDC's Senators and deputies.

[15]Interview with Pedro Radic, official of the PDC's Department of Organization and Control, August 10, 1965.

[16]The averages have been calculated from "Datos Biográficos del Nuevo Parlamento," Presidencia de la Republica, Secretaria de Prensa, May 21, 1965, and *from interviews with deputies and other parliamentary officials.*

[17]*Ibid.* Five of the PDC deputies are medical doctors, demonstrating the active participation of members of this profession in Chilean politics.

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in Latin America, the PDC cannot be considered a prototype of the others on the continent. A majority of the other Christian Democratic parties—those in Peru and Brazil are notable exceptions—more nearly resemble their European counterparts in that they are "coalitions of the most varied social elements, ranging from organized labor to sectors of the financial, industrial, and agrarian oligarchy."[18] The Venezuelan party, COPEI, which stands a reasonably good chance of winning the Presidency in 1968, has been termed "one of the more conservative of all Venezuelan parties."[19] The possibility that the movement will gain momentum in Latin America hinges on the success of the Frei administration and on the strength of the youth sectors present in most of the continent's Christian Democratic parties.

Domestic Program

Unlike his predecessor, Jorge Alessandri, who consumed a year in designing and launching his administration, the new President entered office with a carefully prepared program in his vest pocket. Immediately after his November 4 inauguration, Frei began to draft bills for the annual construction of 60,000 living units (especially in the poverty belts which gird the country's major cities); a land reform aimed at creating 100,000 new property holders; a change in the educational system whereby students at all levels would receive free instruction; and an intensive program of industrial expansion to satisfy domestic demand for products ranging from household appliances to automobiles and television sets.[20] Within six weeks, he had bombarded Congress with what has been termed a legislative "blitzkrieg."

Frei's legislative proposals embrace three notable measures: (1) Chileanization of the copper industry; (2) *Promoción Popular,* a community development program; and (3) fundamental changes in the Constitution.

[18]Ernst Halperin, *The Christian Democratic Alternative in Chile,* prepared by the International Communism Project (Center for International Studies, M.I.T., November 1964, mimeo), p. 1.

[19]*Venezuelan Election Factbook* (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1963), p. 19. *DECE,* a monthly newspaper published in Santiago, provides an up-to-date account of Christian Democratic activities in Latin America.

[20]For a recent description of the social and economic imbalances of Chilean society, see James Petras, "After the Chilean Presidential Election: Reform or Stagnation?," *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* July 1965, pp. 375-384.

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Chileanization

Chilean public opinion has been persistently agitated because two U.S. giants, Kennecott and Anaconda, control 85 per cent of the copper industry. Past presidents have tried in vain to alter the situation. Shortly after the 1964 election, technicians from the Christian Democratic Party began conversations with the copper officials, and on December 21 Frei announced the "Chileanization" of the industry as his "Christmas gift" to the nation.

Simply stated, Chileanization will permit the government to become a partner in the production and marketing of copper. The salient feature of the agreement guarantees the foreign corporations a vastly lower tax rate—they had in the past paid as high as 87 per cent—in exchange for selling part of their holdings to the government and investing more of their profits in Chile. The Christian Democrats assert that production (now 630,000 metric tons annually) will double in the next six years, that the quantity of metal refined in the country will increase by 212 per cent,[21] and that "no ideological barrier" will impede future trade in copper with the Soviet bloc. Because copper earned 61 per cent of Chile's foreign exchange in 1964, Frei labeled the Chileanization plan the "main pillar" in his legislative program.

The speed with which the Christian Democrats concluded the accord springs from a careful use of the carrot and stick. The carrot was in the form of lower taxes and a more favorable investment climate, prompting Kennecott to call the agreement "mutually advantageous" and to predict that it would enlarge the company's immediate and long-term profits. The stick was more blunt. During the electoral campaign, Salvador Allende, candidate of the socialist-communist coalition known as FRAP, had scourged the American firms as imperialist tools. Failure of the new regime to devise a satisfactory copper policy would have heightened the likelihood of a Marxist victory and hence expropriation in 1970. Furthermore, while Frei repeatedly disdained takeover of the industry, he promised not to remain "inactive" if the companies balked at his terms.

Although agreement had been reached with Anaconda and Kennecott, Frei still had to secure Congressional action on the copper measure. The stunning Christian Democratic victory at the polls in March assured rapid passage of the bill in Chile's lower house. But the Senate, which was only partially re-elected,

[21] *La Nación* (Santiago), September 7, 1965, p. 1.

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offered stiff opposition. Despite support from the Conservatives, Liberals and the National Vanguard, the PDC lacked the twenty-three votes necessary for approval in the upper house. FRAP's unalterable opposition to this "Yankee sellout" catapulted the Radicals into the spotlight as owners of the crucial votes.[22]

A messianic party, the Christian Democrats have always felt uncomfortable when forced into the political arena of negotiations, compromises, pacts and alliances. Nevertheless, PDC Senators, led by Ignacio Palma Vicuña, initiated talks with the reluctant Radical Party, whose National Executive Committee had voted unanimously to oppose the copper scheme and whose president seemed intent on forging an anti-government coalition with FRAP. Prolonged negotiations yielded a compromise whereby Radicals pledged support to the administration in exchange for minor alterations in the bill.

Chileanization of copper represented the first major step toward Frei's promised "revolution in freedom." (In February 1965, the Frei government unveiled two other Chileanization measures: the purchase, for $138.5 million, of the Compañía Chilena de Electricidad, a subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company; and plans to acquire a 49 per cent holding in the Compañía de Teléfonos de Chile, an IT&T subsidiary which has been the object of considerable criticism for the poor quality of its service.) It may also provide a precedent for the political tactics of the Christian Democrats. Following a policy often referred to as "purism," the party shunned alliances during the last two electoral campaigns. As a result of its political maneuvering on the copper bill, the PDC may have found the give-and-take of the political process palatable as well as unavoidable when governing in a multiparty system.

[22]The allocation of votes in Chile's parliament is as follows:

House		*Senate*	
Christian Democrats	82	Christian Democrats	13
Radicals	20	Radicals	9
FRAP		FRAP	
Communists	18	Communists	5
Socialists	15	Socialists	7
Liberals	6	Liberals	5
Conservatives	3	Conservatives	2
National Democrats	3	National Democrats	1
		National Vanguard	1
		Independents	2
	147		45

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Promoción Popular

Promoción Popular (literally "promotion of the masses") is Chile's version of the War on Poverty. Directed toward community development and the integration of the lower class (roughly 70 per cent of Chile's eight million inhabitants) into society, the program provides a framework for social and economic advancement in the depressed areas of the country. Frei has expressed his goal as follows: "Only in the measure that this integration of Chileans into the national community is carried out will we be able to mobilize the human resources of our country and, at the same time, give true expression to our democracy."[23]

Promoción Popular (PP) will strive to rejuvenate, or in many cases establish, "grassroot" organizations. Underlying this emphasis is the assumption that "the family, neighborhood, municipality, trade union, region, and enterprise are values that must have full expression; they ought to assume responsibilities and participate in an adequate manner in every phase of the economic, social, cultural, and political process."[24] The Christian Democrats assert that by joining a neighborhood group—a union, PTA, co-op or mother's club, for example—the individual becomes involved in the activities of his community. To the degree that these bodies can be united in regional and national federations providing a forum from which to express the interests of their members, they will serve as capillaries linking the citizen to a presently remote government. At this point the masses will have become a potent pressure group, possessing the "means to make their weight felt in determining the future of the national community."

In addition to the theme of social integration, *Promoción Popular* stresses economic development. Chile suffers from the same problems which plague many developing countries—a highly uneven distribution of land and wealth, monetary instability, a single product economy, and inadequate educational, health and housing facilities. Under PP, each community will have an opportunity to pinpoint and solve local problems by means of a civic organization (*junta de vecinos*). As a starting point, Frei has proposed legislation that would assure *juntas de vecinos* juridical

[23]*La Nación,* December 11, 1964, p. 3.

[24]Eduardo Frei, "Mi programa de gobierno," *Política y Espíritu,* June-August 1964, p. 12.

[25]*La Nación,* September 12, 1965, p. 17.

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personality, permitting them to enter into contracts and gain access to the courts.[25] PP also furnishes funds and technical assistance for a community embarking on an "urbanization" project. Once a well-conceived plan has been approved, a group of citizens can obtain state aid to begin a cooperative, lay a sewer, or erect a school. In connection with the program, Frei plans to establish regional juntas to assist the *Intendentes* (zonal administrators to be appointed by the President). These bodies will represent all interest groups in the area.

The progress of *Promoción Popular* has not measured up to the hopes and plans of the administration. Problems such as illiteracy, lack of communications, mistrust of outsiders and squalid living conditions have combined to frustrate organizational efforts in the shanty towns near Santiago. "Grassroot" politics, often more embittered and intense than that on the national level, has also impeded the development of PP. In one instance, a congress convened to federate the Mothers' Clubs of Barrancas, a model public housing community, set off a vigorous struggle between Marxist and Christian Democratic supporters.

Promoción Popular has become an issue in national politics. If greater economic welfare accompanies the "integration of the masses" into society, the sponsoring party will naturally gain favor. For this reason, some Christian Democrats have urged that the program be administered by the party. The prospect of recruiting broad segments of the lower class into the PDC has sparked sharp attacks on PP from the far Left.[26] Consequently the administration, while continuing to nurture local bodies, has withdrawn the bill from Congress until it can be clarified whether the program will fall under party, government or independent control.

Owing to its prosaic goals, *Promoción Popular* is unlikely to attract attention outside of Chile. But if a plan can be devised to achieve PP's integration and community development aims, it will be a substantial accomplishment. Insofar as it extends Chile's political democracy to economic and social fields, *Promoción Popular* could become the most revolutionary of Frei's programs.

Constitutional Amendments

While he has designed *Promoción Popular* to involve the individual in the affairs of his country, Frei has also submitted

[26]Interview with Laura Allende, Socialist Deputy, September 10, 1965.

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Constitutional amendments to make the government responsive to the wants of its people. Two of these proposals concern decentralization of the country's administrative structure and the granting of plebiscite powers to the President.

Chile's unitary structure concentrates authority in the hands of the Executive. Except for elected municipal councils, local government is conducted by Presidential appointees. This has produced a congested public administration attended by a "come back tomorrow" bureaucracy. Identical situations exist in such public service agencies as the national railway, light and electric companies. Moreover, "Chile has developed a parody of a welfare state, under which the principal beneficiaries . . . are the officials who administer the various welfare programs."[27]

The Christian Democrats find these conditions intolerable because they help to insulate the individual from his government. To redress this situation is the aim of the amendments introduced to decentralize the administrative structure. The amendments, if adopted, will replace the existing twenty-five provinces with ten zones, create regional juntas, and disperse the activities of the state public services. Designed to slash through the red tape of bureaucracy, the reforms are also intended to insure "first that the affairs of each province are resolved in the zone or region without recourse to Santiago, and second, that the interested parties, the groups affected, have made a clear voice . . . in the decisions that concern them."[28]

Meanwhile, there exists little proof that Frei's government has succeeded in reducing Chile's encrusted bureaucracy. No figures have been released, but the size of the Public Administration seems, in fact, to have swollen since November 1964.

To amplify the voice of the people in national affairs, Frei has offered an amendment granting the Executive plebiscite authority. Only Congress can now initiate plebiscites. Frei maintains that the "President of the Republic must have the right to consult directly with the people . . . on matters of transcendental national significance." He recommends that the Executive have recourse to "direct democracy" when Congress rejects a bill or Constitutional amendment proposed by the President, or when Congress rejects totally or partially the President's recommenda-

[27]Donald W. Bray, "Chile Enters a New Era," *Current History,* January 1965, p. 25.

[28]Speech by Eduardo Frei as reported in *El Mercurio,* December 1, 1964, p. 20.

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tions on a bill or Constitutional reform measure. According to Frei's amendment, the plebiscite must take place within thirty days of the impasse between the two branches. A President would be permitted only three plebiscites during a six-year term.

Because of the plebiscite proposal, Frei has been branded a Chilean De Gaulle. The most articulate critic has been Jorge Rogers Sotomayor, an ex-deputy in Frei's party and architect of Chile's parliamentary electoral law. Rogers warns that direct democracy is the worst enemy of democracy. He argues that plebiscites would jeopardize Chile's "republican and representative" status by attenuating the importance of Congress and of political parties. To avoid a deadlock between the Senate and the House, Rogers proposes that all members of both chambers be elected every four years. In the meantime he recommends negotiations, such as took place over the copper bill, as the surest path to Frei's "revolution in freedom."[29]

Other critics indict the plebiscite proposal as one more step toward single party control of public opinion. Already, they argue, all radio stations must present a daily government broadcast. Besides, the administration has applied subtle pressure on opposition newspapers. The right-wing *El Diario Ilustrado* has been shoved to the brink of bankruptcy due to the withdrawal of government advertising. Journalists close to the administration are expected to begin an afternoon tabloid in competition with the Socialist paper, *La Ultima Hora* (the government already has a morning daily, *La Nación*). Senator Pedro Ibáñez, a respected Liberal, recently warned against government domination of the press and pointed out that a significant number of newsmen hold public jobs.

Rapidly approved in the House, the plebiscite legislation will undergo prolonged scrutiny in the Senate. Most political observers doubt that it will be passed. Nevertheless, Frei's penchant for direct democracy and the findings of recent public opinion surveys (85 per cent profess confidence in Frei's program)[30] will undoubtedly influence future debate in the upper chamber. *Topaze,* Chile's leading humor magazine, recently satirized this point. A cartoon depicted the plebiscite as a voodoo mask, used by the

[29]"Democracia representative y democracia directa," *P.E.C.,* September 7, 1965, pp. 4-5. Senators, whose terms are staggered, are elected for eight years. Only twenty-five were elected in March 1965.

[30]Marcelo Montealegre, "Chamber Okays Constitutional Changes," *The South Pacific Mail,* September 10-16, 1965, p. 4.

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Christian Democrats to wrench support from the Radicals on the copper measure.[31]

The Economy

Before turning from the domestic program, we should quickly review the state of Chile's economy.[32] Aware that inflation has capsized more than one imaginative program of past administrations, Frei's energetic Treasury Minister, Sergio Molina, has taken steps to bridle its corrosive pace. By restricting industrial price increases to 19 per cent, by instructing the public administration to reduce expenditures, and by controlling credit, Molina has held the cost-of-living rise to 19.9 per cent in the first eight months of 1965 as compared with 29.9 per cent during the same period in 1964. This achievement assumes added importance when it is recalled that Law No. 16250 of April 21 boosted all wages and salaries 38.4 per cent to compensate for the increase in living costs in 1964.

A confluence of natural disorders has hobbled agricultural production, but a spurt in industrial output and foreign trade gains have improved the economic picture. Official estimates place the direct damage from the March 28 earthquake and from the high winds and torrential rains of July and August at nearly $200 million. Crop and livestock losses have sharply curtailed the food supply; for example, the sale of beef is restricted to three days a week. The natural calamities have galvanized popular support behind the government; it is considered patriotic to make sacrifices for the "national good." Christian Democrats hope that this belt-tightening can last until a comprehensive Agrarian Reform Bill, designed to redress the structural distortions of Chile's economy and to increase food production, can be passed by Congress and put into effect.

On the bright side, industrial production has climbed 12.9 per cent in the first five months of 1965 (as compared with the previous January-May period). Although a strike at the Huachipato mill has reduced steel output 1.5 per cent in the same five-month span, the production of iron ore has jumped 45.4 per cent, while the petroleum industry has exhibited slight gains. Plans for expansion extend to every segment of heavy industry, and foreign

[31]September 10, 1965.

[32]My figures on the Chilean economy were derived from "Chile: Reform and Development," *Bank of London & South America Quarterly Review* (October 1965), pp. 185-194.

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investment is likely to swell as a result of Frei's highly successful trip to Europe last July. In addition, the Chileanization accords have clarified the relation of the government to foreign capital: attractive tax rates will be accorded to firms that are willing to reinvest a high percentage of their profits in Chile.

Chile continues to enjoy a favorable balance of trade. Exports ($205.2 million) exceeded imports ($162.2 million) by $43 million during the first four months of 1965 as compared with a $4.1 million surplus in the previous January-April period. Also, more than half of the interest due on Chile's staggering $2 billion foreign debt has been postponed beyond 1965, giving her a breathing space in which to implement an export promotion plan aimed at increasing foreign exchange earnings.

Reform has been Molina's watchword as Treasury Minister. A personal property tax has been levied and actually collected! Even more astounding—and we must remember that tax evasion is winked at in Latin America—is the imprisonment of twenty "important persons" for falsifying tax returns. Moreover, a revaluation of property has boosted revenue from the real estate tax by 26 per cent (small landowners were excluded). Molina has organized a band of Chilean T-Men to round up tax evaders. The step was prompted when only 1,497 persons declared annual incomes of more than $3,000; yet in 1964, 18,754 Chileans traveled abroad, spending over $40 million. Data processing equipment has also been introduced to help in the campaign against the social evils implied in the saying: "el rico vive del tonto y tonto de su trabajo" (the rich live foolishly and only the foolish work).[33]

Foreign Policy

Three principles have guided the foreign policy of the Christian Democratic government during its first year in office: a determination to remain nonaligned in the ideological conflict between East and West while clearly siding with the "have nots" in the North-South economic confrontation; an active interest in fostering and shaping the development of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA); and a desire to revamp the inter-American system.

Nonalignment

The Christian Democrats wasted no time in showing that

[33]"Misión Cumplida," *Ercilla,* October 27, 1965, p. 32.

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they would conduct "business as usual" with all nations, irrespective of ideological hue. On November 24 Frei kept his campaign pledge and restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (Relations had been severed in 1948 by President González in retaliation against communist agitation.) Later, Frei re-established ties with the rest of the European communist bloc, except Albania and East Germany. In welcoming the Soviet Ambassador, Chile's Foreign Minister defined his country's policy: ". . . the Government of Chile believes that different systems and forms of government or [forms] of political and social organization are not an impediment to normal diplomatic relations between countries if they maintain these ties on a plane of reciprocal respect for the sovereign laws that direct each State."[34]

The attitude of Frei's administration has been somewhat different with respect to Peking and Havana. Last fall China established a trade mission in Santiago. This move invited speculation that the new government, which had emphasized Chile's position as a "window on the Pacific," would expand trade with the Chinese. For the present, no one expects diplomatic relations to accompany increased commerce with Peking. However, Chile's delegate did abstain in November 1965 on the question of admitting the Chinese communists to the United Nations. This abstention represents a leak in the American wall built to ostracize the Peking regime.

Despite lip service about bringing Cuba back into the "American family," Frei has turned a cold shoulder to the Castro regime. During the Presidential campaign, the Christian Democrats strongly attacked Alessandri's decision, in compliance with OAS sanctions, to break diplomatic ties with Havana. Yet since entering office, they have not lifted a finger to reverse the action.

[34]Speech by Gabriel Valdés, Foreign Minister, November 24, 1965. The good relations which Chile enjoys with the Soviet Union (Frei designated Máximo Pacheco Gómez, a highly intelligent young lawyer-professor as Ambassador to Moscow) has probably influenced the Chilean Communist Party's attitude toward the Christian Democrats. Never as intractable as the socialists—last year a deputy was drummed out of the Communist Party for slandering the Church—the communists have demonstrated a "love-hate" complex toward Frei's administration. On the one hand, "bourgeois" and "rightist" epithets have been hurled at the PDC. On the other hand, Luis Corvalán, Secretary-General of the Communist Party, upon returning from a visit to the Kremlin in early August, promised to cooperate with the government on specific measures designed to aid "the masses." (See *El Siglo*, August 12, 1965, p. 9.) His conciliatory gesture led to an agreement on August 24 between the communist paper *El Siglo* and the Christian Democrat-controlled *La Nación* to exchange and to publish major policy documents issued by their respective parties.

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As a matter of fact, the *New York Times* reported that Frei spurned an opportunity to exchange a portion of Chile's potato surplus for Cuban sugar.[35] In the wake of the August 1965 hurricane and torrential winds which swept across Chile, Castro sent a shipload of sugar to the devastated area.

Notwithstanding the "normalization" of ties with the Soviet bloc, the Christian Democrats seek amicable relations with the United States. The Alliance for Progress, under which Chile received over $130.7 million during fiscal year 1964, has been termed "the most impressive undertaking ever contemplated in America."[36] The social reforms, self-help measures and development efforts of the Frei Administration are consonant with the goals of the Alliance. Frei appointed the "number two" man in his party, Radomiro Tomic, Ambassador to Washington. Likewise, he has applauded such projects as the California-Chile program which fosters the exchange of students, technicians and ideas. The one major blemish on Chilean-American relations during the past year has been Plan Camelot, a counterinsurgency study which the U.S. Army had undertaken in Chile. Disclosure of the project immediately triggered protests from all segments of Chile's political spectrum and the study was abruptly terminated. The sending of U.S. Marines into the Dominican Republic also inflamed Chilean public opinion; and the resolution passed by the House of Representatives endorsing force to thwart communism in the hemisphere was viewed as further proof of Washington's new "strong-Mann Doctrine." The USIA did little to alter this image when Assistant Secretary of State Jack Hood Vaughn visited Santiago in August. Press handouts trumpeted Vaughn's past career as a boxer and boxing coach, demoting his diplomatic experience and linguistic ability to final paragraphs.

Although uncommitted in the East-West confrontation, the Christian Democrats fully support the objectives of the "77" developing countries as enunciated at the UN Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva in 1964.[37] An exporter of primary products, Chile agrees that the present system of international trade is stacked in favor of the industrial nations. Consequently, she has backed the efforts of the "77" which seek to improve the terms of trade for primary materials, cushion the

[35]Henry Raymont, "Chile Bars Deal for Cuban Sugar," December 28, 1964, p. 14.
[36]Gabriel Valdés, speech before the Chilean Senate, January 6, 1965.
[37]*Ibid.*

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violent price fluctuations of these goods, and stimulate the diversification and industrialization of the developing economies. In pursuit of structural changes in traditional commercial patterns, the Christian Democrats have made far-reaching recommendations concerning the configuration of Latin American trade.

LAFTA

At the forefront of these recommendations stands a proposal to strengthen the Latin American Free Trade Area. Although the Christian Democrats regard LAFTA as an "instrument of positive value," they argue that Chile has yet to benefit from membership. A myriad of factors hamper the organization: annual national schedule negotiations have often focused on such exotic items as race horses and false teeth; the drafting of the common schedule, a list of products on which tariffs will be irrevocably abolished, has been stalled by national interest groups; and complementary agreements for the purpose of assuring a fair distribution of industrial development among the member-countries have been confined to data processing equipment, calculating machines and TV tubes. In brief, narrow national interests and an abundance of escape clauses have combined to brake progress toward integration.

Frei has offered suggestions to spur formation of a Latin American Common Market. He has proposed to replace LAFTA's "anachronistic" negotiating mechanism with a supranational body empowered to make political decisions. Criticizing the "slow and cumbersome" pace toward integration, he has also recommended automatic tariff reductions. Finally, Frei has advised that labor, as well as business and industry, be drawn into the integration movement to broaden its base of support.[38]

These recommendations are not new; they have been advanced in the past by international civil servants. It is significant, however, that now a head of state, subject to domestic pressure groups, has voiced them. Even more important, Frei has fortified his words with actions. He has drawn up a constitutional amendment that would permit Chilean accession to supranational bodies devoted to economic integration. This represents an unprece-

[38]Letter to Raúl Prebisch, José Antonio Mayobre, Felipe Herrera, and Carlos Sanz de Santa María, dated January 6, 1965, and published in *Comercio Exterior,* January 1965, pp. 15-17. For the Latinocrats' reply, see "Proposals for the Creation of the Latin American Common Market" (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1965), mimeo.

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dented step inasmuch as it marks the readiness of a Latin American president to subordinate the sovereignty of his country to rational continental development.

OAS

Chile's Christian Democratic government fervently supports the remodeling of the political as well as the economic structure of the inter-American system. Chileans—and indeed most Latin Americans—regard the OAS as a vehicle for U.S. foreign policy. A proposal has therefore been advanced to "latinize" the body and to equalize the advantages of membership. Chilean Foreign Minister Valdés has stated that

> the American commonwealth must clearly and consistently recognize that the interests of the United States and of Latin America are not identical but complementary; and that *reciprocity* in the United States' commitments to Latin America is a *sine qua non* for the justification of Latin America's existing commitments in favor of the United States and its interests, within the broad framework of world and regional policy.[39]

Valdés spelled out "Latinization" measures at the Second Special Inter-American Conference which met in Rio de Janeiro in November. He advocated replacing the Inter-American Conference, which has been strikingly unsuccessful since its creation in the 1948 Bogotá Charter, with an Inter-American General Assembly.[40] Essentially a policymaking and coordinating body composed of the foreign ministers of OAS members, the Assembly would convene annually to air hemispheric problems and to "take resolutions which it deems necessary to advance the peace and security of the continent."[41] Three organs of equal importance—the Juridical-Political, Economic, and Social and Cultural Councils—would fall under its jurisdiction. Hence the OAS Council (called the Juridical-Political Council in the Chilean proposal), which presently enjoys preeminence over its economic and social counterparts, would be demoted. Chile has also recommended the elimination of the Pan-American Union as the central organ of the OAS, replacing it with a General Secretariat responsible to the Assembly. Finally, Canadian membership in the Organization of American States has been urged. Canada, which has

[39]Valdés, January 6, 1965, *op. cit.*

[40]"Resumen de las proposiciones que formulará Chile en la Proxima Conferencia Interamericana Extraordinaria de la OEA" (Santiago, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965).

[41]*Ibid.*

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demonstrated little interest in the suggestion, might serve as a partial counterpoise to the United States, as well as a source of development funds.

Frei's government has gone on record against the U.S.-backed proposal for a hemispheric Peace Force. Frei excoriated the sending of U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic as a "grave moral blow"; and Foreign Minister Valdés called a continental military force incompatible with "free determination" and "non-intervention," pillars of his country's foreign policy. Alarmed by the buildup of arms in Brazil and Argentina, Valdés nevertheless warned that "Chile will take no part in a bloc formed to combat guerrillas on the continent."[42]

Summary

Because of Chile's distinctive political history, lessons to be learned from Chilean experience often are not applicable to Latin America as a whole. As a result of the *pax portaliana* of 1830,[43] Chile emerged from the nineteenth century unscarred by the caudillos and chaos which afflicted her neighbors. By and large the military kept out of politics. Institutions such as political parties became fairly stable and sophisticated. In contrast with the rest of Latin America, the Conservative Party, which dominated Chilean politics during the last century, backed social welfare and civil liberties. In spite of oligarchic rule, Chileans regarded the Constitution of 1833 (replaced in 1925 by the present Constitution) as a sacred document, not a passport to temporary legitimacy. Moreover, Chilean Catholics have traditionally been among the most progressive in Latin America. Separation of church and state took place peaceably in 1925; and today, led by Cardinal Raúl Silva Henriquez, Bishop Manuel Larrain and Father Roger Vekemans, the church exerts a strong influence favoring social change and economic progress.

The significance of Chile's Christian Democratic government lies in the left-of-center but democratic alternative to communism if offers for Latin America, and in its potential for leadership in Latin America.

[42] *La Nación,* September 11, 1965.

[43] In 1830 Diego Portales, a merchant-turned-politician, grasped the reins of Chilean government, ending two decades of confusion and civil war. Reforms instituted under his tutelage promoted constitutional order at the expense of militarism and personalism.

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The first point assumes particular relevance if we accept Professor Ulam's observation that

> the study of the underdeveloped territories, and the attempt at their economic development by Western resources and skills, must take into realistic account the fact that at the crucial point of transition from a pre-industrial society to a modern, at least partly industrialized state, Marxism becomes in a sense the natural ideology of that society and the most alluring solution to its problems.[44]

The genius of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party resides in its platform which interlaces the appeals of Marxism—rapid economic progress, replacement of the encrusted social structures with a society that recognizes the importance of the workingman, and a readjustment of the country's position vis-à-vis enclaves of foreign investment—with the precepts of Christianity. The PDC promise is capsulized in its campaign slogan: "revolution in freedom." Structural dislocations in the Chilean economy and a messianic fervor—the Christian Democrats strongly believe that they have been "called" to save Chile and hence they are unsympathetic to compromise or criticism of their program—stand as the most imposing barriers to the party's success.

The second point may be of more immediate significance. No one can predict the future of the inter-American system, but one thing is clear: it very much needs Latin American direction if it is to escape the charge of being a U.S. satellite. (It is worth noting that Latin America has not produced a recent political leader of the stature of Nehru, Nasser or Nkrumah.) Frei's domestic program, grounded on the bedrock of reform, has demonstrated Chilean concern for the aims of the Alliance for Progress. His proposals to refurbish LAFTA have won applause from such distinguished Latinocrats as Raúl Prebisch, José Antonio Mayobre, Felipe Herrera and Carlos Sanz de Santa Maria. Finally, Chile's plan to "latinize" the OAS has struck a responsive chord at the Special Inter-American Conference and will probably be adopted. These factors, buttressed by Chile's position as a critical ally of the United States, have vaulted the Frei Administration into the spotlight as a major candidate for Latin American leadership.

[44]Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 10.

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Reviews

The United States and the Partition of Europe*

by Brutus Coste

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Polish-born director of Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, established his reputation as an analyst of East European problems in his thoroughly documented and rigorously reasoned books, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* and *The Permanent Purge*. In his new volume, *Alternative to Partition,* Brzezinski seeks to develop new guidelines for U.S. policy toward Europe. He elaborates on, and extends to the whole of Europe, the thesis of an article entitled "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," which he wrote in collaboration with Dr. William E. Griffith for the July 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs.*

The author sets out to determine whether the United States, despite the continuing Cold War stalemate in Europe, can take advantage of new "forces for change" in Eastern Europe and design a new policy to bring about the end of the partition of the continent. How can this problem be solved without either side seeming to capitulate? Can Europe be restored without creating new tensions in the process? Brzezinski answers that the only solution is a positive U.S. policy designed gradually to transform the American-Soviet confrontation into cooperation.

This is to be achieved by a many-faceted policy which fosters continued evolution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, spurred by common programs of economic development rather than by a Western effort to secure the defection of individual states from the Soviet bloc. A major feature of Western policy would be the total exclusion and deliberate ostracism of East Germany, in the expectation that a new sense of security, economic betterment and other improvements in the bloc will induce the Soviet Union to revise its estimate of its security and economic stakes in East Germany and eventually consent to German reunification. The author envisages an order ultimately based on four major units: The Soviet Union and the United States, as peripheral powers; Western Europe, including politically integrated but demilitarized East Germany; and an Eastern Europe less dependent on the Soviet Union. It is, for all practical purposes, President de Gaulle's vision of unification by convergence, with the difference that Brzezinski sees American participation necessary to guarantee a real, not an illusory, equilibrium. In brief, this is the thesis of *Alternative to Partition.*

The analysis of political, social and economic evolution in Eastern

**Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe.* By Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 208 pp. $5.95.

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Europe is sober and unmarred by the oversanguine exaggerations of many recent writings. The process of retrogression in Poland is fully described, but its relevance to the whole area might have been better established by explaining the fundamental difference between the Soviet-*opposed* changes in Poland, brought about by impending rebellion, and the more often than not Soviet-*instigated* corrective measures in other countries. The limited character of the internal changes is properly stressed, as is the reluctant response of the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian regimes and the resistance of the Albanian and Rumanian rulers to Soviet demands for de-Stalinization. A rule the author formulated in his earlier book on the Soviet bloc still applies in large measure to the process taking place in Eastern Europe: accommodation of the requirements of the national reality to the demands of the party, as well as to the interests of the bloc.

In outlining his program of "peaceful engagement," Brzezinski rightly stresses that "the more desirable sequence of change would begin with the internal liberalization of the East European societies." (p. 136.) He doubts that a healthy Eastern Europe can be built by promoting "anti-Soviet national [communist] dictatorships." But with the exception of sporadic relaxation of intellectual control, particularly in countries with a leadership split and with an internal nationality problem (for example, Czechoslovakia), and of trends toward a reorganization of crisis-ridden economies, similar to efforts in the Soviet Union, he adduces little evidence that internal evolution might involve more than corrective measures. Moreover, he indirectly refutes the widespread notion that internal and external changes are irreversible when he admits that even in Yugoslavia, which comes closest to the status of an independent and internally evolved communist-ruled nation, changes are in fact controlled. "Occasional measures of relaxation and decentralization, and a more permissive attitude toward contacts," writes Brzezinski, "would be followed by periods of increased emphasis on party control, suppression of the intellectuals, stimulation of closer relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union." (p. 33.)

Because there is little evidence of a trend in the direction of political freedom in Eastern Europe, the author is forced to stress the evolution in the relationships of the satellites with the Soviet Union and the reassertion of national interest. Thus he places emphasis on developments which he found to be of secondary importance for the success of the policy he advocates.

Brzezinski asserts that the ruling elites in Eastern Europe came to realize in recent years "that both their rule and ideology had failed to gain popular acceptance." But he is reluctant to draw clearly the logical inference that it is precisely in an attempt to gain more popular support and cooperation that the regimes have undertaken timid

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internal reforms, have catered, often demagogically, to the national sensitivities of their subjects, and have sought to project themselves as increasingly independent of Moscow. His inclination is to ascribe national self-assertion primarily to the ideological confusion in the bloc and to the Sino-Soviet rift. These problems have certainly reshaped bloc relationships. But internal necessity and the new self-confidence of the ruling elites played the decisive role. This new confidence springs from internal factors, such as experience, long tenure and perfected preventive police control, and from external factors such as the growing realization that the West no longer poses a real threat to their security and that, as a result, there should no longer be any danger of internal insurrection.

Brzezinski notes that the change in intrabloc relationships, from total to relative subordination, "was inevitable and even inherent in the original Soviet intentions." For the Soviet Union Eastern Europe is a buffer and jumping off area requiring popularly accepted regimes. But he contends that the Soviet rulers had not foreseen that "stable and popularly accepted regimes would tend to be nationalistic." (p. 13.) Contrary to this line of reasoning, the recent history of Eastern Europe shows that nationalism is not the by-product of stability and popular acceptance, but rather a means of acquiring stability and acceptance. Why, then, should the Soviets object to the encouragement of nationalistic attitudes which are likely to serve their essential interests by increasing the popularity of, and thus strengthening, the satellite regimes? Brzezinski himself provides the answer in observing that "the experience of Yugoslavia and Poland suggests that the ruling Communist elites gravitate back toward a closer relationship with Moscow once the more objectionable aspects of their relationship with the Soviet Union have been eliminated. Their defections were thus limited and revocable." (p. 136.)

The fact is that ever since the Soviet Declaration of October 1956, designed to forestall the spreading of the Hungarian revolution, Moscow itself has been cautiously revising its relationships, confident that the leash holding the satellites to the USSR can be safely lengthened and made more flexible. The Kremlin no doubt calculated that the East European communists' urge for self-preservation provides the surest guarantee against defection and confers to the Warsaw Pact a dimension NATO lacks. Moscow must have been aware of the positive impact which national self-assertion would have not only on the domestic front, within the satellites, but also on the Soviet effort to fragment Western Europe and NATO.

It is not an accident that the countries ruled by a more capable, de-Stalinized and somewhat fragmented communist elite—i.e., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and to a lesser degree Bulgaria—laid emphasis on internal reforms, whereas Stalinist-ruled Albania and

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Rumania found nationalism a less risky and equally rewarding way to court popular favor. In the case of Rumania, Soviet rulers might have been displeased with some of the more strident expressions of the Rumanian alternative to de-Stalinization, but they carefully refrained from public criticism and especially from actions remotely comparable to their 1948 excommunication of Tito or their 1956 threats against Gomulka.

The fact that the Rumanian regime, unlike those of Belgrade and Warsaw, never felt sufficiently threatened to cover itself by internal concessions to the peasants and workers suggests that Moscow and Bucharest never approached a showdown. Soviet preoccupation with the Chinese problem and the graduated manner and limited scope of the individual Rumanian actions—many of them only verbal thrusts and harmless gestures—may account in part for Moscow's acquiescence. But the more important reasons are probably these: (1) the Rumanians successfully demonstrated to Moscow that their assertion of national independence would help the Soviets to fragment Western Europe; (2) the Soviet rulers came to realize that the geographic isolation of Rumania made it safe for them to permit this Danubian country to develop into Exhibit A of the new, progressive type of relationship within the communist bloc; and (3) the Rumanians' Latin kinship gave them unique advantages in promoting Soviet intrigues in France and the rest of the Latin world. Viewed in this context, the currently fashionable theory on the independence of the Bucharest regime (minus its overexaggerated journalistic versions) which Brzezinski espouses provides a fragile foundation for the author's policy proposals.

A policy of harnessing nationalism to the quest for popular support and to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy undoubtedly entails risks, both for East European and Soviet rulers. There is, however, every indication that the advantages appear worth the risks. Brzezinski himself believes the Soviet leaders must have perceived that "nationalism not only inspires but also fragments Eastern European opposition to Russia"; it enables them to add the classic *divide et impera* to the other devices available to keep the satellites under control.

According to Brzezinski, "closer economic contacts with the West were presumably no longer objectionable *per se* and acceptance of Western aid was no longer tantamount to defiance of the USSR. . . . closer contacts were no longer necessarily and in every case a political gain for the West." (p. 59.) But he thinks that "close economic ties with the West might still be objectionable to the Soviet leaders if they were followed or were accompanied by political changes in the relations with the Soviet Union." He concedes furthermore that U.S. economic aid nowhere brought internal liberalization, but he claims that it gave the rulers "more external option," reducing "the Soviet capacity to

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use its economic power for blackmail purposes" and "forcing Moscow to increase its economic aid." (pp. 119-120.) This might hold in part for Poland, although even there Soviet credits hardly offset losses resulting from the continuing Soviet price discrimination in Polish-Soviet trade.

In my opinion, U.S. economic aid did give the Polish regime an internal option. It is probably not a mere coincidence that the bold plans for economic decentralization and other structural reforms elaborated by the Polish Economic Council in 1957—which were forerunners of reforms now under experimentation in the USSR and Czechoslovakia—were rejected in February 1958, after U.S. aid had been fully secured. Interestingly enough, the second satellite to qualify for U.S. credits, Rumania, is the only East European state which has not yet initiated studies of economic reform and stubbornly clings to the Stalinist pattern of an overcentralized, rigid and autarkic economy.

In his chapter entitled "The European Stalemate," Brzezinski reviews the postwar positions of the USSR, United States, Germany and France toward the partition of Europe. He points out that following the 1953-58 pause caused by domestic and bloc troubles, Moscow embarked on a policy of breakthrough by intimidation. This policy began with the 1958 Berlin crisis and foundered in 1962 on the shores of Cuba. It was followed, after a year of indecision, by attempts to improve relations with Washington. The immediate objectives were to secure Western credits and American sanction of the Soviet order in Eastern Europe. The long-range effort was a "policy of fragmentation" designed to weaken the Western alliance and undermine West European political and economic unity. "France and the U.S. were to be encouraged to checkmate each other; Germany was to be isolated; and Western Europe was to be outflanked by neutralism in the north and in the south. The Eastern European states could play [and, it is submitted, did play and continue to play] a very useful role in promoting this new policy of fragmentation." (p. 80.) He concludes that (1) "for the Soviets East Germany remained a vital outpost in the very center of Europe, geographically, militarily and politically sealing off direct access to East Europe from the West"; (2) "the policy of fragmentation is still basically an offensive policy . . . calculated not to ease the division of Europe, but to divide the non-Communist half"; and (3) "the perpetuation of the division of Germany is . . . the linchpin of the Soviet efforts to promote both Soviet security and European security. The Soviet leaders accordingly attach vital importance to gaining U.S. acceptance of the German division." (pp. 81-86.)

Brzezinski holds that West German policy is committed to two mutually incompatible goals: reunification and frontier revision. Both strengthen the bonds of Po-

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land and Czechoslovakia to the USSR. Without recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, Bonn's present policy of engagement vis-à-vis Eastern Europe appears to the Poles and Czechs as a policy of revision and is, accordingly, an obstacle to German reunification.

The author correctly warns that any "compromise on the firm definition of the East German regime as a tool of the Soviet occupation forces could contribute to the perpetuation of that regime." He believes that "treating East Germany as the rest of Eastern Europe could at best achieve an internal liberalization that might make the East German regime more palatable and respectable, but without diminishing its essential dependence on the Soviet Union." (pp. 100-101.) These are convincing arguments, but are they not equally valid for the other captive nations?

According to Brzezinski, General de Gaulle has a vision but not a policy. "His insistence on a Europe detached from America disunited the West without causing any substantial change in the East." The effect could amount to "driving America out of West Europe without driving Russia out of East Europe." (p. 115.)

The author finds that the U.S. policy of containment has been concerned "neither with exploiting Soviet weakness in East Europe nor with assuaging Soviet fears." (p. 116.) The policy of liberation, which proved to be merely another name for containment, gave way after 1957 to a policy of promoting evolution in Eastern Europe. Under President Kennedy a policy of "more active but peaceful engagement" became the official doctrine. American leaders renewed in 1963 their commitment to the reunification of Germany and Europe by encouraging "evolution within the Communist world toward national independence, peaceful cooperation and open societies." In formulating his "building bridges" policy, President Johnson made German unification dependent on changes in Eastern Europe. This marked, in the opinion of Brzezinski, "the final abandonment of the notion that the German problem could be settled outside of, or prior to, an over-all change in the relations between the two halves of Europe." (p. 123.)

In appraising the implementation of the U.S. policy of "differentiated penetration," Brzezinski points to the danger that the means of this policy might become its ends. His specific apprehensions on this score are valid and worth mentioning. (1) The policy requires an improvement of relations with the ruling governments and this requires silence on such basic objectives as free elections. (2) On the operational level there is a tendency to measure the success of the new policy "by the willingness of the regimes to have formally good relations with the United States and to accept American aid, *neither of which any longer constituted defiance of the Soviet Union,* without substantive changes either in their domestic or external policies." (Emphasis

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supplied, p. 128.) (3) "The concentration on the goodwill of the governments tended to leave the people out of the equation, with the result that the governments concerned might eventually feel less inhibited in impeding domestic democratization and in asserting their control." (pp. 128-129.)

A few expressions of apprehension notwithstanding, notes the author, the response of the communist leaders to the new American approach was in the affirmative. "Increasingly reassured that the U.S. cannot contest their power, they could more easily afford some domestic concessions in return for U.S. acceptance and economic aid." (p. 130.)

Without a clearer definition of U.S. goals in Eastern Europe, concludes Brzezinski, "the American effort could become dissipated in an euphoria of politically meaningless goodwill . . . it could become a disguised way for settling for the *status quo*." (p. 131.) While fully sharing these apprehensions, this reviewer cannot agree that the dangers inherent in the policy of "building bridges" can be overcome by clearer definitions of goals, new techniques, or policies such as the author's "peaceful engagement" program.

The basic expectation of Brzezinski's thesis is that "the gradual Europeanization of Russia, the changing character of the Soviet stake in Eastern Europe, and, above all, stability in the West are likely to induce in the Soviet leaders . . . an eventual willingness to re-examine Russia's relationship to Europe." (p. 88.) This evolution will unfold in a climate of *détente*. The United States should acquiesce in the status quo as a subtle means of changing it, and U.S. policy should be guided by three assumptions: (1) U.S. military strength must be maintained and Western interests vigorously protected. (2) Any basic change in East-West relationships in Europe will have to involve Eastern Europe jointly with the Soviet Union. (3) German reunification will be the last act in the evolutionary unification of the European continent.

These assumptions are unrealistic. The current crisis within NATO suggests that any lessening of the sense of danger induced by a policy of *détente* and the impression that the Soviet bloc is disintegrating places in jeopardy both Western alliances and preparedness. Moreover, friendliness and helpfulness are to a communist signs of weakness, and therefore apt to stimulate appetites rather than induce mellowed contentment. And how can the Soviet Union be coaxed into dismantling the satellite regimes which form an integral part of the communist world system?

Starting from his three assumptions, Brzezinski envisages five goals of U.S. policy: (1) To convince the East Europeans, in particular the Poles and the Czechs, that the existence of East Germany limits their freedom without enhancing their security. (2) To promote a German-Polish reconciliation. (3) To lessen Soviet obsession with Germany. (4) To relate

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expansion of economic ties to more extensive cultural and social contacts. (5) To promote multilateral ties between Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

These are obviously tactical goals designed to promote the strategic goal of German unification. Unification is to be accomplished in the indefinite future when the East European states will no longer be "pliant tools of Moscow." This is a welcome revision of the view that they have already ceased being pliant tools, but it is a rather bleak prospect for the Germans. "Unification" will not be complete: East Germany will not be integrated into NATO, but will remain under the temporary occupation of UN or even Soviet forces, and will continue to be a major supplier to the Soviet bloc.

These proposed tactical goals not only rest on mutually incompatible premises, but are placed in the service of a long-range goal, namely, a "half-unified" Germany and "semi-totalitarian" Eastern Europe, which is uninspiring to Western Europe, unacceptable to West Germany, and incapable of generating the requisite East European popular pressures for change.

The first two tactical goals seem predicated on an exaggerated notion of Polish and Czech fear of Germany. They assume that the Poles and Czechs would rather live indefinitely under communism than face the hypothetical danger of a unified Germany. But East Europeans, minus the communist elite, are by and large aware of the limited military power of Germany. So long as the United States is overwhelmingly superior and present on the continent, and so long as West Germany remains democratic and bound to the West through NATO and the European institutions, it will be regarded more as another factor of beneficial change than a potential menace. A unification plan tied to the recognition of the Polish-German border would be desirable, provided it did not carry the risk of another Rapallo—the development the people of Eastern Europe fear most.

In presenting his third tactical goal, the author warns against German attempts to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift, against a greater German military buildup, and against the various schemes for military disengagement in Central Europe—the latter, on the sound basis that the problem is basically a political one.

The fourth tactical goal stems from the author's legitimate concern with the communist tendency to restrict "closer contacts exclusively to the economic realm, thus resolving their economic difficulties while consolidating their power and perpetuating the present partition of Europe." (p. 152.) Communist economic development, Brzezinski cautions, "can be justified only if it produces such other consequences as the erosion of the Communist commitment to domination, structural reforms in Communist economic systems, the growth of closer contacts and an increasingly free flow of ideas and people." (p. 153.) Yet, when dis-

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cussing the specific concessions the West should exact in exchange for a liberalized trade policy and Western credits, the author dismisses as unrealistic any insistence on political concessions. He suggests concessions which can best be described as marginal: consular agreements, admission and circulation of Western newspapers, more extensive cultural exchanges, and relaxation of communist control on travel to the West.

The author seems to reflect here the current Western indecision regarding economic leverage. While theoretically accepted, economic leverage is used so timidly and sparingly that credits are negotiated virtually on an unconditional basis. So long as economic aid is not tied to substantive political change or, at least, to specific projects designed to raise the standard of living and health of the captive peoples, it impedes rather than promotes evolution in Eastern Europe.

Brzezinski deplores as counterproductive Western competition in granting credits to communist states and stresses that the communist need for Western credits arises from a critical economic situation. He believes that such internal difficulties stimulate power conflicts and thus tend to loosen the communist structure. If so, one wonders why the West should extricate the communist rulers from their own inadequacies, incompetence and ideology.

In the absence of Western credits, the communist regimes would be impelled by economic necessity —and subsequent political consequences — to consider structural reforms in which stress would have to be given to considerations of economic effectiveness rather than to the totalitarian requirement of control over people. Credits and aid are justified only to the extent that the West is able to exact by direct negotiation changes comparable to the ones which economic and political necessity would impose on the regimes in the absence of such assistance. Normal exchanges of goods have the redeeming virtue of reducing the dependence of the captive nations on the Soviet Union. As President Johnson's East-West Trade Committee observed, such trade can expand only after an improvement of production and distribution methods in the communist-ruled countries to meet the requirements of Western markets. A policy of generous and unconditional credits would tend to discourage this type of favorable development.

Undeterred by such considerations, the author recommends, in elucidating his fifth tactical goal, an all-European economic plan and a special fund for underwriting multilateral East-West undertakings. He even postulates turning popular pressures—a factor he generally tends to underestimate—against possible Soviet obstructionism. Should Soviet opposition persist, he seeks consolation in the unlikely prospect that "It would increase the cost of Soviet domination by giving the Eastern European countries new leverage to extract greater Soviet economic

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assistance." (p. 173.) Brzezinski also places great reliance on the influence and pressure which East European regimes will exercise in Moscow to bring about a reconsideration of the Soviet stake in East Germany as well as a reassessment of the Soviet Union's "general commitment to a policy predicated on the desirability and inevitability of Western European fragmentation." (p. 87.)

Today the Soviet Union is on the offensive with a policy of fragmentation that promises important results at little risk. Its strategy calls for "sitting tight," confining action to the arena of political and diplomatic intrigue, while letting the West compete for the privilege of bailing out the communist-ruled countries from their economic troubles. Can Moscow be easily persuaded to withdraw and desist from such a course of action? And why would the satellites try to deter Moscow from pursuing a policy that might produce significant political and economic gains for the communist elites?

The major concern of the East European communist rulers is domestic: they want to perpetuate themselves in power. For this, Soviet power is essential, uncomfortable as it may be at times. Autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is conceived primarily in terms of an assurance that Moscow will not back rival groups within their own party. Once this much is assured, the next aim is to broaden their internal support by identifying themselves with the national interest so long as this action remains compatible with the necessary Soviet link. As Brzezinski rightly notes, the East European communists were near panic at the time of the Cuban confrontation, for they were afraid, as they still are, of a confrontation with U.S. power, the magnitude of which they fully grasp. But this is no indication of a reluctance to back a less risky fragmentation policy. The success of such a policy would, indeed, lessen their dependence on the Soviet Union. A communist-ruled, or even left-wing "progressive" Western Europe would be the optimal solution. It would at once confer them with full internal security and a wider margin of autonomy, for Soviet power would find counterweights in a communist-oriented Western Europe.

Brzezinski's book is an important contribution to current studies on U.S. policy toward Europe. It is stimulating and authoritative, but the author offers a program of action which is not always convincingly supported by his own analysis. To this reviewer, a policy of containment, combined with correct but not friendly relations with the satellite regimes, and with continued stress on the goal of full national and human emancipation, is more likely to further the cause of the evolution of Eastern Europe. Such a policy is more likely to stimulate evolution by the combined impact of economic necessity and other internal pressures. But the inherent instability of the communist power structure, as revealed by the ouster of Khrushchev, may still provide us with surprises and

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prove that the road to freedom can be shorter than the long, tortuous path described by those who see no possible alternative to evolution.

Europe and the American Mind*

by Hans Kohn

Professor Strout, who teaches the history of American civilization at Cornell, submits in his book, *The American Image of the Old World,* a searching analysis of the changing American attitudes toward Europe. Though Strout's book appeared two years ago, it deserves our attention; perhaps today in the grave crisis of the Atlantic Community even more than in the days when a close collaboration between the United States and Western Europe seemed more assured. His analysis in depth helps us to see the present misunderstandings between Americans and Europeans in a wider framework. Both partners — Americans and Europeans — entered into the new partnership of 1949 with centuries-old prejudices and idiosyncrasies.

Professor Strout does not present unknown facts or new interpretations, but he succeeds in recalling the ambivalence and ambiguity in the American image of Europe in a highly self-critical and thereby illuminating way. For the Americans, Europe always loomed very large as a focus of antagonism or envious admiration, whereas until the second third of the present century America meant little to most Europeans, especially their upper classes. "It is a complex fate being an American," Henry James wrote, "and one of the responsibilities it entails is fighting against a superstitious valuation of Europe." But Americans more frequently overvaluated their own country, its "youth," its "innocence," its "virtue," which was largely interpreted as an innate pacifism. America understood itself as an anti-Europe, the opposite of a senescent, war-loving and corrupt hierarchic society. The American mind was dominated by the assumption of a polarity between America and Europe. The European image of America was equally one-sided and wrong, but until very recently Europeans felt culturally so secure that their image of America played only a minor role in their world view and in their self-awareness.

At no time was the estrangement between Europeans and Americans as great as in the two decades after World War I. By that time America began to loom almost as big on the European horizon as Europe had always loomed on America's horizon. The Europeans disliked American self-righteousness and thought her pacifism hypocritical; Americans felt a deep desire to save America from Europe. Even writers who had spent many years in Europe, enchanted by France, Germany or Spain, turned against Europe in the 1930's.

In his posthumous novel, *You Can't Go Home Again,* published in 1940 two years after his death,

**The American Image of the Old World.* By Cushing Strout. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 288 pp. $4.75.

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Thomas Wolfe wrote: "America was young, America was still the new world of mankind's hope, America was not like this old and worn-out Europe which seethed and festered with a thousand deep and uncorrected ancient maladies." Ernest Hemingway wrote in 1934 in an essay, "Notes on the Next War," which won a prize for the best article for 1935: "But of the hell broth that is brewing in Europe we have no need to drink. Europe has always fought: the intervals of peace are only armistices. We were fools to be sucked in once in a European war, and we should never be sucked in again."

Even immediately after World War II, most Americans, at the top and among the people, distrusted British imperialism much more than the Soviet Union. "Power politics" was imagined as a peculiarly Old World and above all a British disease. Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota opposed in July 1946 the loan to Britain as "Russia-baiting dollar diplomacy and monetary imperialism," which would threaten the peace by "dividing the world into rival camps." When shortly after, the American official and popular mood changed, Mr. Mundt's changed too and he became a passionate supporter of Senator McCarthy.

Professor Strout's most useful survey of the American mind should be widely read by Americans. It should be complemented by a similar analysis of the European view of America. Then we would be better able to understand why the growth of an "Atlantic Community" is so slow. Strout himself is an advocate of the Atlantic Community, and this makes his conclusions even more noteworthy. He insists on the need for transcending the traditional polarities of invidious comparison. The United States as the strongest single member of the community should become aware—in view of its own attitude of only twenty-five years ago—that "the strain of the Cold War puts a heavy burden on the growth of mutual respect and confidence between America and Europe" today as a similar "cold war" did twenty-five years ago. American grumbling "about the perversity or weakness of allies in Europe who do not see the world in American terms" does not sound too well to European ears. Even today, a European critic can find an American self-image "of injured innocence in an evil world," seeing things in polar terms—in black and white—with the foil to American innocence, freedom and peacefulness no longer represented by "old-world monarchies and aristocracies," but by ubiquitous "atheists, socialists and communists."

Professor Strout concludes with the perhaps surprising statement that some of the conventional American-European antitheses could today be reversed, with more respect for the truth. But he knows, too, that the relationship of America and Europe has never been static and today is even less so. Its present shape could not have been foreseen in 1945, nor can we foresee that of 1985. An Atlantic Commu-

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nity, uniting the United States, Canada and the secure democracies of Northern and Western Europe in a world of rapid cultural changes and insecurities, may well emerge if all partners, great and small alike, exercise patience and restraint, conscious of the fact that none of them is omnipotent or omniscient.

Toward Atlantic Unity*

by Gerhard Mally

Many American and European statesmen, scholars and writers continue to explore the problems of institutionalizing the Atlantic world so that its peoples may be able to cope with the strategic, political and economic requirements of this century.

Among the most competent studies on this subject is the recent book, *Atlantic Challenge,* by Livingston Hartley, the Associate Director of "Declaration of Atlantic Unity." In his introduction Hartley stresses that he has "endeavoured to make this book readable, popular in style rather than academic. It has been based less upon other books than on personal experience in a number of organizations during the last fifteen years as well as on frequent discussions of foreign policy problems in Washington and other NATO capitals over a longer period." *Atlantic Challenge* seeks to stimulate thinking and action in the field of Atlantic relations; it is not an exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the process of Atlantic political integration. Mr. Hartley, having served as consultant to the United States Citizens Commission on NATO, a member of the Executive Committee of the Atlantic Union Committee, and a delegate to the Atlantic Congress, possesses all of the qualifications for tracing the history of Atlantic relations since 1945 and for proposing realistic methods of promoting Western unity.

At the beginning, Hartley marshals ample evidence in support of his assertion that there exists an Atlantic community of nations founded upon socio-historical traditions, a system of common values, and the political-military requirements of the nuclear age. He dismisses critics who speak only of the "disarray" of the Atlantic Alliance by pointing to the past achievements of NATO. In fact, there is little doubt that NATO was responsible for preventing after 1949 further Soviet aggression in Europe. Moreover, it has achieved a degree of military integration without precedent in peacetime alliances.

According to Hartley, it is General de Gaulle who is largely responsible for the recent setbacks in the movements toward European and Atlantic integration. By exalting French national grandeur and by calling for an independent "European" Europe — both anachronistic objectives in an era of interdependence—the French President is clearly swimming against the tide of history. Fortunately, De Gaulle's efforts to win support for his policies among Germany and

**Atlantic Challenge.* By Livingston Hartley. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1965. 111 pp. $3.95.

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France's other Common Market partners have not succeeded.

Hartley deals at some length with the frequently-heard argument that the pursuit of the twin objectives of European unity and Atlantic solidarity are incompatible and mutually exclusive. This debate should have been settled once and for all in 1951 when the "Three Wise Men" of NATO proclaimed that "the moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European union should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting." He also cites, as indicative of the American attitude toward the idea of European unity, a policy statement of the U.S. Atlantic Council of July 1, 1963 which affirms that "greater unity in Europe which strengthens the Atlantic community is desirable; developments in Europe which weaken Atlantic unity are undesirable."

In the second part of his study, Hartley surveys the existing designs for Atlantic unity (as proposed by the Atlantic Convention), such as the concepts of "Atlantic partnership," "Atlantic union" and "Atlantic community."

The author's contention that progress in international integration can best be achieved by a series of functional steps—as demonstrated by the "Six"—is basically valid. Hartley supports the "gradual approach" adopted by the Atlantic Convention in Paris in 1962. Thus, he calls for a "building by stages" and makes the following detailed recommendations: appointment of permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council and endowment of this body with the right to make certain decisions by a weighted, qualified majority vote, and creation of an Atlantic Commission of "wise men" who would advise the North Atlantic Council and formulate policy directives.

The importance of a body which serves as an "honest broker" and dynamic instrument of integration has become evident in the daily operations of the European communities; the creation of a similar institution on the Atlantic level would be of the utmost significance. Moreover, the adoption of majority voting procedures in the North Atlantic Council would greatly enhance the prospects of Atlantic unity. While Hartley advances a formula for weighted majority voting, he admits that such a voting formula must clear the high hurdle of national sovereignty.

In his conclusion the author challenges American statesmen to supply leadership: "Progress in Atlantic integration is entirely subject to the will of the Atlantic peoples, since the Communists are powerless to prevent it. Success in this task depends primarily upon the American people because of their paramount power and influence. It requires American leadership based upon a willingness to participate fully in new institutions or processes and to undertake such sacrifices of national freedom of action as are necessary and are accepted by others. This leadership, in turn, depends upon the common sense and the will of the American people."

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Development: For What? Edited by John H. Hallowell. Durham: Duke University Press, for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics, 1964. 241 pp. $6.00.

Eight scholars, including Rupert Emerson and Edward Shils, examine the goals of economic and political development in the underdeveloped world. Essay subjects, focusing mainly on Africa, include nationalism, economic reform, the rule of law, constitutional government and religious developments.

A Dictionary of Modern History, 1789-1945. By A. W. Palmer. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 363 pp. $1.25 (paper).

A handbook on the personalities, events and ideas of the last century and a half. Emphasis is given to British history, but the book contains entries on all parts of the globe, especially on the major nations. The entries are listed alphabetically, are presented in essays of from 100 to 2,000 words, and treat economic, social, political, religious and scientific developments, but not the arts.

Driving Forces in History. By Halvdan Koht; translated from the Norwegian by Einar Haugen. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964. 217 pp. $4.75.

Dr. Koht, whom Professor William L. Langer in his foreword to this book calls the "dean of living historians," reflects upon and re-evaluates some of the great forces that have conditioned man's development. The author, for many years a leader of Norway's Labor Party and his nation's foreign minister from 1935 to 1941, is convinced that what changes over time is not man but the economic and social environment. He assesses the role played in human affairs by religion, psychological factors, class conflict, the changing nature and power of the state, nationalism, revolution, war and science.

Equality and Liberty: Theory and Practice in American Politics. By Harry V. Jaffa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 229 pp. $5.75.

Dr. Jaffa, Professor of Political Science at Claremont Men's College in California and author of *Crisis of the House Divided,* a study of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, has collected ten essays written since the late 1950's which focus on the theme that the Declaration of Independence is a statement of principles which "must ever justify our existence as an independent people." He condemns the "widespread notion" that "the principles of the Declaration are more to be considered an expression of 'the thought of the time' than a serious teaching about man and his nature," and includes two essays specifically defending "the older wis-

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dom from the exaggerated and dogmatic skepticism of the 'scientific' methodologists of our academies." The book also contains essays on "Patriotism and Morality," "The Emancipation Proclamation," "On the Nature of Civil and Religious Liberty," and the Lincoln-Douglas debates.

Europe's Steppe Frontier: 1500-1800. By William H. McNeill. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. 252 pp. $5.50.

The author of *The Rise of the West,* which won the National Book Award in History for 1964, turns his attention here to the historical process whereby the steppe lands of Eastern Europe were partitioned among the three great empires of Russia, Austria and Turkey.

Ideology and Discontent. Edited by David E. Apter. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, a division of Macmillan, 1964. 342 pp. n.p.

In this fifth volume of the International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, sponsored by the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, an anthropologist, social psychologist, sociologist and several political scientists examine the role of ideology in the developing nations and its place in the advanced, industrialized countries. Topics include ideology as a cultural system in Indonesia; national loyalties in a new nation, with India as a case study; ideological foundations of Egyptian-Arab nationalism; democracy and socialism as ideologies of African leaders; the nature of belief systems in mass publics; ideology and modernization in Japan; and the politics and ideology of America's radical right.

International Aspects of Civil Strife. Edited by James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 322 pp. $7.50.

A collection of essays on modern civil strife within a nation and its international implications, especially as it tends to become a focus of conflict between the major powers. The authors, including George Modelski, Morton A. Kaplan, Karl W. Deutsch, Richard A. Falk and Manfred Halpern, discuss such subjects as the international law and international relations of internal war, intervention in internal war, and the morality and politics of intervention.

Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law. By Gerhard von Glahn. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 768 pp. $9.95.

An advanced undergraduate text in international law in which the author adopts the traditional approach to the subject and provides abstracts of classic and modern cases. The volume is divided into parts dealing with the nature of international law, the subjects, the law and the individual, territorial problems, international transactions, and war.

The Law of International Waterways. By R. R. Baxter, with the research assistance of Jan F. Triska. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 371 pp. $9.50.

Focusing on the three great interoceanic canals of Suez, Panama and Kiel, the author examines the state of international law governing navigation through the three principal forms of international waterways: rivers, straits and canals. He describes the types of international institutions which have been created to operate or supervise various waterways; discusses freedom of passage in peacetime and wartime; examines legal controls over charges for the use of waterways and over the maintenance of their technical efficiency as arteries of commerce; and ex-

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plores the feasibility and wisdom of proposals to place all or some of the major interoceanic canals under international administration.

Living in a World Revolution: My Encounters with History. By Hans Kohn. New York: Trident Press, 1964. 211 pp. $4.95.

A history of our times and a personal statement of optimism about the future of man. Professor Kohn, drawing upon his experience and profound knowledge of history, writes of the last era of the Hapsburg reign, the Russian civil war, the Zionist movement, European and American intellectual life, the twilight of imperialism, the new Germany, the future of the United Nations, American institutions of learning, and the Negro revolution. His conclusions are worth pondering: "The dream of a unified, harmonious world is as unattainable as the dream of a democratic or communist world." "The survival of our civilization depends upon winning the struggle for equality; in the long run, it is even more important than the struggle against communism." "No document is as significant [in expressing the strength of the spiritual heritage of the West] as the encyclical '*Pacem in Terris*' ('Peace on Earth') of Pope John XXIII. . . . It is a great document in the West's (and mankind's) long ascent to greater freedom and its dedication to the dignity of man."

Mathematics and Politics. By Hayward R. Alker, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 152 pp. $1.50 (paper).

The author, believing that mathematical drudgery or a parochial approach to politics tends to obscure the relevance of mathematics to the moral and empirical problems of political analysis, attempts to illustrate how several important ideas in the history of mathematics could serve to increase our understanding of politics. To achieve this purpose, Professor Alker analyzes the nature of the two disciplines, the objectives they study, and their historical relations. He then endeavors to demonstrate the relevance of the quantitative approach to political activities and the role of mathematics in aiding the process of reasoning, the manipulation of facts and the evaluation of ethics.

Monetary Policy: Ends and Means. By Paul Einzig. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964. 432 pp. $1.65 (paper).

In this revised and updated edition of his earlier book, *How Money is Managed,* Mr. Einzig presents a broad picture of the entire field of monetary policy. In describing a wide variety of monetary policies which have been tried through the ages, he seeks to maintain a neutral attitude; but he feels very strongly that a compromise must be reached between the traditionalists and the welfare statists.

Overseas Management. By Ted R. Brannen and Frank X. Hodgson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 238 pp. $6.95.

This book is aimed at the overseas manager who, the authors feel, can serve the democratic cause in his actions abroad if he takes into account local sensitivities and aspirations. The authors seek to inform the overseas manager of the special problems to be encountered in preindustrial societies, particularly in the area of cultural differences.

The Role of Theory in International Relations. Edited by Horace V. Harrison. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964. 118 pp. n.p.

Five papers by Quincy Wright, Kenneth W. Thompson, William T. R. Fox, Hans J. Morgenthau and the editor which seek to provide some guidelines for

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theoretical inquiry in the field of international relations. The authors discuss the reasons why an integrated theory has not yet been formulated; the essential requirements, substantively and methodologically, which must be met in constructing such a theory; the problems to be encountered in the theorizing process, especially those of theory-application and theory-verification; and how to assess the usefulness of a general theory, especially the intellectual and political functions which such a theory may be expected to perform.

The UN in Action. By Joan Comay. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 150 pp. $3.95.

The author of this book, a journalist and wife of Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations, documents the activities of the UN—from peace-keeping missions in Suez, Cyprus, Congo, Kashmir and Israel, to the work of agencies such as FAO, ILO, WHO, and UNICEF.

World Perspectives on International Politics. Edited by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965. 481 pp. n.p. (paper).

A collection of pronouncements on current international problems by statesmen and scholars from the West, communist bloc and nonaligned world. Following an introductory essay, the editor presents readings on (1) the political, economic and military strategies of the three groups of states; (2) confrontations in Berlin and divided Germany, in Cuba, and along the Indian-Chinese frontier; and (3) the "ordering of conflict," i.e., arms control, the United Nations, and the rule of law.

The Year That Changed the World: 1945. By Brian Gardner. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964. 356 pp. $5.75.

This is an account and reappraisal of the great events of 1945: the great Allied victories in Europe and the Pacific, the Big Power conferences, the death of Roosevelt and electoral defeat of Churchill, the growing differences between the Western Allies and Soviet Russia, and the decision to use the atomic bomb.

II. United States

Affairs at State. By Henry Serrano Villard. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965. 212 pp. $5.95.

In this personal account, Mr. Villard traces the history of the Foreign Service, comments upon its strengths and weaknesses, and examines the effects on the service of such developments as the McCarthy hearings and the relationship of the State Department to the United Nations, USIA, CIA and the Peace Corps. He presents a six-point program to improve the efficiency, caliber and morale of Foreign Service personnel.

American Aspects. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 195 pp. $4.00.

In this compilation of essays, the leading British scholar on American civilization and history reappraises the Civil War, discusses the state of Anglo-American relations, evaluates Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower and Kennedy, depicts the Catholic politician, and examines various aspects of American society and foreign policy.

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America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion. By H. Wayne Morgan. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. 124 pp. n.p.

Dr. Morgan, Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas, offers a general introduction to the diplomacy preceding the Spanish-American War, a brief account of the war itself, and an assessment of the campaign for and against American expansion overseas. He shows how the United States attempted over many years to force Spain to introduce reforms in Cuba; stresses the legitimate strategic, commercial and humanitarian interests of the U.S. government and people in Cuba's fate; downgrades the importance of the "yellow press" and war hysteria in provoking U.S. intervention; and asserts that U.S. acquisition of territory in the Pacific and Caribbean was influenced by a desire to increase our trade with Asia, play a role in Pacific power politics, and spread American ideals of self-rule. This is one of eight volumes in the America in Crisis series.

The Awakening of American Nationalism, 1815-1828. By George Dangerfield. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 331 pp. $6.00.

This volume in The New American Nation Series, edited by Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, has as its central theme the emergence of nationalism following the War of 1812. Professor Dangerfield examines this "Era of Good Feelings"; the major personalities of the period, especially Monroe, Madison, Adams, and Jackson; the panic of 1819; the Missouri compromises; the Monroe Doctrine; the elections of 1824 and 1828; and the defeat of John Quincy Adams' visionary, yet rigid, philosophy of economic nationalism.

Experience of War: The United States in World War II. By Kenneth S. Davis. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 704 pp. $7.95.

A comprehensive narrative of American participation in World War II, written by the author of *Soldier of Democracy,* a biography of General Eisenhower, and of *The Hero,* a biography of Charles A. Lindbergh. Mr. Davis, who went overseas as a special correspondent to cover the Allied campaign in France in 1944-45, relates many of the individual war experiences of statesmen, military leaders and G.I. Joes. He also provides a panorama of the U.S. war effort, both at home and abroad.

Farewell to Foggy Bottom: The Recollections of a Career Diplomat. By Ellis Briggs. New York: David McKay, 1964. 306 pp. $4.95.

Mr. Briggs, a retired 36-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service with service as Ambassador in Cuba, China, Uruguay, Czechoslovakia, Korea, Brazil and Greece, provides an often disturbing picture of how the United States carries on relations with the rest of the world. He tells why, despite our enormous aid programs and informational and goodwill programs, the United States remains unpopular and misunderstood in many areas of the world. He suggests changes in the administrative and policymaking processes of the State Department and appraises many aspects of U.S. military and economic policies.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940. By William E. Leuchtenburg. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 393 pp. $6.00.

This history of American society during the Great Depression begins with the last year of the Hoover Administration and concludes with the election of President Roosevelt to a third term. The emphasis is placed on the economic crisis and New Deal reforms, the social forces which influenced the government, and

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the effect on the American people of hard times. The author also deals with foreign policy issues and traces the growth and finally the erosion of the American commitment to isolationism.

The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920. By Daniel M. Smith. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. 221 pp. $4.95 ($1.95 paper).

In this volume in the U.S. diplomatic history series America in Crisis, Professor Smith of the University of Colorado seeks to answer two questions: Why did the United States reluctantly depart from its traditions of neutrality to become a belligerent in 1917? And why did Americans, after entering the conflict and decisively tipping the balance to ensure an Allied victory, reject the peace treaty which their President had largely shaped?

Kennedy. By Theodore C. Sorensen. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 783 pp. $10.00.

The late President's Special Counsel provides a personal account of his eleven years at the side of John F. Kennedy. Less than one-third of the book is devoted to the years 1953-60 when Kennedy was Senator and later candidate for the presidency. Part three contains a description of the Kennedy "team," the press and the public, and the Bay of Pigs disaster; part four treats Kennedy's domestic policies; and the last part explores Kennedy's foreign policies.

Morning and Noon: A Memoir. By Dean G. Acheson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. 288 pp. $6.00.

Mr. Acheson writes a modest and fascinating account of his youth and early career. The autobiography takes the reader through Acheson's childhood in New England, his position as law clerk to Justice Brandeis, his private law practice in the firm of Covington, Burling and Rublee, and his early government appointments as Under Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant Secretary of State, where the story ends.

Number 7: Alexander Hamilton's Secret Attempts to Control American Foreign Policy. By Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 166 pp. $4.00.

Dr. Boyd, editor of *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* and Professor of History at Princeton University, probes the effort of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton (designated as "Number 7" in the dispatches of a British secret agent) to employ deception against Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and President Washington's official agent in London, Gouverneur Morris, for the purpose of guiding U.S. policy toward closer ties with Great Britain.

Our Free Enterprise Economy. By Morris A. Copeland. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 302 pp. $5.95.

An attempt to provide a systematic account of "the way—on the whole, the the very efficient way—institutions have been performing the central management functions" of the U.S. economy, a free enterprise economy without a general economic manager. Particular attention is given to two major problem areas of the economy: the business cycle and labor-management relations. The author describes the following institutions: freedom to choose one's occupation, trade, the market, price system, profit system, freedom to manage one's enterprise, business corporations, property rights, legally enforceable contracts, debtor-creditor

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relationship, money, income and money circuit (flow), competition, wage system, business accountancy, capitalism, business mores, private wrongs and penalties, and bankruptcy.

Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788, and the Formation of the Federal Constitution. (Second edition.) Selected and edited by Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 380 pp. $2.25 (paper).

This book includes all of the essential documents (including the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Constitution); the more important acts, resolves, state constitutions, and royal instructions; and the debates, letters, pamphlets, Indian relations and frontier petitions, which today throw light on, and in the 18th century influenced public opinion regarding, the American Revolution and Federal Constitution. Military and diplomatic documents on the War of Independence are not included because it is the political-diplomatic aspects of the Revolution which Professor Morison seeks to elucidate.

The Uncertain South: Its Changing Patterns of Politics in Foreign Policy. By Charles O. Lerche, Jr. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. 324 pp. $6.95.

A systematic analysis of Southern attitudes toward foreign policy issues. The author, Professor of International Relations at The American University, analyzes in depth the voting records of the 126 Southern Congressmen from 14 states; constructs six distinct positions on foreign policy issues; shows how the Southern Congressmen have opposed foreign aid programs; explodes the "myth" of Southern internationalism and describes how Southern politicians have come to support a more "unilateral" approach to foreign affairs; and projects likely future trends in their voting behavior and attitudes on foreign policy issues.

The United States in World History. (Third edition.) By John B. Rae and Thomas H. D. Mahoney. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 864 pp. $8.95.

This edition of the Rae and Mahoney standard college text, like its predecessors, integrates American history with that of the Western world as a whole and with the significant features of Latin American, Asian and African history. This is not a typical American history text with occasional references to world events; it is closer to being a global history with the United States as the central theme. The authors examine political, economic, social and cultural factors, and in this edition have given additional attention to science and technology, provided more maps and illustrations, and expanded their coverage of the U.S. role in world affairs since World War II.

United States Monetary Policy. (Revised edition.) Edited by Neil H. Jacoby. New York: Praeger, 1964. 243 pp. $5.95 ($2.25 paper).

A collection of papers originally presented as background reading for a series of American Assemblies on monetary policy, these studies have been revised and updated to provide the layman with an introduction to the function and objectives of monetary policy in a free society. Included among the economists analyzing the basic aspects of U.S. monetary policy are Ralph A. Young, who reviews the tools and processes of monetary policy, and Arthur Smithies, who deals with the various uses of selective credit controls in achieving continued economic growth.

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Woodrow Wilson: The Lost Peace. By Thomas A. Bailey. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963. 381 pp. $1.95 (paper).

Woodrow Wilson: The Great Betrayal. By Thomas A. Bailey. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963. 429 pp. $1.95 (paper).

These are the paperback editions of Bailey's study of President Wilson's peacemaking efforts at the end of World War I. The first volume deals with the peacemaking; the second, with the undoing of the peace, with special emphasis on the role of the United States. Professor Bailey is sympathetic toward Wilson's visions and policies, but he feels that "Wilson's tactlessness and stubbornness had much to do with our colossal failure."

World Pressures on American Foreign Policy. Edited by Marian D. Irish. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 172 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A series of lectures delivered at the Florida State University in 1962-63 on a variety of issues in U.S. foreign policy. The topics include theory and ideology; the future of the communist bloc; colonialism and dictatorship; transitional Asia and the dynamics of nation-building; and U.S. policy in relation to Western Europe, Britain, South Africa and Latin America.

III. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

The British General Election of 1964. By D. E. Butler and Anthony King. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. 401 pp. $9.00.

After examining major political and economic trends in Britain, the authors present a detailed account of the problems facing each party in the General Election of 1964. The volume contains detailed statistical data about voting patterns, as well as a comprehensive examination of the impact of the press, public opinion polls, television and racial issues upon the election. A study-in-depth of the campaign in four constituencies is included.

British Politics in the Collectivist Age. By Samuel H. Beer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965. 390 pp. n.p.

The author traces the development of British political parties and interest groups from Elizabethan times to the present day. The study includes an examination of the structure of the Conservative and Labour parties, as well as an assessment of the impact of ideas about equality, hierarchy, liberty and authority upon the British political system.

Colour and the British Electorate, 1964: Six Case Studies. Edited by Nicholas Deakin. New York: Praeger, 1965. 172 pp. $5.00.

This volume contains studies on the impact of color and immigration upon the British General Election of 1964. The essays examine the nature of the political and racial situation, the major issues, and the campaign techniques of parliamentary candidates in six marginal constituencies.

The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations. By James Barros. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 339 pp. $7.50.

A scholarly and detailed account of the diplomatic negotiations among the representatives of Italy, Greece, France and Britain, and between the League of

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Nations and the Council of Ambassadors that led to the peaceful settlement of the Corfu crisis. The author provides an interesting account of the relations between Mussolini and Italian career diplomats during the crisis.

Europe Ascendant: The International Politics of Unification. By George Liska. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 182 pp. $4.50.

Professor Liska, who teaches government at Wesleyan University, recounts the major features of Europe's resurgence in the 1950's and early 1960's; compares the phases, characteristics and external implications of unification in Western Europe today with those of the unification of the German states 100 years earlier (he also provides an interesting comparison of Bismarck with De Gaulle); and examines the current and prospective relations of Western Europe with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the nations of Eastern Europe and the underdeveloped world.

The First Hundred Days of Harold Wilson. By Anthony Shrimsley. New York: Praeger, 1965. 162 pp. $4.95.

A London political journalist examines the post-election policies and problems of the Labour Government in the period just after the election of 1964. An effort is made to assess the political style of Labour leaders as they strive to solve pressing domestic problems and international crises under the ever-present threat of losing their small majority in the House of Commons.

The Great Ambassador. By Leo Gerald Byrne. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965. 383 pp. $6.25.

A detailed study of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning's career as Her Brittanic Majesty's Ambassador to the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Sultan in the first half of the 19th century.

Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic. By Andreas Dorpalen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 506 pp. $12.00.

Andreas Dorpalen, Professor of History at Ohio State University, using many unpublished and other primary sources as well as interviews with aides and associates of Paul von Hindenburg, appraises the record of this stolid and inarticulate German Field-Marshal during his years as President of the Weimar Republic. This is not primarily a biography of Hindenburg, but a social and political history of the last years of the Weimar Republic. Hindenburg's relations with Adolf Hitler are seen in fresh perspective and new material is presented on the democratic leaders and parties and the extent of their responsibility for the demise of the Weimar Republic.

Modern Italy. By Margaret Carlyle. New York: Praeger, 1965. 154 pp. $5.00.

This expanded and revised edition of a study first published in Great Britain in 1957 treats such topics as the peoples of Italy, constitution and government, political parties, educational system, economy, the role of the Catholic Church, and the government's program for the development of southern Italy.

Munich: "Peace for our Time." By Henri Nogueres; translated by Patrick O'Brien. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 423 pp. $7.50.

The author sets forth a detailed account of the events leading to the Munich crisis of September 1938. The study, based largely upon data drawn from the

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memoirs of participants and diplomatic archives, presents a day-by-day examination of the negotiations which produced the Munich Agreement.

Reforming the World's Money. By Sir Roy Harrod. London: Macmillan, 1965. 181 pp. $5.95.

This study assesses the adequacy of reserves held by countries to finance international trade. The author examines the British payments problem and evaluates the kinds of measures which Britain and other countries might adopt to achieve needed reforms in the international monetary system.

Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party. By D. George Kousoulas. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 306 pp. $7.00.

This study of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) covers its formative years, its unsuccessful attempt to foment revolution in the 1930's, the dramatic years of World War II, the guerrilla war of 1947-49, and the party's more recent programs and tactics. The author, who was personally involved in many of the events described, provides valuable insights into communist techniques of subversion and tactics of guerrilla warfare.

IV. Communist Bloc

The Center of the World: Communism and the Mind of China. By Robert S. Elegant. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. 396 pp. $5.95.

An examination of the political, economic, social and cultural revolution through which the Chinese communists are remolding the people and institutions of China. The author, former *Newsweek* correspondent in Southeast Asia and currently chief of the magazine's Central European bureau, traces the intellectual and psychological roots of Peking's rulers to the time-honored traditions of China, and shows how many of these traditions are now being uprooted. He treats such topics as the Western penetration of China in the 17th to 19th centuries; China's fumbling efforts in the 20th century to meet the West on equal or superior footing; the Sinocentricity, authoritarianism and utopianism evident in traditional and Communist Chinese patterns of thought; the communist governmental and party structure; the communes, great leap forward and periodical campaigns which convulse China; and China's foreign relations. His last chapter discusses the important problem of whether China, "the center of the world," can become a normal member of the community of nations.

China and the Bomb. By Morton H. Halperin. New York: Praeger, 1965. 166 pp. $4.95.

A broad evaluation of Communist China's foreign policy, strategy and tactics, with emphasis on the changes which may be wrought by her gradual acquisition of a nuclear capability. The author examines the role of force and restraint in Chinese policy, the clash between Chinese and other national ambitions in Asia, Chinese attitudes toward arms control and disarmament, and likely U.S. and Soviet responses to a nuclear-armed and aggressive China.

First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905. By Sidney Harcave. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 316 pp. $5.75.

Dr. Harcave, Professor of Russian History at Harpur College of the State University of New York, examines the background of the 1905 Revolution, espe-

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cially the fateful schism in Russia between the autocratic government of Tsar Nicholas II and the intelligentsia. He then traces the fast-moving events of 1904, including the outbreak of war with Japan, and the developments of the year 1905 from the "Bloody Sunday" of January 9 to the flickering out of the revolution by December 19 when the Moscow strike came to an end. In the final chapter, he discusses the aftermath of the revolution and places the events of that year in historical perspective.

International Communism After Khrushchev. Edited by Leopold Labedz. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 232 pp. $7.50.

A collection of articles, many of which originally appeared in the British journal, *Survey,* on the events that led to the dismissal of Khrushchev, the transition to new leadership, and the effects of this sudden change in Soviet leadership upon communist parties throughout the world. In addition to ten pieces on the state of the communist parties in different parts of the world, there are three articles devoted largely to the Sino-Soviet rift: "Schism and Secession," "Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the National Liberation Movement" and "International Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Dispute."

Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine. By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: The Dial Press, 1965. 404 pp. $6.95.

An important study of the development of Marxism in the past 100 years. The author seeks to pin down the original meaning of the Marxist writings, to determine whether Marx preached nationalism or internationalism, democracy or dictatorship, "defensism," defeatism or pacifism. He asserts that much of Marxism's appeal lies "precisely in the fact that for its adepts it is at once science and faith. In its vast, emotion-charged, constantly changing and internally contradictory exposition and application . . . there are to be found the most contrary propositions, moods, attitudes, approaches, the most varied relations to reality." The problem in defining Marxism lies in its "multiple ambiguity . . . ambiguity in the spirit of Marx himself, ambiguity in the heritage he left, and ambiguity in those who claimed to be his heirs."

Russia. By Robert V. Daniels. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 152 pp. $4.95 ($1.95 paper).

In this volume of The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective series, Dr. Daniels, Professor of History at the University of Vermont and author of *A Documentary History of Communism* and *The Nature of Communism,* briefly reviews Russian history, with emphasis on the 1917 Revolution, traces the evolution of the Soviet system, describes the Soviet political and economic structure, and evaluates the Soviet Union's international position and foreign policy.

Russia's Eastward Expansion. Edited by George Alexander Lensen. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 184 pp. $1.95 (paper).

A collection of essays and documents from Russian and Western sources on Russia's eastward expansion, a part of the European tide that inundated Asia and America in the Age of Exploration. The readings are divided into four groups describing Russian expansion across the continent, across the Pacific, into the Russo-Chinese borderlands, and since the Revolution.

The Third World in Soviet Perspective: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas. Edited by Thomas Perry Thornton. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 355 pp. $7.50.

A sampling of Soviet writings on the problems and prospects of the less de-

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veloped areas of the world. The articles are of uneven quality, rarely match the standards of Western scholarship, and contain the usual communist ideological biases and jargon. However, they provide insights into how Soviet scholars, statesmen and writers view these new countries.

Tsars, Mandarins and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Soviet Relations. By Harry Schwartz. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964. 252 pp. $5.00.

A brief review of Sino-Soviet relations undertaken in an effort to show the "long heritage of hate and conflict which weighs so heavily on Soviet-Chinese relations . . . . the Sino-Soviet struggle which has so altered the political outlook of the 1960's is only secondarily an ideological struggle. Its primary components are much more nationalistic and racial distrust . . . as well as competitive striving for power between the leaderships of the two countries. . . ."

V. Middle East and Africa

Algerian Voices. By Richard and Joan Brace. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965. 233 pp. $3.95.

The authors, whose first book on French-Algerian relations, *Ordeal in Algeria,* appeared in 1960, personally observed the Algerian revolutionaries at work in Tunis in 1961-62 as invited guests of the Provisional Government of Algeria. In this book, they describe their experiences with many individuals of the Algerian community in exile, including government leaders, army personnel, laborers and students.

Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action. By Ernest Lefever. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965. 215 pp. $3.50.

One in a series of studies of U.S. policy and the UN under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, this book examines in detail the costly UN peace-keeping operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. The political, military, legal and financial aspects of the mission, as well as their ramifications for future peace-keeping operations, are described and appraised. The author has relied on primary sources, including interviews with many of the principals in the Congo and elsewhere.

The Desert King: Ibn Saud and His Arabia. By David Howarth. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 307 pp. $6.50.

A biography of Ibn Saud, who conquered the Arabian peninsula in the first quarter of this century, established the present kingdom of Saudi Arabia, approved the exploitation of the oil fields in the eastern part of his land, reigned through the Second World War, became one of the richest men in the world, and died in 1953, afraid that the riches he left behind would corrupt his successors. Howarth, who obtained the special permission of the government of Saudi Arabia to write this biography, has uncovered a great deal of new information about Ibn Saud from British government archives and from the king's descendants and others who knew him well.

East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive. By John K. Cooley. New York: Walker, 1965. 246 pp. $5.95.

A country-by-country survey of Chinese efforts to foment revolution in Africa, a continent which the Chinese claim is "ripe" for communist revolution. The

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methodological flexibility of the Chinese offensive stands in sharp contrast with the rigidity of their aims.

Education in Nigeria. Edited by Dr. Okechukwu Ikejiani. New York: Praeger, 1965. 234 pp. $6.00.

A discussion of the Nigerian educational system by three Nigerian educators and a U.S. professor who taught at the University of Nigeria. The articles treat the foundations of the system, the colonial legacy and future goals, problems in Nigerian education, education and the labor force, tribalism, and Nigerian universities.

Ethiopia: A New Political History. By Richard Greenfield. New York: Praeger, 1965. 515 pp. $10.00.

A comprehensive survey of the history and politics of Ethiopia with considerable emphasis on the attempted revolution of 1960. The author, who was teaching in Addis Ababa in 1960, observes that the abortive coup marked the "awakening of a new political consciousness in Ethiopia." The country is now attempting to modernize and become an active participant in the "new Africa." He considers the reasons why modernization has been so long in coming to Ethiopia and why it was this particular coup which moved those in power to institute reforms.

The Geography of African Affairs. By Paul Fordham. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965. 244 pp. n.p.

In this volume, the author presents geographical facts about Africa south of the Sahara which he believes relevant for an understanding of the current political and economic problems of the continent. The book includes several explanatory maps and tables, a general survey of Africa, its resources and problems, and more detailed descriptions of each region.

Lebanon: Improbable Nation. By Leila M. T. Meo. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965. 246 pp. $6.50.

An account of Lebanon in its domestic, regional and international setting. Although pertinent historical information is offered, the author emphasizes modern Lebanon, its political-religious configuration, the causes of the 1958 crisis which brought in U.S. Marines, and the reasons for the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State. By I. M. Lewis. New York: Praeger, 1965. 234 pp. $6.50.

The author traces the process of Somali development from cultural to political nationalism, from pre-colonial times to the formation of the Somali state by the union of British Somaliland with ex-Italian Somalia in 1960. Post-independence problems, including that of the Somali communities in surrounding French Somaliland, Kenya and Ethiopia, are also discussed.

No Easy Walk to Freedom. By Nelson Mandela. New York: Basic Books, 1965. 189 pp. $4.95.

The author, a long-time activist in the struggle against *apartheid,* is currently serving a life-term prison sentence in South Africa. The book contains some of the addresses and writings of Mandela from 1953 to 1963, including testimony from his three trials. It is a passionate account of the restrictions and indignities of *apartheid* and the growing resistance of the black Africans.

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The Political Awakening of Africa. Edited by Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 175 pp. $4.95.

Selected passages from the speeches and writings of African leaders and intellectuals on colonialism, nationalism, political organization, inter-African problems and pan-Africanism.

The United States and Africa. (Revised edition.) Edited by Walter Goldschmidt. New York: Praeger, 1964. 298 pp. $6.50 ($2.50 paper).

A completely revised edition of a collection of papers first presented to participants at an American Assembly conference in May 1958. This edition contains seven essays by authorities on Africa, including James S. Coleman on "The Character and Viability of African Political Systems"; Vernon McKay on "Changing External Pressures on Africa"; and Andrew M. Kamarck on "The African Economy and International Trade."

The United States and the Italy-Ethiopian Crisis. By Brice Harris, Jr. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 187 pp. $5.50.

The author endeavors to untangle the international threads of the Italian-Ethiopian crisis of 1934-36 with emphasis on the policy, action and responsibility of the United States.

Zanzibar: Its Society and Its Politics. By John Middleton and Jane Campbell. London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1965. 71 pp. n.p.

Written in mid-1963 before Zanzibar gained independence, this short book deals with Zanzibar's social, economic and political conditions. A brief summary of events since independence, including the revolution of 1964, is included as a postscript.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Britain and India: Requiem for Empire. By Maurice and Taya Zinkin. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. 191 pp. $5.00.

A fresh examination of the British presence in India. The authors describe the almost accidental way in which the British acquired India; the feeling of the British in the 19th and 20th centuries that India was a burden and a responsibility, not an opportunity; and the influence of India on British foreign and defense policies for a century, even into the 1960's. They conclude with an exploration of the Commonwealth ties between the two countries and a consideration of likely future trends.

Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization. Edited by Marius B. Jansen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 546 pp. $9.00.

Leading experts on Japan, including two Japanese scholars, examine developing Japanese attitudes about the impact of modernization on Japan during the past 100 years. The essays discuss such topics as the legacy of Tokugawa education, the status of science and Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan, attitudes toward the Imperial institution in the 19th century, a Confucian view of Japanese modernization, Japanese Christians and American missionaries, and the changing attitudes of Japanese writers and intellectuals toward modernization.

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China Assignment. By Karl Lott Rankin. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. 343 pp. $6.95.

Mr. Rankin, U.S. Consul-General in Canton in 1949 and Minister and later Ambassador to the Republic of China on Formosa from 1950 to 1958, presents a firsthand account of developments in U.S.-Chinese relations during the 1950's, vivid portrayals of notable Chinese and American statesmen, and a sober appraisal of U.S. policies in the Far East.

The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. By Alastair Lamb. London: Oxford University Press, 1964. 192 pp. 12/6.

This is a scholarly and disinterested record of the demarcation of the India-China border up to the transfer of power in India in 1947. Mr. Lamb, Reader in History in the University of Malaya and author of a study on Britain and Chinese Central Asia, provides a number of valuable maps to aid his narrative of the peoples who live along this border, the geography of the region, and the long series of agreements and disagreements which has led to the present dispute.

The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 405 pp. n.p.

A collection of detailed studies of the major communist parties of South and East Asia—their structure, leadership, membership, methods, strategies, domestic and foreign policy, and their interrelationship. The editor, an authority on Far Eastern affairs, presents, in the initial chapter, a comparative analysis of the communist movement in Asia.

East Asia: The Modern Transformation. By John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. 955 pp. n.p.

This book, like its predecessor, *East Asia: The Great Tradition,* grew out of the collaboration between Fairbank and Reischauer at Harvard University. Much of the earlier volume was written by Reischauer; most of this volume was done by Fairbank, with assistance from the third author who assumed responsibility for the sections on recent Japanese affairs following Reischauer's departure to Japan as U.S. Ambassador. Beginning roughly with the 16th century and the coming of the Europeans, this volume contains two chapters devoted largely to developments in Korea and Southeast Asia, and concludes with an 80-page chapter devoted to the postwar period in China and Japan.

The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, for the IBRD, 1965. 468 pp. $8.50.

This report, designed to assist Australia to institute a program of territorial self-government and economic development, was prepared by a team of experts from the IBRD at the request of the Australian government. Each sector of the economy was examined in detail and recommendations are offered for expanding production and improving the standard of living.

Japan: Past and Present. (Third edition, revised.) By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. 323 pp. n.p.

A revised third edition of this classic introductory survey of Japanese history

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by the American scholar who is the present U.S. Ambassador to Japan. The revisions in this edition are made in the sections on the occupation period and postwar Japan. The latter section is almost entirely new and has been expanded to more than 60 pages.

Japanese People and Politics. By Chitoshi Yanaga. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. 408 pp. $2.25 (paper).

Although this thorough study of Japanese politics and government provides a clear picture of the structure of modern Japanese government, the author emphasizes the forces at work in Japanese politics and the social and cultural bases of government. Chapters are devoted to the Japanese people and their political heritage and behavior, constitutional development and structure, the emperor, the prime minister and his cabinet, the Diet, political parties, elections, bureaucracy, national economy and general welfare, the courts, and foreign relations.

Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism. By Jeanne S. Mintz. New York: Praeger, 1965. 246 pp. $6.00.

An inquiry into the socio-economic ideology of Indonesia, which President Sukarno asserts is a combination of Marxism, religious socialism and a unique Indonesian contribution—Marhaenism, or Indonesian socialism. Dr. Mintz traces the development of Marxism and other forms of socialism in Indonesia through the colonial days and the early years of independence; presents the views of former Vice President Hatta, Socialist Party leader Sjahrir, and the religious socialists; briefly treats the rise of Indonesian communism and the demise of "parliamentary" government in the 1950's; examines the reasons for the introduction of "guided democracy"; and discusses political and economic developments under the rule of Sukarno, the army and the Indonesian Communist Party.

VII. Latin America

The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics. Edited by John D. Martz. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 283 pp. $6.00.

A selection of twenty-seven essays from the wide variety of publications on Latin America. A topical, rather than country, approach is taken, focusing on the domestic issues in Latin American politics. An introductory essay discusses the state of research in Latin American politics and the merits of various disciplines in studying them.

Latin American Mission: An Adventure in Hemisphere Diplomacy. By De Lesseps S. Morrison. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. 288 pp. $5.95.

A personal account of the forging of the Kennedy Administration's Latin American policy by a former Ambassador to the Organization of American States.

Problems of Administration in an Emergent Nation: A Case Study of Jamaica. By B. L. St. John Hamilton. New York: Praeger, 1964. 218 pp. $12.50.

A Jamaican civil servant wrote this study of the problems of administering a new nation originally as a Master's thesis. It has been published as one of the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.

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Monographs and Reports Received

Agrifor and U.S. Plywood in the Congo. By Theodore Geiger. Washington: National Planning Association, Twelfth Case Study in the NPA Series on Business Performance Abroad, 1965. 96 pp. $1.00.

The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China. A Report Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1964. 61 pp. $1.00.

Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis. Edited by Amelia C. Leiss. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 1965. 170 pp. Single copy free; additional copies, $1.00 each.

Development Planning in Asia. By Douglas S. Paauw. Washington: National Planning Association, Center for Development Planning, Planning Experience Series No. 1, May 1965. 29 pp. $1.00.

Documents on Disarmament, 1964. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 27. Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1965. 597 pp. $1.50.

The Future of the World Bank: An Essay. By Escott Reid. Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, September 1965. 71 pp. No charge.

Military Manpower Policy: A Bibliographic Survey. Prepared by Harry Moskowitz and Jack Roberts, for the Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1965. 142 pp. $1.00.

Nuclear Dispersal in Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region. Proceedings of a Seminar, September 5-6, 1964, at The Australian National University, Canberra. Papers by Nina Heathcote, A. L. Burns and G. P. King. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Publications Centre, for the Defence Studies Project of The Australian Institute of International Affairs, February 1965. 101 pp. $3.50.

Pan-Africanism in Action: An Account of the UAM. By Albert Tevoedjre. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 11, November 1965. 88 pp. $2.00.

Perspective in Foreign Policy. By Charles E. Osgood. September 1965. 50 cents. Copies to be ordered from the author, 304 East Mumford Drive, Urbana, Illinois.

Planning for Agricultural Development: The Iranian Experience. By J. Price Gittinger, Washington: National Planning Association, Center for Development Planning, Planning Experience Series No. 2, August 1965. 121 pp. $2.00.

Public Administration in Developing Countries. Proceedings of an international conference held in Bogotá, Colombia, April 15-21, 1963, under the auspices of the Advanced School of Public Administration. Edited by Martin Kriesberg. Washington: The Brookings Institution, June 1965. 198 pp. $2.95.

Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis. By Dennis J. Doolin. Stanford: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Study No. 7, 1965. 77 pp. $2.50.

World Communist Community Building. By R. Judson Mitchell. Stanford: Stanford University, Stanford Studies of the Communist System, Research Paper No. 6, August 1965. 20 pp. n.p.

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